














Justine Dana Price 
2007 
The Dissertation Committee for Justine Dana Price  







Abstraction, Expression, Kitsch: 





 Committee:  
 
 ______________________________ 
 Richard Shiff, Supervisor 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Jeffrey Barnouw 
 
 ______________________________ 
 Michael Charlesworth   
 
 ______________________________ 
 John R. Clarke  
 
 ______________________________ 




Abstraction, Expression, Kitsch: 











Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
 of the University of Texas at Austin  
in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements 
for the Degree of  
































The subtlest change in New York is something people don’t speak much 
about but that is in everybody’s mind. The city, for the first time in its 
long history, is destructible. A single flight of planes no bigger than a 
wedge of geese can quickly end this island fantasy, burn the towers, 
crumble the bridges, turn the underground passages into lethal chambers, 
cremate the millions. The intimation of mortality is part of New York 
now: in the sound of jets overhead, in the black headlines of the latest 
edition.  
 
~ E. B. (Elwyn Brooks) White, Here is New York, 1949  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
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I. Figure/Ground 
 This following is a study on abstract painting: the critical reception and analysis of 
performative, experimental, dissenting painterly practice in New York from 1936 through 
1951. By metonymy, this study also looks at the figure in the political realm via the 
critiques offered by socially-oriented critics at this time (some of whom were also art 
critics). This is, in effect, also a study in time: the dialectic (historical, technical, etc.) was 
the main interpretive tool of this generation of critics. While, as the boundless secondary 
literature on this period has noted, the painting of the New York School would 
“triumph”1 with “stunning success”2 by the late 1950s. In other regards, the subject of this 
dissertation is that of failure. The revolution (or, “the idea of Revolution”) that had been 
hoped for by so many left-wing radicals in the 1930s never quite came to pass or, later, 
went horribly wrong: first in Spain and then elsewhere.3 “Modern art, like modern 
literature and modern life,” Clement Greenberg concluded in a 1948 essay on the Old 
Masters “has lost much.”4 Greenberg’s essay on the Old Masters appeared in the same 
number of Partisan Review as Hannah Arendt’s essay, “The Concentration Camps.”5 
This is the generation of critics, intellectuals and artists who bore the brunt of articulating 
the unspeakable horrors of the Camps and the Bomb—manmade terrors that were 
“beyond human comprehension.”6  
                                                 
1 From the title of Irving Sandler, The Triumph of American Painting (New York: Harper & Row, 1976). 
2 Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the 
Cold War, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983): 3. 
3 Harold Rosenberg, “The Art World: The Thirties,” The New Yorker (30 November, 1968): 206. 
4 Clement Greenberg, “The Necessity of the Old Masters,” Partisan Review 15:7 (July 1948): 813. 
5 Hannah Arendt, “The Concentration Camps,” Partisan Review 15:7 (July 1948): 742–63. 
6 Ibid, 742. 
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 This study is also about belief, of kinds: a Modernist belief in the agency of the artist 
and in the discernment of the critic, and in a “superstitious regard for print,” to which 
Greenberg referred with irony in a 1957 essay (artists didn’t always believe what they 
read, he would conclude).7 Irving Howe, the founder of Dissent in 1954, supposedly once 
quipped that, “when intellectuals can do nothing else, they start a magazine.” The 
dissertation at hand contains a number of kinds of critical statements: ones of ambiguity 
and of skepticism, and others of crisis and disinterest, directed towards art objects and 
elsewhere, and expressed by writers at mid-century, some especially subtle and acute. 
Modernist belief, even if betrayed too often, allowed these critics often to escape 
velleities, or other empty gestures, in their writing.  
 
II. Tilt 
In its own inadequacy, [formalism] brings [hidden or unconscious 
philosophical presuppositions] to the surface, and thus leads to authentic 
ontological questions.  
 
~ Paul de Man, “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism,” 19568 
 
Realistic, naturalistic art had dissembled the medium, using art to conceal 
art; Modernism used art to call attention to art. The limitations that 
constitute the medium of painting—the flat surface, the shape of the 
canvas, the properties of the pigment—were treated by the Old Masters as 
negative factors that could be acknowledged only implicitly or indirectly. 
Under Modernism, these same limitations came to be regarded as positive 
factors, and were acknowledged openly.  
 
 ~ Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Arts Yearbook, 19619 
                                                 
7 Clement Greenberg, “New York Painting Only Yesterday,” Art News 56:4 (Summer 1957): 59. 
8 Paul de Man, “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism,” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism, intro., Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983): 231.  
De Man’s essay was initially published as “L’Impasse de la critique formaliste,” Critique 109 (1956): 438–
500.  
9 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Arts Yearbook 4 (1961): 103–4.  
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I tend to regard the tilt of the picture plane from vertical to horizontal as 
expressive of the most radical shift in the subject matter of art, the shift 
from nature to culture.  
 
 ~ Leo Steinberg, “Other Criteria,” 197010 
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 At some point, it would seem, formalist art criticism lost its edge, or it was discovered 
to be inadequate to its object (or, always to have been so). However, as these epigraphs 
demonstrate, the perceived inadequacies of formalism yielded other possible insights. De 
Man’s 1956 essay, which remains the obligatory starting point for a critique of the 
formalist method, placed the failures and successes of formalism in touch with eachother.   
[E]ven if it were at the point of being overtaken, formalist criticism would 
still have made a considerable contribution: on the positive side, by 
fostering the refinement of analytical and didactic techniques that have 
often led to remarkable exegeses; on the negative side, by highlighting the 
inadequacies of the historical approach as it was practiced in the United 
States.11  
 
In terms of critical practice in the United States (or, in the art world here), the discourse 
turns, ineluctably, to the work of Greenberg, whose mid-century formalist criticism 
extended the flexible boundaries of the method itself, and whose body of work could be 
cited in support of de Man’s dialectical assertion as to the methodological yields. 
Greenberg established himself through the practice of his criticism—his experiences from 
which he came to conclusions about how modernism works.12 Greenberg identified what 
                                                 
10 Leo Steinberg, “Other Criteria,” in Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art (London 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972): 84.  
11 Paul de Man, “The Dead-End of Formalist Criticism,” 230.  
12 For the use of this phrase, see the exchange between Timothy J. Clark and Michael Fried: Clark, 
“Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art,” Critical Inquiry 9:1 (September 1982): 139–56; Fried, “How 
Modernism Works: A Response to T.J. Clark,” Critical Inquiry 9:1 (September 1982): 217–94; and Clark, 
“Arguments about Modernism: A Reply to Michael Fried,” in The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W.J.T. 
Mitchell (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983): 239–48. 
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came to be seen by art historians and critics as the orientation of advanced painting 
towards: “the flat surface, the shape of the canvas, the properties of the pigment.” The 
initial publication of “Modernist Painting” was accompanied by some striking 
comparisons between old and new ‘masters’ (figs. 1–3). The formal resemblances are 
there to be made for those so inclined, if other considerations are suppressed. Lately, it 
seems, it has been more interesting to discuss that which may have been suppressed 
(perhaps actively repressed) to arrive at those comparisons. Subsequent publications of 
Greenberg’s essay are usually stripped of its illustrations, leaving the bare text on the 
page, ripe for citation and distillation. Perhaps it was the repetition of such distilled 
phrases by later speakers that rendered Greenbergian formalism cliché. Subsequent 
generations would be willing to accept a theory in advance of an experience before a 
work of art (and, later even, images in lieu of a body of work). Steinberg’s 1970 essay 
articulates—possibly better than any other—the limitations against which formalism 
found itself straining by the 1970s. The critical judgments of formalism—arrived at by its 
own criterion—became extraneous; by its own refusal to be at play amongst other 
criteria, it made itself irrelevant.  
 The cliché of either/or has been re-articualted by Yve-Alain Bois: “Either one is a 
formalist, hence necessarily oblivious to meaning, or one is an anti-formalist, hence 
entirely uninterested in formal matters.”13  Resisting the trappings of this structural binary 
(however much self inflicted), to which Bois refers as a kind of intellectual blackmail, is 
one of the endeavors of his text.14 In his own desire to recover something from formalist 
methods, Thierry de Duve has sought to arrive at an understanding of modern art beyond 
                                                 
13 Yve-Alain Bois, Painting as Model (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1990): xvii.  
14 Ibid., xviii.  
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the (now) clichés of Modernist morphology (the flatness of the canvas and the shape of 
the support, etc.) De Duve has argued that the avant-garde begins when painters no 
longer know to whom they address their work. 15 He has turned his attention to the 
structure of modernist painting (i.e. modes of address, how modern paintings speak 
vulgarly to the bourgeoisie, at times).16 As with Greenberg, this leaves the content of the 
work unexpressed. The apparent divide between form and content (and address) in the 
abstract paintings of the 1930s is the subject of chapter two.  
 In 1971, Greenberg revisited his own methods and arrived at the necessity of 
‘formalism’.17 Careful readers of Greenberg will note the judicious and consistent use of 
scare quotes to suggest an extreme that may never be met in culture (or, has never been 
so, at least in his own rhetoric). This applies to the threat of the blank canvas, a dialectical 
understanding of history, or an absolute formalist method. Art “gets experienced…for its 
own sake,” Greenberg concluded in his 1971 essay.18 This is what is recognized in 
Modernism as the “ultimate value” of “esthetic value,” however, the “esthetic is not a 
supreme value or end of life.” This distinction is something the “art-for-art-sakers” 
tended to neglect, and thereby “compromised a valid perception.”19 Greenberg, like 
Mondrian, recognized that ‘formalism’ sometimes played in “a little dirt.”20 Chapters 
three and four of this dissertation attend to episodes that made manifest the problems 
                                                 
15 Thierry de Duve, private communication, 4 May, 1999.  
16 See Thierry de Duve, Voici: 100 ans d’art contemporain, trans. Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods 
(Ghent, Amsterdam: Ludion, 2001).  
17 See Clement Greenberg, “Necessity of ‘Formalism’,” New Literary History 3:1 (Autumn 1971): 171–5.  
18 Ibid., 174. Emphasis in the original.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Piet Mondrian, quoted by Max Ernst, statement in “Eleven Europeans in America,” Museum of Modern 
Art Bulletin, 13:4/5 (1946): 18. Cited in Richard Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” in Barnett Newman: A 
Catalogue Raisonné (New Haven and London: Yale University Press with the Barnett Newman 
Foundation, 2004): 25, 98, n. 165. (Hereafter, BNCR.) 
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associated with methods that insisted upon giving expression to the content of a work of 
art. The larger point of this dissertation is to examine some of the materialist origins of 
the approach to art that considers its forms—the “tilt” between nature and culture (two 
extremes, long sought, though never entirely found nor met).  
 
III. Empathy/Negation  
The perfectly conditioned has no need of action, since it is itself the end.  
 
~ Aristotle, On the Heavens, Book II, Chapter 12, as cited by Karl 
Marx in Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen 
Naturphilosophie, 184121 
 
The Greek architect approaches his material, stone, with a certain 
sensuousness and therefore allows the material to express itself as such. 
The Gothic architect, on the other hand, approaches stone with a purely 
spiritual desire for expression and with constructive goals, which were 
formed independently of stone. Stone for him is only as external and 
dependent means of realization. The result is an abstract constructive 
system in which stone has only a practical, non-artistic meaning.  
 
 ~ Wilhelm Worringer, Formprobleme der Götik, 191122  
 
Watch your hands as they live their own free life….Trainer of man, the 
hand multiplies him in space and time.  
 
   ~ Henri Focillon, La vie des formes, 193423  
                                                 
21 Cited by Mikhail Lifshitz, in The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx (New York: The Critics Group, 1938): 
18. For the citation in its initial context of Marx’s dissertation, see Differenz der demokritischen und 
epikureischen Naturphilosophie in Marx/Engels: Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Vol. I, ed. V. 
Andoratsky (Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1927–35): 30.     
22 Wilhelm Worringer, Formprobleme der Götik, intro. and ed. Herbert Read (New York, 1957). 
Worringer’s book was initially published in Munich in 1911. The epigraph above is cited in M.M. Bakhtin 
and P.N. Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological 
Poetics, trans., Albert J. Wehrle, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1978): 51. 
23 Henri Focillon, La vie des formes (Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1934).  Focillion’s text was translated 
into English in 1948, from which the above citation is taken. See Focillon, La vie des formes, (New York: 
George Wittenborn, 1948): 66, 78. Greenberg once remarked privately on the occasion of the Wittenborn 
translation that Focillon’s was “the best formalist essay.” See the collected Greenberg Papers at the Getty 
Research Institute (Series IV, Work Files: clippings and manuscripts, 1939–1994, box 32, folder 4). 
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~~~~~~~~~~ 
 No problem gets solved with finality, or at least not for very long. This does not mean 
that the always-interim solutions are not meaningful or lacking in finality. (To suggest 
otherwise would be outrageous proposition to the “acting and suffering subjects of 
history,” Max Horkheimer concluded in 1930.24) One of the constants in discourse is the 
self-reflexive restatement of a critique of the method. In an essay that was only published 
posthumously, M.M. Bakhtin (1895–1975) offered an authoritative analysis of the 
constructs of formalism, and in doing so, considered the ideological dimension of form:  
The basic positions of the formal movement in Western art scholarship 
that we have summarized give no grounds whatsoever for the denial of 
content in art. No matter how it is understood, i.e., no matter what 
elements of the artistic construction we conditionally attach to the concept, 
all that follows from these basic formalist principles is that content 
necessarily has a constructive function within the closed unity of the work, 
the same function as all the other elements conditionally united in the 
concept of form.  
 
In 1969, de Man made yet another statement (this one regarding early Romantic 
literature) on the consequences of attaining the closed unity of the work itself:  
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or 
identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its 
own origins, and renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it 
establishes its language in the void of this temporal difference. In so doing 
it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which 
is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self.25 
 
The painful recognition of non-self is what some of the painters, discussed in the 
following pages, registered in their work—work that grew and formed through their 
                                                 
24 Max Horkheimer, “Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?” Gründbergs Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus 
und der Arbeiterbewegung, XV (1930). Reprinted in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected 
Early Writings of Max Horkheimer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993): 137.  
25 De Man, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” 207. This initially appeared in Interpretation, ed., Charles 
Singleton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969).  
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contact (their ‘dialogic’ technique) with it. There is a vast difference between leaving 
content unexpressed, suppressing content, and creating art that is about nothing. Tracing 
the patterns of these ideological (man-made) chasms from the 1930s through the 1950s is 
one of the purposes of this dissertation.    
 In his 1911 Formprobleme der Götik, Worringer offered a binary between the 
sensuousness (Greek) and un-sensuousness (Gothic) approach to materials. It’s a 
traditional divide between Classical and Medieval attitudes constructed in art-historical 
scholarship. Worringer’s assessment of the Greek (or, Classical) approach to materials 
transcends (productively) the usual divide between Classical and Modernist modes of 
creating. With the idea that the Ancients allowed for the sensuous (self-assertion) of their 
materials, Worringer made the Classical attitude contiguous with (or, resemble) a precept 
that has come to be identified as Greenbergian. (Even if Greenberg himself argued that 
Modernism was a historical phenomenon, not a specific attitude.26) One could argue that 
the trust that Worringer ascribed elsewhere in his narrative to the empathetic, realist 
artist, in Modernism, was transposed by mid-century artists to a trust in the reality of her 
materials and technique. Indeed, the self-consciousness of technique could allow the 
artist to transcend one of the most familiar metaphors/binaries in the history of art: that of 
Apollo and Dionysus. (These mythic figures appear at various points throughout this 
dissertation.) “Artisanal hard-headedness” did not exclude “passion” (or, vice-versa), 
Greenberg argued, not for the first time, in his 1971 essay.27  
 While Worringer’s ideas were reasserted (posthumously) by Bakhtin in 1978, his 
texts were never really out of sight. In 1944, Clement Greenberg suggested to Barnett 
                                                 
26 Clement Greenberg, “Necessity of ‘Formalism’”, 171. 
27 Ibid., 173. 
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Newman that he read Worringer’s Formprobleme der Götik, which was, as of 1927, 
available in English.28 (The artist had just curated the Pre-Columbian Stone Sculpture 
show for the Wakefield Gallery in New York City.29) T.E. Hulme’s Speculations: Essays 
on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, which was edited by Herbert Read and 
published in 1926, was the traditional source for English-reading audiences of 
Worringer’s Abstraktion und Einfühlung, which was only translated into English in 
1953.30 However, as a fluent reader of German, this language barrier would have been 
transparent to Greenberg. Hans Hofmann, as a native speaker, would not have 
experienced this barrier either. As Ilya Bolotowsky recalled in an interview with Susan C. 
Larsen, “the students at the Hofmann school must have known that Hofmann said 
abstraction was empathy…. Have you ever seen a book by Willem Worringer, 
Abstraction and Empathy?”31 In that same interview, with words heavily salted with 
                                                 
28 See “An Exchange: Annalee Newman and W. Jackson Rushing,” Art Journal 48:3 (Autumn 1989): 268–
9. For the initial translation of Worringer’s work, see: Form in Gothic, ed. and intro., Herbert Read 
(London, Putnam, 1927).  
29 The exhibition ran from 16 May through 5 June, 1944. For the exhibition catalogue of this show, see 
Barnett Newman, Pre-Columbian Stone Sculpture (New York: The Wakefield Gallery, 1944). His 
introduction with a subsequent letter are re-printed in Barnett Newman: Selected Writings and Interviews, 
ed. John P. O’Neill, intro., Richard Shiff, text notes and commentary, etc. Mollie McNickle (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1992): 61–5.  (Hereafter, BNSWI.) For Newman’s assessment that 
Worringer’s explanation “that man’s art is a reflection of his attitude toward the universe,” although 
“interesting” is without “substance,” see “Painting and Prose/Frankenstein,” in BNSWI, 93.  
30 See BNSWI, 92 n. McNickle makes this assertion again in her unpublished dissertation, “The Mind and 
Art of Barnett Newman” (Ph.D. diss, The University of Pennsylvania, 1996): 54, n. 16. See Thomas Ernest 
Hulme, Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art, ed., Herbert Read, with a 
frontispiece and foreword by Jacob Epstein (New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc.; London, Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1924): 82–91. A copy of Hulme’s book was held in Newman’s personal 
library along with several volumes written or edited by Herbert Read. See “Barnett Newman’s Library,” in 
BNCR: 614–46. For the first English-language translation of Worringer’s Abstraktion und Einfühlung, see, 
Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style, trans., Michael Bullock (New York: 
International Universities Press, 1953). 
31 Susan C. Larsen, “Going Abstract in the ’30s: An Interview with Ilya Bolotowsky,” Art in America, 64:5 
(September–October, 1976): 72. This is also cited in the unpublished dissertation of Mollie McNickle, “The 
Mind and Art of Barnett Newman,” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Pennsylvania, 1996): 55, n. 17.  
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irony, Bolotowsky said that he and Balcomb Greene were either good pure abstractionists 
or bad ones: “we had no empathy at all.”32  
 Indeed, in his own commentary on abstraction, Hulme drew a division between 
“natural” art (that of the Greeks and art since the Renaissance), in which the lines are 
“soft and vital,” and that of “other” arts (Egyptian, Indian, and Byzantine), in which the 
lines are “geometrical” and “non-vital.”33 He concluded that contemporary geometrical 
painting was a new manifestation akin to these “geometrical arts” of the past.34 The 
critical play between gestural and geometric abstraction—with and without empathy—is 
the subject of chapters three and four; Greenberg’s presence as a student in Hofmann’s 
seminars in is one of the subjects of chapter five. 
 
IV. Scope & Organization 
 What constituted abstraction—what the mark as well as the word represented—was at 
issue for art critics and art historians in the late1930s. In a brief 1939 essay in the Parisian 
revue Promethée, Maurice Denis (1870–1943), for one, struck upon an understanding of 
painting-as-abstraction:  
All painters, and especially the colorists, translated nature into marks 
[taches] of color. To reduce nature to nothing other than a system of 
colored marks is a primordial necessity of the art of painting, only hinted 
at by the Masters, because of the complexity of the representative and 
psychological elements of the painting.35 
 
Abstraction, to Denis, was not something new—it was just made manifest by the 
Modernists. When Alfred H. Barr made his choices for the 1936 MoMA exhibition 
                                                 
32 Susan C. Larsen, “Going Abstract in the ’30s: An Interview with Ilya Bolotowsky,” 72.  
33 Hulme, Speculations, 82.  
34 Ibid., 91.  
35 Maurice Denis, “L’aventure posthume de Cézanne,” Promethée (July 1939): 193.  
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“Cubism and Abstract Art,” which serves as the starting point for the dissertation at hand, 
no representative showing of abstract painting as practiced by Americans was selected. It 
is clear from the contents of his catalogue essay that the achievements in abstraction of 
which he wrote were somewhere else (mostly with Denis in France). American 
abstraction would eventually emerge from its evidently secondary status. In 1948, 
Greenberg would offer the “impression” that if advanced art (that is, abstract painting) 
was to have any sort of future, that future was dependent upon what was done in 
America.36 In 1950, MoMA would acquire Jackson Pollock’s Number 1A, 1948, a large-
scale drip painting that would become emblematic of Abstract Expressionism (fig. 36).37 
Three works by the artist were also exhibited in the Venice Biennale that year, as 
representative of the achievements of American abstraction, if not also of its culture. 
 The prefatory chapter begins, admittedly, in a strange place for dissertation on mid-
century American abstract painting. This chapter examines an episode in European 
(Viennese) art history: the publication of Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen in Vienna 
in the early 1930s. Both Walter Benjamin and Meyer Schapiro responded in print to the 
publication that was edited by Hans Sedlmayr and Otto Pächt. (In this analysis, one crisis 
situation is exchanged for another.) I argue that the critiques put forth by Benjamin and 
Schapiro were of consequence for later scholars and art critics, many of whom, under 
extreme duress, found themselves in New York. This chapter establishes the means by 
                                                 
36 Clement Greenberg, “The Situation at the Moment,” Partisan Review, 15:1 (January 1948): 82.  
37 This was not the first purchase made by the museum of a work by Pollock. At the recommendation of 
James Thrall Soby, James Johnson Sweeney, and Sidney Janis, Barr approved the acquisition of The She-
Wolf (see fig. 80) in May of 1944. The painting had been shown earlier that year at Pollock’s first one-
person show at Art of This Century. It was the first Pollock acquired by any museum; the purchase price 
was $650. See Kirk Varnedoe with Pepe Karmel, Jackson Pollock (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 
1999): 320.  
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which the dialectic (or, the myth of it) became the dominant diagnostic tool for advanced 
art.  
 The second chapter traces critical statements made about abstraction in the early 
1930s, mostly in conjunction with major exhibitions or spaces of exposition, and those 
statements made in response to those bodies. These include the trio of exhibitions held at 
MoMA in 1936–7: “Cubism and Abstract Art,” “Fantastic Art, Dada, Surrealism,” and 
“New Horizons in American Art.”  I also consider criticism occasioned by smaller 
exhibitions: such as the 1935 Whitney exposition, “Abstract Painting in America,” and 
other shows held at Albert E. Gallatin’s downtown Gallery of Living Art. This chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the ‘Cézanne effect’, circa 1939, as expressed in the critical 
statements made by of Maurice Denis.  
 In the third chapter, I continue to trace the competing claims for abstraction in the 
1930s through an analysis of wider discursive practice during this decade. This includes 
select examples of art criticism from a wide spectrum of political journals, including: The 
Daily Worker, The New Republic, The Marxist Quarterly, Dialectics, and Partisan 
Review. This chapter also traces German-language criticism that was in circulation in the 
U.S. at this time. Specifically, I examine the Expressionismus controversy in Das Wort.  
 The fourth chapter attends to the ‘myth’ of the historical dialectic. The discussion 
encompasses debates staged in the pages of Partisan Review, including Greenberg’s 
celebrated 1939 essay, “Avant Garde and Kitsch”, and the formalism of Leon Trotsky, as 
demonstrated by his open letters published in the journal in 1938 and 1939. These letters 
were published shortly before his murder in Mexico in 1940. The chapter concludes with 
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a discussion of John Dewey’s efforts on Trotsky’s behalf, and with an analysis of their 
shared concerns about the art object.    
 Art criticism published in The Nation and Partisan Review is coupled with that 
published in the artist-run publications of the 1940s is the central focus of the fifth 
chapter. These publications include: Dyn, VVV, Tiger’s Eye, and Possibilities. This 
chapter concerns the self-representations made by abstract painters themselves, through 
the mode of criticism or polemical statements. In this chapter, specifically, I examine the 
controversy surrounding the mid-decade mythological paintings of Mark Rothko and 
Adolph Gottlieb, and the efforts of Barnett Newman made on their behalf in their 
defense. Secondly, this chapter places Greenberg’s early formalist essays within a larger 
discursive context through an analysis of T.S. Eliot’s “Notes on Culture” published in 
two different forms in the 1940s. Specifically, this chapter examines Greenberg’s 
response to the work of the Jane Street Co-op painters, including Judith Rothschild. 
 In the sixth chapter, I examine critical and cultural notions of space and topography in 
relation to abstract painting that were at play in the late 1940s and early 1950s: namely, 
the terms ‘all-over’ and the ‘center’. These include Greenberg’s notion of the all-over 
Abstract Expressionist composition with regard to Pollock’s drip paintings of the late 
1940s and early 1950s, and the scholarly work of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1949) and 
Hans Sedlmayr (1950), and their notions of the center (vital and otherwise). This 
dissertation concludes with an analysis with an analysis of “What Abstract Art Means to 
Me,” a symposium held at MoMA in 1951.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
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  When Benjamin wrote “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” 
he offered concepts for a theory of art that would be “completely useless for the purposes 
of Fascism.” Shortly before his death at the Spanish border in 1940, he finished “Theses 
on History,” in which he argued that the current “‘state of emergency’ in which we live is 
not the exception but the rule.”38 In its rhetoric, it is a statement not wholly unlike the one 
made about abstraction in 1939 by Denis (who took a very different political position 
during the War from Benjamin). Crisis, for these writers, is nothing new; it is rather part 
and parcel of modernity. Well after the war had ended, de Man would write (as an ex-
patriate) that in periods without “crisis…there can be no criticism.”39 For de Man, 
criticism was a type of “crisis-statement.”40 This dissertation traces the crisis statements 
made by critics of abstract painting in its critical formative years. That certain 
intellectuals, Denis or de Man for example, could be avant-garde in their thinking on art 
and criticism, yet could also assume politically conservative positions (even reactionary 
ones) is one of the ironies I investigate. In this dissertation, the abstract mark and the 
painter’s schema stand as points of contact between the artist, the work of art, and the 
public (in the body of the critic).  
 
V. “Background and Paris:” Literature Review41  
                                                 
38 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, ed. and intro. Hannah Arendt, 
trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969): 257. This essay would be published posthumously 
in Neue Rundschau 61:3 (1950).   
39 Paul de Man, “Criticism and Crisis,” 8. This essay was initially delivered as a lecture at the University of 
Texas and was published as “The Crisis of Contemporary Criticism,” Arion (Spring 1967).  
40 de Man, “Criticism and Crisis,” 14.  
41 See “Part Two: Background and Paris” in Thomas Hess, Abstract Painting (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1951).  
 16 
 The mid-1930s saw a number of retrospective or historical accounts of abstract 
painting. Most prominent amongst these accounts were Alfred H. Barr’s exhibition 
catalogues for the Museum of Modern Art, which sought to establish trends in abstraction 
within a continuum of Western art.  Barr, as one critic amongst several, argued that a 
shift (or, dislocation) was taking place in abstract painting in the mid-1930s: working out 
of a post-Cubist fatigue, organic or biomorphic abstraction was in the process of 
replacing geometric abstraction. The end of this study roughly coincides with the 
publication of Thomas B. Hess’s volume, Abstract Painting: Background and American 
Phase. His initial assessment of mid-century American abstraction arrived relatively 
early: in 1951, just one year past the mid-century mark. It is a reflective history on the 
accomplishments of abstract painting (mostly expressive or gestural) in the previous 
decades. Hess sought to establish Abstract Expressionism in a tradition of great art. His 
volume is skillfully divided between an historical background (Paris) and a then-current 
foreground (New York). For the purposes of this study, Hess’s volume serves as a Janus-
faced narrative: the start of the requisite literature review, and as an end for the timeline 
of the discourse traced. Not everyone was pleased that a book (any book) had 
materialized on this new painting. In an unpublished review of Hess’s volume 
commissioned by Partisan Review, Barnett Newman wrote that it was a “very bad” 
book.42 That it was, on the one hand, cluttered with mere “imitators of de Kooning,” but, 
on the other, bereft of purported followers Mondrian indicated the extent of the 
                                                 
42 Barnett Newman, “Review of Abstract Painting: Background and American Phase by Thomas B. Hess,” 
in BNSWI, 120. For a discussion of the reasons that this remained unpublished, see BNSWI, 118–9 n.   
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haphazardness and distortedness of his narrative.43 Newman concluded his review with a 
cautionary warning on the health of the American art world, which he described as being 
in “a state of crisis.”44 It was fine for a critic to argue publicly for an artist of his 
choosing, but that was “not enough.”45 Rather, the critic had:  
[T]he responsibility of examining with sincerity, publicly, the work they 
do no like or that they find hard to understand. Only in this way can the 
milieu be kept open so that every authentic artist becomes visible, whether 
he fits into one’s theories or not. Only thus can speculation concerning the 
arts be kept free, so that theories serve not as uniforms but only as 
elucidations of the experience of art.46  
 
By the 1960s, Newman and Hess had reconciled.47 In the meanwhile, in 1951, the 
artist had put his finger in the future wound of criticism on mid-century American 
painting.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 The secondary literature on Abstract Expressionism is seemingly boundless. As 
Richard Shiff has characterized the situation, “to study Abstract Expressionism is to 
encounter a surplus of evidence.”48 It makes a potentially complete bibliography near 
impossible, though not necessary for this project as it is not a study of Abstract 
Expressionism, per se. Discontent is perhaps the one constant in the writings on/of mid-
century American abstraction. The interventions and re-framings of this subject now 
seem to out-number authoritative texts within the discipline. This dissertation has its 
                                                 
43 Barnett Newman, “Review of Abstract Painting: Background and American Phase by Thomas B. Hess,” 
in BNSWI, 120.  
44 Ibid., 123.  
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid.  
47 See, for example, Thomas Hess, Barnett Newman (New York: Walker, 1969). A monograph by Hess was 
published in conjunction with the posthumous retrospective of the artist: Barnett Newman (New York: 
Museum of Modern Art with the New York Graphic Society, 1971).  
48 Richard Shiff, “Performing an Appearance: On the Surface of Abstract Expressionism,” in Abstract 
Expressionism: The Critical Developments (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1987): 94. 
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origins in this kind of discursive discontent. This kind of dissenting approach has been 
applied to the period as a whole: for example, Ann Gibson and Stephen Polcari edited a 
special number of The Art Journal (Fall 1988) entitled, “New Myths for Old: Redefining 
Abstract Expressionism.” Or, it has taken a monographic form: in conjunction with the 
retrospective of Jackson Pollock at MoMA in 1999, Kirk Varnedoe and Pepe Karmel 
edited Jackson Pollock: New Approaches (1999). This compilation of significant essays 
by senior scholars put many contributors, such as Rosalind Krauss, in the position of 
revisiting their own, earlier scholarship. (The possible triangulations are, indeed, 
manifold.49)  
 One assumption remains held in common, though: scholars have generally agreed that 
the painters of the New York School trumped their European counterparts during this 
time. Two causal arguments have frequently been offered to support this thesis: the 
æsthetic superiority of the post-War American Abstract Expressionism, or, alternately, 
the expression of post-War American political superiority.  Two books best represent 
these antipodal positions, respectively: Irving Sandler’s, The Triumph of American 
Painting (1976) and Serge Guilbaut’s How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: 
Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War (1983). This binary has been 
complicated by the work of T.J. Clark in his 1994 essay “In Defense of Abstract 
Expressionism,” and Michael Leja’s Abstract Expressionism: Subjectivity and Painting in 
the 1940’s from the same year. Both seek to understand Abstract Expressionism as a 
system of ideological representation: Clark’s essay, written in the form of a Situationalist 
manifesto, attributes the “persistence” of these paintings (that is, an inability to make 
                                                 
49 See Krauss, “Reading Jackson Pollock, Abstractly,” in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other 
Modernist Myths (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985): 221–42.  
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them a thing of the past) to their seemingly petit-bourgeois  “vulgarity;” Leja looks at this 
movement as a transparent manifestation of ideologies of “the real” and “the self” in 
post-War America.50 Andrew Hemingway has demonstrated in his volume, Artists on the 
Left: American Artists and the Communist Movement, 1926–1956, that, in fact, the range 
of opinions within the organized left on the subject of abstraction were more varied that 
often assumed. In their respective essays, “American Art During the War”(1973) and 
“Abstract Expressionism: Weapon of the Cold War,”(1974), Max Kozloff and Eve 
Cockcroft, have attended to the subsequent strategic uses of Abstract Expressionist 
painting during the Cold War.51  
 If all of this implies that the layers of discourse are particularly thick, they are equally 
rich in many areas. My own research has benefited enormously from a few recent 
monographic studies: Jackson Pollock (Varnedoe and Karmel, 1999), Barnett Newman 
(Richard Shiff and Anne Temkin, 2002), Barnett Newman: A Catalogue Raisonné 
(Richard Shiff, et al, 2004), and Seeing Rothko (Glenn Phillips and Thomas Crow, 2005). 
Caroline A. Jones’ chapter on Abstract Expressionism in Machine in the Studio: 
Constructing the Postwar American Artist (1996) is a highly valuable for her 
consideration of the studio practice of these painters. That I have gently disagreed with 
some of the conclusions in Dr. Jones’ recent study, Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg’s 
Modernism and the Bureaucratization of the Senses (2005) only attests to the formidable 
depth of her scholarship. 
                                                 
50 Timothy J. Clark, “In Defense of Abstract Expressionism,” October (Summer 1994): 36; Michael Leja, 
Reframing Abstract Expressionism: Subjectivity and Painting in the 1940’s (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1994): 6.  
51 In an interview with the author, Max Kozloff regretted that his essay seems to have been misinterpreted: 
his intentions were always to make the experience of these paintings “richer.” Author interview, Giverny, 
France July, 2005.  
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 This study is written in a similar vein to ones that place the aesthetic work of art in 
proximity to or in contiguity with the cultural or the political. Ann Gibson’s Issues in 
Abstract Expressionism: The Artist-Run Periodicals (1990) re-prints many of the essays 
from the artist-run periodicals of the 1940s and 1950s with a comprehensive 
bibliography. David Craven’s Abstract Expressionism as Cultural Critique (1999) attends 
to the cultural and political conditions in the 1950s, and uses heretofore unpublished 
documents from the papers of Meyer Schapiro and the State Department. Nancy Jachec’s 
The Philosophy and Politics of Abstract Expressionism, 1940-1960 (2000) re-examines 
the post-War political conditions of Abstract Expressionism in the context of the new 
liberalism. Elaine O’Brien’s 1997 dissertation, “The Art Criticism of Harold Rosenberg: 
Theaters of Love and Combat,” argues for a common function in Rosenberg’s social and 
art criticisms. 
 A number of anthologies have traced critical developments surrounding Abstract 
Expressionism more generally or broadly (beyond the collected work of an individual 
artist or critic). Most recently, and perhaps most comprehensively in regards to post-1950 
historiography, Ellen Landau published in Reading Abstract Expressionism: Context and 
Critique (2005), which compiles a number of primary documents concerning the 
movement as well as secondary accounts of the movement arranged chronologically by 
decade. Landau’s substantial work is comparable to the rich bibliographies compiled 
earlier by scholars, such as those by Stephen C. Foster in Critics of Abstract 
Expressionism (1973 and 1980), and David and Cecile Shapiro in Abstract 
Expressionism: A Critical Record (1990). However, since one of my principle concerns 
for this project has been and continues to be the immediate circumstances of the 
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publication of the criticism, this dissertation has relied most heavily upon my own 
primary research. Each citation in this dissertation is given at its first instance of 
publication and then cross-referenced to an anthology, where necessary. 
 The organizing principle of this dissertation is the art criticism from the period, as a 
mode of public discourse. I attend to art criticism published in journals such as 
Commentary, The Nation, The New Republic, and Partisan Review. While those 
publications remain in print, many other journals from this period were relatively short 
lived: Art Front (1934 to 1937), Dyn (6 issues between 1942 and 1944), Marxist 
Quarterly (four issues between 1937 and 1939), The New Masses (longer, 1925–1948), 
and Possibilities (one issue in 1948). The consequence of this approach is that, for the 
most part, the body of paintings considered by critics initially have been included in this 
account. Relevant examples of abstract paintings (or, many not necessarily considered to 
be examples of Abstract Expressionism) have been included in this study. The result is an 
object-oriented dissertation that reconnects the art criticism with the abstract art that 
occasioned it. Valuable anthologies of critical writing, e.g. The Collected Work and 
Essays of Clement Greenberg, or Rosenberg’s The Anxious Object, re-print the essays 
minus the illustrations that were originally published along side them. For example, 
Pollock’s Grey Center and Totem II were reproduced (though not directly mentioned) in 
Greenberg’s “The Situation at the Moment” (see figs. 86 and 87).52 
                                                 
52 Clement Greenberg, “The Situation at the Moment,” Partisan Review 15:1 (January 1948): 81-84. 
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 Throughout this dissertation, I found it productive to pit the critical attitudes of 
Harold Rosenberg against those of Clement Greenberg—and vice versa.53 Rosenberg 
argued in 1962 that, “Almost all the originators of America’s abstract art had been 
steeped in the political art of the Depression.”54 I argue that there is more to that 
statement than the iconographic (and, now-iconic) evocations of the Spanish Civil War 
by Robert Motherwell. By way of examples, an early chapter considers the critical 
response to Arshile Gorky’s murals at Newark Airport. The murals, now mostly lost, 
have been documented by Ruth Bowman in her catalogue, Murals Without Walls: Arshile 
Gorky’s Aviation Murals Rediscovered (1978). The work of Stuart Davis and Jacob 
Kainen figures prominently in the initial chapters, as does the early Expressionist work 
(not yet abstract) of Mark Rothkowitz and Adolph Gottlieb. American abstract painting, 
especially the geometric kind, has been extensively documented by John R. Lane and 
Susan C. Larsen in their 1983 catalogue, Abstract Painting and Sculpture in America, 
1927–1944. This has been an enormously valuable resource of artist biographies and 
excellent reproductions of works.   
 In terms of reconsidering critical statements on abstraction in their initial context, I 
have, in this dissertation, appealed to significant examples of literature that were of 
consequences for the critics of the time—written in modes other than criticism. Thorstein 
Veblen’s ideas on conspicuous consumption, first coined in The Theory of the Leisure 
Class (1899), were at issue for critics writing on commodity culture, such as Greenberg 
in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” (Partisan Review, 1939), Adorno’s  “Veblen’s Attack on 
                                                 
53 See the undergraduate thesis of a precocious James Herbert, “The Political Origins of Abstract-
Expressionist Art Criticism: The Early Theoretical and Critical Writings of Clement Greenberg and Harold 
Rosenberg,” which was published by the Stanford University Humanities Honors Program in 1985. 
54 Rosenberg, “From Pollock to Pop: Twenty Years of Painting and Sculpture,” Holiday (March 1966): 99. 
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Culture,” and Horkheimer’s “Art and Mass Culture,” (the latter two critiques were 
published in Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, 1941). German-language critiques 
of art and culture figure prominently in this study, in addition to the Frankfurt School 
writers (Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin). As a study on mid-century abstract painting, 
this dissertation begins in a strange place (for reasons that I hope become apparent as the 
narrative unfolds): with the publication of Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen in 1931 
and 1933. I also examine the Expressionismus debate that took place in the pages of Das 
Wort in 1938.  
 For this dissertation, I have also availed myself of the several academic studies of 
radicals and intellectuals in New York during this period, two written by participants in 
the era. Lionel Trilling’s essays, frequently published in Partisan Review throughout the 
1940s, were later published in the collected form of The Liberal Imagination: Essays on 
Literature and Society (1950). Daniel Aaron, a former contributor to Partisan Review, 
chronicles left-wing writers in New York from 1912 to the early 1940s in Writers on the 
Left (1961). In Writers and Partisans (1968), James Gilbert offers a broad history of 
literary radicalism and the counter-culture in New York from 1900 to the 1940s. 
Similarly, Alan M. Wald’s The New York Intellectuals (1987) studies this prominent 
group of thinkers and writers and their variable involvement with radical politics from the 
1930s through the 1980s. Taking his title in part from Trilling, Richard H. Pells looks at 
American intellectuals in the post-War period through the 1950s in The Liberal Mind in a 










Chapter II:  
On the Publication of Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen, ca. 1933 
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I. Prolegomenon/Practice Piece 
  
Here it becomes evident that the hallmark of the new type of researcher is 
not the eye for the ‘all-encompassing whole’ nor the eye for the ‘complete 
context’ with which the sedate mediocrity of the founding period used to 
be completely engrossed. Rather, the most rigorous challenge to the new 
spirit of research is the ability to feel at home in the marginal domains. It 
is this ability that guarantees the collaborators of the new yearbook their 
place in the movement that…is filling the study of history with new life.  
 
~ Walter Benjamin, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum 
ersten Bande der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 
193355   
 
The articles, in general, are sketchy, clever, unsystematic, and full of 
original aperçus and untested ‘belles-lettristic’ characterizations. No group 
of psychologists or physicists would venture to announce articles of such 
looseness as a contribution toward a more rigorous science of psychology 
or physics. 
~ Meyer Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 193656 
 
It holds true here, too: one may reject the proffered solution, but one 
cannot get around the problem. 
 
~ Hans Sedlmayr, “Zu einer strengen Kunstwissenschaft,” 
193157  
                                                 
55 Walter Benjamin (published under the pseudonym Detlef Holz), “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten 
Bande der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” Literaturblatt der Frankfurter Zeitung 61:31 (30 July, 
1933). In 1931, the editors of the Frankfurter Zeitung had rejected an earlier draft of the same essay in 
which the last sentences read: “…(which mediocrity has claimed for itself) but rather the capacity to be at 
home in the marginal domains. The men whose work is contained in this yearbook represent the most 
rigorous of this new type of researcher. They are the hope for their field of study.” Interpolated translation 
reprinted in The Vienna School Reader, ed., Christopher Wood, trans. Thomas Y. Levin (New York: Zone 
Books, 2000): 439–451. For re-prints of this same interpolated translation, see “Rigorous Study of Art: On 
the First Volume of Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” trans. Thomas Y. Levin, October 47 (1988): 
84–90; and Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Volume II, ed., Michael W. Jennings, trans. Thomas Y. 
Levin (Cambridge, Mass: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999): 666–672. (Hereafter, 
WBSW.) Benjamin used the “Aryan” pseudonym beginning in 1933 (see the “Chronology” in WBSW, 
Vol. III, 431). For an un-interpolated version of each essay in the original, see Walter Benjamin, 
Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. III, eds. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, Intros. by Theodor 
W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem (Frankkfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972): 363–374. (Hereafter, 
WBGS.)  
56 Meyer Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” The Art Bulletin 18:2 (June 1936): 259.  Reprinted in 
Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 453–485.  
57 Hans Sedlmayr, “Zu einer strengen Kunstwissenschaft,” Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen, I (1931): 
19. In the original: “Auch hier gilt, Man kann die angebotene Lösung ablehnen, aber nicht das Problem 




 In the mid-1930s, Walter Benjamin and Meyer Schapiro each responded in print to 
the provocative work of a group of scholars who would come to be called the New 
Vienna School. The impetus for each of their essays was the publication of the journal 
Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen. The new journal, edited by two young university 
instructors, Hans Sedlmayr (1896–1984) and Otto Pächt (1902–1988), appeared only 
twice: once in 1931, and again in 1933. Benjamin’s review of the first volume appeared 
in 1933; Schapiro’s review of the second appeared in 1936. In their respective essays, 
however, each author gave consideration to Sedlmayr’s essay of 1931, “Zu einer strengen 
Kunstwissenschaft.” In his essay, which both Benjamin and Schapiro termed 
“programmatic,” Sedlmayr laid out the differences between the old art history and the 
new theoretical method of Strukturanalyse or Strukturforschung.58 (It was in this essay 
that Sedlmayr introduced those critical terms.) This new approach necessarily availed 
itself of the earlier work Alois Riegl (1858–1905), in general, and Riegl’s concept of the 
Kunstwollen, in particular.  
 The structure Sedlmayr proposed for the new method was two-tiered (perhaps the 
most familiar binary of Structuralism): the first was factual, empirical; the second, 
interpretive, speculative. Through Strukturanalyse, according to Sedlmayr, the work of 
art, if properly addressed with the “correct attitude,” could produce new insights into the 
figuring imagination and material culture that had produced it.59 In both volumes of the 
journal, the Vienna group demonstrated this new, structural approach through a series of 
practical pieces. The essays were far ranging in time, topic, and topography; 
                                                 
58 Benjamin, WBSW, Vol. II, 667; and Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 258.  
59 Sedlmayr, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 148. 
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circumscribed and monographic in subject.60 The Vienna scholars wrote themselves, 
critically, into the marginalia of art history proper of the time. This is where Benjamin 
found (and recognized) them; Schapiro found their results sketchy. The discordant 
opinions held by Benjamin and Schapiro on the Vienna School were not limited to issues 
usually placed (and neutered) under the category of intellectual differences. Schapiro 
(1904–1996) had the benefit of time; Benjamin (1892–1940) did not.  
 In 1931, the editors of the Frankfurter Zeitung had rejected a pithier and more 
polemical draft of Benjamin’s essay. When Benjamin’s assessment of the Vienna group 
was finally published in 1933, in a heavily revised form, much had yet to happen (or 
become widely known). In the 1930s and 1940s, Sedlmayr’s methodological interest in 
“Kunstwissenschaft als Geisteswissenschaft” would take an obscene turn towards 
national identity, forcing a complete break with Pächt in 1933.61 Sedlmayr would become 
an avid and increasingly public supporter of National Socialism, joining the Nazi party 
from 1932 to 1933.62 And, in 1936, Sedlmayr would notoriously succeed his teacher, 
Julius von Schlosser, as the director of the Institut für Kunstgeschichte in Vienna. Still 
later, in 1938, Pächt would be forced to leave Vienna, as were many of his fellow Jewish 
colleagues. He was able to immigrate to England, eventually taking up a position at 
Oxford University.63 For his part in 1938, Sedlmayr praised the Anschluss of that year in 
a prefatory note to the Festschrift for Wilhelm Pinder and hailed Hitler in its conclusion. 
                                                 
60 Studies included: the organizational design principles of fifteenth century Northern painting; the 
visionary architectural drawings of Claude-Nicholas Ledoux (1736–1806); a study on the figure-alphabet 
of the Master ES; and an analysis of Hagia Sophia. 
61 Sedlmayr, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 149.  
62 See the Introduction in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 12–13.  
63 Eventually, Pächt returned to Europe; his positions in Britain were always impermanent. From 1963 to 
his retirement in 1972, Pächt co-directed the art history institute at the University of Vienna with Otto 
Demus. See Christopher Wood, Introduction in Otto Pächt, The Practice of Art History: Reflections on 
Method David Britt, trans. (London: Harvey Miller Publishers, 1999):11.  
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Sedlmayr would lose his teaching position in 1945, though his Verlust der Mitte, 
published in 1948, would go into wide circulation and would be translated into many 
languages (in English, Art in Crisis: The Lost Center in 1958). He was re-habilitated to 
the University of Munich in 1951, despite vehement opposition from other German 
academics. The laudatory letter from the 1938 Pinder Festschrift was edited out of the 
1960 publication of Sedlmayr’s collected works.64 In the last chapter of this dissertation, I 
compare Sedlmayr’s ideas on the center (lost) to those of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. 
(vital).  
 The grave reservations with which Schapiro met the work of the Vienna group in 
1936 were—and remain—well founded. Yet, Christopher Wood has rightly stated in his 
anthology of the Vienna School that, “Benjamin’s remarks suggest that the foundation for 
the objection to Pächt’s and Sedlmayr’s formalism has to be rethought.”65 It is impossible 
to know if Benjamin would have come to a different conclusion about the Vienna group 
had he written at the same moment as Schapiro. He did not return to their work explicitly 
in the few remaining years of his life (though traces of Riegl’s work can be found in 
Benjamin’s writing throughout his lifetime).66 While fleeing appeasement/occupied 
                                                 
64 Introduction to Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 12–13, 38, 54 n. 5. See Sedlmayr, “Vermutungen und 
Fragen zur Bestimmung der altfranzösischen Kunst,” Fetschrift Willem Pinder (Leipzig: Seemann, 1938): 
9–27. Cf. Sedlmayr, Epochen und Werke, Vol. II (Vienna und Munich: Herold, 1960): 322–341. A standard 
reference work like The Dictionary of Art, makes no mention of Sedlmayr’s engagement with the National 
Socialists. See Petra Schniewind-Michel: “Sedlmayr, Hans,” The Dictionary of Art, Vol. 28, ed. J. Turner 
(London: Macmillan, 1996): 350. 
65 Introduction to Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 17.  
66 In addition to “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten Bande  der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 
see the following works, all of which include references to Riegl, his work, or use of the term 
‘Kunstwollen’: Benjamin’s Curriculum Vitae (III), written in 1928 and unpublished in his lifetime, 
(WBSW, Vol. II, 77–78); “Neues von Blumen” (“News About Flowers,”) published in Die literarische 
Welt, November 1928, (WBSW, Vol. II, 155–157); “Some Remarks on Folk Art,” written in 1929 and 
unpublished in his lifetime, (WBSW, Vol. II, 278–280); “Bücher, die lebendig geblieben sind,” (“Books  
That Have Remained Alive,”) written in 1929, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. III, 169–171; “Karl Kraus,” 
published in Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, March 1931 (WBSW, Vol. II, 433–458); “A Berlin 
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France in 1940, as is well known, Benjamin committed suicide at the Spanish border, 
where he found himself “dans une situation sans issue.”67 What follows, in brief, is an 
analysis of the critical concerns that Benjamin and Schapiro brought to the new 
Strukturanalyse and, for better or worse, its consequences for later art critics and art 
historians. The historical/methodological problem cannot be evaded: the approbation and 
reservations press up against each other.  
 
II. Self Conscious/Bad Conscience  
Also characteristic of this manner of approaching art is the “esteem for the 
insignificant” (which the brothers Grimm practiced in their incomparable 
expression of the spirit of true philology). But what animates this esteem if 
not the willingness to push research forward to the point where even the 
“insignificant”—no, precisely the insignificant—becomes significant? 
  
~ Benjamin, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten Bande  der 
Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 193368 
 
The change in viewpoint hardly constitutes a new science of art. The break 
with past methods is more apparent than real….This is palmistry or 
numerology, not science.  
 
   ~ Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 193669 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chronicle,” written in 1932 and unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime (WBSW, Vol. III, 595–637); “Johann 
Jakob Bachofen,” written in 1934/1935 and unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime, (WBSW, Vol. III, 11–24); 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproducability,” written in 1935–1936 and unpublished in 
long form Benjamin’s lifetime, though an edited version, translated into French, was published in the 
Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung in May 1936. (Hereafter, ZfS). For a translation of the ZfS publication, see 
Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility,” in WBSW, Vol. III, 101–133.  
67 Walter Benjamin in a letter to Henny Gurland [and Theodor Adorno?], Port Bou, 25 September, 1940. 
Reprinted in Theodor Adorno & Walter Benjamin: The Complete Correspondence, 1928–1940, ed. Henri 
Lonitz, trans. Nicholas Walker (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press): 342.  
68 Benjamin, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten Bande  der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 
WBSW, Vol. II, 668.  
69 Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 259.  
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 The layers of art historical discourse become apparent at the start of Benjamin’s 1933 
essay: In its opening passages, a reader of Benjamin’s essay encounters the earlier work 
of Heinrich Wölfflin (1864–1945) and of Riegl. In the space of a few sentences, 
Benjamin established a context for the work of the new Vienna group. It becomes clear, 
quickly, within Benjamin’s essay that his fellow feeling is with Riegl (not with the 1915 
author of Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe). Benjamin’s approving read of the Vienna 
group can be recognized, possibly in large part, as his own recognition of flickers of 
Riegl in their methodology. Benjamin valued the work of the Vienna group for the 
materialist concerns they brought to bear upon the art object, and for their apparent love 
of criticism and interpretation, or their philological concerns (as the citation above 
eloquently demonstrates): that the Vienna group considered no detail, no motif too 
minute or marginal to be beneath consideration.70 
 Benjamin found that the work of the Vienna group bore the hallmarks of the new 
critical approach, as described by Walter Muschg (1898–1965), the literary critic: “the 
turn away from an uncritical realism in the contemplation of history and the shriveling up 
of macroscopic constructions.”71  Instead, the Vienna group turned towards monographic 
studies of the art object. Benjamin cited Sedlmayr’s “programmatic” essay at length. 
                                                 
70 See Christopher Wood’s introduction to the translation of this essay where he suggests that Benjamin 
may have overestimated these aspects in the work of the Vienna group. See Wood, The Vienna School 
Reader, 437. See also Gershom Scholem’s discussion of Benjamin’s “passion for small, even minute, 
things” in The Yearbook of the Leo Baeck Institute (1967), 117. Also cited by Hannah Arendt in her 
Introduction to Illuminations (New York: Schocken Books, 1969): 11.  
71 Walter Muschg, “Das Dichterporträit in der Literaturgeschichte,” in ed., Emil Ermatinger, Philosophie 
der Literaturwissenschaft (Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1930): 311, as cited in Benjamin, WBSW, Vol. 
II, 667. See also, 671, n. 3, WBSW, Vol. II, for a reference to Benjamin’s citation of this same passage in 
his 1931 essay, “Literaturgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft,” published in Die literarische Welt, April 
1930. Re-printed in WBSW, Vol. II, 459–465.  
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While the length of citation from the first (unpublished) and second (published) versions 
of Benjamin’s essay vary, the following was included in both: 
Once the individual work of art is perceived as a still unmastered task 
specific to the study of art, it appears powerfully new and close. Formerly 
a mere means to knowledge, a trace of something else that was to be 
disclosed through it, the work of art now appears as a self-contained small 
world of its own, particular sort.72 
 
The other essays that appeared in the first volume Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen 
seemed to have captured Benjamin’s imagination as monographic demonstrations: G.A. 
Andreades, “Die Sophienkathedrale von Konstantinopel”; Pächt, “Die historische 
Aufgabe Michael Pachers”; and Carl Linfert, “Die Grundlagen der 
Architekturzeichnung.” There studies were all the more rigorous, in Benjamin’s 
assessment, in that they considered “the formal incorporation of the given world by the 
artist;” and for the art historians’ self-conscious consideration of their own activity.73  
 This is not to suggest that Benjamin swallowed the work of the Vienna group whole: 
a paragraph from the unpublished first version of the essay records his reservations, 
regarding:  
[T]he advisability of the move that Sedlmayr attempts…juxtaposing the 
rigorous study of art as a “secondary” field of study against a primary 
(namely positivist) study of art…. Sedlmayr’s essay also demonstrates 
how difficult it is for a particular course of research…to establish purely 
methodological definitions without reference to any concrete examples 
whatsoever. This is difficult, but is it necessary? Is it appropriate to place 
the new aspiration (Wollen) so assiduously under the patronage of 
phenomenology and Gestalt theory? It could easily be that in the process 
one loses nearly as much as one gains.74  
 
                                                 
72 Sedlmayr, as cited by Benjamin, WBSW, Vol. II, 667. Emphasis in the original.  
73 Benjamin, WBSW, Vol. II, 667. NB: There’s an unaccounted paragraph immediately following this 
citation.  
74 Benjamin, WBSW, Vol. II, 667. From the unpublished 1931 version.  
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This is prototypical of many of Benjamin’s formulations: something new is 
assessed in terms of the gains and losses its advent occasions. While in the 
published version of Benjamin’s essay, he concluded that the Vienna group was 
“filling the study of history with new life,” the unpublished version concluded 
with a rhetorically stronger phrasing: that these new researchers “were the hope of 
their field of study.”75 Approbation with reservation (or, promise): that, for now, 
there was hope. 
 Schapiro’s essay is of a different kind from Benjamin’s. It cleaves neatly into two 
parts: a general assessment of the work of the Vienna group, in which he took Sedlmayr 
to task; and a catalogue of abstracts of each of the essays included in the second volume 
of Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen.76 The synopses of the essays were for the benefit 
English-speaking students “who have been fairly indifferent to theoretical problems.”77  It 
is perhaps this pedagogical aspect in which Schapiro finds the value in the work of the 
Vienna group in that he felt it was “notorious how little American writing on art history 
has been touched by the progressive work of our psychologists, philosophers, and 
ethnologists.”78 He notes that American students would do well to consider the work of 
the Vienna School, despite their “defects,” for their:  
[C]oncern with the formation of adequate concepts even in the seemingly 
empirical work of pure description, their constant search for new formal 
                                                 
75 Ibid. See n. 55.  
76 This second volume, lengthier and more expansive than the first, comprised the following: “Remarks on 
the Structure of Egyptian Sculpture,” by Guido Kaschnitz-Weinberg; “The System of Justinian by 
Sedlmayr;” “Towards an Analysis of the Florentine Baptistery,” by Karl Swoboda; a posthumous (and 
fragmentary) essay by Maria Hirsch entitled “The Figure-Alphabet of the Master ES;” a second work by 
Pächt, entitled “Formal Principles of Western Painting in the Fifteenth Century;” an essay by Michael 
Alpatoff on a self-portrait by Poussin; and, finally, Emil Kaufmann’s article on “The City of the Architect 
Ledoux.” 
77 Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 258.  
78 Ibid.  
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aspects of art, and their readiness to absorb the findings of contemporary 
scientific philosophy and psychology.79 
 
It is difficult for a reader not to greet the work reviewed in the ensuing catalogue with 
caution as Schapiro’s criticisms precede his review of the contributions to the second 
volume of Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen. 
 Schapiro gave his most subtle and approbatory review to Pächt ’s essay, which was a 
“rarity of thinking and observation” generally lacking in English-language art history.80 
He reserved his harshest words for Sedlmayr’s work: both the 1931 methodological essay 
and the 1933 essay on Justinian. Schapiro effectively subjected the Vienna scholars to 
their own methods, and the shortcomings were numerous. On the whole, they lacked an 
adequate conception or grasp of history (including Pächt); what they had was a 
Kunstwollen with an immanent goal.  They preferred—to the point of Hegelian cliché — 
“teleological deductions” instead of an “empirical study of historical conditions and 
factors.”81 In particular, Schapiro found Sedlmayr’s distinction between the first and 
second studies of art arbitrary, intellectually faulty, possibly suspect, but most certainly 
the kind of distinction drawn by “German writers” between the taxonomic sciences and 
“their own sciences of the spirit (Geisteswissenschaften).”82 It would be a cliché of the 
hard sciences and of cultural studies, in Schapiro’s view, to suggest that the former did 
not gain from insight and interpretation, nor the latter from method and factual accuracy. 
Sedlmayr’s proposed methodology did not represent “an advance on [hypotheses] 
                                                 
79 Ibid., 260.  
80 Ibid., 263.  
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid., 258. 
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employed by the ordinary run of art historians.”83 Nor did it live up to its claims of rigor 
or its promise of new understandings. Schapiro here did not offer a post-Structural 
critique of facts or facticity, but stressed that even the most basic data concerning a work 
of art can be near-impossible to prove with certainty, as anyone who investigated with 
“real scruple” would know.84 As Sedlmayr’s essay on Justinian demonstrated, Schapiro 
stated, he relied on others to do his research for him. He, Sedlmayr, was too lazy to put 
his own methodology to the test by dusting off the received certainties of the art and 
architecture of his study.  
 The words of Benjamin and Schapiro are, however, in a kind of concord on an 
atypical art object. Benjamin and Schapiro argued separately the merits of an essay on 
architectural renderings that appeared in each edition of Kunstwissenschaftliche 
Forschungen. Linfert’s essay, “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung” (“The 
Elements of Architectural Drawings”), appeared in the first volume; Emil Kaufmann’s 
essay, “Die Stadt des Architekten Ledoux,” appeared in the second.85 Linfert’s essay was 
accompanied by 26 plates; Kaufmann’s by six (figs. 4 and 5). Linfert’s essay was the 
most richly-illustrated essay to appear in the brief run of the journal.86  
                                                 
83 Ibid., 259.  
84 Ibid. 
85 See Carl Linfert, “Die Grundlagen der Architekturzeichnung: Mit einem Versuch über französische 
Architekturzeichnungen des 18. Jahrhunderts,” in Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen I (1931): 133–246 
and Emil Kuafmann, “Die Stadt des Architekten Ledoux zur Erkenntnis des autonomen Architektur,” in 
Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Vol. II (1933): 131–60. Kaufmann returned to the subject of utopian 
architecture at least twice in his career. See his longer work of 1933, Von Ledoux bis Le Courbousier: 
Ursprung und Entwicklung der autonomen Architektur (Vienna: Passer, 1933) and, later, “Three 
Revolutionary Architects: Boullée, Ledoux and Lequeu,” Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, n.s., xlii (1953): 431–564.  
86 Sedlmayr contributed an essay on medieval architectural designs to the second volume, but this did not 
particularly pique the curiosity of either Benjamin or Schapiro. See Hans Sedlmayr, “Das erste 
mittelalterliche Architektursystem,” in Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen, Vol. II (1933), pp. 25–62.  
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 Linfert’s essay, Benjamin argued, was a most fine example of investigating the 
unexplored margins. The 18th-century French renderings that were the subject of the 
essay did not re-produce architecture: “they produce it in the first place, a production that 
less often benefits the reality of architectural planning than it does dreams.”87  In a 
passage that was deleted from the final version of his essay, Benjamin held architectural 
drawings against painterly representations of buildings, another commonplace way of 
presenting architecture, the former having the “closest affinity to nonrepresentational 
work.”88  In that architectural renderings “do not take a pictorial detour,” they create a 
“specificity” that is: 
[I]magined as an objective entity [Bestand] and is experienced by those 
who approach or even enter it as a surrounding space [Umraum] sui 
generis, that is, without the distancing effect of the frame of image space 
[Bildraum].89  
 
The crucial elements in the consideration of architecture for Benjamin here were the 
“apprehension of structures” and “the objective effect of the buildings on the imaginative 
being of the viewer.”90 Here, Benjamin demonstrated an acutely modern critique and 
awareness of pictorial conventions; Linfert’s choice of subject and his analysis kept pace 
with the pace of Benjamin’s dispatch.   
 Schapiro was one such viewer when, three years later, he reviewed Kaufmann’s 
essay, “The City of the Architect Ledoux.” The city in the title of Kaufmann’s essay 
referred to Ledoux’s celebrated plan for a royal salt-works that he had designed in 1776. 
                                                 
87 Benjamin, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten Bande der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 
WBSW, Vol. II, 669.  
88 Ibid., p. 670. Cf. Richard Shiff, “Phototropism (Figuring the Proper),” in Retaining the Original: 
Multiple Originals, Copies, and Reproductions, ed. Kathleen Preciado (Washington: National Gallery of 
Art; Hanover: Distributed by the University Press of New England, 1989): 161–179. 
89 Benjamin, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten Bande der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 
WBSW, Vol. II, 670. 
90 Ibid. 
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Kaufmann grasped “the unexpected modernity” of Ledoux: his desire to create a new 
architecture, the rational or utopian tendencies that were demonstrated in the salt-works 
plan, the published treatises on architecture. These tendencies all pointed to 20th century  
“architectural propagandists.”91  Kaufmann attempted to relate these forms to parallels in 
societal forms: to the conceptions of the insurgent French bourgeoisie (even though the 
architect was, himself, hostile to the Revolution). In this attempt, Kaufmann did not 
succeed, in Schapiro’s opinion, but the essay makes him “unique” in the group.92 Both 
Benjamin and Schapiro saw possibilities, if not always realized, in the work of the 
Vienna group. If Benjamin found value in their work for their ability to realize the 
potential of marginal areas (and the subsequent, potent, imaginative effect on their 
readers), Schapiro saw some limited potential in their ability to imagine (or, reconfigure) 
art-historical objects and method in relationship to their larger contexts.  
 To return to a question raised at the start of the paper at hand, here stated more 
forcefully: Can something be recovered from the formalism of Pächt and Sedlmayr? 
Benjamin rightly recognized traces of Riegl’s methods coming through in the work of the 
Vienna group. To pose another question (by way of a partial answer to the first): Were 
the specious political conclusions at which Sedlmayr arrived in the 1930s and afterwards 
endemic to his art-historical method? Well after the war, Pächt addressed the affinities 
between Riegl’s work and that of the Vienna school:  
With the discovery of a dominant principle [i.e., a Kunstwollen] that was 
verifiable in such diverse artistic media and situations Riegl saw…still 
wider perspectives opened. The next step would be to investigate the 
correlation between the artistic mentality and the other contemporary 
forms of mental life. 
                                                 
91 Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 266 and 265, respectively.  
92 Ibid., 265. 
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Which Riegl did at the conclusion of Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie. Pächt referred to 
this as the first adumbration of the kind of inquiry that would come to be known under 
the “programmatic title of art history as history of the spirit.” Riegl, Pächt concluded, 
“did not pursue this path any further.”93 
 
III. Rigor/Mortis  
 In Sedlmayr’s “programmatic” 1931 essay, he called for a rigorous study of art that 
would at once rescue works of art from endgame, taxonomic classification on the one 
hand, and belletristic appreciations on the other. Sedlmayr advocated for a two-tiered 
methodological system of art historical practice. He termed the first tier Kunstleichen, 
and the second Kunstgebilde. The former was “concrete” (in that it sifted through the 
artistic remains); the latter, “nebulous,” interpretive.94 Sedlmayr found the current state of 
the discipline to be well practiced in raking over old bones, but less than inspired (or 
worse, fanciful) in its understanding of the art object. To restore life and meaning to the 
work of art, the new art historian needed to practice both: the tiers were intertwined and 
reciprocating. And, here the familiar dualisms of structuralism begin to flesh out in and 
around Sedlmayr’s methodological armature—a new art history by methodological 
binarchy, as it were. 
 Sedlmayr’s methodology had, at its base, the primary pairing of the object and the 
culture that produced it. But the coupling splits and shifts. Data (of all kinds) about the 
object is organized under Kunstleichen while the sensory perception of that object comes 
                                                 
93 Otto Pächt, “Art Historians and Art Critics—vi.: Alois Riegl,” Burlington Magazine 109 (1963): 191.  
94 In the original, “massiv” and “nebelhaft.”  See Sedlmayr, “Zu einer strengen Kunstwissenschaft,” 12.  
 38 
under Kunstgebilde. Sedlmayr gave value to the observations of the viewer that recreated 
the art object anew for contemporary society, but also insisted that the art historian 
determine the “correct” attitude [Einstellung] or, the “original” attitude with which the 
object was initially created.95 The art historian was to determine the immanent value of 
the object. Sedlmayr borrowed Kurt Koffka’s term, the “dynamic character” of an object, 
to describe the aspiration of that object to meet its ideal—whatever that ideal may have 
been for the figuring imagination/will at a given time and place.96 If done correctly, this 
process would (and should) bring new insights into the object and its transcendent value. 
Sedlmayr sought complete knowledge [vollkommene Erkenntnis] of the art object, as an 
imbricated [eingeordnet] part of a greater whole [größeres Ganzen]. The task of the art 
historian was to reveal this metonymic relationship to the fullest extent possible. It was to 
bring about a “new appreciation of self-consciousness” [neue Schätzung des Bewußten] 
on the part of the art historian.97 An art historian willing only to experience the art object 
and not to analyze it was of a “bad conscience” [schlecten Gewissen].98 By way of 
conclusion to his 1931essay, Sedlmayr quoted Ramón Fernandez (1894–1944), the 
French literary critic, as a kind of credo for the new art historian: “La pensée peut 
préceder la vie: elle contribuera par là même à la redresser.”99  
                                                 
95 Sedlmayr, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 148.  
96 Sedlmayr, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 169. Sedlmayr’s 1933 essay remains an odd position 
piece: it is not exactly an original treatise, so much as it is a re-statement of the work of other scholars. 
Sedlmayr, it should be noted, was a capable synthesizer of the work of others, for example, Kurt Lewin, 
Carl Linfert, and Kurt Koffka. 
97 Sedlmayr, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 176. 
98 Ibid., 174.  
99 Ibid., 176. From, Ramon Fernandez, De la personnalité (Paris: Au Sans Pareil, 1928). Benjamin would 
also quote Fernandez, as the opening citation in his 1934 essay, “The Author as Producer:” “The task is to 
win over the intellectuals to the working class by making them aware of the identity of their spiritual 
enterprises and of their conditions as producers.” Benjamin may have never delivered this piece, which was 
originally conceived as an address to the Institute for the Study of Fascism, a Communist-front 
 39 
 In toto, Sedlmayr sought a new concept of the work of art, which, by the terms 
of the self-reflexive methods that he himself advocated, would point to some 
potential gains and losses, methodological and otherwise. Sedlmayr’s method 
radically reconfigured the relationship between the object, its maker, and 
beholder.  Strukturanalyse breaches the autonomy of the aesthetic category, and 
situates the art (aesthetic) object in a wider cultural context—albeit on a higher 
tier within this larger context. Most dramatically, the artist, the individual figuring 
agent, is potentially at a loss under Strukturanalyse: many the Vienna writers 
chose works made by anonymous artisans, not the Great Artists of Wölfflinian art 
history. The aesthetic judgment of the contemporary viewer is necessarily 
critiqued by the rigorous search for the ‘correct attitude’. Strukturanalyse places 
relative value over absolutes ones, or perhaps it makes for the reciprocating 
pairing of the two: absolute standards within a specific culture or time. As a 
methodological model, Strukturanalyse could potentially analyze the artistic 
productions of any culture. In an aside in his 1931 essay, Sedlmayr made a point 
about the inappropriateness of holding a European attitude towards African art.100 
It’s a prescient remark in light of more recent trends within the discipline towards 
the study of cultures outside the Western traditions and post-colonial studies. It’s 
also a remark that goes to the heart of the matter: in addressing the differences 
between the art of other cultures through Sedlmayr’s means, one could merely 
                                                                                                                                                 
organization in Paris. The essay remained unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime. See WBSW, Vol. II, 768–
782. For an account of conflicting information on Benjamin’s delivery of this address, see p. 781, n. 1.  The 
arc of Fernandez’s wartime politics was even more severe than that of Sedlmayr: an early follower of the 
Socialist and Communist parties, by 1943, Fernandez was a collaborator on the literary front, who had 
almost been forcibly installed as the editor of the Gallimard publication, La Nouvelle revue française.  
100 Sedlmayr, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 149.  
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buttress these divides, methodologically, between cultures (or, hierarchies within 
a culture) by putting different works of art into national schools, or, by extension, 
ethnic or racial groups—if not into different camps altogether.  Upon doing this, 
one could despair in the plight of culture, as did Sedlmayr in Verlust der Mitte, 




The natural thing would be for every art historical monograph to contain 
some aesthetics as well.  
 
~ Heinrich Wölfflin, Klassic Kunst, 1898, as cited in 
Benjamin, 1933101 
 
[F]rom the viewpoint of modern taste, it seems absolutely impossible that 
there should ever have been a positive Kunstwollen directed towards 
ugliness and non-animation…but everything depends on understanding 
that the aim of the fine arts is not completely exhausted with what we call 
beauty, nor with what we call animation.  
 
~ Alois Riegl, Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie, 1901102 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
 Benjamin’s sympathetic reading of the new Vienna School was informed by his 
reading of and affinity for the work of the ‘old’ Vienna School scholar. It is useful to 
consider, briefly, Riegl’s earlier concept of the Kunstwollen as one source for Pächt’s and 
                                                 
101 Benjamin, “The Rigorous Study of Art,” in WBSW, Vol. II, 666. For the initial publication of this 
citation, see Heinrich Wölfflin, Preface to Die klassische Kunst: eine Einführung in die italienische 
Renaissance, (Basel: B. Schwabe, 1898). Reprinted as Classic Art: An Introduction to the Italian 
Renaissance, trans. Peter Murray, Linda Murray (London: Phaidon Press Limited, 1952): xi. In the original: 
“Das Natürliche wäre, daß jede kunstgeschictliche Monographie zugleich ein Stück Ästhetik enthielte.” 
102 Alois Riegl, Introduction to Late Roman Art Industry, ed. and trans. Rolf Winkes (Rome: Giorgio 
Bretschneider  Editore, 1985): 11. Originally published as Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie, (Vienna: 
Österreichische Staatsdruckerei), 1927; revised from Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie nach den Funden in 
Österreich-Ungarn (Vienna: K. K. Hof-und-Staatsdruckerei, 1901).  
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Sedlmayr’s intellectual context. When Benjamin set off the work of the new Vienna 
group from the “sedate mediocrity of the founding period” of art history, Wölfflin served, 
rhetorically, as the vestigial representative of forefathers.103 In Klassic Kunst, as 
Benjamin noted in 1933, Wölfflin went on to argue that aesthetics so desired for each art 
historical monograph should, necessarily, be coupled with a “systematic” section. In its 
time, this was an “epoch making” pairing. However, as Benjamin continued, acutely:  
[Wölfflin] identified the dualism of a flat, universalizing history of the art 
of ‘all cultures and times,’ on the one hand, and an academic aesthetic, on 
the other, without, however, being able to overcome it entirely.104  
 
Earlier, in a 1915 letter, Benjamin had described the experience of one of Wölfflin’s 
university lectures in Munich. Benjamin’s letter chronicled his disappointment and 
dissatisfaction:  
[Wölfflin] has a theory which fails to grasp the essential but which, in 
itself, is perhaps better than complete thoughtlessness. In fact, this theory 
might even lead somewhere were it not for the fact that, because of 
Wölfflin’s capacities to do justice to their object, the only means of access 
to the artwork remains exaltation, i.e. a feeling of moral obligation. He 
does not see the artwork, he feels obliged to see it, demands that one see it, 
considers his theory a moral act; he becomes pedantic, ludicrously 
catatonic, and thereby destroys any natural talents that his audience may 
have.105  
 
In Benjamin’s assessment, it was, rather, Riegl, who grasped the situation in his Die 
spätrömische Kunstindustrie and who offered a methodological work-around to this 
artificial impasse. And, Riegl did so within the relatively short span of time of three years 
                                                 
103 See n. 55.  
104 Benjamin, “The Rigorous Study of Art,” in WBSW, Vol. II, 666.  
105 Benjamin, letters to Fritz Radt (husband of Julia Cohn, sculptor), 21 November and 4 December, 1915. 
Cited in Thomas Y. Levin, “Walter Benjamin and the Theory of Art History,” October 47 (1988): 79. Also 
reprinted in their entirety by Gershom Scholem, “Walter Benjamin and Felix Noeggerath,” Walter 
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after Wölfflin. By virtue of this, in Benjamin’s eyes at least, this made Riegl—not 
Wölfllin—the “precursor” of the “new type of art scholar.”106  
 In his 1901 work, Riegl examined the artistic productions of what had been, up to that 
point, an overlooked or maligned epoch: the late Roman Empire (the “dark continent on 
the map of art historical research,” as Riegl described it).107 The method he employed did 
not map out canonical works as plot points within a bell curve of culture. It did, however, 
identify patterns of change in the visual representations in late Roman art—changes 
directed towards representational ideals other than the Classical one. Riegl stated his 
premise simply: it was to seek “a solution to the question concerning the nature and the 
underlying forces of the end of antiquity” and to “destroy” the “prejudice” that “late 
Roman art did not constitute progress but merely decay.”108 Die spätrömische 
Kunstindustrie was groundbreaking, risky, and fruitful work. Even the future author of 
The Arch of Constantine, or the Decline of Form found value in it.109 One could 
understand this work as a contrary response to Wölfflin’s theory of the double root of 
style, which was adumbrated in Klassic Kunst and later given full form in his 1915 
Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe. In this later work, Wölfflin established his pairings of 
formal polarities of linear and painterly; closed and open form; multiplicity and unity; 
and clearness and unclearness.110 While Riegl’s specific findings on late Roman are 
                                                 
106 Benjamin, “The Rigorous Study of Art,” in WBSW, Vol. II, 668.  
107 Riegl, Introduction to Late Roman Art Industry, 6.  
108 Ibid., 6, 8.  
109 “Nevertheless if Riegl turns out to have been wrong as an archaeologist, he remains a great art historian, 
for he was the first to employ a rare intelligence and method in investigating change of taste, and how it 
was brought about.” Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History in the Visual Arts, (New York: Pantheon, 
1948): 168. Berenson published The Arch of Constantine, or the Decline of Form in 1954 (London: 
Chapman & Hall, 1954). 
110 For Wölfflin’s later articulation of the double root of style as the expression of an individual 
temperament and the zeitgeist of a time and place, see the Introduction to The Principles of Art History, 
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beyond the scope of the essay at hand, his ideas on taste, style, and immanent value 
remain of consequence.  
 In Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie, Riegl introduced the critical term of 
Kunstwollen, to which Pächt’s and Sedlmayr’s ideas of Strukturanalyse was greatly 
indebted. As a German art historical term, Kunstwollen has been translated into 
something greater than the sum of its compound parts. The glossary of the English 
translation of Late Roman Art Industry offers the following: “internal and external force 
producing art, artistic will, artistic urge, artistic desire.”111 The editors of Benjamin’s 
translated collected works offer the following expanded definition:  
Riegl defines the Kunstwollen as the manner in which a given culture at a 
given time wants to see its cultural objects; his assertion that each epoch’s 
art is informed by its own, inherently legitimate Kunstwollen posed a 
significant challenge to reigning theories of art derived from the notion of 
the classical ideal.112 
  
In his Foreword to Late Roman Art Industry, Rolf Winkes states that Riegl’s use of  
Kunstwollen was a deliberate rhetorical choice, replacing the less forceful terms of 
Kunstdrang (artistic urge) and Kunstwillen (artistic will) that Riegl had used is Stilfragen, 
his earlier work of 1893.113 Winkes goes on to argue that the Kunstwollen effectively 
replaces style in Riegl’s methodology, as signifying something deeper and more dynamic 
than style and the closed periods of time that that term can connote.  
                                                                                                                                                 
trans. M.D. Hottinger (New York: Dover, 1950; facsimile of the 1932 translation): 1–17. 
Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe was originally published in 1915 and translated into English in 1932. 
See Wölfflin, Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe (Munich: Bruckmann, 1915, 1923).  
111 Glossary, in Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, n.ƒ.  
112 Benjamin, “Curriculum Vitae, III,” in WBSW, Vol. II, 79, n. 1.  
113 Kunstdrang (artistic temperament) and Kunstwillen (artistic will) would be more at the level of 
individual expression and technique, in Riegl’s rhetoric.  
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 In a 1952 essay on style, Schapiro argued that Riegl “not only gave up the normative 
view that judges the later phases of a cycle as a decline, but also the conception of closed 
cycles.”114 Schapiro continued, characterizing the grand vista of Riegl’s methodology 
with the following:  
[Riegl] formulates as the poles of the long evolution two types of style, the 
‘haptic’ (tactile) and the ‘optic’ (or painterly, impressionistic)…The 
history of art is, for Riegl, as endless necessary movement from 
representation based on vision of the object and its parts as proximate, 
tangible, discrete, and self-sufficient, to the representation of the whole 
perceptual field as directly given, but more distant, continuum with 
merging parts, with an increasing role of the spatial voids, and with a more 
evident reference to the knowing subject as a contributing factor in 
perception.115  
 
Style, in Riegl’s method, is subsumed to (or, at the affect of) a general Kunstwollen. Yet, 
as Schapiro concluded, for Riegl, art making remains “an active creative process in which 
new forms arise from the artist’s will to solve specifically artistic problems.”116 Margaret 
Iversen, in her 1979 essay on Riegl’s historiography, extends this point farther:  
Riegl’s thinking is informed by a deep conviction that art has an essential, 
constant purpose—that of cultivating human freedom. For him, art’s 
interest lies in its status as a human activity independent of natural or 
material exigencies…Art cultivates human freedom by formulating 
relationships with the world….Haptic styles attest to man’s independence 
of nature through his ability to create spontaneous, abstract design. Optic 
styles recognize and elicit to a high degree the epistemological spontaneity 
which makes experience itself a constructive activity.117  
 
                                                 
114 Meyer Schapiro, “Style,” Anthropology Today, (1952): 301. 
115 Ibid., pp. 301–302. ‘Haptisch’ and ‘Optisch’, in Riegl.  
116 Ibid., pp. 302. See Richard Shiff, “Original Copy,” Common Knowledge 3:1 (Spring 1994): 107: 
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117 Margaret Iversen, “Style as Structure: Alois Riegl’s Historiography,” Art History 2:1 (March 1979): 67. 
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Podro, Critical Historians of Art, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982): 71–97.  
 45 
Riegl’s proposed binary of haptisch and optisch were “opposing ways of framing 
relationships with the world,” Iversen concluded.  
 Both Schapiro and Iversen identified the knowing viewer as holding a privileged 
position in Riegl’s method. In his Introduction to Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie, Riegl 
asked rhetorically what might prevent “even unprejudiced scholars,” such as Franz 
Wickoff, author of the seminal 1895 treatise on the Vienna Genesis, “from appreciating 
the nature of late Roman works of art open-mindedly?” It was, Riegl concluded:  
[N]othing else than the subjective critique which our modern taste applies 
to the monuments at hand. From a work of art this taste demands beauty 
and animation, while the scales incline in turn either to the first or the 
second.118 
 
It is at this juncture in his discourse that Riegl asserts the value of an otherly-directed 
Kunstwollen. One of the consequences of Riegl’s method was to give an immanent 
value—that which remains or operates within the domain of reality or realm of 
discourse—to contemporary taste and judgment.119 His method did not dissolve artistic 
production into larger, cultural (or, visual) studies, nor did it reduce art to a question of 
materials and need.120 It was (as Iversen rightly argued) about freedom—or, the potential 
freedom to re-create one’s material circumstances:  
All human will is directed toward a satisfactory shaping of man’s 
relationship to the world, in the most comprehensive sense of this word, 
within and beyond the individual. The plastic Kunstwollen regulates man’s 
relationship to the sensorily perceptible appearance of things.121  
 
                                                 
118 Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, 10.  
119 By way of comparison, Riegl did for the category of judgment in Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie what 
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno would later do for the history of reason in their Dialektik der 
Aufklärung in 1944. 
120 See Riegl’s comments on Gottfried Semper, in Riegl, Late Roman Art Industry, 9–10.  
121 Riegl, in Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 95.  
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What Riegl’s method maintains is a certain autonomy for art objects and for the nascent 
discipline of art history. As such, art was possessed of an internal logic and should to be 
studied as such. 
~~~~~~~~~ 
 In 1933, the work of the Vienna scholars appealed to Benjamin most likely because 
their work appeared to be the fulfillment of Riegl’s method—the next logical stage of 
development in art historical method. In a brief 1929 essay entitled “Bücher, Die 
Lebendig Geblieben Sind,” Benjamin wrote on a quartet of books that had remained 
alive, the first and oldest of which was Riegl’s Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie.122 In a 
brief passage, Benjamin identified the striking quality of this “epoch-making” work, 
which:  
[B]rought to the monuments of the late empire, with prophetic certainty , 
the stylistic sense and insight of Expressionism, which occurred twenty 
years later; while, at the same time, it broke with the theory of “times of 
decline,” and recognized what had hitherto been called a “retreat  into 
barbarism” as a new sensibility, a new Kunstwollen. At the same time, 
this book is one of the most striking proofs that every great scholarly 
discovery results, without any intent to do so, in a methodological 
revolution on its own.123  
   
It was the spark of the reciprocity—that of marginal or neglected areas grasped with a 
new method, a new sensibility—that, for Benjamin, made Riegl’s work so fruitful. It was 
these sparks that enlivened the work of the Vienna scholars for Benjamin. In 1936, 
Schapiro came to his very different conclusion about the limited potential of the new 
                                                 
122 Walter Benjamin, “Bücher, die lebendig geblieben sind,” written in 1929, WBGS, Vol. III, 169–171. 
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Vienna school scholars. In Schapiro’s view, the invidious political conclusions at which 
Sedlmayr arrived in the early 1930s may have been the inevitable/endogenous conclusion 
of his suspect scholarly method.124  
 
V. Magical/Mechanical  
Not only was the classic attempt to erect a mechanistic system of causality 
between individual phenomena no longer valued….Instead, a mechanistic 
theory of connection between individual shapes no longer seemed 
satisfactory and was replaced with a different kind of connection—magic.  
 
  ~ Riegl, Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie, 1901125 
 
The reader who reads Riegl’s major work today, recalling that it was 
written almost at the same time as the work by Wölfflin cited [above], will 
recognize retrospectively how forces that are already stirring 
subterraneously in Die spätrömische Kunst-Industrie will surface a decade 
later in expressionism. Thus, one can assume that sooner or later 
contemporaneity will catch up with the studies by Pächt and Linfert as 
well. 
~ Benjamin, “Strenge Kunstwissenschaft: Zum ersten 
Bande  der Kunstwissenschaftliche Forschungen,” 1933126 
 
[The historical portions of Dr. Pächt’s article] correspond to the Hegelian 
notion of that whatever befalls a being arises from its own inner nature—
as in Chesterton’s story of the man whose nature it was to be shot at 
constantly, and whose enemies were therefore exempt from any 
responsibility.  
  ~ Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” 1936127 
 
How should the history of art secure its proper object if the processes that 
are meant to deliver it actually offer an ersatz for sensations of a very 
different nature?  
 
  ~ Pächt,  “Das Ende der Abbildtheorie,” 1930–1931128 
                                                 
124 See also, Meyer Schapiro, “Race, Nationality and Art,” Art Front 2 (March 1936): 10–12.  
125 Riegl, “The Leading Characteristics of the Late Roman Kunstwollen,” in Late Roman Art Industry, 232.  
126 Benjamin, “The Rigorous Study of Art,” in WBSW, Vol. II, 668.  
127 Schapiro, “The New Viennese School,” The Art Bulletin 18:2 (June 1936): 263.  
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~~~~~~~~~~ 
 All of the art historians discussed above grasped art objects as objects of history. It’s 
a statement of the lowest common denominator as to be almost comical. For the art 
historians held different conceptions of history. Images of organic off-shoots, cyclical 
changes, binaries, and dualisms cycled through their essays. Even Alfred H. Barr, Jr. 
rendered his conception of the permanent collection of the Museum of Modern Art as a 
torpedo moving through time (fig. 6). This is to suggest not a wide range of differences 
so much as another binary or dualism: open and closed conceptions of history. Most of 
the art historians considered in the essay at hand subscribed to notions of an open or 
dynamic system of history. It is, to borrow from Edmund Wilson, the myth of the 
dialectic.129 We tend to associate dialectical systems of history with the materialist 
descendants of the German Enlightenment: Marx, for one, Benjamin, for another, who, in 
a 1936 essay, famously introduced concepts into a theory of art that were “completely 
useless for the purposes of Fascism.”130 Sedlmayr, who had been an advocate of a 
dynamic Kunstwollen in his youth, sought to end the dialectic in his post-War concept of 
the center: “For the ‘centre’ is not the tepid compromise of extremes, but a mighty and 
radiant encompassing of them.”131 By Sedlmayr’s account of the mighty middle, there 
                                                                                                                                                 
128 Pächt, “Das Ende der Abbildtheorie,” Kritische Berichte zur kunstgeschichtlichen Literatur 3–4 (1930–
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would be no pity (or what’s more, empathy) for the Chesterton character, who would 
have to surrender to his true nature.  While there is (at least in theory) no end to the 
dialectic, Sedlmayr sought its totalizing completion in his art-historical practice. To 
return then, once again, to a question raised above: What can be recovered from the 
1930s formalism of Pächt and Sedlmayr. Perhaps this is best accomplished (for now) 
through a reading of Benjamin’s celebrated 1936 essay, “The Work of Art in the Age of 
its Technical Reproducibility.”132  
 In his 1936 essay, with its concepts useless for the purposes of Fascism, Benjamin 
considered the work of art and its aura—perhaps the term most closely associated with 
Benjamin (the historical critic). Or, as he defined it in the case of the natural object: “the 
unique phenomenon of distance, however close it may be.”133 It is this singular quality 
that withers away from the unique object in the age of mechanical reproduction. 
Mechanical reproduction is age old; photography represents its modern form. 
“Mechanical reproduction of the work of art, however,” Benjamin argued, “represents 
something new.”134 Characteristic of Benjamin’s thinking, this is a potentially positive 
occurrence at the same time that it gives cause for concern. The work of art now meets 
the beholder (the masses) “halfway.”135 In the new age of mechanical reproduction, the 
viewer has the opportunity to reposition herself to the newly-liberated work of art (a 
process aided by the mechanical reproduction). What the mechanical reproduction can’t 
do is reproduce the aura of the work of art—its “presence in time and space, its unique 
                                                 
132 The full text of this essay was never published in Benjamin’s lifetime, although an abbreviated version 
was translated into French and published in the ZfS. 
133 Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations, 222.  
134 Ibid., 218.  
135 Ibid., 220. 
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existence.”136 The withering away of aura from the work of art releases it from “its 
parasitical dependence on ritual.”137 Yet this withering away, as a marker of modernist 
change, also represented to Benjamin a type of loss. In the place of the traditional cult 
value of the work of art came a modern culture of commodities. Benjamin offered the 
following analogy in his essay to represent this new (modern) relationship: 
Art history might be seen as the working out of a tension between two 
polarities within the artwork itself, its course being determined by shifts in 
the balance between the two. These two poles are the artwork’s cult value 
and its exhibition value.138  
 
By casting out the aesthetic object to be in play with modern culture, Benjamin 
transformed Wölfflin’s formalist poles of 1915 into materialist ones.   
  One possible way to read the work of the Vienna group is as Benjamin did, as a 
prolegomenon to any future materialist history of art. This kind of history, though, as 
with any kind of dialectical understanding, could go—and did, in Sedlmayr’s case—very 
wrong. Benjamin’s ideal materialist art historian was akin to the flâneur, another modern 
character who would figure elsewhere in Benjamin’s writing: the art historian offered a 
resistance to the filmic pace of modern culture by offering a slowed and prolonged 
encounter with the art object and its forms. Another way to read the Vienna group is as 
Schapiro did, by turning to the work of Pächt, who did not share Sedlmayr’s political 
taint—to the contrary, he necessarily (bodily) fled from it. And, here, Pächt is given the 
last word (for the moment) from a 1930–1931 essay, “Das Ende der Abbildtheorie.” In 
this essay, which was published in Kritische Berichte zur kunstgeschichtlichen Literatur, 
                                                 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid., 224. 
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in WBSW, Vol. III, 101–133. 
 51 
Pächt wrote of recovering the art object from the poeticizing tendencies in then-current 
scholarship and the misplaced narcissism of the viewer:  
The works of art…serve as points of departure for arbitrary emotional 
associations. In this way, the art historian and his public obtain nothing 
that they do not already latently possess, except that they now wish to find 
it sanctioned as artistic value by history.  
 
The art historian and his audience have, Pächt continued (by way of his colleague, 
Benedetto Croce), “‘allowed the object to disappear in favor of the work of art.’”139   
 
VI. Classic/Late Roman/Modern   
…[I]ndeed modern art, with all its advantages, would have never been 
possible if late Roman art with its unclassical tendency had not prepared 
the way…. 
 
While previously one wanted to hear about victory and conquest, so now 
wanted disgrace and atrocity. Admittedly, these are extremes that were 
seldom reached, but they indicate precisely and clearly the direction taken 
by the new ‘unclassical’ way of feeling in the late Roman world.  
 
   ~ Riegl, Die spätrömische Kunstindustrie, 1901140 
 
Neither extreme is a matter of caprice or arbitrariness.…Modernism has found 
that these limits can be pushed back indefinitely before a picture stops being a 
picture and turns into an arbitrary object…  
 
  ~ Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” 1960141  
 
…[T]hus a stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists as a picture— 
though not necessarily as a successful one.  
 
    ~ Greenberg, “After Abstract Expressionism,” 1962142 
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 The purpose of the following dissertation is not to demonstrate the debt owed by 
modernist art of the last century to the art industry of the late Roman Empire. (That 
would be an entirely different thesis.) Rather, the dissertation that follows examines the 
critical and political attitudes towards American abstract painting from the 1930s through 
to 1951. Even so, Riegl’s point on the unclassical is well taken: the value of modernist art 
is, methodologically, predicated, in part, on its relationship to the classical tradition, and 
the ability of modernist art—as a system of representation—to assimilate and trump this 
classical tradition. Mid-century American abstraction, in general, and Abstract 
Expressionism, in particular, has not suffered from the lack of critical and historical 
attention from which Riegl rescued the artistic production of the late Roman empire. To 
the contrary, the discipline has a surfeit. As one scholar has formulated the issue: “When 
facts are so abundant, possession of them can leave interpretation as free as when there 
are no facts at all.”143 The accretion of this discourse is also the subject of this study, as is 
the transfer of the discourse from Europe to America during the war years via both 
scholar-refugees and critical journals. One example of this transference from the 1930s, is 
the presence of the Institut für Sozialforschung scholars at Columbia University. Through 
the auspices of Schapiro, they found relative safe haven in New York (if, also on 
occasion, the “theoretically indifferent” students about whom Schapiro lamented in 
1936). At Columbia, they published Studies in Philosophy and Social Science, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
142 Clement Greenberg, “After Abstract Expressionism,” Art International 6 (1962): 28. 
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continuation of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, which the Institut had discontinued 
when they left Frankfurt, under force, in 1933.  
 The following is a study of objects (mid-century American abstraction) and one of 
their contexts (critical and political journals published during that time). It’s a familiar 
binary in the history of art (if not the binary). Other historical tropes—dialectics and 
dualisms— figure in the following pages as they were invoked by the critics of the time 
(even if that binary is delimited to the artist in a studio and her medium). An example of 
this appears above. The extremes of which Riegl and Greenberg wrote were historical 
and material. It’s an analogy that each writer struck upon at a different moment in time. 
Similar point, made repeatedly, the meaning of which changes, again, subtly under 
different circumstances. Yet neither Riegl nor Greenberg made easy appeals to 
relativism; each made claims for objectivity in their respective analyses. As a 
contemporary scholar has formulated this point, in regards to the lessons learned from 
Riegl:  “The history of art…cannot be written once and for all: it’s a continuous 
process.”144  
                                                 










Abstract, Abstraction, and So Forth, ca. 1936 
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I. Attitudes towards Abstract Painting, circa 1936  
 The cover of the 1936 exhibition catalogue for Cubism and Abstract Art bore the 
now-famous chart entitled “The Development of Abstract Art,” (fig. 7), which was 
prepared by Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Director of the Museum of Modern Art. It is a graphic 
essay to account of the origins and then-current trends within modernist art. In it, Barr 
identified two major currents in abstract art: “Geometrical Abstract Art” and “Non-
Geometrical Abstract Art.” The first current, Barr argued, which found its sources in “the 
art and theories of Cézanne and Seurat” and the “widening stream of Cubism” could be 
described as “intellectual, structural, architectonic, geometrical, rectilinear and classical 
in its austerity and dependence upon logic and calculation.”  By contrast, the art and 
theories of Gauguin and his circle were the principal source for “the second—and until 
recently, secondary—current.” In an animated summation sentence, Barr described the 
difference in (Nietzschean) patronage between the two:  
Apollo, Pythagoras and Descartes watch over the Cézanne-Cubist-
geometrical tradition; Dionysus (an Asiatic god), Plotinus and Rousseau 
over the Gauguin-Expressionist-non-geometrical line.145 
 
Barr did not, however, envision the two currents as independent or autonomous. In his 
chart, a number of arrows representing artistic movements have their points of origin at 
“Cubism,” which is positioned on the middle-right side at the 1906 mark. The arrows that 
thrust from right to left signify that the artists of the major movements of the early 20th 
century had assimilated the pictorial lessons of Cubism, for which Barr claimed Paul 
Cézanne (1839–1906) as progenitor. (It is a graphic representation of Arshile Gorky’s 
later statement that he was, for a long time “with Cézanne… and now naturally I am with 
                                                 
145 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1936): 19.  
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Picasso!”146) Cézanne is also one of the distant points of origin on Barr’s chart for 
“Fauvism,” the other dominant mode of representation in the early twentieth century, 
which is positioned center-left at the 1906 mark. The left-hand side of Barr’s chart notes 
a progression of artistic movements over time: all of them abstract “(Abstract) 
Expressionism,” “(Abstract) Dadaism,” “(Abstract) Surrealism,” all leading towards 
“Non-Geometrical Abstract Art.” This is to suggest that the gentle, playful rivalry of 
Henri Matisse (1869-1954) and Pablo Picasso (1881-1973) was historicized in mid-
stream. Soon, many American painters would find themselves with Matisse (if, via Hans 
Hofmann).  
 If taken with the same care and sincerity, with which Barr prepared his chart (and 
reworked many times over after had been affixed to the catalogue cover), the point of 
origin for this current study lies in the lower left-hand corner of his chart.147 Barr offered 
a kind of dualism in his chart, and in this dissertation, I argue that the main mode of 
critical interpretation for abstract painting at mid-century was dialectical (or, the use of its 
myth). In part, this is to suggest that critics saw a play between non-geometrical (or, 
biomorphic or gestural) abstraction and geometrical abstraction. A critic such as George 
L.K. Morris, also a practicing abstract painter, saw the mechanics of abstract painting as 
getting cleaner and more efficient and was optimistic; Meyer Schapiro saw similar 
                                                 
146 Julien Levy, “Arshile Gorky” in Memoirs of a Gallery (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977): 283.  
147 The chart remained a work in progress for Barr. A copy of the published chart is to be found in his 
collected papers. Barr reconsidered some of the connections drawn between different movements and 
marked his changes in pencil at an unknown date. Changes include the deletion of the arrow drawn from 
“Near-Eastern Art” to “(Abstract) Expressionism.” For a discussion of Barr’s undergraduate studies in art 
history with Charles Rufus Morey at Princeton and the use of charts and diagrams to map the chronology 
and diffusion of styles, see Sybil Gordon Kantor, Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the Intellectual Origins of the 
Museum of Modern Art (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2002): 18–35 et passim. See also, Susan Noyes 
Platt, “Modernism, Formalism, and Politics: The Cubism and Abstract Art Exhibition of 1936,” Art Journal 
44:4 (Winter 1988): 284–295. This essay was included in a special number, entitled, “Revising Cubism,” 
with Patricia Leighten as guest editor. 
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liberating developments and was deeply concerned for the health of art and culture. Or, in 
the case of Clement Greenberg’s art criticism, the pictorial trajectories re-converged. The 
best new painters in the 1930s, Greenberg would later argue, innovated from within the 
pictorial conventions of late Cubism. Circa 1935, certain critics began to see gestural 
systems of painterly mark-making as having (future) potential: that is, it was no longer 
defined in the negative. (This is the now-familiar arc of histories of mid-century 
American painting—it’s the “triumph” of Abstract Expressionism without Barr’s 
parentheses, for better or worse, as art-historical opinions vary.148)  
 Elsewhere in his 1936 catalogue essay, Barr argued that the abstract painting was “a 
most positively concrete painting since it confines the attention to its immediate, 
sensuous, physical surface far more than does the canvas of a sunset or a portrait.”149 In 
this chapter, I trace critical responses to the major exhibitions of these “positively 
concrete” paintings in the late 1930s, including the celebrated shows at MoMA and 
elsewhere.  Crossovers between journals occurred often during the 1930s: Meyer 
Schapiro wrote for Art Front, Partisan Review, and Marxist Quarterly; and, between job 
descriptions: Jacob Kainen, the painter and printmaker, wrote as an art critic for Art Front 
as well as for The Daily Worker. George L.K. Morris wrote behalf of the American 
Abstract Artist, of which he was a practicing member, and, later, as the art critic for 
Partisan Review. Writing retrospectively in 1956, Morris would write that:  
[I]n 1936 it should have been obvious…that something was about to 
happen in art as in everything else. But there was a comfortable feeling at 
                                                 
148 From the title of Irving Sandler, The Triumph of American Painting. 
149 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 11.  
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the time as though the critical years of revolution had already been 
surmounted.150 
  
Despite Morris’ claims of comfort, competing, dissenting claims were made for abstract 
painting in politically-oriented journals of the day. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
II. Claiming Abstraction in the 1930s: Four Exhibitions, Plus  
Sometimes in the history of art it is possible to describe a period of a 
generation of artists as having been obsessed by a particular problem. 
  
  ~ Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Cubism and Abstract Art, 1936151 
 
What is abstract art? The question will be answered differently by each 
artist to whom the question is put. This is so because the idea of abstract 
art is alive. It changes, moves and grows like any other living organism.  
 
  ~ Stuart Davis, Abstract Painting in America, 1935152  
 
There is very little in this work which follows fashionable reputations at 
home or abroad; no residue of the point of view which in the past has 
tended to make American art a tasteful resumé of European practice. … 
The influence of the School of Paris is rather slight….The lack of self-
consciousness may be an expression of American naiveté.  
   
  ~ Holger Cahill, New Horizons in American Art, 1936153 
 
…[A]rt is essentially aristocratic, but I feel it is highly desirable that a 
carefully selected collection of modern paintings should be constantly 
available to the general public, especially in a museum which is open in 
the evenings, as inevitably this will tend to improve the general taste. The 
value of this collection to a young painter has been fully proven. 
 
  ~ Albert E. Gallatin, Museum of Living Art, 1936154 
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 Abstract painting was subjected to a number of retrospective assessments in New 
York in the mid-1930s. These included Cubism and Abstract Art, and Barr’s other major 
curatorial effort at MoMA of the 1936 season, the exhibition of Fantastic Art Dada 
Surrealism. Both of Barr’s exhibitions focused generally on European art.155 The 
exhibitions at MoMA remain remarkable for their scope and scale: the former comprised 
over 380 examples of painting, sculpture, architecture, graphic design, film, and theatre; 
the latter comprised over 584 works, beginning in date from the fifteenth century, plus 
examples of film and architecture. The previous year, the Whitney Museum of American 
Art put up 134 paintings for Abstract Painting in America.156 The stated purpose of the 
Abstract Painting in America was to present a survey of an art movement in America that 
could be “defined in the broadest terms as abstract painting.”157 A brief essay by Stuart 
Davis, also an exhibitor at that show, accompanied the catalogue. In accounting for his 
curatorial choices, Barr wrote in his essay that he had purposefully excluded American 
artists from the Cubist and Abstract Art show because of the close proximity in time of 
the 1935 show at the Whitney. It would have been redundant, Barr claimed. Yet another 
exhibition was held at the museum, one that did include American painters working who 
                                                                                                                                                 
gallery was free and open to the public, Monday through Friday 8AM to 10PM, and on Saturday 8AM to 
5PM.  
155 “Cubism and Abstract Art” was MoMA exhibition no. 46; “Fantastic Art Dada Surrealism” was no. 55. 
“Cubism and Abstract Art” was on view from 3 March through 19 April; “Fantastic Art Dada Surrealism” 
followed in the autumn, 8 December through 17 January1937.  The third and final exhibition of the series 
was Romantic Painting in America (MoMA exhibition no. 246), which was on display from 11 November 
11, 1943 through 6 February, 1944. See also, MoMA press release, 111636-34 (1936) regarding the 
exhibition dates for “Fantastic Art Dada Surrealism.”  
156 This exhibition ran from 12 February through 22 March, 1935.  
157 Davis, Foreword to Abstract Painting in America (New York: Whitney Museum of Modern Art, 1935), 
n.f. 
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worked in abstract modes: “Art for the Millions,” an exhibition of work produced under 
the Federal Arts Program, opened the 1936–1937 season at MoMA.158 Abstract art was 
on view at yet another space: the downtown gallery of A.E. Gallatin, who also published 
a catalogue on abstract art in 1936.  
 Cubism and Abstract Art, the catalogue and Barr’s substantive essay, remain 
significant in the writing of modernist history. In a book review of the catalogue, one 
critic stressed that “nothing quite as factually exhaustive has ever been published on the 
subject [of modern art] in a single volume.”159 (By way of comparison, David Gascoyne, 
James Thrall Soby, Julien Levy, and Herbert Read all published volumes on Surrealism, 
the first examples of English-language studies on the movement, near in time to Barr’s 
latter exhibition.)160 In a generally favorable review of the catalogue, Harold Rosenberg 
noted that, in its comprehensiveness, it was “neither critical nor controversial.”161 The list 
of exhibitors to Cubism and Abstract Art included a now-familiar representation of 
European artistic movements, all denoted on Barr’s 1936 chart: Post-Impressionists Paul 
Cézanne, Paul Gauguin, the Fauvism of Henri Matisse; Cubists Pablo Picasso and 
Georges Braque; the so-called Salon Cubists: Robert Delauney, Raymond Duchamp-
                                                 
158 This was on display from 16 September through 12 October 1936. See MoMA Press Release no. 92536-
21. This was the third exhibition of federally-sponsored art at MoMA. See also, 1934: PwoAProject and 
1936 Architecture in Government Housing, which notes a “remarkable increase in quality over preceding 
work done under government patronage.” Cahill and Barr had previously collaborated on a couple of 
surveys: Art in America in Modern Times (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1934) and Art in America: A 
Complete Survey (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1935). Both were produced under the auspices of the 
American Federation of Women’s Clubs and the American Federation of the Arts with the coöperation of 
MoMA, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the Chicago Art Institute and others.  
159 E.M. Benson, “New Books on Art: Abstract Art—Twilight or New Dawn?” The American Magazine of 
Art 29:10 (October 1936): 675. This is illustrated with von Doesburg’s Aesthetic Transformation of the 
Object, ca. 1918.  
160 See David Gascoyne, A Short Survey of Surrealism (London: Cass, 1935); James Thrall Soby, After 
Picasso (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1935); Julien Levy, Surrealism (New York: The Black Sun Press, 1936); 
and Surrealism, ed. and intro. Herbert Read (London: Faber & Faber, 1936). For a critical review of this 
last book, see Jacob Kainen, “Dream World Art,” The New Masses, 12 (November, 1936).  
161 Harold Rosenberg, “Book Review,” Art Front 2:5 (June 1936): 15.  
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Villon, Albert Gleizes; the Suprematists and Constructivists: El Lissitzky, Kasmir 
Malevich, Alexander Rodchenko; Dadaists Max Ernst and Francis Picabia. The work of 
Piet Mondrian represented De Stijl. The show also included works by Wassily 
Kandinsky, Jean Hélion, and the categorization-defiant Marcel Duchamp. Alexander 
Calder was the one American exception to this august list. In the later exhibition of 
“Fantastic Art Dada Surrealism,” which traced the fantastical in European art from the 
sixteenth century on, Calder was joined by fellow Americans Georgia O’Keeffe and 
Katherine Dreier. The Whitney show was perhaps more ecumenical in its choices. 
Exhibitors to that show included members of the circle of Alfred Stieglitz: O’Keeffe, 
Charles Demuth, Arthur Dove, John Marin, Charles Sheeler; as well as Arthur B. Davies, 
Walt Kuhn, and Walter Pach, the painter-curators of the landmark exhibition of the 
previous generation: the International Exhibition of Modern Art, or the Armory Show, of 
1913.  
 In a light-hearted summary statement written at the close of the 1936 art season, one 
critic noted that New York had taken “extremes in stride.” The critic offered the 
following trio (figs. 8): Joan Miró’s Rope and Personages (1935) represented “aesthetic 
leftism” and was “typical of last-gasp European modernism;” while Francis Speight’s 
Tamaqua was “progressive” and “normal fare;” and, finally, Ettore Caser’s Girl in the 
Sea-Shell typified “extreme conservative artistic production.”162 If Barr’s first exhibition 
of 1936 focused on the art of aesthetic leftism, the Whitney exhibition of the previous 
year focused more on the normal fare of the machine aesthetics of Precisionism and some 
examples of American Regionalism. This was in contrast to the critical vitriol occasioned 
                                                 
162 “Field Notes: New York Resumé,” Magazine of Art 30:7 (July 1937): 448. 
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by the Armory Show.163 Stuart Davis wrote as much in his brief introduction to the 
Whitney exhibition catalogue:  
The abstract portion of [the Armory Show] which consisted of works by 
European artists, with few exceptions, created a real sensation. 
Argumentation and dispute were constantly carried on in front of these 
canvases by laymen as well as artists.  Friendships were broken and new 
ones made in the heat induced by these daily congresses of opinion. There 
was no American artist who saw this show but was forced to revalue his 
artistic concepts.164 
 
Reviews of Cubism and Abstract Art were mostly measured or, at least, engaged.165 
However, Fantastic Art Dada Surrealism received some sensationalist media coverage 
prompted by the subject matter of the exhibition, and the show had detractors.166 Others 
just thought the show was incredible, with all that that word connotes.167 It was a case of 
extremes of the advanced art of the day (even if taken in stride): Surrealism was art with 
demonstrable yet inexplicable content; pure abstraction seemed to be absolutely about 
nothing.  
 Clarence Weinstock, who was mostly sympathetic to modernist art, distrusted the 
pleasure he felt looking at the “pure” abstractions. This reviewer wondered in print if the 
severely abstract structures of the paintings, seemingly bereft of meaning, wouldn’t 
                                                 
163 See for example: Roosevelt, Theodore, “A Layman’s View of an Art Exhibition,” The Outlook (March 
1913): 718-720; Frank Jewitt Mather, “Art: Old and New Art,” The Nation, 96:248 (6 March, 1913): 240-
243; Frank Jewitt Mather, “Newest Tendencies in Art,” Independent 74 (6 March, 1913): 504-512; Kenyon 
Cox, “Cubists and Futurists are Making Insanity Pay” The New York Times (6 March, 1913): Part 6, 1. 
164 Davis, Foreword to Abstract Painting in America, n.f.  
165 For example, see Balcomb Greene, “Abstract Art at the Modern Museum,” Art Front (September-
October 1936): 5–7.  
166 For example, see Paul Rosenfeld’s review of the exhibition in which he notes his disappointment with 
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collapse under the weight of modern conditions—and if this wouldn’t limit the 
possibilities for abstract art in culture:  
An art in which emotion and ideology are so random must lose out amidst 
modern conflict. It can exist only in relatively undisturbed societies, or 
where an artificial stability has been temporarily built by a small section of 
society, rich patrons and dependent creators.168  
 
Barr may have agreed with this critic: that the appreciative audience for modernist art 
was rarefied (both in the sense of delimited and fragile). While there seems to be little 
reason to question Barr’s standing as a preeminent formalist of his generation, it would, 
however, be an inaccurate cliché of his formalism to conclude that he was oblivious of 
the political circumstances of artists’ bodies, or the proxy entanglements of their bodies 
of work. It was the abstracted quality of abstract art, not its content, that engaged it in 
politics. Barr made exceptions from this generalization on form and content for Futurism 
and Surrealism: “The former in much of its program anticipated Fascism and the latter 
has been involved in Communism.”169 In the section of his essay subtitled “Abstract art 
and politics,” he concluded with a dedication “to those painters of squares and circles 
…who have suffered at the hands of philistines with political power.”170 The immediate 
source of Barr’s irritation was an encounter with the U.S. Customs Department, which 
reads now like a screwball avant-garde comedy.171 Barr went on to offer a more visceral 
                                                 
168 Clarence Weinstock [also known as Charles Humboldt, (1910–64)], “Contradictions in Abstractions,” 
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Gris, Kandinsky, Malevich, Picasso, and Picabia. The works were entered under bond as raw goods, and 
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example: he noted that nine of the artists represented in the 1936 show had left Germany 
since 1933, and only one of them was a “‘non-Aryan’.” 172 
 Under Barr’s aegis, the exhibitions he personally curated at MoMA in 1936 included 
almost exclusively European artists, or European-trained artists who practiced in New 
York after a forced migration from Europe. The American Abstract Artists Group 
(AAA), probably the foremost practitioners of contemporary, geometrical abstraction in 
the 1930s, was also not included in any of the above-mentioned exhibitions.  Barr’s 
claims of redundancy fell flat to the AAA painters. George L.K. Morris, one of the 
founders of the AAA and a future editor at Partisan Review, took to the pen. For the 
annual yearbooks in 1938 and 1939, he produced, respectively, “On the Abstract 
Tradition,” and “The Quest for an Abstract Tradition.”173 The Whitney declined to hold 
their annual group show in 1938. Still later, in 1940, the membership would take to the 
streets in front of MoMA to protest their exclusion. Ironically, the graphic broadside 
designed by Ad Reinhardt that the members distributed in front of the museum was the 
first work by an AAA member to be acquired by MoMA (fig. 9). In a later interview, Ilya 
                                                                                                                                                 
the deliberations delayed the opening of the exhibition by a week. For reports on the incident with 
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Bolotowsky recalled that a museum secretary was sent out by the administration to 
collect a copy of the broadside for the museum archives.174  
 Exhibitors to Cubism and Abstract Art did not include, by reason of style, American 
Regionalists (such as Thomas Hart Benton), Realists (e.g., Yasuo Kuniyoshi), or Social 
Realists (George Biddle). One critic, conservative in outlook, wondered in his measured 
review of the show if Barr’s show could be considered “representative” if it excluded 
representational art.175 Barr also had a hand in New Horizons in American Art, which was 
curated by Holger Cahill, then National Director of the Federal Arts Program (FAP). In 
his own foreword to the catalogue, Barr noted that that exhibition was intended “to serve 
as a visual report to the public: a documented survey of one year’s activity.” 176 This 
show included the works of representational artists, exactly such as Kuniyoshi. Painters 
who worked in abstract modes were in the minority, and in the case of New Horizons in 
American Art, this included many of the AAA painters. (From the exhibition list, one 
would not surmise that the future of American art would come to be dominated by 
abstract painting at mid-century.) On display were over 400 examples of work from the 
easel, mural, and graphic arts projects, and the allied arts projects, including photography, 
industrial design, and examples of children’s art from the education program. Due to the 
massive scale of many of the murals (and their site-specificity), the exhibition also 
included scale models of interiors, which were constructed by the model division of the 
FAP. An example of this was Gorky’s Aviation: Evolution of Forms under Aerodynamic 
                                                 
174 See Susan Larsen, “The American Abstract Artists: A Documentary History, 1936–1941,” The Archives 
of American Art Journal, 14: 1 (1974): 6.  
175 See “Alfred H. Barr, Jr.” Magazine of Art 32: 6 (June 1939): 323.  
176 Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Foreword to New Horizons in American Art (New York: The Museum of Modern 
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Limitations (fig. 10). The complete series of panels totaled 1530 square feet. One 
completed panel, a model and photographs were exhibited in lieu of the actual work that 
was installed at what was then known as Newark Airport.  Since lost, the installation is 
now known only through the reconstructions. A second celebrated example, also lost, 
was de Kooning’s murals for the Williamsburg Housing Projects in Brooklyn, New York 
(fig. 11). In an unpublished essay from 1938, Stuart Davis cited both of these examples of 
early, large-scale abstraction not exclusively for their intrinsic formal properties, but for 
the instructive value of those formal properties: “A vast education in art is being made 
available to the American people.”177 
 In his catalogue essay, Cahill accomplished several tasks. He laid out the goals for the 
FAP, which could be summed up as Art for the Millions.178 Cahill took the long view of 
the development of art and the social context of the artists in America: from the time of 
the Hudson River School painters, through the American genre painters, and around the 
country to the Regionalists. In bringing art to the public, the programs of the FAP were 
nation-wide in scope, though Cahill was quick to note, not necessarily a fostering of 
Regionalist art. FAP artists, he argued, found their audience, at long last, and found that 
there was both a need and a use for their art:  
A new concept of social loyalty and responsibility, of the artist’s union 
with his fellow men in origin and in destiny, seems to be replacing the 
romantic concept of nature which for so many years gave to artists and to 
many others a unifying approach to art. This concept is capable of great 
development in intellectual range and emotional power. This is what gives 
meaning to the social content of art in its deepest sense. An end seems to 
                                                 
177 See Stuart Davis, “Federal Art Project and the Social Education of the Artist,” (1938) in Diane Kelder, 
ed., Stuart Davis: A Documentary Monograph (New York: Praeger, 1971): 165.  
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fact in 1973. See, Art for the Millions, ed. and intro, Francis V. O’Connor (Greenwich, Conn.: New York 
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be in sight to the kind of detachment which removed the artist from 
common experience, and which at its worst gave rise to an art merely for 
the museum, or a rarefied preciousness.179  
 
American artists in the FAP lost their isolation by ceding the autonomy of their art, as it 
were, to Cahill. Cahill did not call out differences between representational and abstract 
art. Rather, he emphasized the diversity of categories in which the FAP artists worked 
(large-scale murals, easel paintings, sculptures, etc.) and the array of media employed by 
the artists (oil, pastel, watercolor). Cahill found a deep reserve of talent in American 
artists, who, under challenging circumstances, “have shown themselves ready to attack 
new problems and to make fresh adaptations.”180  Through a kind of organic adaptation to 
their new environment, FAP artists, in Cahill’s view, were changing the culture in which 
art was made and viewed in America. It was an experiment in symbiosis, in shared, that 
is, common, experience between artists and their audience: newly-receptive audiences 
were cultivated through the program-made, site-specific work of the FAP.181  
 In contrast to Cahill’s art for the millions, A.E. Gallatin (1881–1952) addressed 
himself to a “general public”—even those (or, perhaps especially those) who could 
become engaged with avant-garde art after the workday.182 In 1936, Gallatin published 
an illustrated volume of his collection then held at the Museum of Living Art, housed at 
the New York University campus in Greenwich Village.183 One visitor to the gallery was 
a young Willem de Kooning, who recalled that he:  
                                                 
179 Holger Cahill, Introduction to New Horizons in American Art (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 
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181 See Andrew Hemingway, Artists on the Left: American Artists and the Communist Movement, 1926–
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[W]ent so many times. I remember a Mondrian, and also the French artist 
Hélion. When I met Gorky he used to go there often. It was so easy to 
walk in and walk out again, no charge, it was so nice.184 
 
Gallatin took a different approach to the changing of taste on a large scale, assuming such 
a thing is possible in modern times, from the one employed by Cahill and the FAP.  
Gallatin, who had opened the Gallery of Living Art in December 1927, was the only one 
of his generation of collectors to put forth and publish on his private collection for the 
public. The gallery was devoted exclusively to modern and contemporary (Cubist) 
painting. In the 1930s, Gallatin expanded his collection to include other forms of 
abstraction: Constructivism, Neo-Plasticism, and abstract variants of Surrealism, as well 
as contemporary sculpture. In 1936, Gallatin re-named the gallery the Museum of Living 
Art, which he then closed in 1943 under duress from the university. The posthumous 
“value” of the collection, as Gallatin stated above, was demonstrated through the work of 
the American Abstract Artists, whom Gallatin exhibited in the late 1930s and 1940s, as 
well as Gorky and de Kooning.185 
 
III. Abstract, Abstraction, and So Forth…186 
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[T]he image of a square is as much an “object” or a “figure” as the image 
of a face or a landscape; in fact “figure” in the very prefix used by 
geometers in naming A or B the abstractions with which they deal. 
 
  ~ Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Cubism and Abstract Art, 1936187 
 
Since we forgo all efforts to reflect optical illusions and concentrate on the 
reality of our canvas, we will now study the material reality of our 
medium, paint on canvas, or whatever it may be.  
 
  ~ Stuart Davis, Abstract Painting in America, 1935188 
 
Then, since all logic of natural appearances may be put aside and shapes 
deducted from natural forms to be reorganized unnaturally, there is no 
reason for disallowing the next step in which the artist may express 
himself directly, with only a subconscious memory of forms to depend on 
and with no naturalistic intent.  
 
  ~ James Johnson Sweeney, “Painting,” 1936189 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
  
 In their respective essays, Barr and Davis arrived at differentiated definitions of 
abstraction. One way to account for the difference is the job description of the respective 
authors: Barr wrote on abstraction as an art-historical phenomenon; Davis wrote as a 
practicing abstract artist. Both played upon the word abstract, in its various grammatical 
forms to form their arguments. It was customary, Barr wrote, to apologize for the word 
“abstract” with all of its potential “imprecision.”190 Abstract, as an adjective, Barr argued, 
was confusing because its meaning drew upon the definitions of the word in its verb and 
noun forms. To abstract, to Barr, meant “to draw out of” or “away from,” while an 
abstraction was an object in stasis, already drawn out or away from.191 Barr identified two 
distinct trends under the rubric of abstract: near- and pure-abstraction. Near-abstraction , 
                                                 
187 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 11.  
188 Davis, Abstract Painting in America, n.f.  
189 Museum of Living Art: The A.E. Gallatin Collection (New York: George Grady Press, 1936): n.f. 
190 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 11. 
191 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 
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such as Piet Mondrian’s Composition (1915), abstracted from nature (fig. 12) and did not 
achieve pure abstraction.(It’s similar to Clement Greenberg’s later use of the term 
homeless to describe the figurative abstractions of Willem de Kooning.) In the example 
of this painting, Barr noted, the plus/minus idiom was derived from a seascape. 
Mondrian’s later Composition (1925) was an example of pure abstraction in its “genesis 
as well as in its final form” in that it has “no dependence upon natural forms.”192 
 Despite the possible confusion, Barr ultimately preferred abstract over the possible 
alternatives of non-objective or non-figurative art:   
Substitutes for “abstract” such as “non-objective” and “non-figurative” 
have been advocated as superior. But the image of a square is as much an 
“object” or a “figure” as the image of a face or a landscape; in fact 
“figure” in the very prefix used by geometers in naming A or B the 
abstractions with which they deal.193 
 
This is to suggest that, in its concreteness, abstract art qualified as an art object in its 
forms. In formalist terms, Barr offered a “dialectic of abstract painting and sculpture”: 
it’s the pact between object and viewer. He argued that the dialectic was based upon the 
assumption that “a work of art…is worth looking at primarily because it presents a 
composition or organization of color, line, light, and shade.” As for the content of 
abstract art, Barr defined that in the negative, as abstraction-as-negation, as a lack of or a 
freedom from representational qualities. Artistic practice in the twentieth century seemed 
to be in concord with Barr’s conclusion. He wrote generally on the circumstances of the 
early twentieth-century artist (with a possible allusion to Riegl’s Kunstwollen):  
By a common and powerful impulse they were driven to abandon the 
imitation of natural appearance… “Abstract” is the term most frequently 
                                                 
192 Ibid., 12.  
193 Ibid., 11.  
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used to describe the more extreme effects of this impulse away from 
“nature.”194 
 
Barr argued that resemblance to nature was “at best superfluous and at worst distracting.” 
Like Hans Arp, whom he quoted, Barr liked nature, but not its substitutes.195  
 As for the future of abstract art? Barr concluded with another binary (one that did not 
necessarily exclude that of near- and of pure-abstraction): geometrical- and gestural-
abstraction. If Mondrian’s composition of 1915 was an example of the former, an 
example of the latter was Joan Miró’s painting, also entitled Composition of 1933 (fig. 
13). It was these kinds of biomorphic forms that were on the ascendant, in Barr’s 
analysis: “the shape of the square confronts the silhouette of the amoeba.”196 A footnote 
at the very conclusion of Barr’s lengthy essay mentioned the Whitney exhibition of the 
previous year.197 Barr noted that that exhibition was also conceived in a retrospective 
spirit, and notably, that it contained the work of younger men. Abstract art in America, 
one could infer from Barr’s footnote, would be practiced by the next, up-and-coming 
generation, those same painters who saw current examples of abstraction at galleries such 
as the Gallery of the Living Art and elsewhere. 198 
 Unlike the young practitioners mentioned by Barr, Stuart Davis was already an 
established abstractionist by the 1930s. In response to the rhetorical question he posed in 
                                                 
194 Ibid., 11. For a similar reading of Barr’s phrasing, see: Kantor, Alfred H. Barr, Jr. and the Intellectual 
Origins of the Museum of Modern Art, 320.  
195 In his essay, Barr quoted Hans Arp statement, “I like nature, but not its substitutes.” See Arp, “Notes 
from a Diary,” transition 21 (1932). Also quoted by J.J. Sweeney, Plastic Redirections in 20th Century Art 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934): 30 and by Sweeney again in “Painting” in Museum of Living 
Art: A.E. Gallatin Collection (New York: George Grady Press, 1936): n.f.  
196 Barr, Cubism and Abstract Art, 19. 
197 Ibid., 200.  
198 See, for example, “Five Contemporary American Concretionists: Biederman, Calder, Ferren, Morris, 
Shaw” held at the Paul Reinhardt Galleries in New York from 9 through 31 March, 1936. I believe this to 
be the exhibition to which Barr referred in his essay. 
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his brief essay of 1935—“What is abstract art?”—Davis argued in his own essay that 
amongst the inevitable answers “some basic concordance could doubtless be abstracted,” 
(in Barr’s sense of abstract, to draw out of or away from).199 The responses he offered to 
his own question may be abstracted as such: that art was not about mimesis and that all 
attempts at mimesis were “doomed to failure.”200 Per contra, the abstract painter created 
parallel pictorial world. In taking up abstraction, painters ceased to ask questions about 
capturing a good likeness and such, Davis argued (he wrote on behalf of his fellow 
abstractionists and wrote in the plural). Rather, they asked themselves: “Does this 
painting which is a defined two dimensional surface convey to me a direct emotional or 
ideological stimulus?” Davis wrote in terms that would become more familiar to post-
War critics: in practice, abstract artists concentrated on the autonomous reality of their 
canvas and material reality of their medium. In doing so, abstract painters achieved “a 
two dimensional clarity and logic.” (Or, in Barr’s terms, an abstraction in the sense of an 
object that had already fully occupied its abstract status.) This would, Davis concluded, 
automatically explain the geometric character of many abstract works of art.” A survey of 
the paintings included in the exhibition bore out Davis’s unscientific statistic that most 
abstract paintings were geometric in style, a few of which were reproduced in the thin 
catalogue. These were two works (figs. 14 and 15) that demonstrated mastery of a late 
Cubist-informed aesthetic: Max Weber’s Bathers (1913) and John Marin’s Abstraction—
Lower Manhattan  (1928); and an example of Precisionism (fig. 16) by Joseph Stella 
American Landscape (1932).  An anomaly, in that the painter used organic forms, in the 
catalogue was Gorky’s Composition Number One (1927, fig. 17). In Barr’s analysis, the 
                                                 
199 Davis, Abstract Painting in America, n.f.  
200 Ibid.  
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amoeba confronted the square. It is an example of extremes (if not an extreme example) 
for demonstration purposes. In Davis’ show, the biomorphic is one amongst many forms. 
The organic metaphor is an apt one in this case, to return to Davis’ suggestion that 
abstract art is “alive” —that is “changes, moves, grows.” In the 1930s, as the above 
abstract paintings demonstrate, painters found the means to elide forms, moving between 
hard-line abstraction and biomorphic forms, as did Mondrian and Gorky, or, to phrase it 
differently, they moved from composition to composition. 
 A.E. Gallatin’s catalogue of 1936 contained a number of essays by critics and 
curators who were especially well-connected to the European avant-garde: George L.K. 
Morris’ “On America and a Living Art,” James Johnson Sweeney’s “Painting,” and Jean 
Hélion’s “The Evolution of Abstract Art as shown in the Museum of Living Art.”201 Each 
essayist offered an assessment of the formative dynamics each felt were at play. For 
example, Morris and Johnson both envisioned an abstract art independent of illusionism. 
Morris wrote an essay on the historical genesis of an American art (and the difficulties 
faced in creating such an art on par with the achievements of European painting). He 
located American abstraction as the result of a quest: “And there is no direction more 
tantalizing and more beset with impediments than this journey backward in search of 
significant form.”202 In an obvious reference to the work of Clive Bell, Morris saw art as 
becoming natural again through the pursuit of an historically-distilled [generated] pure 
                                                 
201 Morris’s essay was written in November 1936; Sweeney’s essay in October 1933; Hélion’s essay in 
1933. NB: the catalogue contains no folios. All the following citations are from the first edition printed in 
December 1936.  
202 A reference to the term first used by Clive Bell (1881–1964) in his 1913 treatise, Art, to denote the 
essential sensory import of the work of art. See Clive Bell, Art (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1913).  
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form. (Morris’ criticism of the AAA as published in Partisan Review and elsewhere will 
be discussed at greater length in a subsequent chapter of this dissertation.)  
 In his own essay, Sweeney saw no impediment to the painters of his time, those 
“plastic grammarians,” taking the next, logical step towards complete abstraction. In the 
process of stripping bare the art of painting “to the pelt,” illusionism has been (and should 
continue to be) the prime target of modern painters. Painting would, in the hands of the 
moderns, these “plastic grammarians,” come into its own—finally. By way of fellow 
feeling, Sweeney concludes with Hans Arp’s famous phrase, “I like nature but not its 
substitutes.”203 Abstract painting, true abstract painting, apparently, would offer not a 
simulacrum but the thing itself. It is useful to note that both Sweeney and Morris 
understood pure abstraction, pure plasticity, as coming from some (art-historical) place—
as having a point of origin. This is to suggest that they saw the abstract painter, despite 
surface appearances, as working in something other than a void. It’s rather like one 
theory of the origins of the Earth’s moon: where, through gravitational pull, some of the 
Earth’s own matter dislodged from its surface to form the lunar body—formed, separate, 
and lifeless despite regular movement.  
 Of particular interest for the task of this dissertation is Hélion’s essay where he 
deployed an organic dialectic to account for the change over time. Competing tendencies 
vied, he argued, to keep painting stable, vital, alive:  
It is a kind of breathing phenomenon: one opens, one shuts. To keep 
painting from bursting in scrolls, the tendency of Ingres is necessary. To 
keep painting from shrinking into sterilized statuettes, the tendency of 
Delacroix is needed. This movement of opening and shutting takes the 
most complex aspects, follows the most different reasons, and always 
destroys something. 
                                                 
203 For the circulation of this quote in 1930s art criticism, see n. 195. 
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Hélion went on in his essay to write a general assessment of then-contemporary art: the 
Cubists, the Surrealists, Abstract Art. It’s an essay written with the confidence  that 
general typologies for any of the above-mentioned movements have been previously 
established in the reader’s mind. It is significant that he paused before the work of the 
Uruguayan painter, Joaquin Torres-Garcia (1874–1949), who, Hélion argued, occupied:  
[A]n independent position. Rich in all that has been discovered since 
Cubism, he has made for himself an alphabet of natural forms, keys, 
fishes, boats, doors, people, condensed into signs that he builds together 
like walls. To the naturalistic description, he has substituted an 
enunciation of hieroglyphics freshly inscribed in a masterful checkerboard 
of color.204 
 
Two paintings (and one construction) by Torres-Garcia were included in the Gallatin 
Collection, though not reproduced in the catalogue itself. These are: Composition (1929) 
and Head (1930). The 1929 composition (fig. 18) had been previously exhibited in the 
first (and only) exhibition of Cercle et Carré in Paris in April of 1930.205 Torres-Garcia 
had co-founded this group with the writer Michel Seuphor (1901–99) in 1929. Perhaps 
Hélion, friend and colleague to the painter, and himself one of the founders of Art 
Concret in 1930, admired the universal forms of the abstract self-expression in Torres-
Garcia’s composition. An asymmetrical grid of lines falls across the surface of the 
painting; the grid-lines give way to, or merge with, these “alphabet forms,” universals, 
but here deployed by Torres-Garcia for his own purposes (“made for himself”). The form 
of a woman at left stands on legs that are also an in-set grid; curvilinear forms in the 
center suggesting a ship’s prow (the means of his father’s profession) break through the 
                                                 
204 For reference to the hieroglyphics of Torres-Garcia as explicitly Pre-Columbian motifs, see Michael 
Leja, Reframing Abstract Expressionism, 90. See also Torres-Garcia’s own essay, Metafísica de la 
prehistoria indoamericana (Montevideo, 1935).  
205 Joaquín Torres-Garcia (Providence: Museum of Art at the Rhode Island School of Design, 1970): 47 
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larger grid; several circles are marked with ‘V’ that suggest the face (of a clock). The 
painting was something “freshly inscribed” that maintained the Cubist grid (“rich in all 
that had been learned…a checkerboard”). However, the grid that he created is interfered 
with by another overall grid that he chose: the burlap support of the painting, which has a 
weave far more pronounced than that of traditional canvas. Torres-Garcia offered a 
painting, in its delicacy of line work, that insisted upon its status as an art object—a 
different kind of substitute for nature.  
 The encounter between the body of Hélion (writing as a critic in this particular case) 
and the body of work by Torres-Garcia in Gallatin’s gallery is emblematic of the kind of 
cross-cultural or trans-Atlantic experience that that gallery engendered. (A subsequent 
section of this chapter examines Morris’ role of intermediary between the American 
Abstract Artists and the Plastique group in Paris.) The 1936 Gallatin catalogue 
demonstrates the presences in New York of a particular discursive tendencies 
surrounding ideas of pure plastic art. The Neo-Plastic was called forth in the work of Piet 
Mondrian (1872–1944), who had been publishing his ideas on the “new consciousness” 
of neo-plasticism since 1919.206 Over the course of the next twenty years, Mondrian 
wrote of a perceived changing consciousness: one moving away from natural things 
towards abstraction. This new consciousness was given form in the new plasticism: in 
straight lines and primary colors. He equated the new plasticism with pure painting, that 
is, it is a pictorial means. The new plasticism, he argued, was the expression of the 
universal within us, and was therefore, the representation of a duality: “through the 
                                                 
206 See Mondrian, “Dialoog ove de Nieuwe Beelding,” De Stijl (February and March, 1919); Le Néo-
Plasticisme: Principe général de l’équivalence plastique (Paris: Galerie de l’Effort Moderne, 1920); Plastic 
Art and Pure Plastic Art,” in Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art, 1937 and Other Essays, 1941–1943, ed. 
Robert Motherwell (New York: Wittenborn, 1945): 50–4.   
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reconstruction of the cosmic relations it is a direct expression of the universal; by its 
rhythm, by the material reality of its plastic form, it expresses the artist’s individual 
subjectivity.”207  The neo-plastic, he concluded, “unfolds before us a world of universal 
beauty without thereby renouncing the human element.”208 
 Paris in the 1930s witnessed a number of configurations (and re-configurations) of the 
polemicist geometers in painting—those Neo-Plasticist painters traveling in circles 
around Mondrian. Torres-Garcia, Hélion, and Morris all had foundational roles or 
connections with some (or all) of the organization of the Paris-based Neo-Plasticists. 
Cercle et Carré was short-lived: Torres-Garcia split with Seuphor, who went on to found 
Abstraction-Création in February of 1931. This group, which lasted until 1936, reunited 
many of the Cercle et Carré artists, including Sophie Täuber-Arp (1889–1943). Theo van 
Doesburg (1883–1931), however, refused to join this new group, and instead formed Art 
Concret with Hélion.  After van Doesburg’s sudden death in 1931, the group carried on 
until 1945 largely through the efforts of the Swiss artist, Max Bill (1908–1994).  
 When Barr stated his preference for the term “abstract” over that of “non-objective,” 
it was not a case of mere semantic preference. One could argue that Barr’s choice was a 
pointed refutation of the theories of the Baroness Hilla Rebay (1890–1967), artist, art 
advisor to the Guggenheim family, and first curator of the Museum of Non-Objective 
Painting, which was established in 1939, and renamed the Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Museum in 1959. The Guggenheim collection of non-objective painting was put on 
exhibition several times in the 1930s at venues outside of New York (until the 1939 
exhibition): at the Guggenheim estate in Charleston, South Carolina and in Philadelphia. 
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The Baroness had defined with precision her chosen term, the “non-objective,” in her 
own catalogue essay of 1936. “Non-Objective painting,” she wrote, “represents no object 
or subject known to us on earth.”209 As someone deeply engaged with Theosophy of 
Madame Helena Blavatsky (1831–91), she ascribed spiritual or mystical properties to 
non-objective painting. A discursive chasm separates the play of the term non-objective 
from other terms in circulation in this time period—a chasm that was to be replicated in 
later discursive trends in scholarship.210 The purpose of this dissertation is not to bridge 
this gap, but to mind it—by drawing attention to the discursive patterns that surrounded 
this term in the 1930s. In claiming to represent “non-objects,” critics of this iteration of 
the “non-objective” movement both friendly (such as Rebay) and those less so agreed 
mutually on the terms of these paintings. 211 These works were seen as things out of this 
world, or not of this world. For example, several members of the American Abstract 
Artists group, which is discussed in a subsequent chapter, wrote a letter of protest to Art 
Front to object to Rebay’s ideas that abstract art had “no meaning” and represented 
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“nothing.”212 To these AAA painters, there was a world of difference between the 
abstract painter who “identifies himself with life” and the non-objective painter who is 
“not conscious of or contemptuous of the world about him.”213  
 If the goal of non-objective painting was to transcend the known world and to render 
the invisible visible, many of the works in the Guggenheim collection took the form of a 
hard-edged, geometric abstraction.214 In 1937, Guggenheim himself was photographed 
for Time in front of Rudolph Bauer’s Tetraptychon of 1930 (fig. 19).215  In general terms, 
the dislocation of non-objective painting may have been symptomatic of the larger, 
formal dislocation of geometric abstraction—the kind which Barr identified ca. 1936. 
However, as the recent work of Maurice Tuchman and Rose Carol Washton-Long has 
demonstrated, the discrediting of non-objective painting as the painting of utopian or 
spiritual vision was in fact the consequence of politics. As Washton-Long has recently 
argued, the Expressionism and abstraction of Kandinsky, who was claimed by the non-
objective painters such as Bauer and Rebay, was criticized by some European 
intellectuals on the far left for its “decadence, anarchism, mysticism, and 
bohemianism.”216 Tuchman’s work has shown that the mystical or occultist beliefs 
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prevalent in the early decades of the 20th century became suspect with their later 
associations with fascism in Nazi Germany.217 Perhaps most importantly in terms of the 
discrediting of the category of the Non-Objective, some Marxist analyses of fascism in 
the 1930s presented that doctrine as a kind of mysticism itself. In his book Fascism and 
Big Business, Daniel Guérin dedicated a chapter to the subject of fascistic mysticism. In 
this chapter, he argued that, as a doctrine, fascism offered its “troops…first, mysticism; 
and then social demagogy.”218 How else could fascism be effective, Guérin concluded. 
To demonstrate his point, he cited a number of polemics and utterances by Hitler and by 
Benito Mussolini.219 It was the latter who had earlier claimed that: “Nothing great can be 
accomplished except in a state of loving passion, of religious mysticism.”220 In the eyes 
of some socially-concerned critics, the connective tissue between fascism and mysticism 
and the realm of the non-objective was clear and present in its great threat to society.221 
Perhaps most famously, Meyer Schapiro had deeply-felt concerns about the role of 
abstract art in culture.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
parts, Literatur und Kritik, 7 & 8 (October and November 1966): 44–54, 45–55. This debate will be 
discussed in a subsequent section of this dissertation.  
217 For a discussion of the origins of the Nazi theory of Aryan supremacy as indebted to a version of 
Theosophy, see Tuchman, “Hidden Meanings in Abstract Art,” in the Spiritual in Art, 17–61, especially 
18–19. See also, John Dewey’s later assessment of Hitler’s rise to power: “Hitler repeatedly stated that the 
cause of Germany’s weakness, the weakness which produced its defeat, was ‘spiritual’ (geistige) and that 
therefore its redemption must also first of all be spiritual.” See Dewey, “Hitler’s National Socialism,” in 
German Philosophy and Politics, rev. ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1942): 19.  
218 Daniel Guérin, Fascism and Big Business, intro., Dwight Macdonald, trans., Frances and Mason Merrill 
(New York: Pioneer Press, 1939): 54. Emphasis in the original. Originally published as Fascisme et grand 
capital (Paris: Gallimard, 1936). It was introduced to English-speaking readers in 1939 under the aegis of 
Macdonald, who was at that time still an editor at Partisan Review. As a similar example, in his 1939 story 
School for Dictators, Ignazio Silone subtitled one passage, “On Fascist mythology, its obscurities, its 
fetishes, and its idols, and on the modern technique of hypnotizing and subduing the masses.” For the initial 
publication of a passage from this story, see Partisan Review 6:1 (Fall 1938): 20–42.  
219 Guérin, Fascism and Big Business, 54–70. 
220 Ibid., 56. The Mussolini quote was spoken in a speech on 5 October, 1922.   
221 For an additional example, see Alfred Duras, “Abstrakt, abstrakter, abstraksesten,” Das Wort 6 (June 
1938): 71–84, and 77–8, especially, for his consideration of mysticism.  
 81 
IV. The (Material) Nature of Abstract Art   
Abstract art had therefore the value of practical demonstration. In these 
new paintings the very processes of designing and inventing seemed to 
have been brought on to the canvas; the pure form once masked by an 
extraneous content was liberated and could now be directly 
perceived….These two aspects of abstract painting, the exclusion of 
natural forms and the unhistorical universalizing of the qualities of art, 
have a crucial importance for the general theory of art.  
 
 ~ Meyer Schapiro, “The Nature of Abstract Art,” 1937222 
 
 The year after he published his essay on the Vienna School, Schapiro published a 
lengthy consideration on abstraction in the Marxist Quarterly in 1937, entitled “The 
Nature of Abstract Art.” The premise of this essay was a review of Barr’s 1936 
catalogue, however the essay ranged far beyond its stated premise. Schapiro made several 
damning charges against Barr’s essay: that Barr cast abstraction as unhistorical 
phenomenon; that he used a language of reified “absolutes” in his categories of near- and 
pure-abstraction; and that, Barr’s analysis lacked a motor to account for change. That 
artists simply grew fatigued with representational art and turned to abstraction is a facile 
understanding of art history—a mere “grandfather theory.”223 It reduces the art of each 
generation to a reactionary resistance to that of the previous one. Rather, in Schapiro’s 
analysis, stylistic divisions in art, as in literature, correspond to “the momentous divisions 
in the history of society.”224  
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 By way of example, Schapiro made a lengthy excursus into the radical art of an 
earlier time and place: French Impressionism. Early Impressionism, Schapiro argued, had 
a “moral aspect” that he demonstrated through a discussion of its historical specificity.225 
Of early Impressionist painting, Schapiro argued that:  
These urban idylls…also reflect in the very choice of subjects and in the 
new esthetic devices of the conception of art as solely a field of individual 
enjoyment, without reference to ideas and motives, and they presuppose 
the cultivation of these pleasures as the highest field of freedom for an 
enlightened bourgeois detached from the official beliefs of his class.226  
 
Impressionist painting, therefore, coincided with a radical break in society: that of the 
emergence of the class-consciousness of the bourgeoisie. For Schapiro, Impressionist 
painting represented the coming to consciousness of the bourgeoisie and their awareness 
of individual freedom (and a concomitant sense of “helpless isolation in an anonymous 
indifferent mass” by “those imaginative members of the middle class who accepted the 
norms of freedom, but lacked the financial means to obtain them).227 To extrapolate then, 
early examples of abstraction in the 1930s may have been understood by some critics to 
have had a “moral aspect.”228 
 The point of this detour through the café scenes, picnics, and boating outings, in 
Schapiro’s essay, is to discover the ‘moral aspect’ of then-contemporary abstraction, to 
recover abstraction from the pitfalls of a kind of formalism, into which Barr had fallen in 
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in 1939 published a radical critique of the paintings executed during the revolutions of 1848. See Milton 
Brown, “Relative vs. Absolute Criteria in Art,” Dialectics 9 (1938). 
226 Ibid.,  83. 
227 Ibid., 83.  
228 Perhaps the most well-known citation of this essay in recent scholarship was made by T.J. Clark in 1984. 
That the art of Manet and his followers had a “moral aspect,” as Schapiro had argued it, became the 
premise of Clark’s book. See The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and his Followers 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 3–5. 
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his own essay, over and again. The dialectic of abstract art, for Schapiro, differed with 
Barr’s art-as-social-pact. In Schapiro’s argument, there was more to the nature of abstract 
work of art than (just) to be looked at. Contrary to Barr, Schapiro argued, the abstract 
artist rendered judgment on the world by his choices, what his choose to omit in his 
painting: “such and such aspects of experience are alien to art…he disqualifies them from 
art.” A case in point between the two scholars is the art of the Italian Futurists. Barr 
characterizes Futurism on the whole as an example of near abstraction (that which still 
refers to the physical world, even if obliquely, ominously, in the case of the Futurists); 
Schapiro argues that neither Futurism nor mechanical abstraction can be explained as “a 
simple reflection of the existing machine.”229  These styles, he argued, arise not because 
machines are the modern form of production, but because of the “values assigned to the 
human being and the machine in ideologies projected by the conflicting interests and 
situation in society.” These situations differed from country to country. As Barr did not 
attend to the social circumstances of art and the artist, he could not explain why Futurism 
took hold in Italy in particular. Schapiro filled this gap with a material analysis of the 
situation in Italy. Schapiro concluded: “Whereas the mobility in Impressionism was a 
spectacle for relaxed enjoyment, in Futurism, it is urgent and violent, a precursor to 
war.”230  
 Schapiro had doubts as to what other forms of abstraction might portend.231 What 
Barr termed “biomorphic abstraction,” Schapiro described as a “violent or nervous 
                                                 
229 Schapiro, “The Nature of Abstract Art,” 94. 
230 Ibid., p. 96. 
231 See a later essay by Schapiro, one more confident about abstract art as an avant-garde art form: “The 
Liberating Quality of Avant-Garde Art,” ArtNews 56 (Summer 1956): 36–42. While Schapiro modified his 
view on the potential of abstraction as a new field of discovery for “form-construction and expression,” he 
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calligraphy” or “amoeboid forms, a soft, low-grade matter pulsing in an empty space,” or 
a kind of nihilist neo-Romanticism inspired by the irrationality of the Surrealists.232 The 
valuation of this irrationality was symptomatic of the continuing violent crisis in 
culture—the Surrealists who were birthed by the Dadaists, who had in turn, “issued” 
from the crisis of the Great War.233 The pessimistic and catastrophic imagery of the 
painters who were informed by the Surrealists did not bode well for an end to crisis. Just 
the opposite (and Schapiro was not wrong on this front). In general, Schapiro wrote of 
abstract painting that: “It bears within itself at almost every point the mark of the 
changing material and psychological conditions surrounding modern culture.”234 An 
abstract painting, to Schapiro, bore the markers that pointed to external, material 
conditions. He did not, as Barr did (or Davis) insisted less on the formal qualities of the 
abstract work in material terms. It’s a difference: it depends on what one means by 
‘material’.  While Schapiro may have ceded some ground of the autonomy of the work of 
art, he held the category of art as a distinct one within general culture. At least one writer 
questioned him on this distinction.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
[T]he critical-evaluating focus which the artist directs upon his 
perceptions [is itself] derived from some social basis; but if the artist is 
important, the focus will be literally an imaginative choice among the 
several alternatives which the social base suggests.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
maintained the opinion, held in 1937, that abstract artists had “freed themselves from the necessity of 
representation.” See Schapiro, “The Nature of Abstract Art,” 37.  
232 Wallace Spencer Baldinger arrived at a conclusion in late 1937 similar to that of Schapiro. Baldinger 
drew a formal comparison between the abstract watercolors of Robert Jay Wolff and those abstract painters 
active during the Great War. “The resulting implications,” Baldinger concluded, “might well give us 
pause.” See Wallace Spencer Baldinger, “Formal Change in Recent American Painting,” The Art Bulletin, 
19 (December 1937): 580-591. The citation above is on p. 591. 
233 Schapiro, “The Nature of Abstract Art,” 98. 
234 Ibid., 90–91. 
 85 
 ~ Delmore Schwartz, “A Note on the Nature of Art,” 1937235 
 
Far from being an inherent principle in art, the deliberate, individual 
criticism and evaluation of social facts, the distinction of social values of 
the artist from the values of the world he depicts, is a recently acquired 
function, and even in modern times does not appear in all the arts.  
 
 ~ Meyer Schapiro, “A Note on the Nature of Art (A Reply to  
   Delmore Schwartz),” 1937236 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 Barr did not respond to Schapiro’s essay (in print at least); Delmore Schwartz (1913–
1966), the writer, did. Schwarz wondered in print if Schapiro would find the same social 
facts in any other cultural product: a pulp novel, for example. Didn’t the intentions of the 
artist count for something? Schwartz, coming from the left, faulted Schapiro for 
neglecting the expressive choices—the valuational choices— an individual painter or 
writer makes is creating his work. Schwartz’s brief, if tragic, career would be launched 
the next year with the publication of In Dreams Begin Responsibilities, a collection of 
short stories that would earn him a place amongst the writers of the Partisan Review 
circle. In what is a brief and generally measured response, Schwartz offered several 
canonical examples from literature where the protagonist critiques nature by offering up a 
critical mirror of sorts. None of the examples were more expressive of Schwarz’s point of 
view than his quotation of James Joyce’s celebrated paean to modernist artistic/self 
creation from Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: “‘Welcome, O life! I go to encounter 
for the millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the 
                                                 
235 Delmore Schwartz, “A Note on the Nature of Art,” The Marxist Quarterly, 1:2 (April–June, 1937): 309.  
236 Schapiro, “A Note on the Nature of Art (A Reply to Delmore Schwartz),” The Marxist Quarterly 1:2 
(April–June, 1937): 311.  
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uncreated conscience of my race.’”237  Schwartz concluded that the proper stance before 
the work of art was to behold it as a convergence: “mirror, virtue’s feature, criticism, the 
reality of experience and the uncreated conscience.”238  However, to grasp the importance 
of the work of art, and the pleasure yielded by the phenomenon, these criteria had to be 
held separately within discourse.   
 Schapiro agreed that the expressive critique was a part of the individual artist’s job 
description, but a newly-acquired one. It was a condition particular (or, specific) to 
modernity. Schapiro also did not want his argument caricatured by Schwartz: “Nor would 
I…agree that the comic strip and abstract painting have the same social origins, though 
their causes may intersect.”239 Schwartz had, in Schapiro’s estimation, fallen into the 
pitfalls of trying to avoid the pitfalls of formalism. We read Joyce, Schapiro argued, 
because of his “focus, i.e. a style or form, superior to the forms of others,” not necessarily 
for his critique of modern culture or for his values.240 If, he continued, we viewed art as 
little other than a critique of society, then precisely what is ignored is the professional 
consciousness of the artist: his awareness of his technique and the type/form of his art. 
This consciousness of artistic inheritance is at play in the work of art with the expressive 
choices of the artist, Schapiro concluded.  
 
V. The Cézanne Effect, ca. 1939241   
                                                 
237 Schwartz, “A Note on the Nature of Art,” 310. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Schapiro, “A Note on the Nature of Art (A Reply to Delmore Schwartz),” 311.  
240 Ibid., p. 313.  
241 See Richard Shiff, “Mark, Motif, Materiality: The Cézanne Effect in the Twentieth Century,” in 
Cézanne: Finished, Unfinished, ed. Felix Baumann (Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz, 2000): 99–123. 
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 Maurice Denis’ 1939 essay, “L’aventure posthume de Cézanne,” as discussed in the 
introduction to this dissertation, would prove to be an essential source for critics of mid-
century abstraction. In his essay, Denis considered the painter’s technique: that which 
was proper to Cézanne and that of painters in general. Denis, a painter as well as a critic, 
was writing of very close things, as one of the points of his essay was to demonstrate the 
consequence of Cézanne’s technique on painters working after him—his after-effect. 
Denis demonstrated the point via a comment made by, Paul Sérusier (1864–1927), a 
fellow painter in the Nabis. On the older painter’s celebrated apples, Sérusier had said: 
“He is a true painter…Of a common painted apple, one says ‘I’d like to eat it’. Of an 
apple by Cézanne, one says, ‘It’s beautiful. One wouldn’t dare peel it; one would prefer 
to copy it.”242 This conception of Cézanne’s art does well to explain the effect exercised 
by the painter’s work on then-contemporary painting. This wasn’t a new conception of 
art, just the latest iteration of it. As Denis went on to argue in his essay: “All painters, and 
especially the colorists, have translated nature into touches of color; Tintoretto, for 
example, used color schemes in certain still-lifes identical to those of Cézanne.”243 To 
translate nature into a system of colored marks on the surface of a canvas was a 
primordial necessity of the art of painting, he concluded.  
 Denis had been working with these ideas of painting-as-abstraction since his youth; 
his 1939 essay was not the first adumbration of them. An earlier essay, “Définition du 
                                                 
242 Maurice Denis, “L’aventure posthume de Cézanne,” Promethée (July 1939): 194.  In the original: “Il est 
un peintre pur…D’une pomme d’un peintre vulgaire, on dit: j’en mangerais. D’une pomme de Cézanne, on 
dit: c’est beau. On n’oserait pas le peler, on voudrait la copier.” 
243 Ibid., 193. In the original: Tous les peintres, et surtout les coloristes, ont traduit la nature en taches de 
couleur; Tintoret par example, dont le chromatisme est dans certaines natures mortes identique à celui de 
Cézanne. 
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néo-traditionnisme,” written when the critic was only 20, began with this now-famous 
citation: 
It is well to remember that a picture—before being a war-horse, a nude 
woman, or some anecdote—is essentially a flat surface covered with 
colors assembled in a certain order.244 
  
For the purposes of the dissertation at hand, it is significant to note that Denis’ essay was 
re-published in English by a New York publisher in 1945, in a volume entitled Artists on 
Art, a survey of artists’ writings from the fourteenth through the twentieth centuries.245 
 In his 1939 essay, Denis wrote on the difference between geometric abstraction and 
that which he termed distorted abstractions (déformations). Barr, in his 1936 
juxtaposition of Miró and Mondrian, had written of this difference as the square facing 
off with the amoeba. Denis, rather, wrote of an earlier version of the dilemma: the 
déformations of Cézanne compared to those of his fellow post-Impressionists, Paul 
Gauguin and Vincent Van Gogh. Referring to Cézanne, Denis wrote that: “The tentative 
strokes [faux traits] that he neglects to erase, in seeking the forms, have nothing of the 
systematic nor geometric.”246 By contrast, for the use of willed distortions, one would do 
well to look to the work of the others: “It is by way of Gauguin and Van Gogh that we 
                                                 
244 Maurice Denis, “Définition du Néo-traditionnisme,” in Théories 1890–1910: Du Symbolisme et de 
Gauguin vers un nouvel ordre classique (Paris: Bibliothèque de l’Occident, 1912): 1. This essay was 
initially published in Paris in Art et Critique (23 and 30 August, 1890) under the pen-name of Pierre-Louis. 
In the original: “Se rappeler qu’un tableau—avant d’être un cheval de bataille, une femme nue, ou une 
quelconque anecdote—est  essentiellement une surface plane recouverte de couleurs en un certain ordre 
assemblées.”  
245 See Artists on Art: From the XIV to the XX Century, eds. Robert Goldwater and Marco Treves, (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1945): 379–381. An editorial note on page 379 states that Denis wrote the essay at 
the request of Lugné-Poë, who in 1893, with Camille Mauclair and Édouard Vuillard, founded the famous 
Théatre de l’Oeuvre.  
246 Maurice Denis, “L’aventure posthume de Cézanne,”194.  In the original: “Les faux traits qu’il négligee 
d’effacer, en cherchant la forms, n’ont rien de systématique ou de géometrique.” 
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arrive at the willful deformations that are the origin of the abstract art of the Twentieth 
Century.”247 
 Later, in a 1960s talk on Pop art, Greenberg, made his own reference to Cézanne and 
his contemporaries.248 At first, as Greenberg argued, the opposition was between a 
naturalistic, or “deadpan art,” and a literary one—the now-familiar binary of an art of 
sensation versus an art of ideas.249 While, eventually, it was “flat, unrealistic painting that 
captured the notion of ‘purity,’” the formal issues were not so readily resolved in the 
work of the post-Impressionists, Symbolists, and, of course, the Nabis. The work of the 
latter two groups, while decidedly “literate,” was more emphatic in asserting its flatness, 
more decorative, and more abstract than the seemingly-naturalistic art of Cézanne. In 
turn, as Greenberg related in an anecdote , Cézanne dismissed the work of van Gogh and 
Gauguin, characterizing them to Emile Bernhard as “Chinese paintings.” The notion of 
pure painting, Greenberg continued, no matter how else construed: 
…remained identified with the anti-literary, and this idea reigned supreme 
in avant-garde art during the first twenty years of this century: Both the 
Fauves and the Cubists and their offshoots simply took it for granted that 
serious and ambitious painting had to be anti-literary. 
 
Critics like Denis located the pictorial process of designing and inventing on the surface 
of the canvas, and argued, indeed, that it had always been there. What was historical or 
specific, if one were to use Schapiro’s terms, is that this process was made manifest, self-
evident, by modern painters. Denis’ emphasis on the painterly process and his focus on 
                                                 
247 Ibid., In the original: C’est de Gauguin et de Van Gogh que nous viennent les déformations volontaires 
qui sont à l’origine de l’art abstrait du XXe siècle. 
248 Clement Greenberg, “Pop Art,” the Clement Greenberg Papers, The Getty Research Institute, Box 30 
(Lectures, 1961-1979, n.d.). Lecture unpublished in his lifetime, though recently published in ArtForum 43 
(October 2004): 51–55. All quotations from p. 51 of the ArtForum edition. 
249 For a similar iteration of this idea, see Ralph M. Pearson, “The Failure of the Art Critics, III,” Forum 
and Century 44 (November–January, 1936): 54–59, especially his comments on the art criticism of Thomas 
Craven. 
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the medium of painting would later be worked out in the practice of later American art 
critics. Greenberg’s later insistence on the resistance of the medium and the delimitation 
of the flat support is but one such example. However, as Greenberg’s citation 
demonstrates, literary art did not necessarily equate with representational art, in the strict 
sense of the word. 
 In his 1936 catalogue essay, Barr made no claims for the reasons for the increasing 
prominence (or critical awareness) of biomorphic abstraction; he only observed that is 
seemed to be eclipsing geometric abstractions. In his critique of Barr’s essay, Schapiro 
was right to note that Barr offered no causal factors for this shift, this movement. While 
Schapiro looked to external stressors on paintings to account for their changes, Barr, for 
one, looked to internal characteristics to account for shifts in appearance. However, the 
two critics seem to agree in the division between the two categories, the dualism of the 
types of painting. Barr’s distinction between an abstract art of Pythagoras versus that of 
Plotinus, cited at the beginning of this chapter, suggests that he saw geometric abstraction 
as a literary art, an art of ideas—painted from a position rather than through a Plotinian 
process. It would seem that in the 1930s, biomorphic abstraction represented (to painters, 
to critics) the most direct continuation of pure painting (to borrow terms from Denis and 
Sérusier). Perhaps the analyses of Barr and Schapiro are closer in their understanding 
than appears on the surface. Greenberg, for his part, placed the dislocation of “the quasi-
geometrical as the dominant mode in New York abstract art” slightly later in time, to ca. 
1943.250 This was, Greenberg continued, another “instance of that cyclical alteration of 
painterly and non-painterly which has marked the evolution of Western art (at 
                                                 
250 Greenberg, “After Abstract Expressionism,” 25.  
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progressively shorter intervals after Manet) since the 16th century.”251 Greenberg wasn’t 
alone in his assessment. In 1943, members of the FMPS announced in their exhibition 
statement that America was the recognized nexus for the art world. As such, they 
concluded: “it is time for us to accept cultural values on a truly global plane.”252 The 
consequences of this statement are considered in the next chapter.  
 In this chapter, I have drawn out distinctions about abstract painting because critics of 
the time dwelled upon those terms, or ascribed characteristics to this category of painting, 
or defined and contained this category of painting. A curator, such as Barr, by choosing 
European and European-informed Cubist and abstract art, could make claims for this type 
of representation as a kind of avant-garde, but this would prove to be one set of 
valuational claims amongst several. At one point in his 1936 essay, Barr noted that the he 
wrote at what he saw as an art-historical juncture: the geometric square facing off with 
the non-geometric amoeba; or, hard-edge abstraction facing off with a biomorphic form. 
What, in 1936, had been placed under the rubric of ‘non-geometrical abstraction’ (as 
defined in the negative) would continue to expand to other terms, other than the 
Surrealist-inspired biomorphisms, to include gestural mark-making systems as well. This 
is the subject of the following chapter: where gesture and expression will interfere with 
the square and the amoeba.  
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The Appearance of a Break 
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I. Clichés and Abstractions in the 1930s, Revisited 
Si le jury ne tient pas un peu rigeur à ces simplifications excessives, il se 
trouvera, avant deux ou trois ans, un peinture qui nous représentera le 
Talus des Fortifications vu d’en bas: un tableau à deux teintes; un ton vert, 
puis un ton gris ou bleu pour le ciel; et cela très-juste comme valeur et 
comme effet. 
 
~ Ernest Chesneau, L’Art et les artistes moderne en France et en  
 Angleterre, 1864253  
 
When I was in Paris this spring, I saw a lot of Tscuplitski. I admire his 
work so tremendously. Of course, it’s frightfully abstract now—frightfully 
abstract and frightfully intellectual.…He’d given up the third dimension 
when I was there and was just thinking of giving up the second. Soon, he 
says, there’ll be just the blank canvas. That’s the logical conclusion. 
Complete abstraction. 
 
 ~ Mary Bracegirdle to Gombauld in Aldous Huxley’s Crome  
 Yellow, 1922254  
 
By now it has been established, it would seem, that the irreducible essence 
of pictorial art consists in but two constitutive conventions or norms: 
flatness and the delimitation of flatness; and that the observance of merely 
these two norms is enough to create an object which can be experienced as 
a picture: thus a stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists as a picture— 
though not necessarily as a successful one.  
 




 Art critics, amongst others, have been concerned for some time about painting being 
reduced, absurdly, to its common denominators: broad strokes of colored pigments 
applied to a support, or—in extremis—a blank canvas tacked upon a wall. The negation 
of painterly conventions in the 1930s seemed to be coming to an end or a dead end—as if 
                                                 
253 Ernest Chesneau, L'Art et les artistes modernes en France et en Angleterre (Paris: Didier, 1864): 195. 
Cited in Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism: A Study in the Theory, Technique, and Critical 
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254 Aldous Huxley, Crome Yellow (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922): 115–116. This is a 
possible reference to the abstract work of Pavel Tchelitchew (1898–1957), which he abandoned in the early 
1920s in favor of a more mystical, representational style. 
255 Clement Greenberg, “After Abstract Expressionism,” 27–8.  
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the tips of the directional arrows of Barr’s 1936 chart were co-terminus with the 
delimiting space-time edges of the chart itself. It seemed to other critics, academics, and 
painters (those who practiced abstraction, at least) that they were working in a wake, 
specifically that of late Cubism and of Surrealism.256 The process of making a painting—
the assembling of Denis’ taches in a certain order—was becoming more apparent in the 
modernist painting, and nowhere more so than on the surface of, at least, some abstract 
paintings. How much farther could the conventions of painting be played with before the 
effect of a painting hinged entirely on its values for effect, as Chesneau feared? Or, 
before the material world was dispatched entirely from the surface of the canvas 
altogether, or a blank canvas hung on a gallery wall, unsuccessful yet acclaimed? As 
Greenberg noted in 1962, the threat of the blank canvas was—or, at least seemed to be—
the ultimate, reduction of his theorizations on modernist (abstract) painting.  
 William Schack (1898–1988), the art and theatre critic, seized upon the importance of 
experience in his brief essays on abstraction.257 In 1934, Schack wrote a two-part essay 
                                                 
256 See, for example: Peter Blume, “After Surrealism,” The New Republic 80 (October 1934) and James 
Thrall Soby, After Picasso (Hartford: Edwin Valentine Mitchell; New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 
1935); James Johnson Sweeney, “A Note on Abstract Painting,” The New Republic (17 July, 1935): 280. 
On the passing of abstraction as a phase: Peter Blume, “Will Abstract Art Survive?” The New Republic, 98 
(April 19, 1939) and W.S. Baldinger, “Formal Changes in Recent American Painting,” The Art Bulletin, 19 
(December 1937): 580–91; Walter Abell, “The Limits of Abstraction,” American Magazine of Art, 28 
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148–49 et passim; and, even later, Clement Greenberg, “Review of Joan Miró, Fernand Léger, and Wassily 
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Painting: Its Tendency and Meaning (New York, London: John Lane, 1915). Also cited in William Schack, 
“On Abstract Painting,” American Magazine of Art 28 (September 1935): 470–5. See also by Schack, “On 
Abstract Sculpture,” American Magazine of Art 28 (November 1935): 580–8. In addition to writing on 
Yiddish theatre in New York, Schack was a member of the American Artists Group, an association of 
American artists that sought to create “an authoritative parallel literature of contemporary American art.” 
This series began with The Handbook of the American Artists Group, Number One (New York: American 
Artists Group, 1935). The series continued with John Sloan’s The Gist of Art: Principles and Practise [sic] 
Expounded in the Classroom and Studio (New York: American Artists Group, 1939). The series also 
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for the Magazine of Art: “On Abstract Painting” and “On Abstract Sculpture.”258 
Schack’s essay on painting was reassuring to the reader who might have been skeptical of 
this new type of American painting: he traced the lineage of established painters such as 
Georgia O’Keeffe and John Marin to the earlier landscapes of Cézanne (figs. 20–22). 
These artists, who worked in an abstract mode, clearly retained an experiential 
relationship with the outside world and transmitted this through their art. By proxy, this 
art was both mimetic and, in Schack’s own tautological phrase, “a medium of 
exchange.”259 Walter Abell (1897–1956), the Canadian art historian, responded to Schack 
by arguing that abstraction was passing into art history at that very moment—into its 
“Gotterdammerung.”260 Far from the humor of the blank canvas, the abstractionist, Abell 
argued, could not escape representation: representation would always work its way back 
into the picture. This was because abstraction had failed in its mission to equal the art of 
representation, which had historically attained a higher “degree of richness and 
amplitude…in the creation of aesthetic form.”261 It had failed to be a medium of 
exchange; abstraction, especially in its purest form, was “insignificant” in its form.262 In 
the end, the “decorative” abstractions that Abell had seen were unnatural: if they 
                                                                                                                                                 
included Guy Pène du Bois, Artists Say the Silliest Things (1940), and Schack himself authored And He Sat 
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258 See, William Schack, “On Abstract Painting,” and “On Abstract Sculpture,” The Magazine of Art 
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259 Schack, “On Abstract Painting,” 470.  
260 Walter Abell, “The Limits of Abstraction,” Magazine of Art 28 (December 1935): 735. 
261 This is an adumbration of the essential premise of Abell’s 1936 publication, Representation and Form: 
A Study of the Æsthetic Values in Representational Art, Intro., Arthur Pope (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
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Alfred C. Barnes in The Art in Painting (Merion, Pa: The Barnes Foundation Press, 1925). For an essay 
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262 Abell, “The Limits of Abstraction.” For Clive Bell’s notion of the “significant form,” see his 1913 
volume, Art (Spottiswoode, England: The Ballantyne Press, 1913).  
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represented anything, it was “a forcing of the medium in a direction counter to its natural 
bent.”263 (It would be some years before this kind of named, unnatural tendency would 
meet with approbation in public or in print.)  
 The brief exchange between Schack and Abell is exactly that, pieces in the patterning 
of the discourse, which is to suggest that not all utterances predominate equally. Two of 
the most predominant voices in the discourse on mid-twentieth century American 
painting would come to be, of course, Clement Greenberg and Harold Rosenberg. The 
two critics recalled their experiences of the late 1930s in essays written from the later 
vantage points of 1957 and 1968, respectively. (This more substantive ‘exchange’ is 
discussed below.) Critics contested the historicization of the painterly production of the 
1930s that was practiced in those later decades in terms that might seem familiar to 
current debates on the art and politics of the 1960s and 1970s.264  
 Writing in the catalogue of the 1957 exhibition that would occasion Greenberg’s 
review of the same year, Edwin Denby recalled the vanguard (downtown) painter’s world 
of the1930s. Denby evoked the context of painters in the 1930s—their social 
circumstances, quite literally, one might suggest, as Denby’s essay nominally on the 
emergence of the New York School takes the form of a recollection of the nascent days 
of his friendships with Willem de Kooning, Arshile Gorky, and Rudy Burkhardt. He 
wondered at the cliché about downtown painting during the depression years: “The 
accepted idea that everybody had doubts and imitated Picasso and talked politics.” These 
features, he continued, seemed neither remarkable to him in the 1930s nor at the moment 
                                                 
263 Abell, “The Limits of Abstraction,” 738. 
264 In addition to Rosenberg’s essay on the 1930s, see also, Sidney Geist’s 1956 essay where he argued that 
the then-current historical period had its origins in the 1930s with its social crises and public interest in the 
arts. See Geist, “Prelude: The 1930s,” Arts 30 (September 1956): 49–55.  
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of his writing in the 1950s. There are reasons for the accretion of clichés over time: Davis 
broke off his friendship with Gorky, as legend has it, because he, Gorky, “only wanted to 
play,” (or, paint).265 That the cliché might be true or could remain true, one infers from 
Denby’s words, does not mean its terms should not be handled with care.  
 This chapter, in part, examines critical writing on abstract art and on culture in the 
1930s, and how some American painters made the appearance of a break, transitioning—
sometimes quite suddenly—from literary work towards different modes of abstraction by 
the late 1930s. The abstract works of Arshile Gorky (1904–1948) stand in sharp contrast 
to the Picasso-like portrait of himself and his mother (figs. 23 and 24). George L.K. 
Morris (1905–1975) broke from representing the figures of his youthful study with John 
Sloan (fig. 25); his mature work of geometric abstraction remained unphased by his 
engagement as an editor with Partisan Review from 1937 to 1943 (figs. 26 and 27).266 
Throughout the 1930s, de Kooning (1904–1997) shifted rapidly between abstraction and 
figuration—a pattern he would maintain throughout his career (figs. 28 and 29).267 Both 
Mark Rothko (1903–1970) and Adolph Gottlieb (1903–1974) turned away from the 
Expressionist work done as early members of ‘The Ten’. By 1939, the mythical figure 
had largely replaced the literal one in the work of Rothko; in 1949, he would arrive at his 
iconic color panel paintings (figs. 30–32). In his words, this work was a 
                                                 
265 See, Stuart Davis, “Arshile Gorky in the 1930’s: A Personal Recollection,” Magazine of Art 44: 2 
(February 1951): 58.  
266 Immediately following his undergraduate days at Yale, Morris edited The Miscellany (December 1929–
March 1931) with fellow alumni, F.W. Dupee, G.T. Hellman, and Dwight Macdonald. Morris, Dupee, and 
Macdonald would later reconvene in New York City as editors at Partisan Review.  
267 See Richard Shiff, “De Kooning Controlling de Kooning,” in Tracing the Figure (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press with the Museum of Contemporary Art, Los Angeles, 2002): 152–67; and “Abstraction 
Not Abstraction,” De Kooning: A Centennial Exhibition (New York: Gagosian Gallery, 2004): 7–16. 
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“progression…toward clarity.”268 Gottlieb abandoned the literal figure when he settled 
upon his pictographic work ca. 1940; in 1952, the pictographs would give way to his 
equally emblematic burst paintings (figs. 33–35).  The biomorphic work of Jackson 
Pollock (1909–1956) gave way to his celebrated drip painting, a practice, tragically, he 
could not sustain (fig. 36). For some painters, the break was one of politics, not style: 
Stuart Davis (1892–1964) did not change his painterly practices after his break with the 
official Communist Party in 1941 (fig. 37 and 38).  
 The point here is to examine how critics (or, some painters writing as critics), 
negotiated shifts between different types of paintings in the 1930s. This section examines 
shorter works of criticism, practice pieces as well as position pieces, written with 
different degrees of success and acumen, by the more visible contributors to the discourse 
surrounding abstraction: Davis, Morris, Schapiro, and Jacob Kainen, amongst others. 
These critics contributed most visibly to the debates surrounding abstraction in the 1930s 
by writing for radical journals, most famously at Partisan Review, Art Front and 
elsewhere. It should also be noted that all of these critics wrote, or eventually wrote, from 
positions of dissent from the American branch of the Communist Party (CPUSA). As 
dissenters from the major form of political dissent, as it were, they found themselves 
writing for delimited audiences. Rarely, with the possible exception of Kainen’s 
contributions to The Daily Worker, were they in the position of writing for the broad 
audiences that Holger Cahill, for one, had sought to create for American art under the 
                                                 
268 Mark Rothko and Adolph Gottlieb, letter to Edwin Alden Jewell, “A New Flatform and Other Matters: 
‘Globalism’ Pops Into View,” New York Times (13 June 1943): Sec. 2, 9. For a collection of Rothko’s 
figurative work, see Mark Rothko and the Lure of the Figure, 1933–1946, exh. cat. (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Art Gallery, 2001).  
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aegis of the FAP. More often, they found themselves writing for an audience that was 
elite in its self-selection.  
 Making the break comes to mean several things here: the re-ordering plastic forms, 
instincts, or conditions became a descriptor for painting, painterly practice, or a 
metonymic substitute for realms other than painting. Not satisfied with analyzing the 
world, more often than not, critics sought a kind of agency through their work by placing 
the aesthetic in proximity to or in a metonymy with the material world.269 It is important 
to note that almost all critics writing in New York did so in an intellectual context outside 
of the academy, with the notable exception of Schapiro, who was then a young professor 
at Columbia University. Through the 1930s and long afterwards, Schapiro held a division 
of sorts between his scholarly pursuits and politically-informed criticism. His work on 
Medieval art appeared in scholarly journals, while his critical essays on modern art and 
political analyses (sometimes published under the pseudonym of John Quait) appeared in 
Marxist journals. The point was to get the get the word out (or, to “bring news” to 
“comrades” as Rosenberg wrote in his first poem published in Partisan Review).270 The 
goal was not (or, not yet) to get tenure.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
                                                 
269 By way of example, Walter Benjamin made such a rhetorical move in a 1934 essay, with reference to the 
Surrealists: They reached their goal as intellectuals—that is to say, via the longest route possible. For the 
intellectual’s path to the radical critique of the social order is the longest, just as that of the proletariat is the 
shortest.” Walter Benjamin, “Zum gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Standort des französischen 
Schriftstellers,” ZfS. Paris and Frankfurt: Institut fur Sozialforschung (Spring 1934): 78. 
270 Harold Rosenberg, “The Front,” Partisan Review 2:6 (January–February1935): 74. See also, Bertold 
Brecht’s 1933 statement, “You cannot just ‘write the truth’; you have to write it for and to somebody, who 
can do something with it….” Bertolt Brecht, “Kunst und Politik, 1933 bis 1938,” Gesammelte Werke, vol. 
XVIII (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1967): 230. Cited in Phil Slater, Origin and Significance of the Frankfurt 
School (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977): 141.  
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 Two exhibitions of the painting of the 1930s were held in New York City in 1957 and 
1958. 271 Greenberg reviewed “The 30’s: Painting in New York,” which was a modest 
show by the Poindexter Gallery in 1957 to depict (abstract) painterly trends in the 1930s:  
Looking back, I feel that the main question for many of the painters I 
knew was how much personal autonomy they could win within what 
began to look like the cramping limits of Late Cubist abstraction. And it 
was as if the answer has to wait upon the full assimilation of Paris. Not 
that Paris was expected to provide the entire answer, but that New York 
had to catch up with her and collaborate in delivering it.272 
 
Rosenberg surveyed “The 1930’s: Painting and Sculpture in America,” which was 
a larger and putatively more comprehensive exhibition held at the Whitney in the 
autumn of 1968: 
The idea of Beauty, in capital letters, played as important a role in the art 
of the thirties as the idea of Revolution; painting today is separated from 
that of the earlier period by what happened to both these ideas….The 
Whitney interpretation is equivalent to describing Czarist Russia in terms 
of Diaghliev ballet and the Moscow Art Theatre.273 
 
The respective reviews are archetypal of the individual critics in a sense: Greenberg 
directed his comments towards the formal and material issues of the paintings at 
Poindexter show, while Rosenberg focused on the social situation as constructed at the 
Whitney. As his epigraph demonstrates, he put forth an acute review of what he saw as an 
anodyne account of a decade that had coincided with a “genuine historical epoch.” One 
way to understand their differences is to refer back to the differences in individual shows 
themselves: whereas the Poindexter show was a small exhibition that privileged a kind of 
                                                 
271 “The 30’s: New York Painting” was held at the Poindexter from 4 June through 29 June, 1956; “The 
1930s: Painting and Sculpture in America” was held at the Whitney Museum of American Art from 
October 15 through 1 December, 1968.  
272 Greenberg, “New York Painting Only Yesterday,” Art News (Summer 1957): 58.  
273 Rosenberg, “The Art World: The Thirties,” The New Yorker (30 November, 1968): 206. Rosenberg also 
considered the issues of Beauty and Revolution is his1942 contribution to VVV. See Rosenberg, “Life and 
Death of the Amorous Umbrella,” VVV 1 (April 1942): 12–3.  
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painting that emerged as the vanguard in later years, the Whitney shows made claims for 
a kind of historical accuracy. As such (Rosenberg felt) it should have had a more 
representative selection of works. This is a central dilemma that will recur in the criticism 
considered in the dissertation at hand in terms of the critical understanding of the 
vanguard.  
 In recalling the downtown scene of his memory, Greenberg’s essay makes it clear 
within its opening sentences that easy descriptors for the 1930s were and remain 
problematic. He evoked the situation in which most painters in East 8th Street in New 
York City found themselves in the late 1930s: living in poverty and professional 
anonymity save for the high regard of a select few. He described this vicinity as the place 
where the “WPA Art Project and the Hoffman school overlapped,” and where the big 
event was the annual exhibition of the AAA.274 Yet, none of the painters he admired 
(Gorky, de Kooning, John Graham, and Hans Hofmann) figured prominently in the 
WPA; of the four, only Hofmann was attached to his school; and Greenberg argued that 
most abstract painters who attended the AAA shows “learned at least what they did not 
want to do.”275 While many of the painters read the art magazines, it was mostly out of “a 
superstitious regard for print;” however, the black and white reproductions in Cahiers 
d’Art may have allowed the New York painters to develop an independent sense of 
color.276 After all, Hofmann had a better ability to teach Matisse’s color than Matisse 
himself. Rather, Greenberg continued, “abstract art was the main issue,” among the 
painters he knew; “radical politics was on most people’s minds but for them Social 
                                                 
274 Greenberg, “New York Painting Only Yesterday,” 58. 
275 Ibid., 84. Emphasis in the original.  
276 Ibid., 59. 
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Realism was as dead as the American Scene.”277 The point, which has since become 
rendered as ‘Greenbergian’, was for painters to innovate within strictures of late Cubism 
so as to transcend the “provincialism that had been American art’s historic fate.”278 As an 
example of this provincialism—a “sparkling” one—Greenberg offered Davis’ Summer 
Landscape of 1930 (fig. 38) as a minor canvas of the highest order of this kind of 
provincialism “working with taste and personal sensibility inside an area long staked out 
by Paris.”279 Sophisticated examples of American painting—those that had fully 
assimilated the lessons of French Cubism—were to be found in the work of Ad 
Reinhardt, Franz Kline, and Lee Krasner (Untitled, 1938, fig. 39), amongst others. These 
works, however, in their cloisonné effect, represented to Greenberg the close of 
something, “not the beginning.”280 He identified the work of Gorky (Xhorkom, 1936, fig. 
40), de Kooning (Untitled, 1938, fig. 41), Hofmann (Atelier Table with White Vase, 1938, 
fig. 42), and that of Arthur Beecher Carles (Untitled, 1935, fig. 43) as all making moves 
beyond (or, through) exactly this kind of provincialism in that these painters did not 
resort readily to known visual idiom on the surface of their canvases. The Carles work 
remains notable with Greenberg’s rhetoric: he declared it comparable to the de Kooning 
in that “its originality, despite the evident influence of Matisse, is integral.” This painting 
was, he continued, a “prophetic” work in its “inspired openness of design and color,” 
                                                 
277 Ibid., 58. 
278 Ibid., 85. 
279 Ibid. In his 1945 catalogue essay for the Davis retrospective at MoMA, James Johnson Sweeney argued 
(positively) that Summer Landscape, in its subject matter, rather than form, was an “adaptation of the idiom 
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280 Greenberg, “New York Painting Only Yesterday,” 86.  
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unique to Carles, that anticipates the manner in which “abstract painting was to rid itself 
of the Cubist horror vacui in the next decade.”281 Greenberg also credited the pervasive 
influence of Matisse with two attributes that would become hallmarks of the new 
American painting: the painted surface of the canvas as something “breathing and open” 
and the “big” picture.282 Greenberg specifically made reference to Matisse’s Bathers by a 
River of 1916 (fig. 44), which, in the late 1930s, hung in the lobby of the Valentine 
Gallery at 16 East 57th Street in Manhattan. Greenberg concluded famously, 
“international art, which is coterminous with major art, is beginning today to acquire an 
American coloration.”283 
 Rosenberg argued that the curators at the Whitney had missed the social-ness of 
1930s painting entirely. What one had to grasp, Rosenberg argued, was that “[i]n the 
thirties, the avant-garde of art gave way, step by step, to the political avant-garde.”284 The 
key words, he continued, were  “discipline…responsibility…intellectual conscience” — 
each a virtue with a handicap, he concluded. “Art felt obliged to make its purposes clear 
and its images publicly significant,” which in turn, could have a “stultifying” effect on 
painterly practice.  The “common denominator” of painting in the 1930s, if one was to be 
                                                 
281 Ibid., 86. Carles (9 March 1882–18 June 1952) was an instructor at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine 
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282 Greenberg, “New York Painting Only Yesterday,” 85. Emphasis in the original. See also, Greenberg, 
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found, was a “backward-looking eclecticism.” Here, he concurred with Greenberg: “even 
the “most advanced works of Abstraction and Surrealism were based on memories of the 
avant-garde” from earlier in the century. In terms of making great art for the ages, 
Rosenberg argued that landscape and Realist painters, who were in the majority in the 
1930s, “naturalized again and again” the narrative art of “El Greco, Bosch, Brueghel, 
Velázquez, Goya, Degas, Picasso….” A tiny minority of painters continued to work in 
the “advanced styles of Cubism, Surrealism, and Neo-Plasticism” (and even the “non-
objective” painters felt obliged to argue their work in terms of a social conscience). The 
Raphael Soyer work barely did justice to the artist’s “ubiquitousness” during the decade; 
however, Mark Tobey’s linear abstractions earned their place in the exhibition (fig. 45).  
 Why, Rosenberg wondered, in a show that made claims for being historically 
accurate, did the curators at the Whitney “swell the volume” of 1930s abstraction (with 
the work of de Kooning, Gorky, Hofmann, and Pollock—all painters of whose work he 
approved) and reduce the landscape and Realist painters to “a sampling of the most 
unavoidable names” (Benton, Burchfield, Curry, Evergood, Gropper, Levine, Shahn, 
Marsh)?285 By way of a partial answer, Rosenberg thought the show offered a packaged 
view of the decade designed to appeal to then-current taste (and collectors). Furthermore, 
if the curators sought to knock down the “straw man of a conception” that the art of the 
1930s was “‘monolithic’” in its “‘social conscious’,” citing the catalogue, it had missed 
that objective, too: “The idea of Beauty” was as important as “the idea of Revolution.” 
Painterly practice in 1968 was separated from the 1930s in what had happened to both 
                                                 
285 Rosenberg decried the omission of painters, who “for better or worse” were “fused into the 
period…Alexander Brook, Cameron Booth, Francis Criss, Isabel Bishop, Henry Schnakenberg, Maurice 
Sterne, Louis Eilshemius, Leon Kroll, Eugene Speicher, Boardman Robinson, Karl Zerbe, Anton 
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concepts in the interim years. Rosenberg concluded the meaning of art of the 1930s was 
in “the reality and pertinence” of the problems they presented—“above all the, the 
problem of the relation of advanced art modes and an advanced public consciousness of 
the social situation.”286  
 Despite their well-known antipathy for each other’s work, the judgments of the two 
critics (eleven years apart) found concord in the work of two painters: that of de Kooning 
and Davis. Greenberg’s understanding of innovative abstraction found that of 
Rosenberg’s painterly discipline in de Kooning’s work of the 1930s (see figs. 41 and 46); 
both critics felt the work of Davis was the perfection of an American regionalism (and, as 
such, its ambition was delimited). Davis, Rosenberg argued, arrived at his style in the 
1920s and maintained it throughout his career; his radicalization was “entirely on the 
political side.”287 Davis’ work was a kind of “vanguardism” that was “a conservative 
adaptation of the School of Paris to an ordered picturing of the American scene.”288 As 
noted above, Greenberg felt that the originality of the 1938 de Kooning was integral; 
Rosenberg understood the 1930s de Koonings as possessing another king of integrity (see 
fig. 46). The paintings were “in their sparkling tightness, Renaissance color, and polished 
surfaces, products of the ascetic discipline that in the thirties served as a personal code 
and a social ideal.”289 De Kooning’s paintings had more to do with the era of their 
making, Rosenberg concluded, than as harbingers of later “experiments in self-
liberation.”290 
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 The two “sparkling” works of 1930 and 1931, Davis’ Summer Landscape and de 
Kooning’s Untitled respectively (see figs. 38 and 46) are comparable in their 
compositions. Each relies on a vertical tripartite division of the canvas surface. In 
Summer Landscape, Davis has divided the canvas into three panels. The central scene of 
a seaside village      is set between houses, the panel at left, and docked boats and a lone 
tugboat, at right. Davis’ work is a sort of picturesque framing of a seascape done in a 
1930s idiom: a classical use of staffage, at left, is balanced, at right, with its technological 
substitute, the electric lamppost. Playful abstracted forms of facades, fences, and hills 
vibrate off-angle across the canvas in primary red, aqua blue and ochre. The composition 
is heavily reliant upon black outlining. De Kooning’s untitled 1931 work is divided into 
three vertical bands as well. The narrow band at left and the wider band at right are each 
separated from the central panel by a thin line, almost ‘zip’ like in their quality and 
function. A trapezoid hovers over an amorphous circle at bottom left; at right, four white 
ovals hover in front of an abstracted ‘figure’ that has an extended neck, podium-like in its 
self-presentation. The panels themselves are, to borrow from Rosenberg, tightly painted, 
each in a different tone. To be literal about it, that is to borrow from Greenberg: both 
works could be seen to rely upon the 1916 Matisse in that they both juxtapose abstracted 
forms in the foreground onto radically-simplified backgrounds that are orientated 
vertically. As Margaret Werth notes, the 1916 Matisse marked a significant shift from the 
artist’s earlier representations of idylls in that he “dispense[d] with the horizontal 
orientation of the landscape background.”291 This effectively “splits the canvas into strips 
                                                 
291 Margaret Werth, The Joy of Life: The Idyllic in French Art, circa 1900 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The 
University of California Press, 2002): 233–4. See also, Werth’s reference on p. 301, n. 16, to John 
Elderfield, Henri Matisse: A Retrospective (New York: MoMA, 1992): 69. 
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that fragment it vertically into accordion folds, creating a shallow, disorienting space,” 
Werth concludes.292 It is the de Kooning, however, that capitalizes on this strangeness, 
compared to the Davis, which is reassuring in its disorientation.  
 If both the 1930 Davis and the 1931 de Kooning were “sparkling” in the eyes of 
Rosenberg and Greenberg, it was the however de Kooning that had (future) potential. 
Greenberg had, as noted above, identified de Kooning’s Untitled from 1938 as the “star” 
of the 1957 exhibition (see fig. 41). The later work, while similar in style to the 1931 
abstraction, relies more heavily (especially along the bottom register) on the use of a fluid 
abstraction, one that shifts between (proper) form and (proper) figuration, the kind seen, 
for example, in the artist’s Pink Angels of 1945 (fig. 47). If the contemporary tendency 
within the discourse of art history is to think of Greenberg as having been concerned with 
formal appearances and Rosenberg with the actions of the individual painters, then these 
two de Koonings perform a kind of appearance specific to the 1930s, in the critical 
constructions of these critics.293 De Kooning’s untitled works from the 1930s, in their 
production of disciplined form had found a work-around the strictures of late School of 
Paris. These de Koonings would not have been available for public viewing in the decade 
of their making, both critics would have only know about them privately in the 1930s, as 
de Kooning did not exhibit publicly in New York until 1942; his first one-person 
exhibition was not until 1948.294 (Gorky, however, exhibited in New York as early as 
1938; his first solo show at Julien Levy was in 1945.) For discourse on abstraction in the 
public realm (on de Kooning, Gorky and other abstract painters), it is necessary to turn 
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293 See Richard Shiff, “Performing an Appearance: On the Surface of Abstract Expressionism,” 94–123. 
294 Rosenberg, Willem de Kooning, (New York:  Harry N. Abrams, 1974): 284. 
 108 
elsewhere: to the self-proclaimed vanguard publications of the 1930s and to the critical 
reception of the abstract murals commissioned under the auspices of the WPA.  
 
II. Making and Breaking in the 1930s: Collective Bodies, Action, Negation  
 At least three painters accounted for the shifts in their work (or that of others) as the 
result of profound encounters in the 1930s. The following epigraphs were written, 
respectively, by William de Kooning, Jacob Kainen, and John Graham (before he 
purportedly renounced Modernism altogether (ca. 1944):  
When, about fifteen years ago, I walked into Arshile’s studio for the first 
time, the atmosphere was so beautiful that I got a little dizzy and when I 
came to, I was bright enough to take the hint immediately. If the 
bookkeepers think it necessary continuously to make sure of where things 
and people come from, well then, I come from 36 Union Square. It is 
incredible to me that other people live there now.  I am glad that it is about 
impossible to get away from his powerful influence.  As long as I keep it 
with myself I’ll be doing all right.  Sweet Arshile, bless your dear heart.295 
 
Bookkeeping and story-telling methods may excite the conscious mind for 
a moment, but they leave no germ to grow….Those who think that 
abstract art is just a passing phase are mistaken. Rivers do not flow 
backwards. Every progressive movement now and then retraces its steps in 
apparent renunciation of original postulates, only to make later a stronger 
thrust forward.296 
 
It does not require a prophetic eye to discern subterranean stirring beneath 
the dead level of American art. These stirrings have been going on for a 
long time, evidencing the secrecy and defiance of some artistic 
underworld. Several recent exhibitions in New York, however, have 
brought these plastic attitudes to the surface, this time in a broader manner 
and with more specifically American implications.297 
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While this period remains understood as the high point of collectivist action by artists, the 
Romantic notion of the artist working alone in his or her studio remained a reality 
throughout the 1930s, as evidenced by de Kooning’s tribute to Gorky. Parts of the 
radical, organized left laid claim to abstraction (including its ‘Expressionist’ variant) as 
the advanced art of its day. Graham, saw revolutionary art—that is, abstract art—as being 
turned back upon itself, in something of an incidental eddy in an otherwise forward-
moving river, to borrow from his own metaphors. He arrived at this observation after 
viewing “Eight Modes of Painting” at the Julian Levy Gallery, a show that encompassed 
the major movements of the 19th- and 20th centuries, including the Surrealists.298 In his 
review, Graham made the rare claim for Surrealism as a kind of abstraction.299 
Surrealism, Graham concluded, was, as with all abstract art, revolutionary in its 
“transposition”: by insisting upon the “irreality of the material world and the reality of the 
immaterial world.”300 This method of painting was efficacious, more so than narrative 
painting, in that it could call forth a revolutionary consciousness in the beholder. The play 
of the two for Graham was not no much geometric/biomorphic (Barr) or literate/painterly 
(later, Greenberg), so much as mind/material. 
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 Artists themselves organized into political bodies: union, a congress, a federation, and 
an association, the internecine qualities of which remain striking. Each group organized 
artists for a common purpose, and the names each grouping chose had different 
associations in terms of organization, the relationship of the individual to the collective 
(or, the part to the whole) and of the collective to the outside world (or, to power). They 
did not, by way of contrast, form themselves into congregations, but often incorporated 
for tax purposes. At the same time, this decade is also understood as the beginning of the 
end of, or the discrediting of, collectivist action taken by artists and intellectuals.301 In the 
face of Moscow Trials of 1936, Trotsky’s murder in 1940, and the revelation of CPUSA 
manipulations of the American Artists’ Congress, it would be naïve to argue otherwise: 
Art Front did indeed cease publication in 1937. At the very least, Edmund Wilson could 
argue that, as of 1952, “Marxism was in relative eclipse,” and that an era in its history 
had, for now, come to an end.302 However, it’s important to note that some sort of 
collectivist activity by artists lasted well into the 1940s as evidenced by the artist-run 
periodicals (Dyn, VVV, Possibilities, which are the subject of chapter five) and the 
Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, founded in 1940 in revolt from the 
American Artists’ Congress, has never officially disbanded.303 
 The Artists’ Union had its start as the Unemployed Artists Group at the John Reed 
Club in 1933. It organized artists into a kind of militant trade union with the hope of 
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promoting government sponsorship of the arts.304 The Abstract Artists Association, the 
nominally unaffiliated organization of geometric abstract painters, had its start in 1936 
and shared a number of members with the original Unemployed Artists Group. The AAA 
has never officially disbanded. The Artists’ Union was of central importance in getting 
out the initial call in November of 1935 for an American Artists’ Congress.305 The first 
American Artists’ Congress against War and Fascism took place in New York in 
February 1936. The American Artists’ Congress was largely a function of the Popular 
Front strategy, and it and was effectively defunct by 1943.  
 The artist organizations of the 1930s provided contexts, critical and practical, in 
which artists advocated for themselves and others in print. During the 1930s, reviews of 
the arts were often delimited to poetry and literature in radical journals. An early 
exception, often cited, is the work of George L.K. Morris, who published his regular art 
column in Partisan Review. Additionally, he contributed to the American Abstract Artists 
yearbooks along with his fellow painters. Another, less frequently cited, is the work of 
Jacob Kainen (1909–2000), who wrote a regular column for The Daily Worker, the 
CPUSA daily, from June 1934 through September 1938 and was a regular contributor to 
Art Front, the official publication of the Artists’ Union, which Stuart Davis edited. For a 
brief time in 1934, the Artists’ Union also counted Arshile Gorky and Willem de 
Kooning in its membership.306  
                                                 
304 See Gerald M. Monroe, “Artist As Militant: Trade Union Workers During the Great Depression,” 
Archives of American Art Journal 14: 1 (1974): 7–11.  
305 See “A Call for an American Artists’ Congress,” Art Front 1:7 (November 1935): 6. The call for the 
AAC was simultaneously published in The New Masses (October 1935): This was a special edition 
dedicated to radical art.  
306  Mark Stevens and Annalyn Swan, de Kooning: An American Master (New York: Knopf, 2004): 112–3.  
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 Federal patronage of the arts provided yet another context in which painters could 
work and support themselves. This took form in four different programs: the Public 
Works of Art Project (1933–1934), the Treasury Section of the Fine Arts (1934–1943), 
the Treasury Relief Art Project (1935–1943), and, most famously, the Works Progress 
Administration Federal Arts Project (1935–1943). Two general statements may be 
maintained about the consequences of the WPA in the 1930s: The WPA provided a 
context in which artists could work collectively to support themselves during the Great 
Depression. The Federal Art Project, one of the cultural patronage programs under the 
New Deal umbrella of the Works Projects Administration (later the Works Progress 
Administration) employed artists throughout the Great Depression. From 1935 to the 
termination of the FAP in 1943, 3,600 artists had participated in the program.307 
Collectively, the artists created 16,000 works of art in over 1,000 cities.308 Many of the 
younger artists employed would go on to be the celebrated abstract painters of the post-
War years. In addition to Krasner, fellow FAP participants included Willem de Kooning, 
Arshile Gorky, Adolph Gottlieb, Phil Guston, Jackson Pollock, Ad Reinhardt, and Mark 
Rothko. (Barnett Newman did not join, an act he later thought of as a possible “tactical” 
error.309) The WPA also succeeded in fostering a community of artists in New York City. 
For example, Lee Krasner and Harold Rosenberg cemented what would be a lifelong-
friendship while assigned to Max Spivak as studio assistants in the WPA in 1935.310 
Cahill’s representative showing of a year’s worth of work by the FAP artists was 
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suggestive of the vast scale and scope of the New Deal arts program, which lasted in 
various forms for a full decade before being disbanded during World War II.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 The Popular Front functioned as a strategy more so than an organization: one that 
made use of different organizations and gained the cooperation of various individuals and 
groups. The Popular Front was first called for at the Seventh World Congress of the 
Communist International in Moscow in August, 1935.  The result was an international 
political alliance of Communist, radical, and Socialist parties, which gained power in 
France (1936–38), Spain (1936), and Chile (1938–42), although in Europe it was largely 
ineffective after 1938. The Popular Front was, according to one contemporary historian, 
“Stalinism’s reaction against its own ultra-left follies through which it had smoothed 
Hitler’s road to power.”311 While Deutscher wrote of his disaffection with the Communist 
Party and its official strategy from the vantage point of the 1970s, he probably would 
have written much the same in the 1930s, when he was formally expelled from the CP. 
The point here it to show the path by which a number of American leftists became 
disaffected—rapidly—with the CPUSA between the years of 1935 and 1940. Like 
Deutscher, they felt that the Popular Front strategy had failed in the fight against fascism: 
the Russo-German Pact (23 August, 1939) and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Finland 
(30 November, 1939–March 1940) had so demonstrated. And, like Deutscher, many 
never entirely gave up the idea of radical social change, they would seek it through other 
means.  
                                                 
311 Isaac Deutscher, Marxism in Our Time (Berkeley, Calif.: Ramparts Press, 1972): 291. 
 114 
 The first American Artists Congress (AAC) was held at Town Hall and the New 
School for Social Research on 14, 15, and 16 February, 1936, at which Meyer Schapiro 
delivered his celebrated lecture, “The Social Bases of Art.” John Dewey was also invited 
to speak at the AAC, but apparently declined to speak.312 According to the Congress 
report, it was attended by over 2000 people, and included a delegation from the Mexican 
League of Revolutionary Artists and Writers. The opening address was delivered by 
Lewis Mumford, then chairman of the American Writers’ League, which had been 
organized in April 1935. Among the initiators were George Ault, Peter Blume, Stuart 
Davis, William Gropper, Louis Lozowick, Moses Soyer, Niles Spencer and Harry 
Sternberg. At its height in 1939, it had a membership of over 900 artists.313 The main 
concern of the AAC, as an advocacy group, was the welfare of artists in the depressed 
economic conditions of the 1930s; as an agitating organization, they sought to counter the 
effects of fascism in its censorship of the arts and its deployment of art as propaganda. To 
help in the first cause, the AAC endorsed the Works Progress Administration’s FAP, 
lobbied for permanent governmental sponsorship of the arts and for wage increases for 
the artists; for the second, it held numerous shows, mainly of proletariat art, but 
nominally promoted art done in other styles as well.314 For example, in 1936, the AAC 
announced two symposia to be held at MoMA, both in conjunction with Alfred Barr’s 
major exhibitions of 1936–37, which were discussed in the previous chapter. A 
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symposium on abstract art was scheduled to be held on 10 April, 1936 with Davis, 
Schapiro, John Sloan, Marsden Hartley, Carl Holty and others scheduled to speak.315 
Another symposium, “Fantastic•Dada•Surrealism,” was to be held on 13 January, 1937, 
with Schapiro, Walter Quirt, Salvador Dali, Jerome Klein, and Richard Huelsenbeck 
announced as speakers.316 If the symposium took place, it neither left archival traces at 
MoMA (or in secondary literature).317 This remains an unanswered question in the 
historiography of the AAC.   
 Davis remained one of the most ardent defenders of the Congress until 1940 and 
served as the national executive secretary.318 In his practice of abstraction, Davis 
remained in the relative minority. As George L.K. Morris noted in his review of the third 
annual exhibition of the AAC in 1939, “political earnestness had obviously thrown its 
weight in the opposite direction…of an esthetic impulse.”319 To Morris, their critical 
tendencies towards society had overtaken their critical tendencies towards their own 
painterly practice. While some of the works had a “refreshing directness,” they were 
mostly “social satires” or “illustrative.”320  
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 Membership of the AAC declined sharply in 1940, when a number of members, 
concerned at the apparent support by the Communist-orientated organization for the 
Soviet attack on Finland, seceded to form the politically-independent FMPS.321 As 
Andrew Hemingway argues, “The CPUSA’s manipulation of supposedly independent 
bodies such as the American Artists’ Congress and the League of American 
Writers…was crucial in actually dividing the left, and bringing about the disaffection of 
individuals such as Stuart Davis and Meyer Schapiro.”322  Such manipulation came to be 
seen as a symbol of Stalinist corruption.323 By 1942, the Congress was defunct. 
 Before its implosion, two famous utterances were made at the first and second 
congresses:  Meyer Schapiro delivered his speech, “The Social Bases of Art” in 1936 and 
Picasso’s “Message to American Artists” was delivered by proxy at the 1937 congress.324 
Schapiro’s talk did not reject abstraction per se: it cast doubt on the claims of Surrealism 
as the advanced (engaged) art of its day. Rather than the disruptive, demotic art of the 
avant-garde, Schapiro saw it as narcissistic and expressive—in the sense that the tortured 
pain evidenced in their work was perhaps more the product of an indulgent self-
absorption.  An artist who fulfilled Schapiro’s criteria for the genuinely engaged artist 
was Picasso, whose “Message to American Artists” was delivered by proxy to the second 
AAC in 1937:  
                                                 
321 See also, Hemingway, Artists on the Left, 110.  
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It is my wish at this time to remind you that I have always believed and 
still believe, that artists who live and work with spiritual values cannot and 
should not remain indifferent to a conflict in which the highest values of 
humanity and civilization art at stake. No one can deny that this epic 
people’s struggle for democracy will have enormous consequences for the 
vitality of Spanish art. And this will be one of the greatest conquests of the 
Spanish people.325 
 
The AAC was to play a central role in bringing Picasso’s Guernica to America in 1939 to 
aid in wartime relief to the Spanish. The painting (fig. 48) registers the brutality of the 
bombing of the Basque town of Guernica on 26 April, 1937 by the German Luftwaffe at 
the behest of Franciso Franco, leader of the Spanish fascists. This was the first aerial 
bombardment of civilians, citizens in wartime, in modern warfare and left over 1600 
people dead. Initially, Picasso had been asked by the Republican government to produce 
a mural for the Spanish Pavilion at the Exposition Universalle, which was scheduled to 
open in June 1937 in Paris. His rage at the bombardment provoked him, as is famously 
known, to produce this work instead. (In this sense, the suffering registered by Picasso—
that of the Basque people and his own—was, to use Schapiro’s terms, not self-indulgent 
in its genuine expressiveness.) Once in New York, Guernica was for a time exhibited at 
the Valentine Gallery. 326 (The same gallery where Matisse’s Bathers of 1916 was to be 
found in the lobby.)   
 In Picasso’s pictorial eulogy, the modern lines of the Luftwaffe planes were replaced 
by the assaulting glare of the overhead electric light bulb (or, bomba, in one variant of the 
word in Spanish); the mangled figures here scream out in their post-Cubist deformations. 
                                                 
325 Pablo Picasso, from his “Message to American Artists,” transcribed at the proceedings of the first AAC. 
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These are only but two possible transpositions on Picasso’s part. (The scholarship on this 
work is legion.)327 Picasso was right in some of his predictions made at the AAC: 
Guernica has come to stand as an iconic work of great art amidst the brutality of the 20th 
century.328 Picasso was also right in that the Spanish Civil War was an epic struggle, but 
the eventual loss of the Republicans represented a tragic turning point in the spread of 
fascism in Europe. Instead of the painting returning to Spain victoriously after its tour in 
the US and Europe, the painting remained at MoMA, at the artist’s request, until 1981.  
 For many on the organized left in America, the defeat of the Spanish Republicans 
represented not just a defeat by fascism: it also amounted to a referendum on the strategy 
of the Popular Front. Subsequent revelations of CPUSA manipulations of the AAC and 
the later Soviet invasion of Finland, prompted a body of critics and artists, lead by 
Schapiro, to break away from the AAC in April 1940.329 Specifically, Schapiro sought to 
force a vote on the issue of the Finnish Relief Committee, which the AAC leadership 
sought to block in the hopes of maintaining a fictional unity. The vote left Schapiro and 
thirteen others in the minority, who then promptly voted with their feet.330 The Federation 
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of Modern Painters and Sculptors (FMPS) was dedicated to modernism (that is, abstract 
art) and to the promotion of the art of its members.331 It was also dedicated to the 
eradication of artistic nationalism (whether it was American Regionalism or Soviet 
Realism—the art of the national road to socialism). It was also nominally unaffiliated, but 
initially comprised Trotskyists. For example, Schapiro signed several protest letters 
concerning the CPUSA manipulations of independent artist groups, all written in the 
name of the League of Cultural Freedom and Socialism, which had been organized by 
Dwight Macdonald. All of the petitions and letters of protest appeared in Partisan 
Review.332 Eventually, a couple of painters who would come to be associated with 
Abstract Expressionism were founding members of this group: Gottlieb and Rothko 
headed the Cultural Committee of the FMPS. Eventually, Stuart Davis joined after his 
own disenchantment with the CPUSA; George L.K. Morris also joined by 1946, not too 
long after his own departure from Partisan Review. As will be discussed in a subsequent 
chapter, the FMPS opened its 1947 show to non-members and thereby created an 
exhibition that spanned contemporary abstract practice.  
 The American Abstract Artists (AAA), which was founded in late 1936, four years 
prior to the FMPS, perhaps did the most of any of the artists groups to promote geometric 
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abstract art in the U.S.333 The group was at its most active between the years of 1936 to 
1942. It sought to promote the work of its members through its annual exhibitions, and 
thereby “present in a dignified and competent way all the significant ‘abstract’ work done 
in America.”334 While the painters of a hard-edged geometric abstraction came to 
dominate the group eventually, there was, in its early years, a stylistic range within the 
group. Post-Cubistic biomorphic forms shared exhibition space with the geometric plastic 
forms of strong colorations, akin to those of the Cercle et Carré and Abstraction–
Création groups in Europe. Most members, at one point or another, studied with Hans 
Hofmann, who had settled in the U.S. as of 1932. This pedigree showed in their color 
palettes. Initial members included: Burgoyne Diller, Balcomb Greene (who was the first 
chairman of the AAA), Gertrude Greene, Harry Holtzman (who was also the Assistant 
Director of the FAP), Ibram Lassaw, and George McNeil. By 1937, the circle had 
expanded to include, amongst others: Josef Albers, Ilya Bolotowsky, Albert E. Gallatin, 
Arshile Gorky, Carl Holty, Paul Kelpe, Willem De Kooning, Alice Trumbull Mason, 
George L.K. Morris, and Ad Reinhardt. Gorky’s membership lasted but a few months, 
and that of de Kooning’s not much longer. Gorky left the November 1936 AAA meeting, 
with the famous slammed door, after an argument over the direction on the group (Gorky 
felt the membership was not yet ready to exhibit, and he felt that he should be the one to 
                                                 
333 The AAA was founded in November of 1936; formal meetings began in 1937, hence, the use of both 
years by scholars as the starting year for the organization. See Susan C. Larsen, “The American Abstract 
Artist Group: A Documentary History, 1936–1941,” 2–7. Dr. Larsen’s unpublished dissertation remains the 
foundational account of the ambitions, activities, and consequences of the AAA. See, Larsen, “The 
American Abstract Artists Group: A History and Evaluation of its Impact upon American Art” (Ph.D. diss., 
Northwestern University, 1974). 
334 General Prospectus of the American Abstract Artists, 1937, Archives of American Art, Smithsonian 
Institution, Washington, D.C. microfilm NY59-11, frame no. 00184.  
 121 
lead group critiques).335 Like the FMPS, the AAA positioned itself on the vanguard in 
relation to the Social Realist artists of the AAC. When it felt it necessary, the 
membership protested their exclusion from exhibition venues like MoMA. In 1940, the 
AAA picketed the museum and distributed a cutting cartoon by Reinhardt to passers-by, 
one of who was a member of the museum staff. Ironically, the protest poster was the first 
AAA work ever acquired by MoMA (see fig. 9).336  
 Despite the word American in its name, the AAA made claims to an international 
outlook and style.337 Through members like Morris and Gallatin, the AAA had close 
connections to the European abstractionists to whom their own work was often 
disparagingly (or, dismissively) compared: Jean Hélion, Fernand Léger, and Amédée 
Ozenfant. Through their yearbooks and other publications, the AAA published examples 
of European discourse on abstraction in New York. Occasionally, though, the exchange 
went the other way. Gallatin and Morris collaborated with Sophie Täuber-Arp to publish 
Plastique (1937–1939) in Paris. Morris’ “On the Abstract Tradition” was re-printed in 
Plastique, published both in Paris and New York.338 Morris’s membership in the group 
also offers one of clearest crossovers between art and politics in the 1930s—or the 
seeming contradiction of the unaffiliated artists. George L.K. Morris, while a practicing 
member of the AAA, was an editor and the main financial backer of Partisan Review 
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from 1937 (after the re-organization of the journal) through 1943. Morris represents a 
particular historical character, the kind from which Greenberg drew his analogies in 
1939: Morris was an émigré to Bohemia (even if he and the painter Suzie 
Freylinghuysen, as a married couple, maintained their home on Park Avenue in 
Manhattan), and, for a time, sustained Partisan Review through an umbilical cord of gold.  
 
III. Expression and Expressionism  
If Expressionism at the moment behaves in an ungainly, violent manner, 
its excuse lies in the prevailing conditions it finds….People little know 
how near the truth they are when they jeer at these pictures and say that 
they might be painted by savages. The bourgeois rule as turned us into 
savages. 
 
  ~ Hermann Bahr, Expressionismus, 1916339 
 
Socially, the young Expressionists belonged to the petit bourgeoisie as did 
the Impressionists from which they sprang. They reached beyond their 
own class only in their dreams…They sought to shatter the foundations of 
the old world but could not break even the shackles of their own class.  
  
  ~ Charmion von Wiegand, “Expressionism and Social  
  Change,” Art Front, 1936340 
 
The subject matter which interests these artists may be, with individual 
exceptions, divided into three main groups—an interest in the purely 
aesthetic activity…an interest in the proletariat and its problems…and a 
third interest in the general expression of futility, abandonment and the 
insecurity of modern life. 
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 In the 1930s, Expressionism and its concomitants (e.g., doubt, decadence, decline) 
was a persistent issue for art critics and social theorists. Expressionism, as a tendency, 
was re-considered from a range of viewpoints. In limited cases, the tendency was re-
habilitated from the depths of nihilism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Schapiro 
was deeply dismayed as to what the renewed expressionist tendencies in abstraction 
might portend for culture, which he voiced in his 1937 essay, The Nature of Abstract Art. 
In the late 1930s, several critics took up the issue of Expressionism in their criticism as it 
appeared in Art Front and other left-wing publications. Herbert Lawrence, Charmion de 
Wiegand, and Jacob Kainen, amongst others, all reconsidered the play of Expressionism 
in art in their reviews, all of which were prompted by exhibitions of The Ten.342 In 1938, 
a set of German-speaking intellectuals took up the issue of Expressionismus in Das Wort, 
the German-language émigré journal edited (in name) by Bertolt Brecht. While the larger 
scope of the Expressionism debate is beyond that of this dissertation, it is useful to 
consider some of the issues in select essays—in the midst of the larger discussion on 
Expressionism, Alfred Durus, published an essay on abstraction.343 This debate, in 
particular, and the journal in general, were known to critics in America: Schapiro made 
reference to the debate in one of his many letters to Theodor Adorno, who was newly 
relocated to the US; Greenberg noted in his final interview that he had read the journal in 
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his earlier days and might gotten “wisps” of this debate.344  As such, this Expressionismus 
episode from Das Wort represents an eruption of German intellectualism in US discourse.  
 Von Wiegand (1898–1983) was primarily an artist, who, upon coming into direct 
contact with Mondrian in 1941, moved towards greater abstraction in her work (see, for 
example, her Environment No. 2, 1946, fig. 49).345 Earlier, she had spent several years 
working as a journalist in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, prior to her marriage to Joseph 
Freeman, one of the founding editors of The New Masses (1925–1948). She joined the 
editorial board of Art Front in 1937 and would later exhibit with the AAA from 1948 
through the 1960s.346 Von Wiegand, who came from an affluent German-émigré family, 
was familiar with the German-émigré community in New York. Because of this, Andrew 
Hemingway argues, she was the best suited amongst left-wing critics to address the issue 
of Expressionism.347 Kainen, as a print-maker, worked for the Graphic Arts Division of 
the WPA from 1935 to 1942. He was a frequent contributor to Art Front, and also had a 
regular column in the Daily Worker, the official daily of CPUSA, from June 1934 to 
September 1938. In his earliest works of criticism, he wrote strongly in support of Social 
                                                 
344 For a reference to this debate by Meyer Schapiro in a 1938 exchange with Theodor Adorno, see Theodor 
Adorno & Walter Benjamin: The Complete Correspondence (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
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345 See Virginia M. Mecklenburg, The Patricia and Phillip Frost Collection: American Abstraction, 1930–
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Abstract Art (New York: Wittenborn, 1957).  
347 See Hemingway, Artists on the Left, 115.  
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Realism.348 He did not, as a critic, characterize Social Realist art with disinterest for the 
disinherited, nor as “poor art for poor people” as Gorky derided it (as legend would have 
it).349  Rather, he saw it as efficacious art actively engaged with the times in its figuring 
of the struggles of working people. Kainen endorsed some forms of modernist practice 
with regard to abstraction, and this attitude was most clearly articulated in his reviews of 
The Ten. As it were, the group actually comprised nine artists: Mark Rothko (still then, 
Marcus Rothkowitz), Adolph Gottlieb, Ben Zion, Ilya Bolotowsky, Louis Harris, Jacob 
Kufeld, Louis Schanker, Joe Solman, Nahum Tschacbasov, and later Lee Gatch.350 
 In his own review of the exhibition of The Ten at the Montross Gallery, Lawrence 
found this group notable because of their attempts to synthesize artistic traditions with 
“contemporary, realistic, social needs.”351 Lawrence identified three themes as 
demonstrative of their a collective interests: “aesthetic activity,” (e.g. Bolotowsky); “the 
proletariat and its problems,” (e.g., Rothkowitz or Ben-Zion); and “the general expression 
of futility, abandonment, and the general insecurity of modern life.”352 It was with this 
last theme that Gottlieb, for one, achieved a kind of “lyrical” synthesis with his work, 
Conference. The resolution, however, was only momentary and, at best “entertaining”: 
                                                 
348 For an example, see Jacob Kainen, “Revolutionary Art at the John Reed Club,” Art Front 1:2 (January 
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the works lacked profundity, Lawrence concluded, and offered only description when 
they should have offered real insight or solution.  
 Lawrence’s assessment of the aesthetic array was echoed in an anonymous entry in 
the Art Digest: “What the group has in common is sensed rather than stated: a glum 
search for today’s Beauty.”353 Beauty, in its modern form, could also be re-discovered in 
the art of pre-historic Europe. As it would happen, the 1936–37 exhibit of the Ten 
coincided with the exhibition of “Prehistoric Rock Pictures in Europe and Africa at the 
Museum of Modern Art.”354 Reviews of the two shows appeared side by side in a number 
of dailies, and the visual parallels were not lost upon the reviewers.355 For example, 
Jerome Klein asked readers of the New York Post to ponder which work was more 
modern: a study of musicians by Louis Schanker or rock paintings from modern-day 
Libya (fig. 50).356 Primitivist tendencies in the work of this generation of painters—and 
metaphors in its criticism—were already being employed as early as 1937. 
 From the reviews of the 1936–37 exhibition of the Ten, the star of show seemed to be 
Lee Gatch’s Pennsylvania Barn (fig. 51). Klein felt the work “reduced Pennsylvania 
barns to a fine fabric of floating color;” Kainen felt that his work was possessed of “a 
strange magic and distinction which reflect his joy in handling pigment;” and von 
Wiegand felt the work recalled “in color and design…some of the style of the patterns of 
                                                 
353 “‘The Ten’ at Passedoit’s,” Art Digest 11:15 (1 May, 1937): 23. This exhibition was held at the 
Georgette Passedoit Gallery from 26 April through 8 May, 1937. 
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“Prehistoric Rock Pictures at the Modern Museum: Ageless in Beauty,” New York World Telegram (1 May, 
1937): 10A; Charmion von Wiegand, “The Fine Arts,” The New Masses 23 (18 May, 1937): 32–3.  
356 Jerome Klein, “Art Comment: What Do You Call Modern?” New York Post (1 May, 1937): 26.  
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the ‘levant style’ paintings in the exhibition of the of prehistoric artists at the Museum of 
Modern Art.”357 The two latter critics also applauded Joe Solman’s Gas Station (fig. 52) 
for his “painter’s painter” juxtaposition of “flat black and a sort or antique white with a 
fine regard for texture” (Kainen); and his “sensitive handling of pattern” (von Wiegand). 
With regard to texture, Kainen could also have been referring to that of the canvas, which 
is co-terminus with the plane of the background (the bright oranges, which break up the 
surface pattern of the work, also caught Kainen’s eye).358 It speaks volumes about the 
integrity of the judgments of Kainen and von Wiegand that they maintained their 
orientation towards painting and formal problems when publishing in The Daily Worker 
and The New Masses. This also suggests a greater acceptance by the official left, at least 
within the limited context of the official party publications, of modernist aesthetics than 
is usually thought. By way of comparison, Kainen felt that the Rothkowitz work, 
Family[Trinity] (fig. 53), was “mussy and mystical”; von Wiegand passed over the 
“broadly composed” work in favor of others.359 This suggests that that the Rothkowitz, in 
its diffuse handling of paint, lacked the rigor or the “ascetic discipline,” to use 
Rosenberg’s later words (as discussed above), of the work of Solman or Gatch.  
 In their other essays on Expressionism in Art Front, von Wiegand and Kainen shared 
the concerns of Schapiro and Lawrence. These longer essays were dialectical in the sense 
that they took on Expressionism as a socio-historical object of study (this as opposed 
                                                 
357 Kainen, “Art: The Ten,” The Daily Worker, (6 May, 1937): 7; Klein, “Art Comment: What Do You Call 
Modern?”; von Wiegand, “The Fine Arts,” 33.  
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their dialectical criticism on “judgment and the events within the work of art itself.”)360 
They also gave value to it precisely because of the potential efficaciousness of the 
violence of its forms. Expressionism could, at the very least, Kainen argued, offer a 
bridge “from individual rejection of the status quo to social rejection.”361 Indeed. In an 
un-signed 1938 gallery leaflet, The Ten argued on their own behalf that they sought to 
break out of the inherited confines of provincialism and regionalism.362 They argued that 
the judging of art by “non-aesthetic standards—geographical, ethnical, moral, or 
narrative” was overly limited.363 That is, by rejecting the current order of things in the art 
world, they sought to repudiate “the equivalence of American painting and literal 
painting.”364 They sought to make paintings, good ones (without any other qualifiers). 
While this was their concerted purpose, they were not unified (as were the AAA) on 
stylistic grounds. The field for non-literal painting, in 1938, was wide open.  
 In her essay, von Wiegand rightly located the debate over ‘expressionism’ between 
objective and subjective painting as an old one.365 Von Wiegand’s essay is a theorizing of 
the phenomenon of Expressionism. Von Wiegand argued that Expressionism arises (and 
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returns) when the artist repudiates “the principles upon which society is built,” and turns 
to his or her own conscience for guidance. This rebellion “without program” is only 
possible at moments when modern society has ceased to function for the vast majority of 
its citizens—it signifies a disturbance over something, anything. Expressionism, to von 
Wiegand and others, was necessarily bound up with time and place. This is why, she 
argued, the delicate, often erotic, paintings of Jules Pascin (1885–1930), while important, 
had not provoked a movement when the painter had lived in America from 1914 through 
1920: America still functioned reasonably well for the majority. Rather, it was the 
German variant of Expressionism that was now taking root in the America of the Great 
Depression, and it was to this modern America that so many German émigré painters had 
fled. Unlike Schapiro, who saw Expressionistic tendencies generally as symptomatic of 
nihilism or general social decay, von Wiegand argued that Expressionism had no 
essential political orientation. As a defiant tendency, it could lead towards fascism or 
towards Communism. It was, like Nature itself, both generative and devastating: Its 
“destructive” activity had the effect of “clearing the ground for future building.”366 Or, as 
a movement, one that usually suffused “old forms” with the “brilliant colors of sunset,” 
Expressionism could easily become formulaic, a cliché of its former self. Von Wiegand 
offered one cautionary tale for American artists on the scene:  
The life of former Die Brücke painter Karl Schmidt-Rottluff (1884–1976). 
The former rebel, trapped in an oppressive culture, had served on the 
Eastern front during the Great War.367  
 
                                                 
366 Ibid., p. 10.  
367 Von Wiegand does not mention that Karl Schmidt-Rottluff was expelled from the Preussische Akademie 
der Künste in 1930 and declared a degenerate artist by the Nazis in 1937. This fact may not have been 
available to her.  
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For the moment, in America, the situation was in flux, the consequences not yet fully 
known. Would the transplanted tendency fully take? In addition to the members of The 
Ten, von Wiegand identified the work of older Expressionists, Helen West Heller and 
David Burliuk, as providing a contemporary bridge to the latest generation. Specifically, 
John Vavak’s Whirling Dust Storm, shown in the New Horizons in American Art, 
demonstrated how a “contemporary American subject may be realized in Expressionist 
form.”368 
 Kainen wrote “Our Expressionists,” a review of the then-current gallery scene in the 
wake of von Wiegand’s more theoretical piece. He, too, wrote of American subjects 
realizing Expressionist forms. If Kainen advocated for “Our” expressionists, it was 
obviously the German Expressionists who represented the ‘them’ or ‘their’ implicit in his 
rhetorical divide. Like abstraction, Kainen argued, Expressionism had a hard row to hoe 
in America as it was not an “indigenous” tendency.369 In its efforts for acceptance, it 
encountered the nativist tendencies of Regionalism or realism. However, the economic 
“shattering” economic crisis of the 1930s had left American primed for the 
“revolutionary consciousness” of Expressionism.370 Joe Solman, who had taken up the 
theme of New York City, with “all of its accidental structural effects and social chaos,” 
was the most consistent artist of the group. His Venus of 23rd Street (fig. 54), for example, 
demonstrated the confluences in Solman’s work: the use of “flat vigorous color areas,” 
and “emotional linear emphasis.”371 In this case, in Kainen’s opinion, the lasting effect of 
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the work was promising: it showed the supplanting of outmoded forms with a new 
revolutionary plasticity.  
 The attention paid to Expressionism in Art Front parallels, on a delimited scale, the 
debate on Expressionism that took place in the pages of Das Wort in 1938. The German-
language journal itself was the result of the Popular Front strategy adopted by the 
Comintern in 1935, and despite the tepid quality that that lineage might suggest, the 
essays published in it were generally lively and rigorous.372 In 1935, the International 
Writers Congress for the Defense of Culture made the decision to create a journal, to be 
published in Moscow, for German intellectuals in exile as a forum for anti-fascist writing. 
The end result was Das Wort, the triumvirate editorship of which spanned the left-
political spectrum. Bertolt Brecht was a famously independent Marxist, Willi Bredel, a 
member of the KPD, and Lion Feuchtwanger was a pro-Soviet liberal; however, due to 
the erratic presence of the three editors in Moscow, the editorship was effectively 
managed by the journalist Fritz Erpenbeck, who was close in his thinking to Georg 
Lukács.373  
 In the June, 1938 issue of Das Wort, Georg Lukács and Ernst Bloch took stock of the 
debate on Expressionism, and each used his essay to offer an opinion contrary to the 
beliefs of the other. The results were Bloch’s “Diskussionen über Expressionismus” and 
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Lukács’ “Es geht um den Realismus.”374 As the author-translators of the volume 
Aesthetics and Politics have noted about the culture of the 1930s in general, “the epoch 
affords no comfort to facile retrospective alignments, in either aesthetics or politics.”375 
This statement may be extended to this exchange between these contemporaries in 
particular. By an additional extension, the exchange between Bloch and Lukács as a 
debate on the precepts of modernism itself, as Expressionism was, arguably, the first 
modernist art movement in Germany. At issue for the writers were genuine 
expression/solecism, a genuine reflection of the chaos of the times/nihilism, latent 
humanism/elitism. Lukács’ attack on Expressionism had begun in 1934, and it was to this 
earlier essay that Bloch addressed himself in 1938.376 Bloch defended Expressionism on 
the grounds that it represented an artistic response to the crises of the era. While it 
represented a kind of vanguard—one only possible at the historical moment of the 
disintegration of the ruling class, its practitioners demonstrated a genuine interest in the 
traditional forms of art. Lastly, he argued for the humanism of Expressionism, the 
genuine/disruptive expression of the self, at a time when the radical consciousness of 
working people was still unformed. It was the fascists—and he called forth Hitler by 
name—who had changed the general view of Antiquity (cultural inheritance) and 
demonstrated that true indicator of any great art was its proximity to the people; he also 
showed himself to well aware of the dangers of “kitsch:”377  
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At this point, the reader may well believe that he detects a contradiction in 
our argument: surely immediacy and abstraction are mutually exclusive? 
However, one of the greatest achievements of the dialectical method —
already found in Hegel—was its discovery and demonstration that 
immediacy and abstraction are closely akin, and, more particularly, that 
thought which begins in immediacy can only lead to abstraction.378 
 
While Bloch’s essay may not have fully succeeded in refuting Lukács position, one that 
was generally popular at the time of their writing, he did succeed in pointing to the 
“notorious blind spot of Lukácsian criticism:” the work of art itself.379 In Bloch’s 
analysis, no work of art is “replaceable by another, by virtue of its ideological exchange 
value.”380 The lack of easy answers had been and would be again an issue in the careers 
of each author. While Bloch’s defense of Expressionism may sit more readily to 
modernist readers in the face of Lukács’ officious Popular Frontism, it was Bloch who 
had readily provided affidavits for the infamous Moscow trials. However, it was Lukács, 
as is famously known, who, in 1930, had been forced to recant the ‘messianic’ 
utopianism of his celebrated 1923 work, History and Class Consciousness by bureaucrats 
in Stalin’s administration.381  
 Expressionism seemed to take root in America in the 1930s. Art critics such as 
Kainen and von Wiegand had done much to create discourse around the Expressionist 
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tendencies of the Ten in particular. Clearly there was an awareness by critics in New 
York of the sophisticated terms of the Expressionismus debate in Europe. John D. 
Graham, for one, remained skeptical of this new movement, though. In 1937 he published 
Systems and Dialectic of Art, which was his self-described, two-part attempt to provide a 
systematic terminology for art and to classify art meaningfully (according to “social-
economic periods” and “space-consciousness”—not by the dictates of time and place); 
and to provide the “methods of logical argumentation in the domain in art.”382 In one of 
his enumerated aphorisms, he described the difference between genius and insanity:  
[F]undamentally there is a basic difference: genius is order supreme 
(frequently, a chaotic order) while insanity is supreme disorder. Insanity is 
an excessive preoccupation with details to the detriment of the whole. 
Genius is the exact opposite. …Being an exception genius is not 
normality. Literally the insane person is one whose conscious mind has 
been engulfed by his unconscious. Genius is one whose conscious mind 
works with his unconscious.383 
 
In 1936, Graham and Jacob Kainen had a conversation on the subject of Expressionism. 
Kainen recalled that Graham admired artists like Vincent van Gogh, Emil Nolde, and 
Chaim Soutine (1893–1943), painters who were “highly compulsive,” but he felt that 
rational artists would rapidly go insane if they pursued this kind of painting for too 
long.384 It was, Graham concluded in his tutorial of Kainen, “like getting ready to scream 
every time one approached the easel.”385 How then could a painter sustain his or her 
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expressive self as had, for example, Matisse, who was “after, above all…expression”?386 
One possible route was to turn to the pictorial means, as had Matisse, famously.  
  
IV. Praxis and Technique  
The murals designed for public buildings by artists of the Public Works 
Division seem to meet with official approval in inverse order to their 
social and artistic worth….Seemingly, the primrose path to official favor 
lies through lifting the art and the hypocritical moral lessons of the cheap 
magazines, or better, school text books, and translating them into art for 
walls.  
  ~ Art Front, editorial, July 1935387 
 
In these times, it is of sociological importance that everything should stand 
on its own merit, always keeping its individuality. I much prefer that a 
mural fall out of the wall than harmonize with it.  
 
 ~ Arshile Gorky, “My Murals for the Newark  
 Airport: An Interpretation,” ca. 1936388 
 
The question is, can you detach the quality of the work from its technique? 
I am inclined to say: No. … If somebody paints a mural painting on 
canvas in oil paint (in the case of Gorky) he is either revolutionary, an 
amateur, or one who is prevented from vice-majeur to do what he thinks is 
right to do. … It seems that it is this last group of factors were the ones 
which decided Gorky in his choice of detached canvas and oil paint for 
this wall decoration at Newark Airport.  
 
 ~ Frederick T. Kiesler, “Murals without Walls:  
 Relating to Gorky’s Newark Project,” Art Front, 1936389 
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 As these epigraphs demonstrate, artists and critics were discontented, if not outright 
dissatisfied, with the practice of mural-making in the 1930s. (Others, like Schapiro, 
Kiesler, or Gorky remained unsatisfied, but hoped to be sated in the future.) The writer(s) 
of the Art Front editorial went on to express the position that some of the recent Social 
Realist murals offered easy lessons derived from popular glossies. Naming no names, this 
form of Social Realism handed back the working classes their own kitsch, reworked. In a 
1937 essay, Schapiro did name names: he cast the work of Thomas Hart Benton, in 
particular, and Popular Front aesthetics, in general, as a kind of opportunistic populism 
sustained by “scholasticism in overalls.”390 In its current state, public mural making had 
little, if any, revolutionary potential as a form of praxis.  
 In the autumn of 1936, Schapiro further addressed the problem of public art and the 
crisis of the 1930s.391 Government patronage of the arts and work programs for artists, 
such as the FAP and WPA, represented a real achievement, however it was not an end in 
itself. (By way of comparison, Schapiro offered the case of Italian artists who found 
themselves dependent upon a “brutal fascist regime.”392) Nor were government programs 
permanent: whereas trade worker wished to return to permanent, full employment, the 
programs for artists were emergency stop-gap measures. Nor was it enough to bring 
before the so-called masses the art of the upper classes (though, that had to happen, too, 
                                                                                                                                                 
203, 214–5, 217, p. 237 n.9, 299 n. 197, and 306 n. 3. For the Fourth Dimension aspects of Kiesler’s early 
theatrical work, see Henderson, The Fourth Dimension, 345, n. 9. 
390 Schapiro, “Populist Realism,” Partisan Review 4 (January 1937): 57. 
391 See, Schapiro, “Public Use of Art,” Art Front 2:10 (November 1936): 4–6. The following month, 
Clarence Weinstock published a defense of public art programs in general and the Artists’ Union “Public 
Use of Art Committee” in particular, in what amounted to a refutation of Schapiro’s analysis. See, 
Weinstock, “Public Art in Practice,” Art Front 2:11 (December 1936): 8–10. 
392 Schapiro, “Public Use of Art,” 6.  
 137 
he argued). The masses part of the public already had an art: comics, magazines, etc. The 
artist, inclined to be supportive of the struggles of working people, had to recognize this 
(on an intellectual level if not an aesthetic one). Even if the fine arts, a category in which 
Schapiro included abstraction, were made available to every region and stratum of the 
nation, most people lacked the cultivation and leisure time to appreciate it. The category 
of art was something that would be perceived as a mere luxury object by people desirous 
of a better social class, so long as the bourgeois order of things remained undisturbed. 
Public art, real art for everyone, had yet to be achieved and artists needed to look beyond 
they current “wretched state of culture” to achieve it.393 The answers were not to be found 
in the present order of things. 
 Murals made in the style of abstraction did not always fare better than their Social 
Realist counterparts in the eyes of critics who were of a mind to be dismissive. In an 
unpublished essay from 1938, Stuart Davis cited two examples of early, large-scale 
abstraction not exclusively for their intrinsic formal properties, but for the instructive 
value of those formal properties (their usefulness as a medium of exchange). With 
reference to the plastic forms of the abstract work of Gorky and de Kooning made during 
their tenure as WPA artists, Stuart concluded that, “A vast education in art is being made 
available to the American people.”394 The abstract murals they and others produced under 
the aegis of the WPA received critical attention from the organized left and elsewhere. 
Some critics scoffed at Gorky’s WPA murals, Aviation: Evolution of Forms under 
Aerodynamic Limitations, as comical equivalents to the purported poetry of Gertrude 
                                                 
393 Ibid. 
394 See Stuart Davis, “Federal Art Project and the Social Education of the Artist,” (1938) in Stuart Davis: A 
Documentary Monograph, ed. Diane Kelder (New York: Praeger, 1971): 165.  
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Stein (fig. 55).395 In his own essay, Frederick T. Kiesler suggested that the style of the 
murals, a kind of parable of Cubism, might have confounded some viewers. However, he 
thought the trickier problem was that of Gorky’s technique: Kiesler examined Gorky’s 
positioning of the easel painting to that of the modern mural. 
 About the same time that Gorky and de Kooning walked out of the AAA meetings, 
both were engaged in projects for the WPA/FAP programs: Gorky was employed by the 
WPA programs from late 1935 to mid-1941; de Kooning, from October of 1935 through 
July of 1937, when he necessarily had to resign due to his ‘alien’ status.396 Some of these 
murals now exist only in memory or in photographs. The purpose of this passage is to put 
into play the criticism of left-wing critics on these very public (social) examples of 
abstraction: works of abstraction in the 1930s that were not confined to the artist’s studio, 
or to the relatively exclusive precincts of the museum or gallery walls.397 Gorky’s series 
of 10 panels, which totaled 1530 square feet, was formerly located in the second floor 
foyer of the Administration Building at the former Newark Airport. One panel, a scale 
model of the installation, and one complete panel from the series were included in 
Cahill’s 1936 exhibition at MoMA. (Despite being mostly lost, Gorky’s series has been 
partly recovered through documentary photographs, which are compiled in Murals 
without Walls.398) A second example, also lost, was de Kooning’s murals for the 
Williamsburg Housing Projects in Brooklyn, New York (fig. 56). 
                                                 
395 The three journalistic clippings are: Gerard Sullivan, “Mr. Gorky’s Murals the Airport They Puzzle” 
(with photo inset), The Newark Ledger (10 June, 1937); “American Art: WPA Show Opens at Museum,” 
The Newark Ledger,” (8 November, 1936). These are reproduced in Murals without Walls, 39.  
396 See Art for the Millions, Appendix A, 278.  
397 See Cahill, Introduction to New Horizons in American Art, 32–33.  
398 The title of this volume was taken from Frederick T. Kiesler’s review of the same title in Art Front, 
December, 1936. See n. 404 below. Ruth Bowman researched the history of the murals and the rescue of 
the extant panels. The volume is an essential compilation of documentary photographs, essays, and 
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 In the case of the Newark murals, the artist himself contributed to the critical 
discourse of the work, if posthumously. Gorky’s 1937 essay, “My Murals for the Newark 
Airport: An Interpretation,” was intended to explain his abstractions to the public, which, 
at one moment, included then New York City mayor, Fiorello H. Laguardia (fig. 57). The 
essay was initially intended for publication in a volume called Art for the Millions, 
though this was not published until decades later.399 Gorky began his essay with a 
discussion of the “elevated object.”400 His first encounter with such an object came in his 
childhood (an onion, suspended from a wooden cross, with seven feathers stuck into its 
top most layer—this was, in his Armenian childhood, a substitute for a calendar or 
timekeeper). A “plastic operation” on the object is imperative, were it to be of “our 
Time.” Otherwise, the object would fall back onto the photographic image (the 
“weakness of the Old Masters”). And so, for example, using “morphic forms” he 
dissected the airplane into its “constituent parts” in Activities on the Field (fig. 58).401 
These kinds of plastic operations on the part of the artist could open up “new vistas of 
understanding” for people with little access to art (school children, workers, hospital 
patients).402 The potential was not because the artist represented a kind of sociology of 
                                                                                                                                                 
interviews. For a definitive account of the rediscovery of the murals, see Ruth Bowman, “Arshile Gorky’s 
Murals Rediscovered,” in Murals without Walls, 34–45. The extant pieces of the series and the photographs 
were exhibited together in an exhibition of the same name at the Newark Museum. The exhibition was held 
from 15 November, 1978 through 11 March, 1979; the exhibition went on tour from July 1979 through 
December 1980 under the auspices of the American Federation of Arts. My thanks to Andrew F. 
Hemingway for bringing this volume to my attention.  
399 See Art for the Millions, ed. and intro., Francis V. O’Connor (Greenwich, Conn.: New York Graphic 
Society, 1973): 72–3. Several versions of Gorky’s “My Murals for the Newark Airport: An Interpretation” 
exist: a four-page essay, and an edited two-page version of the same, a holograph copy discovered by 
Francis V. O’Connor, ca. 1978, and yet another in the Archives at the Whitney Museum of Art. For a 
pointed assessment of the use and abuse of these different versions, see Francis V. O’Connor, “A Note on 
the Texts of Gorky’s Essay for Art for the Millions,” in Murals without Walls, 16.    




suffering or of human progress, but because he had fulfilled his obligations as an artist. 
Borrowing from Rimbaud, he concluded: “The poet should define the quantity of the 
unknown which awakes in his time…The enormous becoming the normal, when 
absorbed by everyone, would really be a multiplication of progress.”403   
 In the opening passages of his own essay on Gorky’s murals, Kiesler offered an 
evocative description of the sensation of running one’s hand over the surface of a proper 
fresco and that of an oil painting: “If your hand glides over the mural painting, you do not 
feel it, but the roughness of the wall itself; your skin gliding over and oil painting feels of 
the bulk of paint and stroke.”404 Most painters in the WPA, he concluded, were not true 
mural painters, or those whose work “interbinds” with the building structure while it is 
swallowed by it.405 Rather, they produced “easel paintings muralized by pasting a painted 
canvas on the wall.”406 Who controlled the will of the hand that made the final finish: the 
artist, or did the artist bend his will to a larger force, (art) history, of the “vice majeur” of 
committee, or the so-called masses, those whom the committee purportedly represented? 
The contact point throughout this, in Kiesler’s analysis, was that of the tip of the brush to 
the support. Ultimately, Kiesler came down on the side of the artist in all of this, Gorky, 
in this case. The implicit assumption in Kiesler’s analysis is that the mural (proper), once 
completed, assumed a decorative function once it was subsumed to its architectural 
                                                 
403 Ibid., p. 14–5.  
404 Kiesler, “Murals without Walls,” Art Front (December 1936): 10.   
405 Ibid.  
406 Ibid. For a discussion on the “mural effect” in twentieth-century art, see Romy Golan, “From Monument 
to Muralnomad: The Mural in Modern European Architecture,” in Architecture and the Pictorial Arts from 
Romanticism to the Twenty-First Century, ed. Karen Koehler (Burlington: Ashgate, 2002): 186–208. The 
installation of painted canvases in lieu of painted murals pre-dates the work of the WPA artists. For 
example, Edwin Howland Blashfield (1848–1936), the “Dean” of American murals, made almost-exclusive 
use of this technique in his work. My thanks to Ann Samuel, doctoral candidate at the University of 
Delaware, for bringing this aspect of Blashfield’s technique to my attention.  
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setting. Moveable works in oil on canvas, because of the technique of the artists, had the 
desirable potential to retain some kind of discordant autonomy, as the artist had claimed 
in his own words.407 Gorky overcame the limits imposed upon his larger practice 
“valiantly,” Kiesler concluded. In the end, was it an abstract mural? Not expressly, and 
the artist probably would have agreed in that he was being more literate than painterly in 
his analysis of aviation motifs. This is apparent if the comparison is made between 
Activities on the Field or Mechanics of Flying (fig. 59) and Xhorkom (see fig. 40), which 
captured Greenberg’s attention in 1957. His abstract forms in the Newark series are done 
in a far more concrete style with a demonstrative resemblance to aviation mechanics than 
the fluid biomorphic forms of Xhorkom. The same kind of distinction can be made 
between de Kooning’s relatively conservative study for the Williamsburg Housing 
Projects (see fig. 56) and the untitled painting of 1931 (see fig. 46), which caught 
Rosenberg’s attention in 1968. While the study, no doubt, possesses the kind of 
strangeness that Davis, Kiesler or Schapiro thought could raise the public conscious if, at 
the same time, make the committees wary, the figure/ground relationship he constructed 
in that study is far more stable and conventional that that in the untitled work of 1931. In 
the 1931 work, for example, the four ovals at the lower right superimpose the over the 
rectilinear ‘figure’, but the apparent lack of color in the ovals interferes with the tenuous 
spatial relationship, as does the tangential relationship of the left-most oval to the vertical 
                                                 
407 These words by Kiesler, who was a close associate of Peggy Guggenheim, in some ways presage those 
of Jackson Pollock in his application for a Guggenheim Fellowship in 1947: “I intend to paint large 
moveable pictures which will function between the easel and the mural….” The application was ultimately 
rejected. For a partial transcription, see Jackson Pollock: A Catalogue Raisonné of Paintings, Drawings, 
and Other Works, Vol. IV, Francis V. O’Connor and John Thaw, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1978): 238.  
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purple line. The orange parallelograms that recede into the purple vista are foiled by the 
orange oval beneath, which punctuates the flatness of the purple ground.408  
 
V. The Appearance of a Style 
If the historical process is forcing the artist to relinquish his individualistic 
isolation and come into the arena of life problems, it may be the abstract 
artist who is best equipped to give vital artistic expression to such 
problems as he has already learned to abandon the ivory tower in his 
objective approach to his materials.  
 
  ~ Stuart Davis, “A Medium of 2 Dimensions,” Art Front,  
  1935409 
 
Most of the artists go whole hog with rarely a glimmer of the crass 
material world coming through to break contact with the infinite. 
 
  ~ Jacob Kainen, The Daily Worker, 1938 
 
Their works are reticent, for their expressive ends have purposefully been 
carried no farther than the simplified fabric will allow. Yet through such 
limited means they have destroyed the old conception of the ‘picture’; 
each has substituted a thing—an object that is at rest completely—and 
thus some day can a way be cleared for a new reality. 
 
  ~ George L. K. Morris, “American Abstract Artists,”  
1939410 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 If this dissertation had a different organizing principle, it might explore left-leaning 
art and examine figurative works of Social Realism from the 1930s, the “main category 
of left practice” as Andrew Hemingway has characterized it. Indeed, there is a long 
                                                 
408 Correspondence with Richard Shiff on 13 November, 2006 drew my attention to the peculiarities of this 
work.  
409 “A Medium of 2 Dimensions” was written by Davis in reply to Clarence Weinstock’s doubts about 
abstract painting. The above citation, as Davis noted in his essay, was initially intended for his Whitney 
catalogue essay of 1935, but was edited out due to page constraints. See, Stuart Davis, “A Medium of 2 
Dimensions,” Art Front 1:5 (May 1935): 6. See also, Byron Browne, et al, Letters, Art Front 3:7 (October 
1937): 20–1.  
410 George L. K. Morris, “Art Chronicle: American Abstract Artists: Third Annual Exhibition, New York,” 
Partisan Review 6:3 (Spring 1939): 64. Emphasis in the original.  
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tradition of art historians sympathetic to Marxism who have given considerable attention 
to the radical figurative art of previous generations.411 For example, in his publications 
with the Critics Group, Milton Brown wrote on the practice of the revolutionary art and 
artists of the revolutions of 1789 and 1848; Schapiro, as discussed in a previous chapter, 
wrote on the French Impressionists.412 Realism, as embodied by figurative painting, was 
not the exclusive domain of the expressly engaged artist, though. As Fernand Léger’s 
essay on his own practice demonstrated: his art, and that of his associates, was realistic in 
its essence.413 And, as the work of Stuart Davis demonstrated, modernist abstraction was 
not alien to left practice in the 1930s (even if it was considered conservative in art-
historical terms by some critics). In this section, I argue that left practice also included 
some forms of abstract painting. This is to suggest something more antagonistic than the 
watered-down pluralism suggested by the fictional consensus of the Popular Front 
exhibitions, as rightly argued by Hemingway.414 For example, at an A.C.A. Gallery 
symposium on “Social Painting and the Modern Tradition” in 1939, Jacob Kainen 
recalled that John Graham denounced proletarian art as being neither “proletarian” nor 
“art.”415 True revolutionary painting involved images drastically treated or abstracted 
from nature. This was, rather, “art in action.”416 In this section, I let play out the critical 
                                                 
411 For a recent compilation of essays, see: Marxism and the History of Art: From William Morris to the 
New Left, ed. Andrew Hemingway (London: Pluto Press, 2006).  
412 For Brown’s work, see “The Marxist Approach to Art,” Dialectics 2 (1937): 23–32 and Painting of the 
French Revolution, (New York: The Critics Group, 1938).  
413 See, Léger, “The New Realism Goes On,” Art Front 3:1 (February 1937), n.f.  
414 See Andrew Hemingway, “Fictional Unities: ‘Antifascism’ and ‘Antifascist Art’ in 30s America,”107–
117. Conversations with Andrew Hemingway over the course of the summer of 2005 while in residence at 
the Terra Foundation Museum of American Art in Giverny, France greatly clarified my thinking about 
these issues.  
415 The symposium took place in February 1939, in conjunction with the exhibition of the New York 
Group, 5–18 February, 1939. See Kainen, “Remembering John Graham,” 29.  
416 Ibid. 
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divides in between left-wing critics and their responses to abstraction: the reviews of 
Jacob Kainen and George L. K. Morris figure most prominently. Nuance has eluded 
much of the historical assessments of the 1930s. An individual critic, such as Stuart 
Davis, was difficult to place precisely for his double negations.  
 What if these abstract shapes, seen as such, were truly revolutionary. What if Denis’ 
taches, blown up to macroscopic proportions, represented the most radical of all painting 
styles? This is the premise of the work of the American Abstract Artists group, as 
expressed in their yearbook of 1938.417 Their first yearbook was a compilation of self-
assertive essays bound in a cover of “Neoplastic typographical design” (fig. 60).418 The 
enemy they perceived, articulated by Charles G. Shaw in his essay, “A Word to the 
Objector,” approached on two fronts: the conservative art establishment that was resistant 
to modernism in general, and the vanguard that was resistant to their practice of 
abstraction in particular.419 Critics of the AAA commonly felt that their art represented 
nothing, was “cold-blooded” or seemed to be “more like a game than painting.”420 What 
those critics seemed to be missing, Shaw argued, was the essential formalism of their 
work that appealed, in the highest, to “one’s aesthetic emotion alone.”421 Their work was 
neither literary nor realistic, but then again, nor was it sentimental, pretty, anecdotal, or 
melodramatic, he concluded.  (While there was no prescription for its members to 
practice hard-edged or geometric abstraction, most members were working in this style 
by the end of the 1930s. As earlier work of the individual members demonstrates, there 
                                                 
417 The AAA would publish yearbooks in 1939 and 1946.  
418 Larsen, “The American Abstract Artists: A Documentary History, 1936–1941,” 4.  
419 Charles G. Shaw, “A Word to the Objector,” American Abstract Artists: 1938, (New York: AAA, 1938): 
9–11.  
420 Ibid., 9.  
421 Ibid., 11. Emphasis in the original.  
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was a greater diversity of style in the very early years of the group.422) Shaw’s idealist (or, 
utopic) notions about abstraction were echoed by his fellow painters in their individual 
essays: those who were moved solely by “plastic experience” (Robert Jay Wolff); or, 
motivated by the “fuller employment of these [plastic] means which build a new 
imaginative world” (Alice Mason); or, the abstract painter as one who “anticipates the 
time when every man will be better able to enjoy the fruits of culture and the progress of 
human thought” (Rosalind Bengelsdorf).423  
 In his own essay for this yearbook, “The Quest for an Abstract Tradition,” George 
L.K. Morris argued that his fellow American abstract painters was any sort of historical 
continuity for their practice: “the roots had not yet sunk to a depth essential for a full-
bodied tradition.”424 (Edward Alden Jewell, for one, agreed. The work of the AAA was 
akin to a hothouse flower and just as pretty: it existed only in a “sealed chamber” where 
the air was “extremely rarefied.”425) In what was, by 1938, a familiar refrain amongst 
many critics, Morris argued that previous means of plastic expression were exhausted. 
The problem was repetition compulsion: the exploitation of “American local 
color…geographical or illusory;” the “tedious rehearsals” of the Surrealists who only 
sought to shock the bourgeoisie; and the technical innovations of Matisse and Rouault, by 
name, were now well-worn replications.426 In this “maze of vulgarity and grotesqueries,” 
                                                 
422 Larsen, “The American Abstract Artists Group: A History and Evaluation of its Impact upon American 
Art,” 430.  
423 Robert Jay Wolff, “Toward a Direct Vision,” in American Abstract Artists: 1938, 15; Alice Mason, 
“Concerning Plastic Significance,” in American Abstract Artists: 1938,  20; “The New Realism,” in 
American Abstract Artists: 1938, 22.  
424 Morris, “The Quest for an Abstract Tradition,” in American Abstract Artists: 1938, 14.  
425 Edward Alden Jewell, “American Abstractionists,” The New York Times (11 April, 1937): Sec. 10, 10.  
426 Ibid., p. 13.  
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the time was ripe for a “complete beginning,” Morris concluded.427 And, this new 
beginning would be international is its style and outlook. Through his friendship with 
Albert Gallatin and his studies abroad at the Académie Moderne in Paris in 1929 and 
1930, Morris had extensive contacts with European abstract and Neo-Plastic artists.428 
His essays in Partisan Review mostly focused on the work of this European vanguard.429 
Between the years 1937 and 1939, Morris collaborated with Sophie Täuber-Arp on the 
publication of Plastique, which came out both in Paris and New York. The publication 
became a site for multi-lingual, trans-Atlantic discursive exchange: the final edition 
contained essays by Morris and Gallatin, Eugen Jolas, the former editor of transition, as 
well AAA members Balcomb Greene and Charles G. Shaw.430 Publication ceased just 
prior to when Täuber-Arp and her husband were forced to flee from Paris in 1940; this 
was followed by the untimely death of Täuber-Arp in Zurich in 1943. 
 The AAA members espoused a desire to reorder the material world via a metonymic 
reordering of their plastic instincts. The critical response to the work of the AAA, 
however, was often less than enthusiastic: their work, it seemed, failed to keep pace with 
their ambitions. While Morris may have argued in 1938 that quality, the essential aspect 
of art, could never be “counterfeited,” it was the perceived lack of quality that would, in 
                                                 
427 Ibid., p. 14. For Morris’ sharp retort to Magical Realist painters, such as Peter Blume, see “Some 
Personal Letters to American Artists Recently Exhibiting in New York,” Partisan Review 4:4 (March 
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1940, lead the curators at MoMA to reject their work.431 Writing on behalf of the museum 
trustees in response to a 1940 essay by Morris, Philip L. Goodwin averred that the 
museum would continue to exhibit “some of the better abstract work…as in the past.”432 
This would never include a group show of the AAA membership.433 
 Both von Wiegand and Kainen reviewed the AAA exhibits of the 1930s, and, as with 
their cautious acceptance of Expressionist tendencies (as discussed above), they were 
open to modernist abstraction. In their reviews, both addressed the paintings as 
phenomenological objects, and this distinguishes their essays from others in publications 
of the organized left.434 However, their opinions diverged. Von Wiegand wrote 
optimistically about the stylistic advances she saw in their well-attended 1937 exhibit at 
the Squibb Galleries.435 She drew a comparison of high praise: “Whether they speak in 
the fluent idiom of Picasso or the vivid colors of the Expressionists, these painters are 
seriously concerned with the aesthetic problems of painting.”436 By “abstract surrealism,” 
von Wiegand (who was more sympathetic to Surrealism than her fellow travelers) meant 
the abstractions of Miro, whose work had escaped claims of ‘vulgarity’ or ‘literariness’. 
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Kainen, in his review of the same exhibition, wished (with irony) for more of “a glimmer 
of the external world” to intrude itself in their work.437  
 When Kainen argued in his 1938 review that the AAA artists “go whole hog with 
rarely a glimmer of the crass material world coming through to break contact with the 
infinite,” he was suggesting in no uncertain terms that those painters were being non-
objective in the same mien as the artists around the Baroness Hilla Rebay.438 The work, 
he argued, while technically capable (and improved from the exhibition of the previous 
year), offered “little new material” from the standpoint of “creating new insights into 
modern life.” Furthermore, Kainen continued, the work itself failed to attain the 
modernity that the artists sought. With some exceptions, the artists seemed to be caught 
in their own cliché of the “total” modern form. He singled out Morris’ Composition No. 
17 (fig. 61) for being overly technical: a kind of “cold-bloodedness” that reduced the art 
of Cézanne, Seurat, Matisse, and Rouault to issues of style only. The attitudes that each 
of those painters held towards nature and society were not transmitted in Morris’ work, 
even if he might have grasped their technics. It was abstraction as pure form that ended 
the dialectic of painterly technique. It’s also, very possibly, a reaction to artists like 
Bolotowsky, who seemed to have purged the figure (and subjects and mimetic subject 
matter along with it) from the time that he was a member of The Ten, (see, for example, 
his Sweatshop, fig. 62). In a later essay, Kainen recalled an encounter that took place 
between Bolotowsky, Graham and himself in the 1930s. Bolotowsky invited the other 
two into his studio one day when they making their way up the stairs to Gorky’s studio a 
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few flights up. Bolotowsky bemusedly recounted for them that the custodian of the 
building had seen one of his paintings in passing—red and black geometric shapes on a 
white ground, as Kainen recalled. Faced with this work, the custodian reportedly said, “I 
see you’re a medical student.” After they had excused themselves, Kainen recalled that 
Graham concurred with the custodian: “The paintings have a clinical look. They’re 
sterilized.”439 Bolotowsky might have agreed: in an interview late in life, Bolotowsky 
said, with high irony, that he and Balcomb Greene were either good pure abstractionists 
or bad ones: “we had no empathy at all.”440 
 Kainen’s distaste for non-objective painting echoed the concerns of another left-wing 
writer: Bertolt Brecht. While Brecht’s critique of European, non-objective painting may 
be beyond the scope of a dissertation on American abstraction, the attitude and concern 
that he recorded in his notebook in the 1930s is not:  
I see that you have removed the motifs from your paintings. No 
recognizable objects appear there anymore. You reproduce the sweeping 
curve of the chair—not the chair; the red of the sky, the burning house.… I 
wonder about it, and especially because you say that you are Communists, 
going out to reconstruct a world that is not habitable. If you were not 
Communists but subject spirits of the ruling classes, I would not wonder 
about your painting….You would do better to show in your paintings how 
man in our times has been a wolf to other men, and to say then: “This will 
not be bought in our time.” Because only the wolves have money to buy 
paintings in our times. But it will not always be this way; and our 
paintings will contribute to seeing that it will not be.441   
 
 Even earlier, Samuel M. Kootz, the American gallerist, had worried about the issue of 
technique as an end in itself in his 1930 catalogue, Modern American Painters. (Though, 
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as he himself stated, he was primarily concerned with the technique of the French artist 
because France was then still the unsurpassed “breeding ground for all modern 
movements in painting.”442) Kootz laid his concerns at the feet of the hard-edge 
abstractionists and their “fatuity” in allowing for the “domination of technique” over 
experience and expression.443 Since these painters “had nothing to say in these geometric 
forms, they have chose to believe that these forms are what they have to say.”444 As with 
Graham, Kootz’s objections were not with geometric art per se—that style was simply 
the most demonstrative example of the problem. It was, rather, that these painters had lost 
the lesson of the work of Cézanne: “stringent geometry…was but a means of acquiring 
control of one’s craft [so] better to express individual inspirations.”445  
 Left-wing critics were certainly open the practice of abstract painting: in the 
case of Kainen and von Wiegand, they were, at times, practitioners themselves. 
While von Wiegand was cautiously optimistic about the work of the AAA, 
Kainen was troubled by the purity of their work (the quest for an abstract 
equivalent of 0).446 It was as if the structural rigor of late Cubism had ossified into 
a kind of Mannerism.  For Kainen, the AAA paintings were the results of 
deploying abstraction as a conceptual category. Painters, such as Graham, Gorky, 
and de Kooning were indeed dissatisfied with the formal impasse of late Cubism 
and sought ways out of this odd dead-end or cul-de-sac of abstraction. As Graham 
                                                 
442 Samuel M. Kootz, Modern American Painters (New York: Brewer & Warren, Inc., 1930): 7.  
443 Ibid.,7–8.  
444 Ibid., 8. 
445 Ibid. See also, John D. Graham, “96. What is the real influence of Cézanne on modern painting? And of 
Picasso?” in System and Dialectics of Art, 93–7.  
446 The idea that painting could come from nothing is one that de Kooning would term typically American: 
It’s “‘painting made out of John Brown’s body.’” See, Willem de Kooning, “Is Today’s Artist with or 
Against the Past?” Art News 57 (Summer 1958): 27. This was an interview with Thomas Hess conducted in 
the galleries of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.  
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argued in his 1937 System and Dialectics of Art, “abstract painting” (as distinct 
from “painting”) was “an argument drawn to a conclusion.”447  
 However, the conversation over the end of abstract art continued. Indeed, in 
1940, Wyndham Lewis (1882–1957) declared the death of abstract painting, 
recalling his earlier conclusion in The Caliph’s Design: that it was a “(fantastic) 
branch of architecture,” which was now obsolescent as architecture had become 
sufficiently “reinvigorated.”448As the editors of The New Republic noted in the 
subsequent issue, the “mad-letters” prompted over the “April Fool” number were 
lengthy and lively.449 Respondents included AAA members Morris and Reinhardt 
as well as Weldon Kees (1914–1955?). Reinhardt predicted that abstract art would 
“yet have its day.”450 Lewis doubted this. In his own response, printed with the 
“mad-letters,” he argued that the artist, were he to survive, must:  
[C]ome to terms with the people at large, and no longer accept the role of 
purveyor of sensation, or of a highbrow clown, to a handful of socialites: 
for in no great capital are there more than a dew dozen people, with the 
means necessary to set up as private patrons, who even pretend to care for 
pictures.451 
 
VI. Negative Dialectic: Reverting to Ingres at the End of the 1930s  
To be true to one’s time is an automatic thing. You do not have to try it. 
Ingres was true to his time in spite that he followed Raffael.  
 
                                                 
447 John D. Graham, System and Dialectics of Art, 24. Emphasis in the original.  
448 Wyndham Lewis, “The End of Abstract Art,” The New Republic 102 (April 1940): 439. See also, 
Wyndham Lewis, The Caliph’s Design: Architects! Where Is Your Vortex? (London: The Egoist, Ltd. with 
the Pelican Press, 1919).  
449 “Abstract Art Turns Over,” The New Republic 102 (May 1940): 674.  
450 Ad Reinhardt, Letters, The New Republic 102 (May 1940): 674. 
451 Wyndham Lewis, Letters, The New Republic 102 (May 1940): 675.  
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  ~ John Graham, notebook entry, ca. 1936452  
 
Gorky was waving an Ingres reproduction around at the opening of the 
first American Abstract Artists annual exhibition and proclaiming that the 
French master was more ‘abstract’ than all the work in the exhibition. 
 
~ Recollection by Rosalind Bengelsdorf Browne, ca. 
1940453 
 
I used to make imaginary portraits from Ingres and the LeNains (I never 
did copies; I don’t think I’d be able to).  
 
~ Willem de Kooning, “Is Today’s Artist With or Against 
the Past?” ArtNews, 1958454 
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 The interest in mastering line was not delimited to the hard-edge or geometric 
painters in the 1930s, as these epigraphs demonstrate.  What these epigraphs share, in 
their respective references to Ingres, is an assertion of a technical proficiency for abstract 
painting. Both looked to the lines of the Classical painters of the past in an effort to be 
conditioned by that same self-mastering line.455 Like Gorky, de Kooning rejected the 
calculations of his colleagues in the AAA; the two also turned away from the highly 
competent (geometric) abstractions in their own work for the WPA. Both rejected 
primitivist strategies of the Expressionists. What then did it mean to Gorky for a painting 
                                                 
452 John D. Graham, Notebooks, Archives of American Art, Washington, D.C. Cited by Melvin Lader, 
“Graham, Gorky, de Kooning, and the ‘Ingres’ Revival in America,” Arts Magazine 52:7 (March 1978): 
99, n. 57.  
453 See also, the unpublished 15-page autobiography (written ca. 1940) held in the Rosalind Bengelsdorf 
Browne Papers, Archives of American Art, Washington, D.C. See also, Virginia M. Mecklenburg, The 
Patricia and Phillip Frost Collection: American Abstraction, 1930–1945 (Washington, DC: National 
Museum of American Art and Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989): 46, n. 3. 
454 Willem de Kooning, “Is Today’s Artist With or Against the Past?” 27.  
455 On de Kooning’s innovations with line, see Richard Shiff, “‘With Eyes Shut’: De Kooning’s Twist,” 
Master Drawings 40: 1 (Spring 2002): 73–88. For Gorky’s relationship to line in his drawings, see Janie C. 
Lee, “Arshile Gorky: The Power of Drawing,” and Melvin P. Lader, “What the Drawings Reveal: Some 
Observations on Arshile Gorky’s Working Method,” in eds. Lee and Lader, Arshile Gorky: A Retrospective 
of Drawings (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art and Harry N. Abrams, 2004): 15–83. 
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by Ingres to be “more abstract” than one by an AAA member? Earlier, Roger Fry 
suggested that Ingres’ methods bore the mark of a different kind of primitivism with his 
interest in “mediæval illuminated manuscripts” and his formal tendency towards 
“positive, flat even assertiveness which takes but little note of accident.”456 In 1960, 
Greenberg argued that Ingres had “executed portraits that were among the flattest, least 
sculptural paintings done in the West by a sophisticated artist since the 14th century.”457 
Susan C. Larsen, even later, suggested that Gorky felt that abstraction and sensuality 
“need not be mutually exclusive in a work of art.”458 To get to the matter at hand, it’s 
useful to insert experience in between the terms abstraction and sensuality. (Otherwise, 
the abstraction could be delimited to a representation of sensuality, not an understanding 
of it.) This is how Kainen, for another, understood Gorky’s technique, specifically in 
relation to Gorky’s The Artist and His Mother (see fig. 24), which Kainen had seen, in 
process, at the artist’s studio.459 In a later interview, Kainen recalled that, “Just before 
painting when the pigment was just about dry, [Gorky would] scrape it with a razor 
blade, because he wanted to get very smooth, smooth gloss, on that smooth surface but he 
still wanted a painterly quality.”460 The resulting “clarity” was Ingres-like, Kainen 
recalled, but the pigment was “more dense.”461 Gorky, in his youth, made a habit of 
studying and copying Ingres and other Old Masters. As Rosenberg would later write of 
                                                 
456 Roger Fry, “Plastic Colour,” in Transformations (New York: Brentano’s, 1926): 217.  
457 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Arts Yearbook 4 (1961): 105.  
458 Susan C. Larsen, “The American Abstract Artists: A Documentary History, 1936–1941,” 3.  
459 Kainen made it clear that he saw the version of this painting that is now in the collection of the Whitney 
Museum. Interview with Jacob Kainen, conducted by Avis Berman at the artist’s studio in Washington, 
D.C. on  10 August and 22 September, 1982. The transcript held in the Jacob Kainen Papers, Archives of 
American Art, Smithsonian Institution (microfilm reel no. 4937). My thanks to Avis Berman for bringing 
her interview to my attention. For Gorky’s draftsmanship on the preparatory drawings for this work, see 
Lader, “What the Drawings Reveal: Some Observations on Arshile Gorky’s Working Method,” 21–23.  
460 Interview with Jacob Kainen, conducted by Avis Berman.  
461 Ibid. 
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Gorky’s habit: “imitation was a learning to be, as well as a learning to do.”462 In terms of 
mastering self-invention by modern painters, Richard Shiff has stated the aim of 
modernism: “as the attempt—perhaps doomed—to fuse iconic appearance to indexical 
appearance.”463   
 Gorky’s obsessive attention to the work of Ingres is not unique within the history of 
art—generations of painters have rediscovered his work for themselves.464 The French 
master purportedly admonished a twenty-year-old Edgar De Gas (1835–1917) to: “Draw 
lines, young man, many lines; from memory or from nature, it is this way that you will 
become a good artist.”465 A young Alfred Barr noted in his graduate journals (ca. 1925) 
that the Cubist phase of art was complete, and that artists were then turning to Ingres, but 
an Ingres “simplified and continuous in contour, based on…profound knowledge.”466 
Kainen also made a practice of copying over the works of Old Master paintings, but in 
black and white—like the monochromatic under painting of academically-trained 
painters. He did so “just to study the composition.” 467 He also recalled that Clive Bell’s 
                                                 
462 Harold Rosenberg, Arshile Gorky: The Man, the Time, the Idea (New York, Horizon Press, 1962): 50. 
On Gorky’s self-invention, see Donald Kuspit, “Arshile Gorky: Images in Support of the Invented Self,” in 
Abstract Expressionism: The Critical Developments, 48–63.  
463 Richard Shiff, “Performing an Appearance: On the Surface of Abstract Expressionism,” in Abstract 
Expressionism: The Critical Developments, 103. 
464 For a general history of line in nineteenth-century French painting, see The Essence of Line: French 
Drawings from Ingres to Degas, with essays by Jay McKean Fisher, et al. (Baltimore: Baltimore Museum 
of Art: Walters Art Museum; University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005). See also, 
Greenberg’s tribute to line of Paul Klee in “Art Chronicle: On Paul Klee (1870–1940),” Partisan Review, 
8:3 (May-June, 1941): 224–229; Greenberg, “The Necessity of the Old Masters,” Partisan Review 15:7 
(July 1948): 812–5; Greenberg, “The Venetian Line,” Partisan Review 17:4 (April 1950): 360–4. 
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Danse, Dessin (Paris: Gallimard, 1938): 59–62. See John Rewald, The History of Impressionism, (New 
York: MoMA, 1974):16, 35, n. 5.  
466 Alfred H. Barr papers, file no. B2725 H36 1982, Archive of the Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
Also cited in Susan Noyes Platt, “Modernism, Formalism, and Politics: The Cubism and Abstract Art 
Exhibition of 1936,” 287, 293, n. 12.  
467 Interview with Jacob Kainen, conducted by Avis Berman. See also, Clive Bell, Landmarks in 
Nineteenth-Century Painting (London: Chatto & Windus, 1927).  
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Landmarks in Nineteenth-Century Painting was his favorite book on artists.468 By another 
account, Walter Pach (1883–1958) was the author of Gorky’s favorite book on Ingres.469 
In 1939, Gorky had occasion to participate in a panel discussion with the author in front 
of Guernica, which was now safely installed at the Valentine Gallery. Dorothy Tanning 
(b. 1910), who was in the audience that evening, recalled that Gorky would “point out a 
strategic line, and follow it into battle as it clashed on the far side of the picture with 
spiky chaos.”470 While Gorky’s most innovative exploitations of his media would come in 
the 1940s, his engagement with strategic/chaotic line began in the 1930s.  
 Another recollection, this one by Jacob Kainen from March of 1940, is instructive 
here on attitudes towards abstraction and about the practice of abstraction. Kainen 
recalled attending the exhibition at the Durlacher Gallery with Gorky and Graham, where 
they saw a small show of the work of Nicolas Poussin (1594–1665), including The 
Triumph of Bacchus of 1636–6 (fig. 63).471 Kainen recalled that, while at the gallery, the 
Gorky noted strong diagonals that converged at the uplifted arm of the brazier, and that 
the white of the horse’s rump and the leopard skin held the painting together at the center. 
Graham noted that the thrusts and counter thrusts of the composition, but that the effect 
was static “so you can contemplate the formal order.”472 Four years later, after what 
Kainen termed a period of “percolation,” Graham painted Poussin m’instruit (fig. 64).  
                                                 
468 Interview with Jacob Kainen, conducted by Avis Berman.  
469 Walter Pach, Ingres (New York: Harper, 1939). See Hayden Herrera, Arshile Gorky: His Life and Work 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2003): 308  
470 Herrera, Arshile Gorky: His Life and Work, 308.  
471 Doubts over the authenticity of this work by Poussin were shed after its exhibition in Edinburgh in 1981. 
See Christopher Wright, Poussin, Paintings: A Catalogue Raisonné (London: Harlequin Books, Ltd., 
1985):178. See also, Lader, “What the Drawings Reveal: Some Observations on Arshile Gorky’s Working 
Method,” 48.  
472 Kainen, “Remembering John Graham,” 29.  
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 By way of comparison to the 1940 outing of Gorky, Graham, and Kainen, in 1941 
George L.K. Morris offered another account of how abstraction worked. In his capacity 
of art critic for Partisan Review, Morris offered an account of the processes of 
abstraction, in “On the Mechanics of Abstract Painting,” complete with diagrams (fig. 
65).473 It’s a highly competent assessment of the current state of abstraction. Morris 
concluded his argument with a demonstration: a comparison between Peace and Plenty, a 
landscape by George Inness (1825–94) and his own Composition No. 2, which for the 
purposes of his essay, he temporarily re-named Composition No. 2 Peace and Plenty (fig. 
66). The difference between distillation and percolation could not have be clearer to 
critics in the 1930s who were inclined to make qualitative judgments in favor of creative 
foment. Some artists and critics opted out of modernism, though: after 1944, the tension 
Graham constructed in his System and Dialectics of Art between revolution and tradition 
(indeed, between that of materialism and spiritualism) shifted towards the latter in both 
cases.474 For his part, Kainen and his family left New York for Washington, D.C. in May 
of 1942, when he took up a curatorial position in the Graphic Arts Division of the 
Smithsonian Institution.475  
                                                 
473 George L.K. Morris, “On the Mechanics of Abstract Painting,” Partisan Review 8:5 (September–
October 1941): 403–17. Perhaps Morris was inspired by the kind of diagrams that accompanied Mondrian’s 
1938 essay, “The Necessity for a New Teaching in Art, Architecture, and Industry.” While this essay 
remained unpublished in Mondrian’s lifetime, Morris could have seen drafts of it during Mondrian’s time 
in New York. This essay is reproduced in full in Piet Mondrian, The New Art—The New Life: The 
Collected Writings of Piet Mondrian, Harry Holtzman and Martin S. James, eds. (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 1993): 310–7.  
474 For a discussion of Graham’s interest in the mystical and the spiritual (e.g., alchemy, Theosophy, the 
Cabala, astrology, etc.) see, Marcia Epstein Allentuck, Introduction, John Graham’s System and Dialectics 
of Art (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971): 39–44, et passim. 
475 On the FBI surveillance of Kainen in the post-War years, see the interview with Jacob Kainen, 
conducted by Avis Berman. 
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 Still for others, the divide was not between Old Masters and new beginnings. In a 
1958 interview with Thomas Hess that took place in the galleries of the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, Willem de Kooning suggested that modern “artists keep influencing old 
masters.”476 Indeed, the figure ground relationship of the Poussin also merits a 
retrospective comparison with de Kooning’s untitled work from 1931 (see fig. 46). In the 
Poussin, the ‘ground’ of earthen tones (the sinuous figures, ropes and chariots all) is 
punctuated in three areas by vibrant, primary color: the red of the cape on Bacchus, at 
left, and in the middle, the yellow of the leopard skin, and the blue of the toga of 
Bacchante; and in a fourth by the white rump of the horse that caught Gorky’s eye.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
The dissident artist, if he understands the extremity of the age and voices 
what is tries to stifle, will thus be saved from its sterility and delivered 
from its corruption. Instead of deceiving himself and others by playing 
with bureaucratized visions of the shining cities of the future or else by 
turning his art into a shrine for things that are dead and gone, he would be 
faithful to the metamorphosis of the present. And every metamorphosis, it 
has been said, “is partly a swan song and partly a prelude to a great new 
poem.”  
   ~ Philip Rahv, “Twilight of the Thirties,” Partisan Review,  
   1939477  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 
 Throughout the1930s, the future potential of abstract art, as practiced in New York, 
remained in doubt for some critics. It would be another decade before Clement Greenberg 
would offer the “impression” in 1948 that if advanced art (that was, for the moment, 
abstract painting) was to have any sort of future, that future was dependent upon what 
                                                 
476 Willem de Kooning, “Is Today’s Artist with or Against the Past?” 27. 
477 Philip Rahv, “Twilight of the Thirties,” Partisan Review 6:4 (Summer 1939): 15. The citation is 
probably an oblique reference to Wallace Steven’s poem, Academic Discourse in Havana. See Wallace 
Stevens: Collected Poetry and Prose (New York: The Library of America, 1997): 115–7.   
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was done in New York.478 Those painters—the good ones—who Greenberg would later 
identified were the ones who had the “courage to reject and to continue rejecting.”479 This 
was what Greenberg understood as the challenge posed by painterly technique, or, the 
“‘destructiveness’” that was a “positive and creative factor,” not as the elimination of 
representation in painting, per se.480 Also in 1948, Ronald Ossory Dunlop (1894–1973), 
the Irish painter and some-time Bloomsbury affiliate, would arrive at a definition of 
Abstract Painting, in his slim volume, Understanding Pictures: “The pure abstract picture 
in which all representation of objects, all extraneous subject-matter, was finally 
eliminated and the canvas contained only shapes, spaces, colours.”481 Abstractionists, 
who painted in a style in which the finality of its forms was pre-determined, brought their 
painting to a kind of conclusion by the late 1930s. In the eyes of a range of critics, this 
painting (abstract painting as a conceptual category) arrived at a dead-end of sorts.  
 The break that many artists appeared to make in the late 1930s comes to be 
multivalent then. It was not delimited to breaking away from literal figurative 
representation and moving towards abstraction. The shift or split was also between that of 
painting, the kind that represented itself, and the category of abstract painting, the kind 
that represented the ‘pure’. The conscious privileging of painterly abstraction over 
‘abstract painting’ begins with the qualitative judgments of critics in New York by the 
1930s, well before 1948 when market forces held a place for the new American painting, 
                                                 
478 Greenberg, “The Situation at the Moment,” Partisan Review 15:1 (January 1948): 82.  
479 Ibid., 84.  
480 Ibid. 
481 Dunlop, Understanding Pictures: From Primitive Art to Surrealism (New York: Pitman, 1948): 42. 
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as Guilbaut has argued.482 It was the former type of painting that seemed to have future 
potential to critics in the 1930s, and later to critics like Greenberg and Rosenberg. It was 
painting that could work its way through the strictures of late Cubism and offer a retort to 
the over-sized easel picture or the a priori conclusions of abstraction.  It was painting that 
had something to say (even if by means that seemed, for a time, destructive, counter-
intuitive or unnatural). Rosenberg, though, was wary. Writing on politics in 1944, he 
noted that “‘Here we go’” had somehow become identical with “‘After all—why not?’  
and political action into sexual experience.”483 Not every negation was smart, necessary, 
or productive. Some would turn out to be just plain silly.  
                                                 
482 See Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art, 178–9. On this point, see Deidre Robson, 
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Myth and History, ca. 1940 
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I. Marxism at the End of the 1930s  
The arts which today have the greatest vitality for the average person are 
things he does not take to be arts: for instance, the movie, jazzed music, 
the comic strip, and, too frequently, newspaper accounts of love-nests, 
murders and exploits of bandits.  
 
  ~ John Dewey, Art as Experience, 1934484 
 
I did not, as Schwartz says, try to find a social fact for every pictorial 
element. Nor would I…agree that the comic strip and the abstract painting 
have the same social origins, though their causes may intersect. 
 
~ Meyer Schapiro, “A Note on the Nature of Art (A Reply 
to Delmore Schwartz),” Marxist Quarterly, 1937485 
 
A system has been created for the mechanical drawing of analogies. The 
symbolism of “pure poetry” has long been outdistanced; the new 
[analogical] technique expands and contracts to embrace the vastest 
abstractions and the most trivial-sounding commonplaces; it applies 
equally to Time, newspaper advertisements, love, horse-breeding, or 
international politics.  
 
~ Harold Rosenberg, “Myth and History,” Partisan Review, 
1939486 
 
One and the same civilization produces simultaneously two such different 
things as a poem by T.S. Eliot and a Tin Pan Alley song, or a painting by 
Braque and a Saturday Evening Post cover. All four are on the order of 
culture, and ostensibly, parts of the same culture and products of the same 
society. Here, however, the connection seems to end.  A poem by Eliot 
and a poem by Eddie Guest—what perspective on culture is large enough 
to enable us to situate them in an enlightening relation to each other? 
 
~ Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan 
Review, 1939487 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
                                                 
484 Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1980, 1934): 5–6. In the Preface to his book, 
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 162 
 The juxtaposition of the rarefied with the commonplace was a frequent device used 
by philosophers, historians, and critics in the 1930s, as these epigraphs demonstrate. In 
their respective essays, these writers pointed to the problems or consequences of 
disassociating the work of art from common, or shared, experience (Dewey); of binding 
the work of art to the workings of the economic base (Schapiro); the problems of 
rendering aesthetic all aspects of culture (Rosenberg); or, the possibilities of placing the 
autonomous art object in dialogue with the common culture (Greenberg). This section 
examines efforts made by writers on art to develop an art criticism appropriate or 
adequate to the modern art object. An absence in Marx’s writing, as has been often noted 
by scholars, is the art object (or, it has been very well hidden).488 Critics looking to take 
up the mantle of a Marxian interpretation of art found themselves often holding only a 
cloth coat.489 And so, this lacuna brought forth some very interesting writing in the 1930s 
as critics, more often than not, had to work it out for themselves. Generally, this section 
examines attempts by other left-wing critics working in New York to reconcile (or 
dispute) the aesthetic with the material, autonomy in art and the (historical) dialectic. For 
some critics, abstraction represented a revolution within artistic tradition—the next, 
logical step in the evolution of modernist art; or, abstraction literally represented the 
momentary suppression of the signs and symbols of the old order; and still for others, 
                                                 
488 See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, The Aesthetic Dimension: Towards a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics 
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31.  
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abstract art was the cultural vanguard that represented a site of resistance within modern 
commodity culture. 
 The decade of the 1930s witnessed the well-documented split between Trotskyists 
and Stalinists, circa 1936, in Europe, America, and elsewhere; the Moscow Trials of 
1936–38 at which Leon Trotsky and other leading members of the original Bolshevik 
party were purged; the rise and demise of the first Popular Front (1935–ca. 1939); and the 
final defeat of the Loyalists and the supporting international brigades in Spain by the 
Fascists (April 1939). Secondary art-historical literature that gives consideration to the 
political climate of 1930s mostly attends to the rift between Trotskyists and Stalinists 
(and with good reason).490 This chapter attends to the formalism and formulations of Leon 
Trotsky. As one of the major “historical actors” of his age, to borrow again from 
Wilson’s vocabulary, and as one of the “subjects of history” who truly suffered, to 
borrow from those of Max Horkheimer, he was seen by some intellectuals as the 
paradigmatic man of art and action in his lifetime. In the 1930s, Trotsky made several 
contributions to Partisan Review on art and politics including a manifesto on free, 
revolutionary art co-authored with André Bréton and Diego Rivera.491 Reports of the 
Moscow Trials and the infamous purges had a galvanizing effect on the imaginations of 
politically-minded New York intellectuals. Most prominent amongst them was John 
Dewey, who, in 1934, had written Art as Experience, a Pragmatist articulation of art.492 
In September 1937, Dewey famously chaired the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry into 
                                                 
490 The CPUSA purged a number of members believed to be Trotskyists, including Max Schactman, in 
1928. Until 1934, the Trotskyist Cannon group saw itself as a faction within the CPUSA, before finally 
splitting from the party altogether.  
491 For reasons that are discussed below, Trotsky’s name was initially omitted from authorship credit.  
492 See also, Philip Rahv, “Trials of the Mind,” Partisan Review 4:5 (April 1938): 3–11. 
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the Charges Made against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials. The assembled 
commission traveled to Coyoacán, Mexico, where Trotsky was then living in exile with 
his family through the aegis of Rivera.493 In its report, published in the same year, the 
commission found Moscow Trials to be “frame-ups” and Trotsky and his son, Leon 
Sedov, who died under suspicious circumstances on 16 February, 1938, “not guilty!”494 In 
1938, Dewey and Trotsky went on to collaborate, if at cross purposes, on Their Morals 
and Ours, a study on differences in Marxist and liberal values. Despite all efforts, 
Trotsky was attacked in his study on 20 August, 1940 by Ramón Mercader, a Stalinist 
agent, who used an ice pick for his attack. Trotsky died the next day.  
  In this chapter, I argue that Marxism was at play in New York during these years in 
another form—that of the Frankfurt School. The Expressionism controversy in Das Wort 
remains an instructive example of German-language criticism intruding in the left-wing 
critical discourse of the US: Lukács derided the historical possibility of an avant-garde; 
Bloch was well aware of the dangers posed by kitsch. During the 1930s, the Frankfurt 
School writers disseminated their ideas on art and mass culture through the Zeitschrift für 
Sozialforschung (as well through the émigré journal, Das Wort). Hitler’s rise to power in 
Germany forced a migration of the Institut’s membership: Max Horkheimer, the Director, 
Leo Löwenthal, Herbert Marcuse, and Friedrich Pollock emigrated in 1934; Theodor 
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Paterson strike in 1913, Francisco Zamora, author and former Mexican unionist, and Suzanne La Follette, 
author and former editor of The Freeman and The New Freeman. John F. Finerty, then counsel to Tom 
Mooney and former counsel to Sacco and Vanzetti, acted as counsel to the Commission. 
494 The Case of Leon Trotsky; Report of Hearings on the Charges Made against him in the Moscow Trials, 
by the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry, John Dewey, Chairman, Carleton Beals (resigned) Otto Ruehle, 
Benjamin Stolberg, Suzanne La Follette, Secretary (New York: Harper, 1937): xv. 
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Adorno in 1938. As mentioned in the prolegomenon, the Institut was able to continue 
publishing Studies in Philosophy and Social Science in New York until 1941, thought its 
temporary association with Columbia University. Specifically, this section examines the 
consequences of the critical theory of the Frankfurt Institut for American critics, 
especially for Schapiro and a young Greenberg.  
 In their work, the Frankfurt School theorists approached the problem of the aesthetic 
realm (which was not necessarily co-terminus with the history of the fine arts for these 
writers). Rather, the avant-garde work of art succeeded if it sensitized its beholder in the 
deadening context of a commodity-based culture. In his essays from the 1930s, for 
example, Max Horkheimer, the director of the Institut, made charges against idealist 
thinkers (or idealist aspects of some materialists): namely G.W.F. Hegel, William 
Dilthey, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Henri Bergson, in that they over-
emphasized the idea of an autonomous individual at the expense of action in culture. 
“After Marx,” he wrote, “we are forbidden any such [idealist] consolation about the 
world.”495 However, vulgar materialism or positivist hypostatization of concepts or 
categories in culture concerned him even more: this was the philosophy of the acceptance 
of the existing order and the ceding of individual agency. For example, in his first essay 
published in Gründbergs Archiv in 1930, Horkheimer attacked Karl Mannheim’s 
Ideology and Utopia. By interpreting Marxism as but one ideology amongst many, 
Horkheimer argued that Mannheim, (who was certainly of the left and a colleague), had 
                                                 
495 Max Horkheimer, “Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?” Gründbergs Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus 
und der Arbeiterbewegung 15 (1930). Reprinted in Between Philosophy and Social Science: Selected Early 
Writings of Max Horkheimer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993): 139.  
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made all existence relative and meaningless by naming it an extreme false consciousness: 
This was an outrageous proposition to the “acting and suffering subjects of history.”496  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Marx had once—in a first draft for the “Introduction to the Critique of 
Political Economy”—made some attempt to explore the difficulties in the 
connection between art and economic conditions. The periods of the 
highest development of art do not coincide, he says, with the highest 
developments in society. Great art—the Greek epic, for example—is not 
even necessarily the product of a high period of artistic development. In 
any given instance it is possible to see why a particular art should have 
flourished at a particular moment….The difficulty lay only in discovering 
the general laws of the connection between artistic and social 
development. One would say that Marx found a great deal of difficulty in 
explaining the above specific case and that his explanation was far from 
satisfactory.  
~ Edmund Wilson, “The Myth of the Marxist Dialectic,” 
Partisan Review, 1938497 
 
In the real world? Is it proper now to speak of the real world, which the 
work of art is intended to reflect or represent? Is not the work of art itself 
an element of this real world, in fact a very superior element? What is the 
literary intervention into this process of exchange between the formal and 
the unique but the final human act of understanding, the synthetic image 
that knits together the physical and the unreal, and thereby, becomes itself 
the only total reality.  
 
~ Harold Rosenberg, “Myth and History,” Partisan Review, 
1939498 
 
It is among the hopeful signs in the midst of the decay of our present 
society that we—some of us—have been unwilling to accept this last 
phase for our culture. In seeking to go beyond Alexandrianism, a part of 
Western bourgeois society has produced something unheard of 
heretofore:—avant-garde culture. A superior consciousness of history—
more precisely, the appearance of a new kind of criticism of society, an 
historical criticism—made this possible.  
 
~ Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan 
Review, 1939499 
                                                 
496 Ibid., 137.  
497 Edmund Wilson, “The Myth of the Marxist Dialectic,” Partisan Review 6:1 (Fall 1938): 70.  
498 Rosenberg, “Myth and History,” Partisan Review 6:2 (Winter 1939): 24. 
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~~~~~~~~~~ 
 Greenberg’s 1939 essay remains a seminal text in the critical history of modernist art, 
and it continues to be singled out and subjected to critical scrutiny.500 However, it was, in 
the initial circumstances of its publication, part of a larger debate at Partisan Review on 
how history (or its myth) worked in culture generally, and the status of the work of art in 
contemporary culture, specifically.501 Participants included American writers who were 
more established at that point in time than the young Greenberg, who, with his autumn 
1939 essay, was committing his words to print for only the second time.502 In the autumn 
of 1938, Edmund Wilson (1895–1972) and William Phillips (1907–2002), one of the co-
founders of Partisan Review, had a heated exchange over the theory of the Marxist 
dialectic.503 In the winter 1939 edition, Harold Rosenberg published “Myth and History,” 
which was his intervention into the 1938 debate between William Troy (1903–1961), the 
literary critic, and James Burnham (1905–1987), future author of The Managerial 
                                                                                                                                                 
499 Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review 6:5 (Autumn 1939): 35. 
500 See, for example, the exchange between Timothy J. Clark and Michael Fried: Clark, “Clement 
Greenberg’s Theory of Art,” Critical Inquiry 9:1 (September 1982): 139–56; Fried, “How Modernism 
Works: A Response to T.J. Clark,” Critical Inquiry, 9:1 (September 1982): 217–94; and Clark, “Arguments 
about Modernism: A Reply to Michael Fried,” in The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W.J.T. Mitchell 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983): 239–48.  
501 John O’Brian has argued that the one of the impetuses for Greenberg’s essay was an essay on Soviet 
cinema written by Dwight Macdonald. See, Macdonald, “Soviet Society and Its Society,” Partisan Review 
6:2 (Winter 1939): 80–95. For a later essay on his ideas on popular culture, see Macdonald, “A Theory of 
Popular Culture,” Politics 1:1 (February 1944): 20–3.  
502 Greenberg’s review of Bertolt Brecht’s A Penny for the Poor had appeared in the Winter 1939 volume 
of Partisan Review. For an incisive analysis of the literary avant-garde (of lack thereof), see Philip Rahv, 
“Twilight of the Thirties,” Partisan Review 6:4 (Summer 1939): 3–15.  
503 See, Edmund Wilson, “The Myth of the Marxist Dialectic,” Partisan Review 6:1 (Fall 1938): 66–81; 
William Phillips, “The Devil Theory of the Dialectic: A Reply to Edmund Wilson,” Partisan Review 6:1 
(Fall 1938): 82–90. See also, Victor Serge, “Marxism in Our Times,” Partisan Review 5:3 (August-
September 1938): 26–32, which Serge contributed from Paris, his home in exile.  
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Revolution of 1941, on the figure of Thomas Mann (1875–1955), who was at that time 
touring the U.S. lecturing on “The Coming Victory of Democracy.”504 
 The dialectic, as the primary interpretive instrument of Marxism, had been distorted 
or mythologized, according to Wilson. Rather than the inspiring idea “that the human 
spirit will be able to master its animal nature through reason,” Marx and Engels had 
managed to make a good number of people believe something of the opposite: “that 
mankind was hopelessly the victim of its appetites.”505 A scholar of Hegel might have nit-
picked at Wilson for his perpetuation of the “Hegel Myth,” in his own use of the triad of 
thesis/anti-thesis/synthesis to explain Hegel’s theories.506 This is to suggest that the elitist 
positions often assumed by Partisan Review writers, such as someone of Wilson’s 
seriousness and erudition, were not always scholarly ones. While this mystification of the 
dialectic was convenient to the appalling condition of prevailing politics, Wilson argued, 
the obfuscation had its origins with Marx himself. Marx had made the Dialectic “a 
religious myth, disencumbered of divine personality, and tied up with the history of 
mankind.”507 Wilson accused Marx of identifying “his own will with the antithesis of the 
dialectical process,” (e.g., Marx’s famous conclusion to Theses on Feuerbach, that: “The 
philosophers have only interpreted the world. Our business is to change it.”), and for 
                                                 
504 For the Troy-Burnham debate, see: William Troy, “Thomas Mann: Myth and Reason, Part I” Partisan 
Review 5:1 (June 1938): 24–32, and Part II, Partisan Review 5:2 (July 1938): 51–64; James Burnham, 
“William Troy’s Myths,” Partisan Review 5:3 (August-September, 1938): 65–8; Troy, “A Further Note on 
Myth,” Partisan Review 6:1 (Fall 1938): 95–100. See also, Terry A. Cooney, The Rise of the New York 
Intellectuals: Partisan Review and Its Circle, 1934–1945 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1986): 153–61.  
505 Wilson, “The Myth of the Marxist Dialectic,” 68.  
506 According to Gustav E. Mueller, the only occurrence of the “triplicity” is in the Preface to the 
Phenomenology of the Mind. In his Preface, Hegel referred to this triad as a “lifeless schema” (geistloses 
Schema) specifically in relation to the work of Kant. See Gustav E. Mueller, “The Hegel Legend of 
‘Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis’,” Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (June 1958): 411–2.  
507 Wilson, “The Myth of the Marxist Dialectic,” 77. 
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projecting himself into the role of the martyred writer. This pseudo-religiosity had 
obscured the essential posit of Marxism: the struggle for real, universal freedom.  Wilson 
argued that the “departments” of the superstructure, e.g., law, politics, philosophy, etc. 
(could one extrapolate the realm of art here?) struggled to make themselves free from 
their tethers to economic interests.508 That is, to become professional and independent 
groups—to appear natural. In a forceful concluding statement of the universality of 
Marxism, Wilson resorted again to the writings of Marx: “If we have committed 
ourselves to fight for the interests of the proletariat, it is because we are really trying to 
work for the interests of humanity as a whole.”509 Humanity, like its disciplines, would 
have to deliver itself and not await the deliverance in a history powered by the dialectic.  
 Phillips, in his response, welcomed Wilson’s “irreverent and civilized” reminder of 
the essential humanist precepts of classical Marxism to those who would “mummify 
Marxism into a system of eternal truths.”510 Wilson’s “difficulties,” as Phillips referred to 
them throughout his essay, began with his convenient ahistorical analysis of the Dialectic, 
one in which the historical, revolutionary Marx was lost to a messianic fiction and the 
historical dialectic was subsumed to a “Naturdialectic.”511 Phillips concluded his 
refutation by arguing that critics like Wilson appeared “indifferent to the conservative 
implications” of their position (e.g., that this messianic German will could potentially 
                                                 
508 This metaphor of a tether or attachment seemed to be a rhetorical work around to over-determined base-
superstructure relationships with this generation of critics. Cf. Greenberg’s use of the “umbilical cord of 
gold” in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” which is discussed below.   
509 Wilson, “The Myth of the Marxist Dialectic,” 81.  
510 Phillips, “The Devil Theory of the Dialectic: A Reply to Edmund Wilson,” 82.  
511 Ibid., 83.  
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claim both the Sparticists and the National Socialists as its offspring).512 And, finally, 
what analytic tool would Wilson offer in place of the Dialectic?  
 In his own essay from early 1939, “Myth and History,” Harold Rosenberg pointed to 
the dangers of “the analogical technique” (citing Oswald Spengler’s phrase from his 
1926–28 The Decline of the West) especially the kind Thomas Mann made use of in his 
fiction.513 Rosenberg by-passed much of the exchange between Burnham and Troy and 
directed his intense criticisms at Mann directly. What were the consequences for culture 
and its inhabitants if technique of analogies (the “logic of correspondences”) were to 
replace science? (In Rosenberg’s case, as with many members of his generation, science 
can be read as a metonymy for Marxism—that which held out the possibility of real 
understanding and change). Or, when a culture adopts the “values of Art,” or embarks on 
a “conservative revolution” as a last act of preservation?514 Rosenberg argued—with an 
effective construction of commonplaces with uncommon ideas—that there were any 
number of manifestations of the oppositional conflict between science and the irrational, 
the known and the living, manifested in culture. In painting, he argued, this conflict has 
developed “esthetic content as a more or less organized symbolism of the Monumental 
and the Organic—e.g., statues, machines, geometric abstraction, contrasted with sex, 
dreams, biomorphic shapes.”515 If the dubious achievement of Mann’s work, Rosenberg 
argued, was the “converting of all happenings into a special kind of fable” through the 
technique of analogy, then that made for serious consequences. In the schematization of 
his fable-making, the individual creative act was lost; if the resolution of the dialectic 
                                                 
512 Ibid., 90.  
513 Initially published as Untergang des Abendlandes (Munich, 1922–23).  
514 Rosenberg, “Myth and History,” Partisan Review 6:2 (Winter 1939): 20–21.  
515 Ibid., 22.  
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were mis-directed into an absolute synthesis in the work of art (and nothing else), then 
where was the possibility for forward motion or real change? Mann, Rosenberg 
concluded, in his novels cast the current conditions of struggling, alienated humanity as 
“eternal”—as an ancient Passion play.516 And, is this what the so-called conservative 
revolution wished to preserve? (It would be like condemning someone to the permanent 
role as a peasant in a Knut Hamsun novel.) 
 Indeed, Mann was taking his beliefs to the crowd: the American audiences, 
Rosenberg speculated, with their “cherished illusion” of “limitless freedom of the 
individual to create values and to live by them,” were no doubt receptive to Mann.517 Not 
that that myth was inappropriate, but Mann (and, by proxy, his audience) failed to see the 
means of scaling the obstacles facing humanity. This was not an idle question for 
Rosenberg, who argued that Mann was predicting the end of the war through a dangerous 
“revival of Christianity and individual metaphysics,” and that the socialist order would be 
attained without the aid, and “even in conflict with Marxism and the materialist analysis 
of history.”518 The materialist analysis of history—with an eye towards changing its 
future course—is a long-standing concern within Rosenberg’s writing. It’s important to 
note that in his celebrated 1952 essay, “The American Action Painting,” Rosenberg 
understands the field of operation of the painter as a very real one—not as an analogy but 
rather as a metonymy for the real world. No small semantic difference.  
 It is within the discursive context that Greenberg’s essay is best understood as a 
contribution and continuation of that context. In this essay, which was only Greenberg’s 
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second contribution to Partisan Review, the critic offered a mostly theoretical essay on 
the function of the avant-garde and of kitsch in modern culture.  It is, as Serge Guilbaut 
has rightly argued, an “‘elitist’” position in terms of the balance between art and politics 
in his celebrated 1939 essay.519 If the counterpart to the avant-garde had usually been that 
of the rear-guard, Greenberg interjected a third term into the English-language discourse: 
that of kitsch.520 In this celebrated essay, Greenberg proposed some historical definitions: 
that the distinction between avant-garde and kitsch was (is) not one of æsthetics; that, in 
the midst of a decaying culture (one of Alexandrianism or academicism), Western 
bourgeois society, the beneficiary of the industrial revolution, produced something new: 
“avant-garde culture”; that it was to the aristocracy that the avant-garde belonged, tied to 
the ruling class by “an umbilical cord of gold.” This is not a casual metaphor on 
Greenberg’s part. The connection was mutual and sustaining for a certain time: 
immigrants to bohemian New York were just as likely to come from Europe, as they were 
the bourgeoisie of New York. Living culture, Greenberg argued, depended upon the 
health of that elite culture (and conversely, when it is abandoned or threatened, so too is 
its culture).  
 Abstract art had its genesis in modernist artists turning away from “common 
experience” and turning towards the medium of their own craft: that is, the “imitation of 
                                                 
519 See Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art, 36, 214, n. 79. As Guilbaut noted, and 
as was discussed in the previous chapter, this seemingly-elitist position had been mapped out by American 
artist groups, such as the Ten and the AAA, who were in contact with their European counterparts, such as 
Abstraction-Création, as early as 1936. See also, Paul Hart, “The Essential Legacy of Clement Greenberg 
from the Era of Stalin and Hitler,” 76–87. 
520 See also, Sheldon Cheney, “Art in the United States, 1938,” in which he addressed similar concerns to 
Greenberg: recidivism in art, ‘high’ culture and ‘mass culture’, patronage in the arts (both private and 
governmental, e.g., the WPA). Published in, America Now: An Inquiry into Civilization in the United 
States, Harold E. Stearns, ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938): 82–103. For an assessment of 
the changes over time in Cheney’s approach to art, see Linda Dalrymple Henderson, The Fourth Dimension 
and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983): 231–4.  
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imitating.”521 The excitement in the work of “Picasso, Braque, Mondrian, Miró, 
Kandinsky, Brancusi, even Klee, Matisse and Cézanne” appears to be from their ability 
“to derive their chief inspiration from the medium they work in.”522 Through the process 
of imitating imitation, content is dissolved, Greenberg concluded. On this point the critic 
credited to his former teacher, Hans Hofmann (perhaps de Kooning would have 
complained that he, Greenberg, was writing as a “bookkeeper” critic). By way of 
contrast, Hofmann had argued that the Surrealists, as the other advanced art of the day, 
demonstrated a “reactionary tendency” in their attempt to “restore” outside content matter 
to their art. An artist like Dali, Greenberg continued, was to contrive the representation of 
the activities of his sub-conscious, not “the processes of his medium.”523 The former is 
feigned, the latter sincere. The avant-garde specialized in itself—its best were “artists’ 
artists;” by extension, then, the work asks for the (real) time of its audience.524 
 If avant-garde art imitated the processes of high art, kitsch imitated only its effect; 
kitsch offered a vicarious experience, and “demands nothing of its customers except their 
money—not even their time”; and, when kitsch masqueraded as art, a debased culture 
resulted. In Greenberg’s assessment, kitsch offered easy comfort in a commodity-based 
culture. As a commodity from its inception, kitsch is destined for consumption (as 
opposed to the avant-garde work of art that becomes an item for the market only at the 
end). Kitsch was formulaic, faked; it offered a pre-digested experience of culture. It posed 
no challenge, and so posed no threat to the individual viewer. Finally, perhaps the most 
                                                 
521 Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” 35–6. 
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ambitious proposal in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” was that both an avant-garde and kitsch 
were necessary in contemporary culture. How else was a vigorous, ambitious, avant-
garde to survive unless it could work off of (and out of) kitsch? Kitsch needed the avant-
garde as a source for its production. An ever-changing, innovating avant-garde (one that 
maintained tradition) was necessary as a defense against the debilitating effects of kitsch. 
Greenberg’s formulation was a conservative revolution of a different sort. Kitsch, as a 
cultural product, posed (and poses) particular political problems, as numerous critics have 
noted after the initial publication of the essay.525 One these commentators included 
Greenberg himself, who re-visited this essay while sitting for what would be his final 
interview. “I made kitsch the enemy when the enemy was really the middlebrow.”526 
 Initially, in 1939, like Wilson, Greenberg placed a certain faith in the possibility of a 
vanguard that would fulfill the Humanist promises of Marxist texts; like Rosenberg, 
Greenberg saw the dangers posed by a cliché of “l’art pur”—a vanguard with no 
corrective kitsch. In 1939, vigilance against kitsch took on weighty political tones for 
some. To the editors and writers at Partisan Review, it represented the culture of 
Fascism.527 The figure of Leon Trotsky, in his words and deeds (if the two are to be 
separated) represented to some the best hope for critical resistance against Fascism and 
the political kitsch of the Popular Front.  
 
                                                 
525 As Thierry de Duve has stated the problem, “[E]very kitsch object, even at the benign scale of the garden 
dwarf, proclaims: fiat ars, pereat mundus.” See de Duve, Clement Greenberg, Between the Lines (Paris: 
Editions Dis-Voir, 1996): 48. 
526 Clement Greenberg, in “The Last Interview,” in Clement Greenberg: Late Writings, Robert C. Morgan, 
ed. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003): 233. Initially published as Saul Ostrow, “Clement 
Greenberg: The Last Interview,” World Art (November 1994):  24–32. 
527 “Otherwise, how could the SS have enjoyed playing Brahms in the Camps?” de Duve, Clement 
Greenberg, Between the Lines, 48. 
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II. Leon Trotsky’s Formulations/Formalism 
Art, don’t you see, means prophecy. Works of art are embodiments of 
presentiments; therefore, pre-revolutionary art is the real art of the 
Revolution.  
  ~ Leon Trotsky, “Neo-Classicism,” 1923528 
 
It has always been one of the most essential functions of art to engender a 
demand for which the hour of full satisfaction is yet to come. The history 
of every art form has critical moments of striving toward effects that can 
only be freely realized with a changed technical standard, that is, in the 
context of a new art form. The excesses and crudeness associated with art 
in this type of situation . . . emerge from the richest historical 
concentration of forces. 
 
~ Walter Benjamin, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” 1936529 
 
Semblance is a promise of non-semblance.  
 
  ~ Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialektik, 1966530 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 If it is the job description of the professional artist to figure the work of art, then the 
task of the critic has usually been to re-state this job description, time and again. 
Trotsky’s assertions about the autonomous work of art partook of a recurring idea within 
Marxist criticism. Writing from the vantage point of a sympathetic academic in 1952, 
Donald Drew Egbert arrived at a construction that would bear a rhetorical resemblance 
(at least to his close readers) to a future heuristic challenge made by Greenberg in 1961. 
In his study, Egbert argued that:  
Trotsky was accused of the deadly sin of “formalism.” He was accused, in 
short, of encouraging art that is abstract, or that is mechanical or 
experimental for its own sake, art in which the form or the technique is 
                                                 
528 Leon Trotsky, “Neo-Classicism,” in Literature and Revolution (New York: Russell & Russell, 1957): 
110. By Neo-Classicism, Trotsky was referring to the emerging International Style in architecture.  
529 Benjamin’s celebrated essay was initially published in ZƒS 5:1 (1936); translation by Richard Shiff in 
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itself the end rather than a vehicle by which suitable socialist subject 
matter is given a socialist content. The Stalinists therefore increasingly 
maintained that Trotsky and his followers, in separating form in art from 
social content, were divorcing theory from practice and thus had become 
‘idealists’ who, in believing that mind, ideas, can exist without matter, 
were ipso facto not true Marxian realists.531  
 
At its most basic definition, Trotsky put forth a vision of Marxism that was not vulgar. If 
one accepts the dualism of idealism/materialism, then Trotsky’s analysis regarding the 
work of art insisted upon the idealist roots of Marxism in its materialist analysis of 
modern culture. Trotsky argued for the proposition of the necessity of the autonomous 
work of art (one that would stand apart from political ideologies) and the avant-garde (in 
the course of human history, no idea of consequence had begun as a mass idea). (Even 
the fascists, whose etymological roots lie in the group—ad. It. fascismo, f. fascio bundle, 
group—were in need of a so-called great leader to mobilize.)  
 The root of the question, Trotsky argued in 1926, was a matter of technique:  
And here, first and foremost, we have to ask ourselves regarding 
technique: is it only an instrument of class oppression? It is enough to put 
such a question for it to be answered at once: no, technique is a 
fundamental conquest of mankind; although it has also served, up to the 
present, as an instrument of exploitation, yet it is at the same time the 
fundamental condition for the emancipation of the exploited. The machine 
strangles the wage slave in its grip. But he can free himself only through 
the machine. Therein is the root of the entire question.532 
 
                                                 
531 Donald Drew Egbert, Socialism and American Art: In the Light of European Utopianism, Marxism, and 
Anarchism (Princeton University Press, 1952, 1967): 64–5. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
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532 Leon Trotsky, “Technique and Culture,” in Culture and Socialism, 1926. Initially published in Krasnaya 
Nov 6 (1926); and re-published in New York in Novy Mir 1 (1927). Reprinted in Leon Trotsky on Art and 
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To cede technique to the dominion of the dominant ideology or the ruling class would be 
to enter an historical dead-end, one with no possibility for agency or change. Technique, 
then, is meaningful when employed by people—that is its tautological definition. In this 
regard, as a term, a function, it potentially transcends the age-old divide of 
idealism/materialism. Without artists and their productive engagement with their 
materials, there would be no works of art; only barbarism. Trotsky’s accusers were not 
always accurate: while Trotsky could be tagged as a ‘formalist’, his judgments did not 
always lead him towards vanguard works of abstraction. (A possible inconvenience for 
his later admirerers.) Rather, he held up the figurative fresco cycles of Diego Rivera as 
the maker of true revolutionary art:  
In the field of painting, the October revolution has found her greatest 
interpreter not in the USSR but in far away Mexico, not among the official 
“friends,” but in the person of a so-called “enemy of the people” whom the 
Fourth International is proud to number in its ranks….Do you wish to 
know what revolutionary art is like? Look at the frescoes of Rivera.533 
   
Vandals of Rivera’s frescoes, “catholics [sic] and other reactionaries…and, of course, 
Stalinists” only gave “even greater life” to his frescoes, which were “a living part of the 
class struggle” and at the same time “a masterpiece!”534  
 Trotsky’s critical model necessarily required an enemy. This is perhaps appropriate to 
the former leader of the Red Army and future founder of the Fourth International in 1938, 
in whose path so many adversaries had crossed. In Trotsky’s lifetime, the advance guard 
would find itself set upon violently both by the old order and by internecine fighting. 
Eventually, Trotsky found himself in the position of the exiled dissenter from the Stalinist 
order after being expelled form the party in 1927 (along with Grigory Zinoviev, who was 
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executed in 1936), expelled from the USSR in 1929, and purged in absentia in 1936. In 
his extensive expatriate writing, he stuck to his Left-Opposition guns, which famously 
include: History of the Russian Revolution (1930); The Defense of Terrorism: A Reply to 
Karl Kautsky (revised in 1935 from the 1922 publication); The Revolution Betrayed: 
What is the Soviet Union and Where is It Going? (1937); and Their Morals and Ours 
(1938), a collaboration with John Dewey. 
 In an essay on ‘anti-fascism’ and ‘anti-fascist’ art in the 1930s, Andrew Hemingway 
argued that too much has been made of “the influence of Trotskyism in the culture of the 
late thirties” in that some scholars have “made Trotskyism seem almost the precondition 
for modernist practice on the left in the late thirties.”535 Hemingway’s objections are 
twofold: to delimit modernist art history in the 1930s to that of Trotskyist circles is to 
render an incomplete topography of left-wing discourse. For example, the most well-
known abstract painter in the US at that time was, technically, a Stalinist (Stuart Davis 
did not resign officially from the CPUSA until 1940). Secondly, to presuppose the 
essential importance of Trotsky would be to flatten (or, naturalize) a period of history in 
which many of its participants actively understood their times dialectically. It would be 
(to borrow from one of Benjamin’s other famous formulations), to fail to rub history 
against the grain. In this critical line of analysis, Hemingway has also criticized histories 
of the Popular Front, the body against which Trotskyists took their oppositional stance. 
Hemingway has characterized the histories of the 1930s as presenting fictional unities of 
                                                 
535 Andrew Hemingway, “Fictional Unities: ‘Antifascism’ and ‘Antifascist Art’ in 30s America,” 116, n. 
18. 
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this fictional unity. Whatever unity the Popular Front achieved with liberal intellectuals 
was done so at the cost of ultimately alienating many leftists.536  
 One such alienated leftist was Sidney Hook, philosopher, socialist, critic, and former 
student of John Dewey. In a 1939 critique of the strategy of the Popular Front, he argued 
forcefully that the devaluation of political labels in recent times had not meant the 
articulation of re-evaluated ideas.537 Rather, the Popular Front strategy had meant a right-
ward swing in the political alliance which would, out of necessity for the feigned unity of 
the alliance, have to adopt the policies of the pro-capitalist parties.  It was “an invitation 
to disaster.”538 For many in Spain, the Popular Front strategy had meant a literal dead 
end. The means of defeating fascism and re-engineering society, goals to which Hook 
was actively sympathetic, were vital to the achievement of those goals. The Popular 
Front, in its denial of critical difference, and the Moscow Trials, in which coercion and 
torture had been used to obtain false confessions, had betrayed the ends by corrupting the 
means, he concluded.  
 Hook’s review appeared in Partisan Review. The journal was founded in 1934 as a 
literary outlet for members of the John Reed Clubs; it split from the official Communist 
Party in 1936 and, after an abortive one-year collaboration with Jack Conroy’s Anvil, it 
re-emerged as independent and nominally Trotskyist in 1937.539 However, the 
hagiography of Partisan Review as the independent voice of Trotskyism in the US is 
                                                 
536 Ibid., p. 109. 
537 Sidney Hook, “The Anatomy of the Popular Front,” Partisan Review 6:6 (Spring 1939): 29–45. Hook’s 
essay took as its starting point Max Lerner’s It’s Later Than You Think: The Need for a Militant 
Democracy (New York: Viking Press, 1939).  
538 Hook, “The Anatomy of the Popular Front,” 33.  
539 See “This Quarter,” Partisan Review 4:1 (Winter 1937): 3–4. Mike Gold, the editor of The New Masses, 
attacked the so-called defectors in 1936, calling them “Phi Beta Kappa Trotskyites” whose victories were 
all “on paper” and who erected “monuments of sterile theory.” See, Gold, “Migratory Intellectuals,” The 
New Masses 21 (15 December 1936): 27.  
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tempered by the fact that the man himself thought they had nothing to say. Trotsky wrote 
as much to Dwight Macdonald in a 1938 letter, here cited at length:  
It is my general impression that the editors of Partisan Review are 
capable, educated and intelligent people but they have nothing to say. 
They seek themes which are incapable of hurting anyone but which 
likewise are incapable of giving anybody a thing. I have never seen or 
heard of a group with such a mood gaining success, i.e., winning influence 
and leaving some sort of trace in the history of thought.  
 
Note that I am not at all touching upon the content of your ideas (perhaps 
because I cannot discern them in your magazine). ‘Independence’ and 
‘freedom’ are two empty notions. But I am ready to grant that 
‘independence’ and ‘freedom’ as you understand them represent some 
kind of actual cultural value. Excellent! But then it is necessary to defend 
them with the sword, or at least whip, in hand. Every new artistic or 
literary tendency (naturalism, symbolism, futurism, cubism, 
expressionism, and so forth and so on) has begun with a ‘scandal’, 
breaking the old respected crockery, bruising many established authorities. 
This flowed not at all solely from publicity seeking (though there was no 
lack of this). No, these people—artists, as well as literary critics—had 
something to say. They had friends, they had enemies, they fought, and 
through this they demonstrated their right to exist.540 
 
The editors at Partisan Review did try to have something to say. (No one doubted their 
sincerity until well into the future.541) The editors at Partisan Review maintained their 
roles as dissenters from the official party line of dissent. They did so, in part, by 
publishing essays by Trotsky: these include his essay, Art and Politics, and several 
letters.542 These were contributed to the journal after the Dewey Commission had 
formally cleared Trotsky of all charges made against him by Stalin.  
                                                 
540 Leon Trotsky, from a letter to Dwight Macdonald. Written on 20 January, 1938 (from Coyoacán, 
Mexico). First published in Fourth International (March-April 1950).   
541 For references to the financial backing of Partisan Review by Henry Luce, publisher of Time, in the 
amount of $10,000, see Frances Stonor Saunders, The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts 
and Letters (New York: The New Press): 162–163, 335, et passim.  
542 See, Trotsky, “Art and Politics,” Partisan Review 5:3 (August-September 1938): 3–10; André Breton 
and Diego Rivera, “Manifesto: Towards a Free Revolutionary Art,” Partisan Review 6:1 (Fall 1938): 49–
52; and Leon Trotsky to André Breton, “Letters,” Partisan Review 6:2 (Winter 1938): 126–7. Trotsky co-
wrote the Manifesto, but requested at the time that his name be left off the credit line). 
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 What I do wish to argue quite seriously is that Greenberg can be taken at his word in 
his 1961 heuristic challenge. To do otherwise would be to ride roughshod over the 
subtleties in his parenthetical statement of 1961, in which he wrote:  
Though that is not all, by far, that there was to politics in art in those 
years; some day it will have to be told how “anti-Stalinism,” which started 
out more or less as “Trotskyism,” turned into art for art’s sake, and 
thereby cleared the way, heroically, for what was to come.543 
 
Through the use of scare quotes around anti-Stalinism and Trotskyism, Greenberg 
acknowledged the status of his fellow editors at Partisan Review as critics and 
intellectuals, not as insurrectionists. To return to his final interview from 1994, he 
recalled that the consensus at the editorial board was that no one was reading them. 
(Which is to suggest the inverse corollary to Trotsky’s initial proposition: no successful 
storming of the gates has ever been made up of a mass of vanguard editorial board 
members.544)  
 The Dewey commission and its proceedings form an instance of the connective tissue 
between the 1930s move from ‘anti-Stalinism’ to ‘Trotskyism’ to art for art’s sake (as a 
kind of metonymy by contiguity). By the autumn of 1939, the organized left in the US 
(along with everyone else) had witnessed: the partition of Poland, the entry of UK and 
France into the war, the Russo-German Pact and the Soviet attack on Finland. With the 
figure of Dewey, Liberalism inherited the mantle of dissenting political integrity if, as 
Serge Guilbaut, rightly argues, in non-revolutionary form.545  
                                                 
543 Greenberg, “The Late ’Thirties in New York,” Art and Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961): 230. 
544 See also, John D. Graham, “39. What is the difference between the people of action and the people of 
reflection?” in System and Dialectics of Art, 42–3.  
545 See Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art, 38–39. These pages include a brief 
discussion of The League for Cultural Freedom and Socialism, which represented the revolutionary (if 
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III. John Dewey in Mexico and on Art 
The philosophy of John Dewey represents a distinctive contribution to the 
thought of the modern age. He has carried to completion a movement of 
ideas which marks the final break with the ancient and medieval outlook 
upon the world. In his doctrines the experimental temper comes to self-
consciousness. A new way of life is proposed to realize the ideal promise 
of our vast material culture. Organized intelligence is to take the place of 
myth and dogma in improving the common lot and enriching individual 
experience.  
    ~ Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait,  
    1939546  
 
I completely agree with your idea about the necessity of giving a Marxist 
criticism of Dewey’s philosophy and I believe it is your direct duty to do 
this job. 
  ~ Trotsky, Letter to J. Gerland, August, 1940547 
 
Art, as Dewey suggests, is perhaps the chief example of experience where 
it is pure, in the sense of being realized without distraction or distortion, 
where it is in any complete and direct sense experience at all. Art is what 
experience in a humanly successful life, in a genuinely free society, would 
always be.  
  ~ Irwin Edman, “Dewey and Art,” 1950548 
 
 
Actually, both Dewey and Hook, at least partly, were classic liberals in the 
thirties, especially in their social democratic leanings. Hook was just 
emerging from his Marxist phase, and that was evident in his strong 
interest in progressive reform, and in his concern with the democratization 
of art. Dewey’s essential and classic liberalism was also expressed in his 
espousal of social reform.  
    
~ William Phillips, “John Dewey Then and Now,” 
Partisan Review, 1996549 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
                                                                                                                                                 
ineffective) branch of anti-Stalinism, founded by Dwight MacDonald. As Guilbaut notes, the Committee 
for Cultural Freedom, led by John Dewey and Sidney Hooks, formed in the summer of 1939.  
546 Sidney Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: The John Day Company, 1939): 3.  
547 Letter to J. Gerland, published in Fourth International 1:5 (October 1940): 127. ‘J. Gerland’ was the pen 
name of Jean van Heijenoort (1912–86), who was a mathematician and former aide to Trotsky.  
548 Irwin Edman, “Dewey and Art,” in John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, ed., Sidney Hook 
(New York: The Dial Press, 1950): 55. Edman was Chair of Department of Philosophy at Columbia 
University, where Dewey had been Hook’s dissertation advisor.  
549 William Phillips, “John Dewey Then and Now,” Partisan Review 63:1 (1996): 9. This was written on 
the occasion of the re-issue of Hook’s John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait. 
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 John Dewey’s stature as a philosopher, scholar and educator was such that his work 
provoked a wide-range of responses, laudatory and critical. The immediate concern of 
this passage is, first, to come to grips with Dewey’s role as the Chair of the Commission 
of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against Leon Trotsky in the Moscow Trials, and, 
second, to account for the consequences that Dewey and Trotsky had for each other in 
their understanding of the work of art. John Dewey was a professor in the Department of 
Philosophy at Columbia University in the 1930s. As Jay Martin argues in his recent 
biography of the philosopher, he was the ideal candidate: previously, he had been asked 
to run on the Socialist Party ticket for the governorship of New York, yet he was quoted 
by the liberal New York Times, and friends with enlightened capitalists, such as A.C. 
Barnes.550 As Martin also argues, Dewey had demonstrated his openness to the Soviet 
experiment, at least in its early years, through his published reports of his fact-finding 
mission there in 1928. However, by 1937, The New Republic, which had previously 
published his essays on the nascent Soviet Union, was now, Dewey suspected, an 
apologist venue for the Stalinists.551 Indeed, Dewey became the subject of criticism in a 
number of essays by CPUSA-affiliated writers to whom Dewey’s work was suspect.552 
To others, Dewey’s work possessed a personal integrity that, in the light of his chairing 
of the commission, drew comparisons with the epic dissent of Émile Zola during the 
                                                 
550 Jay Martin, The Education of John Dewey (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002): 409. See also, 
Stewart Buettner, “John Dewey and the Visual Arts,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 33:4 
(Summer 1975): 383–91.  
551 See, for example, an editorial most likely authored by Malcolm Cowley, “The Trial of the Trotskyites in 
Russia,” The New Republic (2 September, 1936): 88–9. 
552 See Frank Meyer, “Reactionary Philosophy of Dewey and his School,” Daily Worker (16 October, 
1939), and Philip Carter, “Pitfalls of Pragmatic Logic,” The Communist 18:2 (February 1939): 163–9. Both 
cited by Andrew Hemingway, Artists on the Left, 310, n. 34. See also, Guilbaut, How New York Stole the 
Idea of Modern Art, 38–9.  
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Dreyfus Affair.553 James T. Farrell drew that comparison in 1950 when recalling his trip 
to Mexico with Dewey in 1937. Farrell’s own career followed the now-familiar path of 
that of 1930s radical to post-War liberal. He had been regular contributor to Partisan 
Review in the 1930s, and by 1950, he wrote as an ardent liberal. 
 The full extent of the charges made against Trotsky and the full proceedings of the 
Moscow Trials are beyond the scope of this dissertation (as is a history of the pre-
Revolutionary Menshevik/Bolshevik split and the subsequent rise of the Soviet 
bureaucracy). In summary, Trotsky had been accused of promoting counter-revolutionary 
activity (terror) and plotting to assassinate Stalin. The role of the Commission was 
premised upon the idea that, “the conduct of the Moscow Trials was such as to convince 
any unprejudiced person that no effort was made to ascertain the truth,” and that the 
‘confessions’ contained “such inherent improbabilities as to convince the Commission 
that they do not represent the truth, irrespective of any means used to obtain them.”554 
The proceedings, which were held at the fortified Kahlo-Rivera house in Coyoacán, 
concluded after eight days of testimony. Upon the return of the Commission to New 
York, they published their highly publicized verdict of “Not Guilty!” In the wake of the 
hearings, Trotsky made some of his most direct statements on the work of art. These 
statements demonstrate shared concerns with Dewey’s own work on art and experience. 
Their collaboration, if it can be called that, came to an end with the publication of Their 
Morals and Ours, also in 1938. 
                                                 
553 See James T. Farrell, “Dewey in Mexico,” in Hook, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait, 376. 
554 The Case of Leon Trotsky, xiii.  
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 In his 1934 Art as Experience, John Dewey argued that abstraction was to be found 
“in every work of art.”555 He appeared to be in the relative minority in his greeting of 
abstraction with equanimity. Dewey argued that the degree of abstraction could be 
modified through the selective practices of the individual artist. Whereas scientists 
abstracted for the sake of clarity, artists did so for the sake of expressiveness: “The 
artist’s own being and experience determine what shall be expressed and therefore the 
nature and extent of the abstraction that occurs,” he concluded.556 Consider two citations 
by each author, the first from Art as Experience; the second from Trotsky’s 1938 “Art 
and Politics”:  
The existence of art….is proof that man uses the materials and energies of 
nature with intent to expand his own life, and that his does so in accord 
with the structure of his organism—brain, sense-organs, and muscular 
system. Art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of 
restoring consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of 
sense, need, impulse and action characteristic of the live creature. The 
intervention of consciousness adds regulation, power of selection, and 
redisposition. Thus it varies the arts in ways without end. But its 
intervention also leads in time to the idea of art as a conscious idea—the 
greatest intellectual achievement in the history of humanity.557  
 
Generally speaking, art in an expression of man’s need for an harmonious 
and complete life, that is to say, his need for those major benefits of which 
a society of classes has deprived him.558  
 
One could argue that the experience of the work of art (of making or of seeing), for both 
of these authors, held the promise of un-alienation—an end to being “deprived” (Trotsky) 
or the beginning of a process of “restoring” (Dewey). Dewey’s re-statement of Pragmatist 
belief in the 1930s offered another model for critics of art: if not the Marxian or historical 
                                                 
555 John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1980, 1934): 95. See also the discussion 
of the work of Maurice Denis in the previous chapter of this dissertation.  
556 John Dewey, Art as Experience, 95. Emphasis in the original.  
557 Ibid., 25. Emphasis in the original. 
558 Trotsky, “Art and Politics,” 3.  
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dialectic, then a dialectic of another kind, one between the artist, his materials, and the 
viewer/participant. What has been termed as Dewey’s instrumentalism with regard to the 
making and experiencing the work of art became a technique for testing, developing, 
verifying one’s senses. The encounter, then, was mutual between live creatures. In 1938, 
when Trotsky wrote that the attacks had left “cuts and gashes” in Rivera’s frescoes, this 
represented a Pragmatist rupture into his Marxist thinking.559 Both agreed upon the 
central importance of the work of art in culture. The mutuality that Trotsky and Dewey 
achieved ended in 1938 over their contributions to Their Morals and Ours.560 The 
divisive issue was, as it had been for Hook, a vital question of means and ends, morality 
in relation to political action (or, the consequences of those actions). Trotsky did not have 
time to write the rejoinder he had hoped and was dead by August of 1940. If Greenberg 
was right, and that was not all there was to politics in those days, it’s ca. 1940–1941 that 
the turn to art for art’s sake takes place, with critics, such as Greenberg, encountering on 
the advanced/dissenting work of art as an indicator of the potential health of a culture. 
This chapter concludes with an analysis of yet another source of dialectical thinking 
available to critics in New York: that of the Frankfurt School and their ideas on the 
autonomous work and its life during wartime.  
 
IV. The Frankfurt School in the U.S. and Elsewhere 
                                                 
559 “These cuts and gashes give even greater life to the frescoes. You have before you, not simply a 
“painting,” an object of passive esthetic contemplation, but a living part of the class struggle. And it is at 
the same time a masterpiece!” See Trotsky, “Art and Politics,” 8.  
560 Trotsky’s Their Moral and Ours was initially published in the New International in February of 1938; 
Dewey’s reply was published in the same journal in August of 1938. Trotsky’s essay was also published in 
pamphlet form in 1939 in Coyoacán. See Trotsky, Their Morals and Ours (Coyoacán, Mexico: Pioneer 
Publishers, 1939).  
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Emigration is the best school of dialectics. Refugees are the keenest 
dialecticians. They are refugees as a result  of changes and their sole 
object of study is change. They  are able to deduce the greatest events 
from the smallest  hints—that is, if they have intelligence. When their  
opponents are winning, they calculate how much their  victory has cost 
them; and they have the sharpest eyes  for contradictions. Long live 
dialectics! 
~ Ziffel to Kalle in Bertolt Brecht’s Flüchtlingsgespräche, 
ca. 1940561 
 
I share your happiness that we have Benjamin’s history theses. They will 
keep us busy for some time to come, and he will still be with us. 
 
  ~ Max Horkheimer in a letter to Theodor Adorno, 1941562 
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 The 1941exchange between Theodor Adorno (in New York) and Max Horkheimer 
(newly re-located to the West Coast), gestures towards a number of concerns of and 
about the Frankfurt School writers: that they produced, collectively and individually, a 
number of critical works of great historical understanding and urgency; that these works 
were prescient; and, in Benjamin’s case particularly, that his contributions to the 
discourse would remain even after the author had perished. And, finally, the 
circumstances of the letter—one colleague writing from California to another in New 
York on the inauspicious death of one of their own in Europe—suggests that the standing 
of the Institut ƒür Sozialforschung as a formal Institut was so in the loosest possible sense 
of the word. In his exhaustive study of the Institut, Rolf Wiggershaus makes another 
valuable point that none of the main writers of the Institut came to their radical thinking 
through party affiliation or direct political action. Their collective interest in Marxism 
                                                 
561 Ziffel to Kalle in “Dänemark oder der Humor über die hegelsche Dialektik,” in Bertolt Brecht, 
Flüchtlingsgespräche (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1965): 112.  
562 Horkheimer to Adorno, Pacific Palisades, 21 June, 1941. Cited in Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt 
School: Its History, Theories and Political Significance, trans. Michael Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press 
with MIT, 1994): 311.  
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was a rationalist one: Marxist methods allowed for the potential resolution of 
contradictions in culture that were the root of societal problems. It was not, however, an 
‘academic’ interest.  The Institut members offered their critique of authority and 
domination while much of Europe was under the fascists. Between the years 1933 and 
1947, most Institut members necessarily had had to offer their critiques from the U.S., as 
Brecht’s incisive if marginal dialecticians. In this section, I argue that the critical theory 
of the Frankfurt School writers was one of the sources for the New York Intellectuals. 
While the Frankfurt School members necessarily kept a low profile while working in the 
States, they made lasting connections with New York critics and writers, especially with 
Schapiro and with Greenberg. For example, in 1962, Adorno responded to Mamie 
English, an editor, declining to oversee a possible English-language edition of the 
collected works of Walter Benjamin; he recommended Greenberg instead. In his letter, 
Adorno wrote:  
I know Clement Greenberg very well from my American time and I think 
exceedingly high of him. His opinion on Benjamin, without any doubt, 
will not only agree with my own but will also carry great objective insight. 
I am sure he already called your attention to the most essential points.563  
 
In his final interview, given in 1994, Greenberg recalled his shared concerns with 
Adorno. (In this same interview, he also complained that Benjamin had a tendency to 
make things too complicated.564) In this interview, he said that he and Adorno “saw eye to 
eye on a lot”…though he [Adorno] had nothing to do with the visual arts, really.”565 
                                                 
563 See Greenberg Correspondence, the Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 
D.C. No. N69/72.  
564 See the unedited transcript of the Paul Ostrow interview held in the Clement Greenberg Papers at the 
Getty Research Institute, Los Angels, Box 37, Folder 17.  
565 Clement Greenberg: Late Writings, Robert C. Morgan, ed. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 
2003): 235–6. Initially published as “Clement Greenberg: The Last Interview,” World Art (November 
1994): 24–32.  
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When Greenberg was an editor at Commentary (from 1945 through 1957), Adorno 
worked with the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in the mid-1940s.566 The Committee 
and its publication shared space and causes, as Greenberg noted in the interview. If 
Adorno offered critical models, his essays offered few moments of formal consideration 
of the thing itself, at least in regard to the work of art. (Music was Adorno’s proper 
study.) Greenberg’s essays, which recorded a critic’s judgments made on the spot, did. 
Indeed, here is the binding difference, as expressed by Adorno in a 1963 lecture.  
The concept of technique in the culture industry is only in name identical 
with technique in works of art. In the latter, technique is concerned with 
the internal organization of the object itself, with its inner logic. In 
contrast, the technique of the culture industry is, from the beginning, one 
of distribution and mechanical reproduction, and therefore always remains 
external to its object. The culture industry finds ideological support 
precisely insofar as it carefully shields itself from the full potential of the 
technique contained in its products.567  
 
If one of the topos of American modernist art history is that, over time, Greenberg shifted 
his frame of vision to include the art object (only) at the expense of culture at large (or, 
he shifted seemingly from left to right), then another trope to consider is that of the 
historical agent. The masses could be unpredictable: passive, active, or reactionary (and 
here, both Adorno and Trotsky would agree with him—the crowds might even be 
conditioned to laugh at their own victimization, Adorno would later argue). If “Kant 
confirmed his experiences,” as Greenberg stated in that final interview, his writing 
                                                 
566 In 1944, Horkheimer was appointed director of the newly-created Department of Scientific Research. In 
this capacity, he oversaw the series Studies in Prejudice, which included The Authoritarian Personality, 
with Adorno as the Institut’s main collaborator on the project. See Martin Jay, Adorno (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1984): 39; and Jay, Permanent Exiles: Essays on Intellectual Migration from 
Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986): 39.  
567 Adorno, “The Culture Industry Reconsidered,” trans. Anson G. Rabinbach, New German Critique, 6 
(1975), p. 14. Reprinted in Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. and intro. 
J.M. Bernstein (London: Routledge, 1992): 86–7. 
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confirmed his own autonomy as a critic, which he argued in that same interview.568 
Which is to suggest, Greenberg wrote of the autonomous art object as a self-reflexive 
model—one with which he himself could live for the long haul. The passages included 
below on the subject of the Frankfurt School conclude with a consideration of the work 
of Adorno and Benjamin and their analyses of the potential held by the autonomous work 
of art in the age of its mechanical reproduction—perhaps an object more reliable in its 
unpredictable dissent to the prevailing order.  
 Perhaps the term most frequently associated with the Frankfurt School writers is 
critical theory. The critical theory developed by the Institut members to analyze culture 
was distinct from other Marxist methods. It was dialectical, for the most part, in its 
understanding of history. However, Horkheimer frequently engaged with the intellectual 
traditions of philosophy and the problems posed by contemporary thinkers in their 
understanding of ideology or idealism.569 Adorno and Benjamin both took as their starting 
points the phenomena of the everyday, e.g. Adorno’s studies of jazz or Benjamin’s 
Arcades Project. In their case, it’s a metonymic understanding of society whereby the so-
called ephemera of culture gestures towards larger issues. Rather than dismissing the life 
of the mind or the noisy bric-a-brac of modernity as mere false consciousness, the Institut 
writers took both these as their subject matter for their urgent critique of culture. The rise 
of fascism was of paramount importance. As such, they wrote on issues in popular 
culture, art and literature, philosophy, economics, political economy, and psychology. 
                                                 
568 Ostrow, “Clement Greenberg: The Last Interview,” in Clement Greenberg: Late Writings, 238. 
569 For examples, see Max Horkheimer, “Ein neuer Ideologiebegriff?” Gründbergs Archiv für die 
Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung 15 (1930) and “Zum Rationalismusstreit in der 
gegenwaärtigen Philosophie,” ZfS III (1934). Both reprinted in Between Philosophy and Social Science, 
129-149 and 217-264, respectively.  
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The official journals of the Institut were the main medium for their essays: Gründbergs 
Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung (1923-1930), the 
Zeitschrift ƒür Sozialforschung (1932-1938), and Studies in Philosophy and Social 
Science (1939-1941). After the end of World War II, the writing of Institut members 
appeared in monograph form or in American journals such as Commentary and Kenyon 
Review. One way to characterize the Institut writing from this later time is as a series of 
analyses on the use of Reason in society and the remains of the Enlightenment in mass 
culture.  
 Autonomous art, as the Frankfurt School authors collectively understood it, was one 
possible site of resistance to capital and fascism. Specifically, these passages consider 
their writing during the war years and post-War periods.  In their writing, the Institut 
members gave extensive consideration to the problems of commodity-based mass culture 
and the role of the artist or writer: those who produced difficult, advanced art, and those 
who betrayed their responsibilities to culture by producing kitsch. While the Institut 
members collaborated with each other intensively on these essays, it should be noted that 
most of the membership was in orbit around Horkheimer in his capacity of Director of 
the Institut. Before considering their ideas on art, autonomy, and mass culture, it would 
be useful to consider briefly Horkheimer’s construction of critical theory from his 1930s 
essays. His work provided a kind of critical armature to and around which the 
membership responded.  
 One of Horkheimer’s most important essays, “Traditionelle und kritische Theorie,” 
appeared in the Zeitschrift in1937. Citing Edmund Husserl, Horkheimer argued that 
theory, in the fullest sense, is “‘a systematically linked set of propositions, taking the 
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form of a systematically unified deduction.’”570 Furthermore, “if experience and theory 
contradict each other, one of the two must be reexamined.”571 Critical theory, then, 
examines the contradictions glossed over in culture. He outlined the (negative) space in 
which critical theory continually operated: “this negative formulation, if we wish to 
express it abstractly, is the materialist content of the idealist concept of reason.”572 
However, theory had been “absolutized” and “reified” in a number of contemporary 
schools of materialist and idealist thought.573 What was needed, Horkheimer argued, was 
“a radical reconsideration, not of the scientist alone, but of the knowing individual as 
such.”574 In the bourgeois mode “the activity of society is blind and concrete, that of the 
individual abstract and conscious.”575 Critical theory takes a dissenting, dialectical, 
position:  
Critical thinking is neither of the isolated individual nor of a sum total of 
individuals. Its subject is rather a definite individual in his real relation to 
other individuals and groups, his conflicts with a particular class, and, 
finally, in the resultant web of relationships with the social totality and 
with nature.576  
 
Critical theory, as practiced by the Frankfurt School writers, is also a radical 
consideration of the agent, or agents, in culture.  
 However, Horkheimer wrote in that same essay that “it is possible for the 
consciousness of every social stratum today to be limited and corrupted by ideology, 
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however much, for its circumstances, it may be bent on truth.”577 Possible and very real. 
Horkheimer himself had fled Nazi Germany in 1933. That nothing is inevitable is a 
possibility opened up by a dialectically materialist understanding of history; that is also 
its consequence. The working class was just as capable of perpetuating its own 
destruction as it was of exerting its own agency. Therefore, it was the job of the critical 
theoretician to “reduce the tension between his own insight and oppressed humanity in 
whose service he thinks.”578 Here, Horkheimer set upon a distinction that would be 
echoed in the work of his colleagues: the intellectual (and, by extension, the critic, the 
writer) and the working class had different (if reciprocal) tasks in the struggle for this 
better order of things. However, with perhaps the great exception of Benjamin, 
Horkheimer and his colleagues broke with paradigmatic Marxist thought by placing no 
objective faith in the working class. An exchange of essays between Benjamin and 
Adorno, published in the Zeitschrift in 1930s, demonstrates these points. To borrow from 
one of Benjamin’s most famous formulations, the most difficult and most important tasks 
would not be tackled by the mobilized masses alone. In the 1930s, it would do so through 
film or autonomous art. If Greenberg, whose formulations continue to be at play in the 
critical discourse on art in the U.S. and elsewhere, saw eye to eye with Adorno, at least 
on the subject of Benjamin, it is useful to consider briefly some of the important 
propositions by Benjamin and Adorno. 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
Since, moreover, individuals are tempted to avoid such [new] tasks, art 
will tackle the most difficult and most important ones where it is able to 
mobilize the masses. Today it does so in the film. 
                                                 




~ Benjamin, “L’œuvre d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction 
mécaniséee,” 1936579 
 
The consciousness of the mass of listeners is adequate to fetishized music. 
It listens according to formula, and indeed debasement itself would not be 
possible if resistance ensued, if the listeners still had the capacity to make 
demands beyond the limits of what was supplied.  
 
~ Adorno, “Über den Fetischcharakter in der Musik und die 
Regression des Hörens,” 1938580  
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 Benjamin’s celebrated essay on the work of art and mechanical reproduction first 
appeared in the Zeitschrift in 1936 as “L’œuvre d’art à l’époque de sa reproduction 
mécanisée.” It remains a prescient study of the newness of mechanical reproduction and 
its political consequences for mass culture. While reproduction is age old, photography 
represented its modern, mechanical form on a mass scale. Through mechanical 
reproduction, the work of art was liberated from its cultic origins in a process of 
technological secularization. In his essay, Benjamin offered his ideas, with urgency, on 
the status of the work of art in the wake of mechanical reproduction, the revolutionary 
potential of film, the consequences film for the newly-formed masses, and the 
consequences of those same masses.  
 Perhaps the term most closely associated with Benjamin (the historical critic) is that 
of aura. Or, as he himself defined it, in the case of the natural object: “the unique 
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phenomenon of distance, however close it may be.”581 It is this singular quality that 
withers away from the unique object in the age of mechanical reproduction. 
Characteristic of Benjamin’s thinking, this is a potentially positive occurrence at the same 
time that it gives cause for concern. The withering away of aura from the work of art 
releases it from “its parasitical dependence on ritual.”582  In the age of mechanical 
reproduction, the viewer has the opportunity to reposition him or herself to the newly-
liberated work of art. Photographic reproduction could represent objects or phenomenon 
that had heretofore been beyond human vision and the work of art now could now meet 
the beholder (the masses) “halfway.”583  What the mechanical reproduction of the work of 
art could not reproduce is “its presence in time and space, its unique existence in at the 
place where it happens to be.”584 When the historical testimony of the object is challenged 
by mechanical reproduction, “what is really jeopardized…is the authority of the 
object.”585  
 Benjamin saw this jeopardized authority, this liquidation of history, as opening up 
possibilities for the mass movements. However, this rupture was one of potential (not a 
guarantee): in the place of the traditional cult value of the work of art, there also arose the 
“phony spell” of the commodity or the film star.586 Of even more extreme danger was the 
fascistic attempt to re-introduce aura through the cult of the Führer. If the aestheticized 
politics of the National Socialists forcibly ‘encouraged’ the masses into submissive 
positions of viewing, politicized art responded by encouraging them to assume a more 
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democratic attunement. Film, as a “process of pictorial production… accelerated so 
enormously that it could keep pace with speech,” was the potential medium for this 
resistance.587 The film-viewing “public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one.”588 As 
Benjamin argued, film would tackle the most difficult tasks of the day in mobilizing the 
distracted masses.  
 Adorno’s rebuttal to Benjamin came in the form of “Über den Fetischcharakter in der 
Musik und die Regression des Hörens,” that appeared in the Zeitschrift in 1938.589 At 
issue were concerns about the autonomy of art, the commodification of culture, and the 
psychological structures of the mass audience. While Benjamin had written with 
surprising optimism of the possibilities of film as an inherently revolutionary mass 
medium, Adorno put no such faith in the liberating potential of that popular art, one that 
he understood to be irrational and reified. Nor did he place any faith in the agency of the 
masses who have been “forcibly retarded” by commodity culture.590 Rather, Adorno 
established two counter-propositions in his essay: the fetishization of music and 
regression in listening. He understood art, in general, and music, in particular, as being 
divided into irreconcilable high and light spheres. One could objectify serious music as 
the flight from the banal, or, one could gloss over the divide between the two and make a 
“continuum…leading safely from commercial jazz and hit songs to cultural 
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commodities.”591 Both were unsatisfying: “Cultural barbarism is no better than cultural 
dishonesty.”592 Between these spheres, “there is no room…for the individual…The 
liquidation of the individual is the real signature of the new musical situation.”593 Culture 
had become dominated by commodities to the point that listeners themselves were 
reified: listeners were more concerned with actively “looking good” than with any kind 
of genuine experience, musical or otherwise.594  This kind of “radical reification produces 
its own pretense of immediacy and intimacy.”595 And, pretense of individuality, one 
might add. The syncopations of jazz, for Adorno, epitomized this limitation in culture: it 
was a series of variations on the familiar rendered only momentarily unfamiliar. As 
opposed to the potential of the Benjaminian distracted viewer, Adorno saw a culture of 
de-concentrated listeners caught in cycles of remembering and forgetting. These are the 
actively retarded, regressive listeners. While this might suggest a stupefied culture, 
Adorno argued that “regressive listeners are in fact destructive.”596 It would require only 
the right circumstances of history for “bigots” of the older order and these youth to align 
“in a united front.”597 This was precisely the circumstances of Nazi Germany and 
elsewhere. Adorno held out a slim possibility of change in real dissonance—
unpleasure—as encountered, genuinely, in the work of Arnold Schönberg or Anton 
Webern. The most difficult tasks of the day would not be tackled through film, according 
to Adorno, but rather through autonomous, dissonant music.  
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 While Benjamin and Adorno may have been in disagreement as to the medium of 
resistance against fascism, they were in accordance as to the role of dissonance, or shock, 
in art. Adorno found hope in the dissonance of some composers of his day. For 
Benjamin’s part, there was something shocking in the loss of aura. The pre-modern work 
of art was not experienced auratically: aura could only be experienced upon its loss. The 
significance of Benjamin’s essay lies in its foreseeing, after the fact, this inadvertent and 
unforeseen effect of a technological process and its consequences for human behavior.598  
In an earlier essay from 1934, Benjamin had considered contemporary writers who had 
rendered the shock of modern life conscience in their art. However, these were different 
kinds of shocks than the ones derived from technological changes, they were staged 
shocks by writers and artists.  
 In this 1934 essay, “Zum gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlichen Standort des 
französischen Schriftstellers,” also published in the Zeitschrift, Benjamin made claims for 
the potential of “dangerous” literature—as rare a find as it may have then been in the 
climate of pre-War Europe.599 To make his point, Benjamin called upon a writer from a 
past era: “If Zola was able to portray the France of the 1860s, this was because he 
rejected it.”600 Contemporary writers were unable to portray modern society, because they 
were inclined “to accept it at its face value.”601 That is to suggest that professional 
novelists had abdicated from their responsibilities as writers: “the exceptions—Proust and 
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Gide above all—confirm the rule.”602 It was André Gide, Benjamin argued, who had 
“drawn our attention to the gulf between our desires and our dignity…He has awakened 
the intellectual conscience of half the people we call ‘the younger generation’.”603  Unlike 
Filippo Marinetti and his ilk, Gide, as an advanced writer, had made common cause with 
the Communists. Another exceptional example were the Surrealists. Benjamin wrote that 
this group achieved their goal as intellectuals, “that is to say, via the longest route 
possible. For the intellectual’s path to the radical critique of the social order is the 
longest, just as that of the proletariat is the shortest.”604 As Horkheimer had argued in 
1930, the intellectual and the proletariat had different, if reciprocal, job descriptions.  
 The role of shock had a great value for both Adorno and Benjamin: it clamored 
against the forward march of commodification and fascism. People genuinely engaged 
with advanced art should pose problems for fascistic movements that would demand 
blind obeisance and obedience. In Benjamin’s case, the intellectual and the artist made 
conscious the world-historical task of the working class. However, as Benjamin had 
argued in that essay, the exceptions of Gide and Proust proved the rule that writers of 
their day were more inclined to produce literature that accepted the prevailing order. 
Benjamin had begun his 1934 essay with a citation from Guillaume Apollinaire’s Le 
poète assassiné of 1914 that contained an apocryphal editorial from a German chemist 
living in Australia: “Poets have to go. Lycurgus drove them out of the republic; they 
should be driven from the face of the earth […] There will no longer be any 
                                                 
602 Ibid., 755.  
603 Ibid., 758.  
604 Ibid., 763.  
 200 
poetry…writers will be exterminated.”605 While Benjamin noted that these words are not 
unmarked for the passing of twenty years, what seemed like an “exuberant 
improvisation” on Apollinaire’s part has come to pass. “The process of selection that has 
since taken place at the hands of the ruling classes,” he contended, “has assumed forms 
that are scarcely less inexorable than the process Apollinaire described.”606 If the world-
historical task of intellectuals has been to be the guardians of values of freedom, justice, 
and humanitas, writers like Maurice Barrès, Charles Maurras, Arthur Conan-Doyle, and 
Oswald Spengler had begun to betray those values. Benjamin wrote that “not even 
Machiavelli tried to embellish [the maxims of realpolitik ] with the pathos of ethical 
precepts.”607 Here, Benjamin identified the type of artist appropriate to fascism: the 
bourgeois nihilist—someone who rejected notions of reality and whose amoral life (or 
death) was bereft of meaning.  
 
Post-Script: 1940  
Incidentally, I have learned a good deal from reading Trotsky’s book La 
Révolution trahie, and despite your aversion against getting involved in 
the whole matter, I think you should take a look at it sometime. 
 
   ~ Theodor Adorno, in a letter to Walter Benjamin, 4 March,  
1938.608 
 
It is first of all necessary to affirm that the attempted assassination could 
only be instigated by the Kremlin; by Stalin through the agency of the 
GPU [secret police] abroad. During the last few years, Stalin has shot 
hundreds of real or supposed friends of mine. He actually exterminated my 
entire family, except me, my wife and one of my grandchildren….All the 
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theatrical Moscow trials during 1936–37 had as their aim to get me into 
the hands of the GPU. 
 
~ Leon Trotsky, Letter to the Attorney General of Mexico, 
1 June, 1940609 
 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in 
which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a 
concept of history that is in keeping with this insight.  
 
  ~ Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,”  
  1940610 
 
My questions to the first two questions are no. I wish I could say yes. 
There ought to be a verifiable dialectic process; I wonder if it was this 
ought that more than anything else moved Trotsky to defend Dialectical 
Materialism—at any rate he was moved by much more than Marxist piety.  
 
  ~ Clement Greenberg, Response to “An Inquiry on  
  Dialectical Materialism,” Dyn, 1942611 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 Brecht survived; Trotsky and Benjamin did not. When Trotsky died, he was an 
internationally-known figure who had previously appeared on the cover of Time; 
Benjamin’s fate was posthumous fame.612 These two, amongst others, fulfilled Wilson’s 
prophecy of paradigmatic martyred writers in the 20th century. As is famously known 
                                                 
609 First published in Fourth International 1:5 (October 1940): 138–39. 
610 Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, 256.  
611 Clement Greenberg’s response included in Wolfgang Paalen, “Inquiry into Dialectic Materialism,” Dyn, 
2 (July–August 1942): 50. The first two questions posed were: “Is Dialectic Materialism the science of a 
verifiable ‘dialectic’ process?” and “Is the ‘dialectic method’ a scientific method of investigation?” In his 
extended answer, Greenberg said that the third question, “Hegel in his logic established a series of laws…”,  
was not a valid one. The other respondents were: Bertrand Russell, Sidney Hook, Albert Einstein, William 
Heard Kilpatrick, George W. Hartmann, Pierre Mabille, Dwight Macdonald, Philip Rahv, Goodwin 
Watson, John L. Childs, Meyer Schapiro, Parker Tyler, Morton G. White, and Charles Givors. The 
following intellectuals were sent the questionnaire, but declined to participate: Lionel Abel, George Baker, 
André Breton, Nicolas Calas, James T. Farrell, Sidney Hook, Robert Motherwell, Guenter Reimann, 
Harold Rosenberg, Bertrand Russell, and Harold Rugg. Furthermore, Paalen noted that he had not asked 
John Dewey, Max Eastman, or Joseph Ratner to contribute “because their published criticisms of Hegelian 
metaphysics are already well known.” Paalen, “Inquiry into Dialectic Materialism,” 49.  
612 Trotsky appeared on the cover of Time on 18 May, 1925, 21 November, 1927, and 25 January, 1937; for 
a consideration of Benjamin’s posthumous fame, see Hannah Arendt, “Introduction: Walter Benjamin, 
1892–1940,” in Illuminations, ed. and intro, Hannah Arendt, trans., Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken 
Books, 1968): 1–55.   
 202 
now, Trotsky was attacked in his study on 20 August, 1940 and died the next day; 
Benjamin took his own life on 26 September, 1940 at the Spanish border town of Port 
Bou when it became clear that safe-passage to Spain was impossible on that day.613  
Benjamin, like Baudelaire, was to find an audience for his work in the future.  
 Trotsky’s models necessarily required a vanguard and an enemy. Trotsky was the 
only Marxist critic, according to Philip Rahv, who developed his literary analyses around 
the concept of the “special role and changing status of the intelligentsia.”614 Like 
Greenberg’s positing of the avant-garde work of art, the vanguard would find itself beset 
upon by the old guard. This was to be expected. Benjamin, in some ways, anticipated this 
obstacle by bringing along enough morphine to cut short his journey should that be 
necessary. Here lies the risk associated with the dialectical method (as distinct from a 
fixed system of antipodes): the revolution, the avant-garde, could find itself betrayed by 
its fellow travelers. Such was the case with Trotsky. Or, even worse, the so-called science 
of history could be used to justify the actions of the 20th century dictators. This was the 
conclusion Barnett Newman drew in some private notes:  
The more we study the forces that have been motivating Hitler, Mussolini, 
and Hirohito, the more it becomes plain that they live and act by pseudo-
science, racism, intrinsic destiny, the progress of mankind—and most false 
of all—the ‘science’ of history with its [Hegelian] synthesis.615   
 
The task of the self-stated revolutionary, such as Trotsky, was to recover dialectical 
techniques from the forces of militarism and fascism in the 1930s. Nevertheless, as 
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Newman’s formulation indicates, those motivated by a predictable theory of history—and 
most dangerously—those who motivate the crowds with such a theory—could wind up 
slaughtering each other over whose prediction of the future should win out. That is, 
indeed, a large part of the history of the previous century.  
 Dwight MacDonald in his fulsome tribute to Trotsky, implored his readers: 
“[I]magine Stalin or Hitler in exile….Would they exercise any influence on the 
consciousness of our times?” Or, “would, most brutal test, anyone read their books?”616 
And yet, the last years of his life proved to be a failure in many ways, Macdonald 
concluded. Despite the “penetration” of his analysis of circumstances in the post-
Revolutionary, post-Lenin Soviet Union, Trotsky was not able to win over the party or 
the working people to his permanent revolution, nor was he able, despite his insightful 
clarity, to prevent the circumstances that lead to his own murder.617 As long as he was 
alive, there would be “a center of Marxist consciousness in the world.”618 What Trotsky 
had left behind, James T. Farrell argued in his own posthumous tribute, was a body of 
writing, one that was “fertile, suggestive, illuminating.”619 If this generation of critics 
became Trotskyists for any length of time, it was through their own actions as authors 
that they sought to maintain the consciousness that had been snuffed out in Mexico in 
1940. The shock of his murder prompted Greenberg, for one, to write an (unpublished) 
tribute in which he wrote that the start of a new era of crisis began on the day of 
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Trotsky’s death, not on the earlier date of 1 September, 1939, when the Nazis had 
invaded Poland.620 Rosenberg, in his now-famous comment on 1940, wrote that:   
For a decade, the whole of civilization has been sinking down, lowering 
Paris steadily towards the soil of France. Until its restoration as the capital 
of a nation was completed by the tanks of the Germans.621  
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I. The War and the Intellectuals (ca. 1917 and 1939) 
 
Twenty-two years ago, The Seven Arts printed Randolph Bourne’s article, 
“The War and the Intellectuals.” “To those of us who still retain an 
irreconcilable animus against war,” Bourne wrote in 1917, “it has been a 
bitter experience to see the unanimity with which American intellectuals 
have thrown their support to the use of war-technique in the crisis in 
which America found herself. Socialists, college professors, publicists, 
new-republicans, practitioners of literature, have view with each other in 
confirming with their intellectual faith the collapse of neutrality and the 
riveting of the war-mind on a hundred million more of the world’s people. 
And the intellectuals are not content with confirming our belligerent 
posture. They are now complacently asserting that it was they who 
effectively willed it, against the hesitation and dim perceptions of the 
American democratic masses. A war made deliberately by the 
intellectuals!… A war free from any taint of self-seeking, a war that will 
secure the triumph of democracy and internationalize the world! 
 
  ~ “This Quarter,” Partisan Review, Spring 1939622 
 
Thus the Paris Modern, resting on the deeply felt assumption that history 
could be entirely controlled by the mind, produced a no-time, and the Paris 
‘International’ a no-place. And this is as far as mankind has gone towards 
freeing itself from the past.  
 
~ Harold Rosenberg, “On the Fall of Paris,” Partisan Review,  
1940623 
 
* My position here, I admit, is a difficult one and open to serious 
misunderstanding, but no matter: as Trotsky said, “If we theoretically 
admit war [involving the Soviet Union] without revolution, then the defeat 
of the Soviet Union is inevitable.” If we admit this present war without 
revolution, the defeat of humanity is inevitable. 
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~ Clement Greenberg, in a solo-authored footnote to “10 
Propositions on the War,” Partisan Review, 1941624  
 
I am not suggesting that Greenberg and Macdonald and their political 
friends should rush to join the war-party. Doubtless, they have other things 
to do. In a sense this war, even if it is accomplishes the destruction of 
fascism, is not yet our war. But this fact in itself does not permit us to take 
for granted that the salvation of mankind has been entrusted to us and that 
we alone know how to achieve it. 
 




 The start of World War II in Europe, and the possibly entry of the U.S. into the 
fighting became the all-consuming question for American intellectuals at the start of the 
decade. As these epigraphs demonstrate, contributors to Partisan Review were severely 
divided on the character of this new war and the appropriate response to it.626 Artists and 
the intelligentsia were mostly homeless, Rosenberg argued, once Paris was returned to its 
place an occupied, national capital. Greenberg and Macdonald were naïve in their 
response to the war, Rahv concluded, and they had failed to learn from history. “Despite 
the shattering surprises of the last two years,” Rahv countered, the authors were “still sure 
that they had all the answers.”627 But those answers were the “same old orthodox 
recommendations.”628 Elsewhere in his editorial, which was published just days before 
the air raid by the Japanese military on Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, Rahv stated 
that the offensive forces of the U.S. military would “astound” the world once it entered 
                                                 
624 Clement Greenberg and Dwight Macdonald, “10 Propositions on the War,” Partisan Review 8:4 (July–
August 1941): 275. Apparently because this essay was the product of a collaborative effort, it was omitted 
from CGCEC.  
625 Philip Rahv, “10 Propositions and 8 Errors,” Partisan Review 8:6 (November–December 1941): 506. 
Emphasis in the original.  
626 For a discussion of the divided editorial board, see Terry A. Cooney, The Rise of the New York 
Intellectuals: Partisan Review and Its Circle (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986): 186–7.   
627 Philip Rahv, “10 Propositions and 8 Errors,” 499.  
628 Ibid. 
 208 
the war, and, ultimately, the defeat of fascism would lead to a re-organized working 
class.629 The re-organization never quite happened as Rahv imagined it, and the full force 
of his statement on U.S. military might would not be felt until 6 August, 1945 in 
Hiroshima, and 9 August in Nagasaki, when a new era in the shocking technics of terror 
began.  
 A later editorial in Partisan Review outlined the new position of the editorial board: 
dissent from one another, which eventually precipitated a changing of the guard at the 
journal.630 By the end of 1942, Greenberg resigned as an editor; late in1943, Morris also 
withdrew from the editorial board and turned towards his work as an AAA member, to 
the exclusion of most other activities; in 1944, Macdonald left to found Politics. (In what 
would be his final interview, Greenberg said he later regretted the position that he and 
Macdonald took in 1941.631) Rosenberg, who was never a member of the editorial board, 
contributed only three essays to the journal during this time.632 He would, of course, go 
on to publish some of his most celebrated essays later in the decade at Commentary and 
The Kenyon Review.633 Schapiro, who was, by this time, fully engaged in his academic 
career at Columbia, contributed select essays to Partisan Review and other left-wing 
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631 See Saul Ostrow, “Clement Greenberg: The Last Interview,” in Clement Greenberg: Late Writings, 236–
7. 
632 In addition to “The Fall of Paris,” Rosenberg contributed “On the Profession of Poetry,” Partisan 
Review 9:5 (September–October 1942): 392–13; and “Notes on Fascism and Bohemia,” Partisan Review 
11:2 (Spring 1944): 177–182. Greenberg gave a sharp retort to Rosenberg’s ideas on poetry in his own 
essay, published in the next issue. See, Greenberg, “Poets, English and American,” Partisan Review 9:6 
(November–December 1942): 532–7.  
633 See, for example, Harold Rosenberg, “The Herd of Independent Minds,” Commentary 6:3 (September 
1948): 244–52; “The Resurrected Romans,” The Kenyon Review 10:4 (Autumn 1948): 602–20; and “The 
Pathos of the Proletariat,” The Kenyon Review 11:4 (Autumn 1949): 595–29.  
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journals during this time.634 The exodus left Phillips and Rahv as the main intellectual 
framers of the journal during the war-time years.635  
 Greenberg becomes one of the most visible art critics during this time: he wrote 
reviews mainly for The Nation in his position as art critic, and he also contributed longer 
essays to Partisan Review, Commentary, and elsewhere. Other critical voices who had 
been heard regularly on the subject of modern art became, by choice, less audible: in 
1942, Kainen left New York for Washington, D.C. and von Wiegand turned to her 
painterly practice almost full time by 1944. However, von Wiegand also turned towards 
the task of translation: most famously, the essays of Mondrian.636 Greenberg’s writing 
was at play with that of others at this time, not just with other critics, but also with artists 
writing as critics. Most notably, these included: Stuart Davis, Barnett Newman, who was, 
in the 1940s, perhaps more visible as a writer than as a painter, and Robert Motherwell, 
who was formerly a graduate student of Schapiro. Critics and artist-critics registered their 
observations on the figuring imagination in a number of now-celebrated artist-run 
publications: Dyn (1942–4), which was published in Coyoacán, Mexico by Wolfgang 
Paalen (1905/07 [?]–1959), the self-taught artist, publisher and critic; Possibilities (1947–
                                                 
634 For an exhaustive bibliography of the life work of Meyer Schapiro, see Meyer Schapiro: The 
Bibliography, ed. Dr. Lillian Milgram Schapiro (New York: George Braziler, 1995). For Schapiro’s heated 
exchange on Socialism with Sidney Hook, which Schapiro published under the pseudonym of David 
Merian, see, “Socialism and the Failure of Nerve: An Exchange,” Partisan Review 10:3 (May–June 1943): 
248–62. For the extended debate, see the series of essays published in The New Failure of Nerve, Parts I & 
II, Partisan Review 10:1/2 (January–February, March–Aril, 1943).  
635 See, for example, William Philips, “The Intellectual’s Tradition,” Partisan Review 8:6 (November–
December 1941): 481–90.  
636 See, Piet Mondrian, Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art, ed. Robert Motherwell (New York: Wittenborn, 
Schultz, 1945). In a review of the same year, Clement Greenberg noted that von Wiegand, who essentially 
set “Toward the True Vision of Reality” to text, was not acknowledged. See, “Review of the Exhibitions of 
Mondrian, Kandinsky, and Pollock; of the Annual Exhibition of the American Abstract Artists; and of the 
Exhibition of European Artists in America,” The Nation (7 April, 1945): 397. The third edition of the 
Documents of Modern Art volume (1951) included an acknowledgment of von Wiegand’s translations. For 
von Wiegand’s account of meeting and working with Mondrian, see von Wiegand, “A Memoir,” Art 
Yearbook 4 (1961): 57–66. 
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8), which was a one-issue collaboration of Rosenberg, Newman, and Motherwell; and 
Tiger’s Eye (1947–9), an interdisciplinary arts magazine published by Ruth and John 
Stephan.  
 In addition to the émigré painters who were making their way to New York, the city 
became a haven to European intellectuals. Between the years of 1934 and 1938, the 
Institut ƒür Sozialforschung membership necessarily fled Europe after the German police 
closed the Institut and seized its contents (including the Gründbergs Archiv) on 13 
March, 1933. Eventually, with the tragic exception of Benjamin, all would settle in New 
York, where the Institute re-opened at Columbia University as the Institute for Social 
Research and published the Studies in Philosophy and Social Science (hereafter, SPSS). 
In 1940, the first Liste Otto is published in Paris, naming works that were to be recalled 
by the publishers or forbidden by the German authorities.637 The list targeted émigré, 
Marxist, and Jewish writers and included the ZƒS.638 By 1941, Horkheimer, Adorno, 
Friedrich Pollock, and Herbert Marcuse had re-settled on the West Coast. The 
membership continued their critique of the terrible events that were unfolding in Europe, 
while at the same time, almost all went to work for the U.S. government in support of the 
war effort. Marcuse returned east to work for the Office of War, while others held posts 
at the OSS. Horkheimer and Adorno were the exceptions here.639 A few important shifts 
that took place in the writing of the Institut membership during their American days 
should be noted. One is that direct references to Marxism were mostly replaced with 
                                                 
637 “Liste Otto,” or, Ouvrages retirés de la vente par les éditeurs ou interdits par les autorités allemandes, 
which was issued in Paris by the Syndicat des éditeurs (following the Convention sur la censure des livres) 
as a supplement to the Bibliographie de la France, nos. 25/40, (June 28–October 4, 1940).  
638 The ZfS was one of many publications banned under the title of “Presses Universitaires (Alcan, Leroux, 
Rieder)” in the Liste Otto, n.f.  
639 See Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School, 299–301 for a listing of the employment of the Institut 
membership by the U.S. government.  
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citations of respectable American thinkers, such as Henry James or John Dewey. The 
status (and safety) of the membership as resident aliens in the U.S. could have been 
jeopardized had they been too strident in expressing their dialectical materialism. Another 
is that their tone took a turn for the optimistic. Perhaps in keeping with their efforts on the 
Allied home front, they did not wish to suggest in their rhetoric that fascism might 
actually triumph.640 Finally, the subject matter of their essays was often provoked by 
examples of American discourse, such as those by Thorstein Veblen. The 1941 volume of 
Studies in Philosophy and the Social Science contained a number of essays in which the 
Frankfurt School writers considered the problems of autonomous art and its relationship 
to mass culture and mass culture in its extreme form: that of fascism.  
 This chapter traces the criticism of these critics as they understood the figuring 
imagination of the artist and art objects in the context of the crisis years of the Second 
World War. Stated differently, this chapter traces the choices made by artists during this 
time, and how these choices (artistic, ethical) were understood by critics and by artists 
writing as critics during these years. For example, the differences between the realms of 
Apollo and of Dionysius that Alfred Barr had sketched out as a formal divide in 1936 
took on a moral force in the work (both painted and written) of Barnett Newman and 
others in the 1940s.641 (The consequences of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy for 
Newman’s generation of fellow painters is considered below.) Paalen was someone 
generally sympathetic to Newman’s ideas. In his own writing, Paalen considered the 
intensely-problematic pursuit of Beauty in the modern in 1944:   
                                                 
640 Discussion with Professor Peter Jelavich at the University of Texas at Austin on 17 April, 2001 clarified 
my thinking on this point.  
641 See Richard Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” in BNCR: 17.  
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For Stendahl, Beauty was still “a promise of happiness,” but already 
Baudelaire could not think of “a type of beauty that did not include 
misfortune.” For Rilke, beauty became the “beginning of the terrible” and 
for Breton it can no longer be but “convulsive.”642 
  
Robert Motherwell, also writing in 1944, began his essay, “The Painter’s Object,” with a 
citation from Baudelaire: “The study of the beautiful is a duel in which the artist cries out 
in terror before he is vanquished.”643 Even later, in 1969, Adorno would conclude that art 
was “the ever broken promise of happiness.”644  
 To artists and critics who lived through the War and through the post-War years with 
the knowledge of the European Holocaust, the broken promise might have been the limits 
of art within contemporary culture. For other critics modern art could be a weapon of 
sorts: a pronouncement published in Dyn declared modern art, because of its “vital 
stimulus to the imagination,” to be “an invaluable weapon in the struggle for freedom.”645 
Others thought, modern art was in need of defense: Stuart Davis, in 1941, saw the main 
threat to “genuine art” as coming not only from its “outright suppression” under 
European dictatorships, but also from “defeatism,” those elements (e.g., demands for 
propaganda, home-grown censorship, “ballyhoo for Americanism in art,” etc.) that would 
deny the “independent social role of art.”646  Still others believed that artists could create 
a society for which it was worth fighting. In an essay included in his 1943 New Frontiers 
in American Painting, the gallerist Samuel M. Kootz looked to artists for future guidance 
in the post-war world, predicting that the “war itself is not as great a revolution as the 
                                                 
642 Wolfgang Paalen, “The Meaning of Cubism Today,” Dyn 6 (1944): 4. 
643 Robert Motherwell, “The Painter’s Object,” Partisan Review 11:1 (Winter 1944): 93. 
644 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Madison: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997): 136.  
645 Dyn 1 (April-May 1942): n.f.  
646 Stuart Davis, “Abstract Art in the American Scene,” Parnassus 13:3 (March 1941): 102.  
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aftermath promises to be.”647  
 The aftermath of the war was not as Kootz predicted (even if he wrote in optimistic 
hyperbole appropriate to the darkened days of 1943), or the revolution would be, 
possibly, de-limited to the realm of art. In his 1943 review of the Annual Exhibition of 
Contemporary American Art at the Whitney and of Artists for Victory at the 
Metropolitan, Greenberg wrote that these shows demonstrated “how competently and yet 
how badly most of our accepted artists paint, draw, and carve.”648 (Kootz agreed: he 
called the show at the Metropolitan a “hippopotamus.”649) Contemporary American art 
was no so “un-enterprising” as these two shows made out, the critic concluded. (Indeed. 
Subsequent passages in this chapter attend to the enterprising consequences of the work 
and teachings, material and metaphysical, of Piet Mondrian and of Hans Hofmann for 
artists working in New York during these years.) The exclusion of modernist jurors at the 
Metropolitan show galvanized a number of men (and women) of culture into action. The 
exhibition of American Modern Artists was hung in protest at the Riverside Museum, 
which included members of the Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors, including 
Adolph Gottlieb, then vice president of the FMPS.650 Though he did not contribute work 
to the show, Newman wrote the catalogue essay and dispatched a number of press 
releases and letters on behalf of the organizers. In the catalogue essay, Newman (like 
Davis) wrote on the social role of the work of modern art: “We, who dedicated our lives 
to art—to modern art—to modern art in America…we mean to make manifest by our 
                                                 
647 Samuel M. Kootz, “War of Ideas,” in New Horizons in American Painting (New York: Hastings House 
Publishers, 1943): 3.  
648 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 156:1 (2 January, 1943): 32.  
649 Kootz, “War of Ideas,” vii.  
650 The exhibition ran from 17 January through 27 February, 1943. See BNSWI, 29.  
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work, in our studios and our galleries, the requirements for a culture in a new 
America.”651 
This chapter concludes with modern invocations of Kant, and passages on the subject of 
Taste and Judgment, in which I draw parallels (and differences) between the category of 
the autonomous work of art as dissent and as resistance to mass culture. 
 
 
II. Fictile Myths652 
 
I painted quite a large painting for Miss Guggenheim’s house during the 
summer. 8 feet by 20 feet, it was grand fun.  
 
  ~ Jackson Pollock, in a letter to his brother, 1944653 
 
The Philoctetes story, which has so established itself among us as 
explaining the source of the artist’s power, is not really an explanatory 
myth at all; it is a moral myth having reference to our proper behavior in 
the circumstances of the universal accident. In its juxtaposition of the 
wound and the bow, it tells us that we must be aware that weakness does 
not preclude strength nor strength weakness. It is therefore not irrelevant 
to the artist, but when we use it we will do well to keep in mind the other 
myths of the arts, recalling that [Apollo] was given the lyre by its inventor, 
the baby Hermes—that miraculous infant who, the day he was born, left 
his cradle to do mischief: and the first thing he met with was a tortoise, 
which he greeted politely before scooping it from its shell, and, thought 
and deed being one with him, he contrived the instrument to which he 
sang “the glorious tale of his own begetting.” These were gods, and very 
early ones, but their myths tell us something about the nature and source 
of art even in our grim, late human present.  
 
  ~ Lionel Trilling, “Art and Neurosis,” from The Liberal  
Imagination, 1947654 
                                                 
651 BNSWI, 30.  
652 The peculiarity of Barnett Newman’s use of this word was made apparent to me through reading Richard 
Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 27, 99, 181n. 
653 Jackson Pollock to his brother Frank, 15 January, 1944. Cited in Kirk Varnedoe, “Comet: Jackson 
Pollock’s Life and Work,” in Jackson Pollock (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1998): 81, n. 81.  
654 Lionel Trilling, “Art and Neurosis,” in The Liberal Imagination (New York: Doubleday, 1950, 1953): 
175. This essay was initially published as “Art and Neurosis,” Partisan Review 12:1 (Winter 1945): 41–8. 
A subsequent version was published in The New Leader (13 December, 1947). My attention was drawn to 
 215 
 
What is the raison d’etre, what is the explanation of the seemingly insane 
drive of man to be a painter and poet if it is not an act of defiance against 
man’s fall and an assertion that he return to the Adam of the Garden of 
Eden? For the artists are the first men.  
 
~ Barnett Newman, “The First Man Was an Artist,” Tiger’s 
Eye, 1947655 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 The New York art scene of the early 1940s has been referred to as the time of the 
“Myth Makers,” usually meaning those artists, usually Pollock, Newman, Gottlieb, and 
Rothko, who incorporated mythological figures in their work.656 None of these artists 
fitted neatly into this category, nor had exclusive claim to the realm. New myths were 
transmuted for old: many of these artists made myths of the Everyman (to use the 
vernacular of the time).657 In his Pictographs of the 1940s, Gottlieb perhaps demonstrated 
most emphatically, by the use of meaning-laden symbols, his interest in the ideas of Carl 
Jung (1875–1961) and his concept of archetypes and the collective unconscious. Pollock, 
it has been argued, took a Freudian path in his work in the early 1940s, a direction in 
which he made use of the work made by the Surrealists. This generation of artists was not 
interested exclusively in the mythic Greco-Roman past and its descendants, though: their 
respective searches lead them to cultures outside of the West. As W. Jackson Rushing has 
argued, when, in 1941, MoMA held its landmark exhibition, Indian Art of the United 
States, the idea of First Nation cultures as “a spiritual and aesthetic resource” was a 
                                                                                                                                                 
this particular essay in this collection after reading Richard Shiff’s essay, “Criticism at Odds with Its Art: 
Prophecy, Projection, Doubt, Paranoia.”  
655 Barnett Newman, “The First Man Was an Artist,” Tiger’s Eye 1:1 (October 1947): 60.  
656 For use of term “Myth Maker,” see Mark Rothko, Introduction to Clyfford Still, exh. cat., Art of This 
Century, 1946. For two recent examples of the term “Myth-Makers,” see Irving Sandler, “The Myth-
Makers,” in The Triumph of American Painting, 62–71; and Michael Leja, “The Myth-Makers & The 
Primitive: Gottlieb, Newman, Rothko & Still,” in Reframing Abstract Expressionism, 49–120.  
657 See Newman’s reference to Gorky’s tragic suicide in 1948 as “his private Passion.” Newman, “Arshile 
Gorky: Poet and Immolator,” in BNSWI, 112.  
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commonplace in the minds of viewers sympathetic to modern art.658 Paalen had a life-
long interest in the art of the First Nation peoples of the Pacific Northwest, which was 
demonstrated by a special issue of Dyn devoted to the subject in 1943.659 In 1946, 
Newman organized the Northwest Coast Indian Painting exhibition at the newly-
relocated Betty Parsons Gallery.660  
 Myths of self-making were equally at play (what Rosenberg would later term 
“private” myths of “future self-recognition.”661) Hofmann, for one, well understood the 
risks associated with the engendering of modern pictorial life: one could create something 
that would not be understood, readily grasped, or even experienced as art. “It makes 
people furious when you speak your own language,” he concluded in his 1941 address to 
the AAA.662 Two years later, Pollock created in one day, ex nihilo, his mural for Peggy 
Guggenheim, an act that has become the stuff of art-historical legend (fig. 67). This 
chapter also attends to the myth of New York in the 1940s: the last available spot for 
possible return of a ‘no-time’ ‘no-place’ that had been lost with the Fall of Paris. Through 
historical happenstance, this was where artists, such as Newman, could, once again, be 
Adamite artists; or where critics, such as Rosenberg, might witness their actions. In some 
cases, what was made was the kind of modern painting that Paalen argued grimly, 
expressed to us “what one may call the Golem complex of our civilization.”663 
                                                 
658 Rushing, W. Jackson, “Ritual and Myth: Native American Culture and Abstract Expressionism,” in The 
Spiritual in Art: Abstract Painting, 1890–1985 (New York: Abbeville Press in collaboration with the Los 
Angeles County Museum of Art, 1986): 273.  
659 See the Amerindian number of Dyn 1:4–5 (December 1943). 
660 This exhibition ran from 30 September through 19 October, 1946.  
661 Harold Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” ArtNews 51 (December 1952): 48. 
662 Goodman, Hans Hofmann, 167. For a similar attitude expressed close in time and place to Hofmann, see 
Samuel M. Kootz, New Frontiers in American Painting, 47–9, et passim.  
663 Paalen, “Farewell au Surrealisme,” 26. In a footnote to this statement, Paalen wrote: “The popular 
equivalent is in the innumerable versions of the Frankenstein theme, the scientific homunculi.”  
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 In 1933, Newman ran in the mayoral race in New York City (fig. 68).664 Anne 
Temkin, for one, has characterized this run as “the stuff of legend…variously 
exaggerated into a viable candidacy against Fiorello H. Laguardia or dismissed as a 
Dadaist prank.”665 Newman’s act of 1933 can be compared, in the category of art-
historical legends, to Pollock’s 1941 creation as action in a different (Rosenbergian) 
arena. Newman, the candidate, made manifest his beliefs in an essay, “On the Need for 
Political Action by Men of Culture.”666 In 1968, he commented retrospectively on the 
circumstances of the politics of the 1930s: “The din against libertarian ideas that came 
from shouting dogmatists, Marxist, Leninist, Stalinist, and Trotskyite alike, was so shrill 
it built an intellectual prison that locked one in tight.”667 His comments were well timed; 
he said so himself. In 1968, he could see a new set of intellectual prisons being built: by 
Marcusians, Maoists, and the followers of Che, etc. Repeated encounters with ideologues 
re-confirmed his convictions: throughout his career, in print and in paint, he sought to be 
an “untrammeled person.”668 Newman sought to handle chaos through creative acts, as 
had Kroptkin (this as opposed to being handled roughly by chaos).669 Newman possessed 
                                                 
664 See A.J. Liebling, “Two Aesthetes Offer Selves as Candidates to Provide Own Ticket for Intellectuals,” 
New York World-Telegram (4 November, 1933).  
665 Ann Temkin, “Barnett Newman on Exhibition,” in Barnett Newman, Ann Temkin, ed. with essays by 
Temkin and Richard Shiff (Philadelphia: The Philadelphia Museum of Art with Yale University Press, 
2002): 22.  
666 This essay is reprinted in BNSWI, 4–8.  
667 Barnett Newman, “Foreword: The True Revolution is Anarchist!” in Peter Kropotkin, Memoirs of a 
Revolutionist (New York: Horizon Press, 1968): ix.  
668 This is Newman’s admiring description of Kropotkin, in “Foreword: The True Revolution is Anarchist!” 
xi.  
669 See Newman, “The Plasmic Image,” in BNSWI, 138–155. As Richard Shiff has noted, this essay, 
composed in the spring of 1945, was “a catchall statement of his concerns at the time; he never completed 
it.” See Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 27.  
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a life-long distrust of fixed systems of being, meaning and representation and evinced his 
anarchist tendencies through his work (of all kind).670 
 In 1943, Newman once again took up the defense of his fellow painters. As is well 
known, Edwin Alden Jewell, the art critic for the New York Times, reviewed the 
exhibition of the FMPS and singled out the pictures by two members, Rothko and 
Gottlieb, as particularly baffling.671 “You’ll have to make of Marcus Rothko’s The Syrian 
Bull what you can,” Jewell wrote, “nor is this department prepared to shed the slightest 
enlightenment when it comes to Adolph Gottlieb’s Rape of Persephone.”672 (See figs. 31 
and 69). (Not every critic was skeptical of the Rothkos, though: writing in Art Digest, 
Maude Riley, wrote that “one is inclined to sympathize with than blame its failures.”673) 
The works are strange, but it wasn’t the immediate references to myth that puzzled 
Jewell. It was, rather, the gross distortions in both works by which Jewell coyly claimed 
to be bewildered. Newman helped Rothko and Gottlieb craft a response, which ran in the 
paper a week later.674 Was it necessary to have to explain that the Gottlieb painting is “a 
poetic expression of the essence of myth; the presentation of the concept of seed and its 
                                                 
670 See, for example, Richard Shiff’s discussion of Newman’s attitudes towards the “pseudo-science” of the 
Hegelian dialectic. See Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 26, 98, n. 175. The manuscript from the Barnett 
Newman Foundation Archive dates to ca. 1944. This is two years after Wolfgang Paalen published his 
inquiry into dialectical materialism (as discussed in chapter four). While Newman was not one of the 
invited respondents, perhaps the article prompted him to formulate his thoughts in writing. See Wolfgang 
Paalen, “Inquiry into Dialectic Materialism,” Dyn 2 (July–August 1942): 49–54.  
671 See Edwin Alden Jewell, “Modern Painters Open Show Today,” The New York Times (2 June, 1943): 
28. The Federation of Modern Painters and Sculptors: Third Annual Exhibition was held at Wildenstein & 
Co., Inc., New York from 3–26 June, 1943.  
672 Edwin Alden Jewell, “Modern Painters Open Show Today,” 28.  
673 Maude Riley, “The Mythical Rothko and His Myths,” Art Digest (15 January, 1943): 15.  
674 See Mark Rothko and Adolph Gottlieb, letter to Edwin Alden Jewell, “A New Flatform and Other 
Matters: ‘Globalism’ Pops Into View,” New York Times Sec. 2 (13 June 1943): 9. For a comparison of the 
drafts of the letter to the published version, see Bonnie Clearwater, “Shared Myths: Reconsideration of 
Rothko’s and Gottlieb’s Letters to The New York Times,” Archives of American Art Journal, 24:1 (1984): 
23–5.  
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earth with all of its brutal implications”?675 Or, that the Rothko painting was “a new 
interpretation of an archaic image, involving unprecedented distortions”?676 They asserted 
the “self-evident” reality of their canvases and the reasserted tactile reality of the picture 
plane: flat forms “destroy illusion and reveal truth.”677 Nor was it about being an 
academic and painting whatever subject, but painting it well. As the artists famously 
concluded: “There is no such thing as good painting about nothing. We assert that the 
subject is crucial and only that subject-matter is valid which is timeless and tragic.”678  
 These paintings have not suffered from a lack of critical attention since their initial 
testing in 1943. Perhaps Gottlieb’s rendering is more readily emblematic of the myth of 
Persephone, Demeter’s daughter whose knowledge of the Underworld came in the form 
of the sweet juice of pomegranate seeds.679 Neither painting is a literal representation of a 
given myth nor the result of a “specific program,” as Lucinda Barnes has rightly argued 
in her essay on these paintings.680 The Rothko work is especially peculiar and has 
provoked several scholars to account for this strangeness. Lee Seldes uncovered an 
illustration made by Rothko in 1928 for a graphic Bible written by Rabbi Lewis Brown 
(fig. 70).681 This illustration and the painting share the image of the 9th-century Winged 
Bull from Assyria (fig. 71). In a tour-de-force analysis, James E. Breslin has argued that 
                                                 
675 Ibid.  
676 Ibid. This is a possible reference to Aaron and the golden calf from Exodus, 32:1–35.  
677 Ibid.  
678 Ibid.  
679 For a well-told composite version of the Persephone myth, see Edith Hamilton, Mythology (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1942): 112–3.  
680 Lucinda Barnes, “A Proclamation of Moment: Adolph Gottlieb, Mark Rothko, and Barnett Newman and 
the Letter to the New York Times” in the Allen Memorial Art Museum Bulletin 47:1 (1993): 2–13.  
681 See, Rabbi Lewis Browne, The Graphic Bible: From Genesis to Revelation in Animated Maps & Charts, 
(New York, 1928). See also, Lee Seldes The Legacy of Mark Rothko (New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston, 
1978, 1996), p. 15. This subject was also attended to by James E.B. Breslin in “The Trials of Mark 
Rothko,” Representations 16 (Autumn 1986): 1–41; and more recently by David Anfam, “A Note on 
Rothko’s The Syrian Bull,” Burlington Magazine 139:1134 (September 1997): 629–31.  
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this painting is Rothko’s interpretation of the Persian myth of Mithra: By slaying a bull, 
the god Mirthra is able to create the world.682 Ancient representations of the myth show 
the god in a multi-colored cape plunging a dagger into its shoulder.683 Michael Leja has 
suggested that viewers might “glimpse something of tragedy” but that the surrealist 
aspect of the work upstages this: we are, he argues, looking at a surrealist personage or 
biomorph “posing in a landscape.”684 
 The bull is strange, indeed: the hooves are flame-like and comically dainty for such a 
hulking figure with pretensions to tragedy; the regularly-patterned plumage is interrupted 
on the right by another kind of distorted white plumes. Yet another episode from Greek 
myth was a possible source for the Rothko painting. At least two ancient writers make 
reference to the myth of the brazen bull of Phalaris.685 Perilaus, a well-regarded bronze 
caster presented the bull to Phalaris, the tyrant of Agrigentum. Phalaris was thought to 
have used the bull to punish individuals by placing them inside the bull and lighting a fire 
beneath its feet. The punished would then roast to death; their screams were to be heard 
through the pipes fitted into the nostrils of the bull—“so that the augmented cruelty of 
their shrieks came to mean something entirely different to him.”686 The first victim was 
Perilaus himself. (It’s a macabre corollary to Newman’s 1947 statement that the first men 
art artists; they are also the first into the crucible.)  
                                                 
682 See James E. Breslin, Mark Rothko: A Biography, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): 186–
91. 
683 Ibid., 187–8.  
684 Michael Leja, Reframing Abstract Expressionism, 78.  
685 For two differing accounts, see Cicero, Verrine Orations, 4.73; and Diodorus of Sicily, World History 
9.19.1. 
686  Søren Kirkegaard, Practice in Christianity, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991): 255, 505, n. 138.  
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 The Syrian Bull was painted shortly after Rothko had taken a hiatus from painting, ca. 
1940.  In an unpublished autobiographical statement from 1945, Rothko wrote that he 
had earlier “stopped painting and spent a nearly a year developing both in writing and in 
studies my ideas concerning the myth and anecdote which are the basis of my present 
work.”687 Rothko, the painter who sought to represent the timeless and tragic in his mid-
century paintings of myth, was also a reader of Aeschylus and Kierkegaard; he would 
also draft an essay, ca. 1951, in response to Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.688 In his 
studies, he may have come across the myth of the brazen bull in a few sources: one 
arcane, another less so.  
 The longest purported passage from Prometheus Unbound, the lost tragedy of 
Aeschylus, is to be found in Cicero’s Tusculans. In the second Tusculan disputation, very 
near the Aeschylus fragment, Cicero examines views held by a number of philosophers 
on the thesis that “pain is the greatest of evils.”689 In the disputation, Epicurius is quoted 
as arguing that someone disciplined in his methods “would even fry in the Bull of 
                                                 
687 This statement is held in the archives of the Mark Rothko Foundation For an extended transcription of 
this statement, see David Anfam, Mark Rothko: The Works on Canvas (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1998), p. 63, n. 15. This auto-biographical statement has also recently been re-published in Mark Rothko: 
Writings on Art, ed. and intro, Miguel López-Remiro (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
2006): 42.  
688 See also Dore Ashton, About Rothko (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983): 42–5 et passim; 
Christopher Rothko, Introduction to Mark Rothko, The Artist’s Reality: Philosophies of Art (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 2004): xxiii et passim; and Ashton, “Rothko’s Frame of Mind,” in 
Seeing Rothko, eds. Glenn Phillips and Thomas Crow (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2005): 15–6. 
Charles Harrison has recently suggested that Rothko read Gilbert Murray’s Aeschylus: The Creator of 
Tragedy shortly after its publication in 1940. See Harrison, “Scenes and Details,” in Seeing Rothko, 184, 
197, n. 6. For the volume by Murray (1866–1957), see Aeschylus: The Creator of Tragedy (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1940). For a copy of the Rothko’s draft on Nietzsche, see the James E.B. Breslin papers 
held at the Getty Research Institute, Los Angeles (“Notes and Writing Fragments” in Box 17, Folder 19).  
689 See Cicero, Tusculans (2:10:23–25) and C. John Hernington, “Aeschylus, Prometheus Unbound, Fr. 
193 (Titanum suboles…),” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 
92 (1961), p. 242. 
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Phalaris with exclamations of pleasure.”690 Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) made direct 
reference to the bull of Phalaris in the opening passage of Either/Or, which was 
published in 1843. The short-lived philosopher drew a parallel between the victims of the 
brazen bull and the unhappiness of the poet “who conceals profound anguish in his heart 
but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass over them they sound like 
beautiful music.”691 As for the crowd (the audience), they say:  
“Sing again soon”—in other words, may new suffering torture your soul, 
and may your lips continue to be formed as before, because your screams 
would only alarm us, but the music is charming. And the reviewers step up 
and say, “That is right; so it must be according to the rules of 
aesthetics.”692 
 
To Rothko, the artist, the near-sadistic necessity of having to transform one’s pain into 
something charming so as to be understood may have seemed a particularly apt, tragic, 
personal myth. (Kierkegaard’s oblique reference to the mouth of Laocoön is discussed at 
the conclusion of this chapter.) That Rothko immersed himself in classical myth and 
modern philosophy during the late 1930s and early 1940s seems clear, yet I can offer no 
proof that he read these exact citations, however plausible. If this work does borrow from 
the Bull of Phalaris, the suffering is there, it’s just hidden from sight, transmuted into 
something other by the artist. That’s why we, like Jewell, can’t see it.  
 In a 1960 interview, Gottlieb recalled that he had, along with Rothko, embarked on 
the mythological series, not in an end in itself, but rather with the hope that “some new 
                                                 
690 Ibid.  
691 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987): 20. 
692 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. Also, the Russian-Jewish existentialist, Lev Shestov (born, Lev 
Isaakovich Schwarzmann, 1866–1938) dedicated part of his Athens and Jerusalem to Kierkegaard. See 
Shestov, “In the Bull of Phalaris: Knowledge and Freedom,” in Athens and Jerusalem, trans. and intro., 
Bernard Martin (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1966): 155–266.  
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approach to painting, a technical approach, might also develop.”693 Newman returned to 
the engendering act of paining ca. 1944.694 While Nietzsche’s work, The Birth of 
Tragedy, was a mediating text on Greek myths for Rothko and others, Newman tended to 
bypass Freud and explanatory psychoanalytic systems and go directly to the originary 
myths, as Richard Shiff has argued.695 Annalee Newman, the artist’s widow, stated that 
her late husband “did not need Nietzsche to learn about Greece or the Greeks. He had 
many diverse sources of information and formed his own theories.”696 In an unpublished 
essay from 1948, Newman staged a collision between Freudian and Surrealist, and even 
Nietzschean systems. He distinguished his own theory of Greek tragedy from then-
prevailing notions:  
This is also different from the psychological notion of tragedy that the 
surrealists tried to achieve for modern man. The surrealists hoped to 
produce with Greek force the despair they felt. But it was not a despair of 
the individual act but a despair felt at the world and at life. They thereby 
reduced Greek tragedy…into an abstract formulation.697  
 
Abstract formulations were inadequate to the tragic conditions of post-War life in which 
one lived with the full knowledge of the terror of the War years. With the new sense of 
fate, Newman asked if the modern artist should follow in the steps of the Greek sculptor 
(and, thereby, make the same mistakes) and “play with an art of overrefinement, and art 
of quality, of sensibility, or beauty?”698 He proffered another path: “Let us rather, like the 
                                                 
693 “Adolph Gottlieb (1960),” in David Sylvester, Interviews with American Artists, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2001): 31.  
694 See Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 50.  
695 Ibid., 15.  
696 See “An Exchange: Annalee Newman and W. Jackson Rushing,” Art Journal 48:3 (Autumn 1989): 268. 
697 Newman, “A New Sense of Fate,” BNSWI, 169. This was initially written for the third issue of Tiger’s 
Eye (March 1948).  
698 Newman, “A New Sense of Fate,” BNSWI, 169. 
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Greek writers, tear the tragedy to shreds.”699  While Newman’s article was not published 
in his lifetime, his painting of 1946, Genesis—The Break (fig. 72) was exhibited in 1947 
and reproduced in a 1949 issue of Tiger’s Eye.700  The ‘shredding’ in the painting is 
evident, as is the hovering orb at right against the light blue ground (“an earth without 
form, and void”701). The title of the work suggests simultaneously ancient (prelapsarian) 
origins and a new beginning (not a ‘clean’ break).702 Much of the painting of the 1940s 
fell into predictable categories of the bio-morph, the squiggle, or the grid. Or, not that. 
The following passages attend to dissatisfied painters who, like Newman, sought 
something else in their painting.  
 
III. Interpolating Mondrian (ca. 1944) 
Through the composition and other plastic factors, it is possible for a 
naturalistic work of art to have a more universal expression than a work of 
Abstract art which is lacking the proper use of these factors.  
 
 ~ Piet Mondrian, “Abstract Art,” 1941703 
 
I have not yet seen it pointed out that this liberation of form and color is 
closely linked with all the other liberations one hears about. I think it 
ought, perhaps, to come into one our lists of war-aims….The power, for 
instance, to create space (not ‘literary’ space but actual space) is surely 
invaluable. 
  
 ~ Ben Nicholson, “Notes on Abstract Art,” 1941704 
                                                 
699 Ibid. 
700 Genesis–The Break was exhibited at the Betty Parsons Gallery in 1947 (gallery records incomplete). See 
BNCR: 152–3. It was reproduced in a 1949 edition of Tiger’s Eye under the title The Break, upside down, 
without the inscription, and dated 1948. See Tiger’s Eye 9 (15 October, 1949): 59. Newman added the 
inscription in 1959 to correct “the title, orientation, and date.”  
701 Genesis, 1:2.  
702 Richard Shiff has argued that this work demonstrates Newman’s co-ordination of his studio work and of 
his beliefs. See, Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 59.  
703 Piet Mondrain, “Abstract Art,” in Art of This Century (New York: Arno Series of Contemporary Art, 
No. 18, 1942): 32.  
704 Ben Nicholson, “Notes on Abstract Art,” in Art of This Century, 143. Nicholson’s essay was initially 
published in Horizon in October 1941. Nicholson (1894–1982) met Mondrian in 1934, the same year in 
which he and fellow artist Barbara Hepworth (1903–1975) were married.  
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“The study of the beautiful is a duel in which the artist cries out in terror 
before he is vanquished.”  
  
~ Charles Baudelaire, as quoted by Robert Motherwell in 
“Painter’s Object,” Partisan Review, 1944705 
 
Even the most abstract art does not arise from an inner source alone. As is 
all art, its origin is in the reciprocal action of the individual and 
environment and it is inconceivable without feeling. 
 
~ Mondrian, “Liberation from Oppression in Art and Life,” 1941, 
1945706 
 
The hope shining from Piet Mondrian’s white canvases with their criss-
crossed bands of black has little to do with his platonizing theories except 
in so far as they express an almost naïve faith in the future.  
 
 ~ Clement Greenberg, The Nation, 1945707 
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 As of 1937, Mondrian’s work was designated entartete Kunst by the Nazis.708 
Mondrian arrived in New York, via London (to which he had fled from Paris in 1938), in 
October of 1940 and died there on 1 February, 1944. His work had been seen previously 
in New York at Gallatin’s Gallery of Living Art and in the Abstract and Cubist Art 
exhibition at MoMA in 1936. Harry Holtzman (1912–1987), an AAA member, was 
instrumental in his moving to New York and in securing the Dutch painter studio space 
there. Mondrian was welcomed in New York by art world members and especially by 
                                                 
705 Robert Motherwell, “The Painter’s Object,” Partisan Review 11:1 (Winter 1944): 93. The quotation is 
taken from the prose of Charles Baudelaire, Le Confiteor de l’artiste, which was included in his 1862 Le 
spleen de Paris: “L’étude du beau est un duel où l’artiste crie de frayeur avant d’être vaincu.” See 
Baudelaire, Oeuvres complètes, Vol. I, ed. Charles Pichois (Paris: Gallimard, 1975–6): 279.   
706 Piet Mondrian, “Liberation from Oppression in Art and Life,” in Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art, 1937 
and Other Essays, 1941–1943, 43. This collection was published in The Documents of Modern Art series 
(Robert Motherwell, director), and it was the initial publication of this 1941 essay by Mondrian. Emphasis 
in the original.  
707 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 156:14 (7 April, 1945): 396.  
708 Stephanie Barron, et al. ‘Degenerate Art’: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany (New York: 
Harry N. Abrams with the Los Angeles Museum of Art, 1991): 13, 61, 68.  
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AAA members as a mentor figure—one who had pioneered in Europe the kind of 
abstraction that they themselves wanted to be understood as practicing in New York. In 
an essay that gave an overview of Mondrian’s career, von Wiegand described his new, 
New York work as opening “a road of infinite possibilities of experiment for the 
future.”709 Yet, it was Mondrian’s work that prompted Newman to distinguish between 
“abstract art” and art of the “abstract form.”710  
 In a November 1944 review of “Art in Progress,” a survey held during earlier that 
year at MoMA in celebration of its fifteenth anniversary, Newman decried the “pure 
abstractionists” who were “typified by Mondrian” whose work “denies the world around 
us completely and insists on a purist world of pure form and color.” 711 Newman would 
maintain these distinctions for the rest of his life. In a 1965 interview with David 
Sylvester, the artist described Mondrian’s work as the “illustration of a scientific attitude 
toward life,” which could be summarized in the catchphrase: “‘Let’s get down to 
fundamentals.”712 The ‘fundamentals’ then become “arbitrary and dogmatic.”713 Newman 
read Mondrian’s work (which, like his own, took the form of paint and print) against the 
                                                 
709 Charmion von Wiegand, “The Meaning of Mondrian, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 2:8. 
(Autumn, 1943): 70. 
710 See Newman, “The Plasmic Image,” 155. See also, Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 34–5.  
711 Barnett Newman, “On Modern Art: Inquiry and Confirmation,” in BNSWI, 69. The essay was initially 
published in the November 1944 number of La Revista Belga, the New York based Belgian publication of 
the Offices of Latin America. Newman’s comments are most likely in response to Broadway Boogie 
Woogie. “Art in Progress” was held at MoMA from 24 May through 15 October, 1944 (exhibition no. 
258a). See the MoMA Archives, Public Information Records, microfilm no. 16/2.  
712 Barnett Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” in BNSWI, 256. The interview was initially 
broadcast over the BBC on 17 November, 1965 and printed in The Listener, 10 August, 1972. For 
additional comments Newman made to Sylvester on Mondrian, see BNSWI, 254.  
713 Barnett Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” in BNSWI, 256. 
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grain.714 This was in stark contrast to the critical reception—especially the posthumous 
tributes—that the work of the European master received.  
 Mondrian’s arrival in New York provoked a renewed interest in his writings, many of 
which were published in English at mid-decade. (Newman acknowledged that 
Mondrian’s example “as artist and man” had “created respect for the steadfastness to 
principle these artists have maintained.”715) Mondrian maintained a reciprocating tension 
in his written work on art: between the ‘material’ (plastic) and the ‘spiritual’ 
(consciousness). (It’s an inconvenience for his later chroniclers who might have wished 
that he had gone one way or the other.) From 1919 onwards, he insisted in his written 
work that a new consciousness and a new plasticism were engendered in the collision of 
these two realms. This collision was accomplished through the continued 
work/expanding consciousness of the artist. In his 1919 essay, “Natural Reality and 
Abstract Reality,” Mondrian argued that:  
[T]hrough the reconstruction of the cosmic relations [pure painting] is a 
direct expression of the universal; by its rhythm, by the material reality of 
its plastic form, it expresses the artist’s individual subjectivity.716  
 
Not too long after this statement, Mondrian struck upon his ‘mature’ grids, a pattern he 
would hold until the last years of his career. These are the utopian, shining white 
                                                 
714 For a discussion of Newman’s reading of Mondrian, see Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 25–6.  
715 Barnett Newman, “Plasmic Image,” in BNSWI, 155.  
716 Piet Mondrian, “Natural Reality and Abstract Reality” was initially published as “de nieuwe in de 
schilderkunst” in De Stijl (Amsterdam) 1 (1919). An English translation was announced as early as 1945, 
but an English translation by way of Michel Seuphor did not appear until 1956. See Michel Seuphor, Piet 
Mondrian: Life and Work (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1956). A subsequent translation, from which the 
above citation is taken, was published Herschel B. Chipp, Theories of Modern Art: A Sourcebook of Critics 
and Artists (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 968): 321.  
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canvases that, to borrow from Nicholson, create “actual space.”717 When, in 1965, 
Newman dismissed Mondrian’s art as a “non-tragic” one, Mondrian would have 
agreed.718 Mondrian had said so himself in 1921. (However, the ‘non-tragic’ had its 
origins in the tragic.) In his 1920–1 essay, “Neo-Plasticism: The General Principle of 
Plastic Equivalence,” Mondrian wrote that:  
The disequilibrium between individual and universal creates the tragic and 
is expressed as tragic plastic…. The tragic in life leads to artistic creation: 
art, because it is abstract and in opposition to the natural concrete, can 
anticipate the gradual disappearance of the tragic. The more the tragic 
diminishes, the more art gains in purity.719 
 
Mondrian re-stated this position in “Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art,” as essay that was 
initially published in 1937 and republished in New York in 1945.720 Mondrian’s essay, 
“A New Realism,” was initially commissioned for the AAA and was published in their 
1946 yearbook. It was the last one the group would produce.721  
 Just before Mondrian’s death, both Motherwell and Greenberg turned their attention 
to Mondrian’s Broadway Boogie Woogie (fig. 73). Both responded in terms generally 
more favorable then Newman would later in 1944. Greenberg judged the work to be both 
“a radical step forward in the Mondrian’s evolution” and  “a failure worthy only of a 
great artist.”722 Motherwell, whose essay was published a few months after that of 
                                                 
717 See also, von Wiegand’s assessment that Mondrian had “carried out the Cubist revolution to its final 
conclusion: the total abolition of the form, not only as pictorial representation but as abstraction.” Von 
Wiegand, “The Meaning of Mondrian,” 67.  
718 See Barnett Newman, “Interview with David Sylvester,” in BNSWI, 257. Sylvester offered the phrase 
and Newman concurred.  
719 Piet Mondrian, Le Néo-Plasticisme: Principe general de l’équivalence plastique, (Paris: Galerie de 
l’Effort Moderne, 1921): n.f.  
720 See Piet Mondrian, “Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art,” in Plastic Art and Pure Plastic Art, 1937 and 
Other Essays, 1941–1943, 50–4.  
721 See, Mondrian, “A New Realism,” in American Abstract Artists: 1946 (New York: AAA, 1946): 225–
35. 
722 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 157:15 (9 October, 1943): 416.  
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Greenberg, concluded that Broadway Boogie Woogie represented a marked shift on the 
part of the artist from “purification” to “expressiveness.”723 Indeed, it’s almost sedate in 
comparison to Victory Boogie Woogie of 1943–4, which was also reproduced in the 
posthumous collection of his essays, (fig. 74). This work is believed to have been 
“unfinished” at the time of the artist’s death.724 Motherwell noted that this work was, at 
times, considered a failure and that Mondrian had removed the black bands from his New 
York paintings. Both of these observations seem to be in response to Greenberg’s earlier 
review. It was in that review that Greenberg remembered seeing “slightly impure” colors 
in the work; he also noted that the “hitherto immutable elements of Mondrian’s space 
composition have begun to break up.”725 In a correction published the following week in 
The Nation, Greenberg noted that Mondrian had in fact not used impure color, but grays. 
However, he felt that this “after-effect legitimately belongs to one’s first sight of the 
painting.”726 Indeed, the black bands in earlier works by Mondrian had kept this kind of 
after-glow in optical check. The work improved on second viewing; over time, Greenberg 
concluded, the work might seem entirely successful.  
 In her recent study on Greenberg, Caroline Jones has argued that the critic’s 
ignorance of Mondrian’s “highly spiritualized theories of abstraction [that] demanded the 
use of absolutely pure primary hues” caused Greenberg to mis-perceive (“infamously”) 
                                                 
723 Robert Motherwell, “Painter’s Object,” Partisan Review 11:1 (Winter 1944): 95. See also, Motherwell, 
“The Modern Painter’s World,” Dyn 6 (August 1944): 9–14. For an interpretation of the aphoristic essays 
of a young Motherwell representing a shift from the collective to the individual, see Guilbaut, How New 
York Stole the Idea of Modern Art, 79–81.  
724 J.J. Sweeney, “Piet Mondrian,” 12.  
725 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 157:15 (9 October, 1943): 416. 
726 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 157:16 (16 October, 1943): 455.  
 230 
Broadway Boogie Woogie.727 However much the formalist, it seems unlikely that 
Greenberg would have been entirely oblivious to Mondrian’s theosophic tendencies 
during the earliest years of his career (ca. 1906–19). In an unfavorable review of a 
Kandinsky show at the Nierendorf Gallery in 1941, Greenberg wrote that he did not 
“hold theories to be responsible for the decline in Kandinsky’s art; Mondrian has 
produced very good painting in terms of pure geometry, and Mondrian has theories.”728 
(Theories that were derived from praxis, as von Wiegand recalled the painter saying 
during a visit to his studio.729) In his posthumous tribute to the artist, Greenberg drew 
parallels between Mondrian’s idealism and that of Marx.730 His intention was certainly 
not to claim the painter as a Marxist.731 Rather, Greenberg’s essay throws into high relief 
the utopian nature of Mondrian’s ideas, which stood in stark contrast to prevailing 
materialist constructs at the time. It’s a long-standing binary in left-wing discourse.732  
 That Greenberg wouldn’t countenance (or, stomach) direct references to Theosophy 
in his own criticism seems more likely. (As discussed in chapter three, a discrediting of 
                                                 
727 This mis-perception “forced” Greenberg to print a “humble-pie” correction in the following issue of The 
Nation. See Jones, By Eyesight Alone: Clement Greenberg and the Bureaucratization of the Senses 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2005): 212–3. Given Greenberg’s proximity to 
people (e.g. A.E. Gallatin, George L.K. Morris) who were knowledgeable about aspects of Mondrian’s 
earlier career, it seems unlikely that Greenberg would have been in a state of complete unawares. Even with 
such knowledge, could Greenberg’s optical imprint of the painting have been other? 
728 Clement Greenberg, “Review of Exhibitions of Joan Miró, Fernand Léger, and Wassily Kandinsky,” The 
Nation 152:16 (19 April, 1941): 481–2. For further comments on Kandinsky (a “great painter” whose work, 
nevertheless, is a “dangerous” example to “younger painters”), see Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 160:2 (13 
January, 1945): 53.  
729 “You should know that all my paintings were done first and the theory was derived from them.” 
Mondrian as quoted by Charmion von Wiegand in “A Memoir,” 65.  
730 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 160:16 (21 April, 1945): 469. Mondrian’s art, Greenberg 
concluded, was “guided by an ideal, as all human action in or out of art should be.” 
731 Compare Greenberg’s comments to Charles Arnault’s 1945 comment that a “Picasso, Mondrian, and 
Siqueros…contain more Marxism than can be found in whole paragraphs of, say, any one of the studies on 
painting issued by the Critics Group some years back.” Charles Arnault, “Painting and Dialectics,” The 
New Masses (14 August, 1945): 28.  
732 See Frederick Engels, Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, trans. Edward Aveling (London: S. 
Sonnenschein; New York: C. Scribner, 1892). 
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spiritualist tendencies has taken place within left-wing, oppositional discourse in the 
1930s.) However, Mondrian had stopped making references to Theosophy in his own 
essays. As early as 1919, the term Neo-Plasticism had become a kind of code for, 
amongst other things, Theosophy. None of the essays that were published in New York at 
mid-decade made direct reference to the theosophic tendencies of the young painter.733  
Mondrian’s later paintings (and theories) are not not about Theosophy (to use a 
Newmanesque construction); but they are not only about Theosophy. Mondrian was 
subject to his own theories as he himself evolved over time. He responded to his new 
environment.  
 As von Wiegand recalled when she saw both Broadway Boogie Woogie and Victory 
Boogie Woogie, not only were his touches more emphatic, but his primary colors were 
even more “brilliant.”734 As von Wiegand also noted, while in New York, Mondrian had 
the benefit of colored tape. This allowed him to test out compositions (place, remove, 
shift at will). And so, “under Victory Boogie Woogie,” von Wiegand wrote, “lie buried 
six or seven different solutions, each of which might have been a complete picture.”735 
Her use of word under to describe the stratigraphy of the work throws into question 
whether or not she knew or believed the work to be unfinished. As the off-white squares 
in Broadway Boogie Woogie demonstrate, Mondrian, later in his career, liked “a little 
                                                 
733 Toward a True Vision of Reality was published as a pamphlet by the Valentine Gallery in conjunction 
with Mondrian’s exhibition there in 1942; Abstract Art (as cited above) was published as a preface to Art of 
this Century, also in 1942; Kootz also published a lengthy passage from Mondrian’s “Pure Plastic Art” in 
his New Frontiers in American Painting in 1943. See Kootz, New Frontiers in American Art, pp. 50–1. 
Granted, Greenberg was absent from the city due to his military service from February through September 
1943. See “Chronology to 1949” in CGCEC, Vol. I, 255.  
734 Charmion von Wiegand in “A Memoir,” 58.  
735 Ibid., 64.  
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dirt.”736 The “feeling” that Mondrian insisted upon in art was not limited to the touch of 
the painter, but also encompassed the touch of the painting upon the retina of the viewer 
(Greenberg included).737  
 Abstraction that resembled that of Mondrian did not always fair as well in its critical 
reception, as discussed in chapter three. Perhaps because it lacked this “feeling” or 
“empathy,” as Balcomb Greene once suggested.738 Even those relatively sympathetic to 
American “abstractors” had their doubts.739 In a 1943 essay written in a tone of high irony 
and full of left-handed compliments, Lincoln Kirstein described painters, such as his 
friend, George L.K. Morris, as sincere but essentially “cerebretonic,” that is “not 
necessarily intellectual, but their imagination is stimulated by brain energy which is often 
as automatic and unimaginative as healthy.”740 In short, Kirstein thought that they were 
poorly-wired painters. Greenberg was rarely so cruel in his numerous reviews of the 
AAA painters. His reviews noted the (qualified) future promise that he sometimes found 
in the exhibited works, even when the works failed. Such was the case with Albert 
Swindon (1901–61), who showed “as much promise in his single unsuccessful painting 
as the other in their successful ones,” (fig. 75.).741 “Upon this future a lot depends,” he 
suggested in his 1942 review of the Sixth Annual AAA exhibition.742  
                                                 
736 Piet Mondrian, quoted by Max Ernst, statement in “Eleven Europeans in America,” Museum of Modern 
Art Bulletin 13:4–5 (1946):18. Cited in Richard Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” 25, 98, 165 n. 
737 For an analysis of the optical ‘touch’ of abstract painting, see Meyer Schapiro, “On the Humanity of 
Abstract Painting,” Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Letters 10 (1960): 316–23; and 
“Mondrian: Order and Randomness in Abstract Painting,” in Selected Papers, II: Modern Art: 19th and 20th 
Centuries (New York: George Braziller, 1978).  
738 Susan C. Larsen, “Going Abstract in the ’30s: An Interview with Ilya Bolotowsky,” 72. 
739 Lincoln Kirstein, “Life of Death for Abstract Art? Con: A Mild Case of Cerebrosis,” The Magazine of 
Art 36 (March 1943): 119.  
740 Ibid. 
741 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 154:18 (2 May, 1942): 525.  
742 Ibid. 
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 One name in particular stands out in Greenberg’s subsequent reviews of the AAA: 
Fannie Hillsmith (1911–07). In his 1944 review of abstract and surrealist artists at Art of 
This Century, Greenberg singled out Hillsmith’s Imprisoned (fig. 76) as “perhaps the best 
thing in the show.”743 Elsewhere in his review, Greenberg noted the “absence of strength” 
in the Motherwell and the “inflated” quality of the Pollock. Despite this, the critic argued, 
the work deserved attention—even though they lacked “pressure.”744 Perhaps it was the 
signs of pressure that Greenberg sensed in the Hillsmith. In a 1947 review, Greenberg 
applauded her ability to “grasp the identity of a picture most instinctively.”745 As 
Hillsmith described her practice:  “I try to combine the structural with the intimate.”746 
By implication, her work was not ‘felicitous’ in Greenberg’s terms, or at least it aimed to 
be other than. ‘Felicitousness’ was a word he had leveled at the work of AAA member 
Alexander Calder and at Stuart Davis. Their work showed the “tasteful adaptation 
and…the felicity permitted by the un-obsessed mind.”747 Greenberg, for one, was making 
qualitative judgments for art that was pressured, obsessed… serious (usually).  
 Greenberg also reviewed the painters of the Jane Street Co-op, which was an artist-
run collective that was active from 1943 through 1949. The membership of the co-op 
tended towards abstraction, especially so after 1944. It was founded by Ken Ervin, Josiah 
Lancaster, Janet Marren, Howard Mitcham, and Hyde Solomon.748 As Greenberg noted 
                                                 
743 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 158:22 (27 May, 1944): 634. 
744 Ibid. Emphasis in the original.  
745 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 164:18 (3 May, 1947): 525. Greenberg also included the work of 
Maurice Golubov (1905–1987) with that of Hillsmith.  
746 Fannie Hillsmith, statement in Sidney Janis, Abstract and Surrealist Art in America (New York: Reynal 
& Hitchcock, 1944): 100. 
747 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 161:20 (17 November, 1945): 533. 
748 The gallery initially opened at 35 Jane Street; it relocated to 41 Perry Street in March of 1948. In 
September of that year, it moved uptown to 760 Madison Avenue. For two recent histories of the group, see 
Jennifer Semet, “The Jane Street Group: Reconciling Abstraction and Figuration,” and Irving Sandler, “The 
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in a 1949 review, the Jane Street Group was one of the galleries that was attempting to 
fill the gap left by the closing of the Kootz Gallery at the end of the 1947–1948 season, 
although it did not last much longer itself.749 The membership changed over the course of 
six years, but active members included: Leland Bell, Nell Blaine, a former student at 
Hofmann’s school, Frances Eckstein, Larry Rivers, and Judith Rothschild, also a former 
Hofmann student and a member of the AAA.  
 The figure re-asserted itself in the work of a number of painters after the war. The 
painters themselves largely attributed this shift to the presence of Jean Hélion, who was 
in the U.S. as of 1942, and in New York from 1944 to 1946. (Bell was the superintendent 
of the apartment building where he lived with Pegeen Guggenheim.) In 1943, They Shall 
Not Have Me, Hélion’s harrowing account of his experiences as a prisoner of war, was 
published; his work was also exhibited at Guggenheim’s gallery that year.750 Blaine 
recalled that Hélion’s return to figuration had a deep impact on the group. To them, it 
represented “a deep, soul-searching change.”751 (Hélion’s choices were pressured, 
serious.752) That this shift occurred just as abstraction was on the ascendant was perhaps 
inconvenient. Blaine said that she “always had the instinct not to be fashionable.”753 It 
may seem especially ironic that, in a later review, Greenberg singled out the work of 
Larry Rivers (not a painter known for being either serious or pressured). The “plenitude 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jane Street Gallery,” in The Jane Street Gallery: Celebrating New York’s First Artist Cooperative, exh. cat. 
(New York: Tibor de Nagy Gallery, 2003): 3–13.  
749 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 168:24 (11 June, 1949): 669–70.  
750 See, Jean Hélion, They Shall Not Have Me (Ils ne m’auront pas): The Capture, Forced Labor, and 
Escape of a French Prisoner of War (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1943). 
751 From an interview with Anne Skillion, quoted in Jennifer Semet, “The Jane Street Group: Reconciling 
Abstraction and Figuration,” 10, 12, n. 29.  
752 That Hélion may have had a more ambivalent attitude towards the abstraction/figuration debate, as 
demonstrated by his 1946 work, À Rebours (fig. 77) isn’t the immediate point to be taken.  
753 Martia Sawin, Nell Blaine: Her Art and Life (New York: Hudson Hill Press, 1998): 34–5.  
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and sensuousness” of his Studio Interior had knocked out Greenberg’s eye (fig. 78).754 
The work was also representational. This had never disappeared from mid-century 
painting (even if immediate references to the figure became rare). ‘Figuration’ 
returned/persisted in the work of a number of painters, but it was a figuration informed 
(made problematic) by the lessons of abstract form.  
 
IV. Digesting Hofmann (ca. 1944) 
 
I owe this formulation to a remark made by Hans Hofmann, the art-
teacher, in one of his lectures. For the point of view of this formulation 
surrealism is plastic art is a reactionary tendency which is attempting to 
restore ‘outside’ subject matter. The chief concern of a painter like Dali is 
to represent the processes and concepts of his consciousness, not the 
processes of his medium.  
 
   ~ Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review,  
   1939755 
 
In every great epoch in painting there is always an indivisible relation 
between color and form. This correlation between color and form is the 
plastic basis of painting…. The mutual dependency of form and color has 
a Life of its own—it is pictorial Life…. Abstract art, in my opinion, is the 
return to a professional consciousness—a consciousness which controls 
the emotional accumulations in the process of creation.  
 
   ~ Hans Hofmann, spoken at a symposium at the American Abstract  
   Artists exhibition, 1941756 
 
“Primitive” painting belongs to the Industrial Age. It emerged toward the 
close of the eighteenth century and defined itself as independent of 
tradition, whether that of sophisticated art or that of folk art.  
 
 ~ Clement Greenberg, “Primitive Painting,” The Nation, 1942757 
                                                 
754 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 168:16 (16 April, 1949): 453–4.  
755 Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review 6:5 (Autumn 1939): 49, n. 2.  
756 Hans Hofmann, address delivered on 16 February, 1941 at a symposium held in conjunction with the 
AAA exhibition held at the Riverside Museum, New York. Text re-printed in, Cynthia Goodman, Hans 
Hofmann, with essays by Goodman, Irving Sandler, and Clement Greenberg, (Munich: Prestel-Verlag with 
the Whitney Museum of American Art, 1990): 165–7. Emphasis in the original.  
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Hofmann’s reaction was—one of the questions he asked Jackson was, do 
you work from nature? There were no still lifes around or models around 
and Jackson’s answer was, “I am nature.” And Hofmann’s reply was, “Ah, 
but if you work by heart, you will repeat yourself.” To which Jackson did 
not reply at all. 
 
~ An exchange between Jackson Pollock and Hans Hofmann in 
1942, as recalled by Lee Krasner in 1964758 
 
Her work is extraordinarily free from imitativeness and from self-
consciousness and pretense.  
 
~ John Dewey, Foreword written on the occasion of Janet Sobel’s 
first solo exhibition, 1944  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
  
 Under the aegis of Peggy Guggenheim, many of the Surrealists arrived in New York 
between the years of 1940 to 1942. As is well known, she herself returned to the U.S. in 
1941 and was married to Max Ernst (1891–1976) later that year. In October of 1942, 
Guggenheim opened the now-legendary gallery, Art of This Century, the Surrealist 
interior of which was designed by Frederick T. Kiesler. That same month, the First 
Papers of Surrealism exhibition was held at the Reid Mansion in New York City.759 
Duchamp’s contribution famously filled the exhibition space with web-like string. 
                                                                                                                                                 
757 Clement Greenberg, “Primitive Painting,” The Nation 155:15 (10 October, 1942): 351–2. Greenberg 
claimed as his source an essay by Nicola Michailow, in “a very important, almost epochal article,” in 
Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 5/6 (1935).   
758 The oral history transcript is the result of a tape-recorded interview with Lee Krasner on 2 November, 
1964, 14 December, 1967, and 11 April, 1968. The interviews were conducted by Dorothy Seckler for the 
Archives of American Art, Smithsonian Institution. This particular citation comes from their 1964 
interview. See: http://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/oralhistories/transcripts/krasne64.htm. In a 1967 
interview, Krasner remembered Pollock’s reply differently. “Hofmann, being a teacher, spent all the time 
talking about art. Finally, Pollock couldn’t stand it any longer and said, ‘Your theories don’t interest me. 
Put up or shut up! Let’s see your work.’” See, “Who was Jackson Pollock? Interviews by Francine du 
Plessix and Cleve Gray,” Art in America (May–June, 1967): 50.  This later, pithier version of the exchange 
has entered the discourse. See, for instance, B.H. Friedman, Jackson Pollock: Energy Made Visible (New 
York: Da Capo Press, 1995, 1972): 65.  
759 The Reid Mansion was located at 451 Madison Avenue; the exhibition ran from 14 October through 7 
November, 1942. Artists in the exhibition included: Hans Arp, William Baziotes, Alexander Calder, Max 
Ernst, Paul Klee, Joan Miró, Robert Motherwell, and Pablo Picasso.  
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Earlier, in 1940, the American writers Charles Henri Ford (1913–2002) and Parker Tyler 
(1904–1974) had begun publishing View (1940–47), a journal dedicated to avant-garde 
and Surrealist literature and art. The Surrealists had not had such levels of exposure in 
New York since the landmark exhibitions of the 1930s: “Surréalisme” held at Julien 
Levy, and “Fantastic Art Dada Surrealism,” Barr’s exhibit of 1936–37.760 By 1944, 
Sidney Janis could write that, Sidney Janis argued in 1944 that the Surrealists had made 
“an ordered, scientific attempt to release the creative impulse, mainly through its 
adaptation of psychological techniques and especially through a system of tapping the 
resources of the unconscious.”761 And, yet, at Greenberg’s epigraph demonstrates, some 
critics and painters began to distance themselves from Surrealism exactly during these 
years. 
 On the surface, it would seem that the myth makers (as discussed above) would have 
a natural affinity with the Surrealists in America. André Breton, who had relocated to 
New York as of 1941, was quoted in View in 1942 as saying: “I cannot grant you that 
mythology is only the recital of the acts of the dead…. Have we not known for a long 
time that the riddle of the sphinx says much more than it seems to say?”762  
The Surrealists, with their espousal of irrationality and automatism, should have 
been seen as the real Primitives of the day (the genuine dissenters), and yet the 
                                                 
760 Surréalisme was held at the Julien Levy Gallery, 603 Madison Avenue, from 9 through 29 January, 1932 
761 Sidney Janis, Abstract & Surrealist Art in America (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1944): 2. Richard 
Shiff initially drew my attention to his citation of Janis in this essay. Greenberg was also displeased with 
the exhibition, on the whole. In his review, he argued that “almost the sole merit” of the show was that “it 
prints the names and reproduces among other things, the paintings of several advanced artists whose work 
deserves to be better known.” See Greenberg, “Pictures and Prattle,” The Nation 162:4 (26 January, 1946): 
378. For an earlier essay by Greenberg on the Surrealists in general, see his two-part essay, “The Surrealist 
Painters,” The Nation 159:7–8 (12 and 19 August, 1944): 192–3, 219–20.   
762 André Breton, “The Legendary Life of Max Ernst, Preceded by a Brief Discussion of the Need for a 
New Myth,” View 1 (April 1942): 5. Also cited in Judith E. Bernstock, “Classical Mythology in Twentieth-
Century Art: An Overview of a Humanistic Approach,” Artibus et Historiae 14:27 (1993): 180, n. 24. 
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legitimacy of their claim was being questioned by the early 1940s, even from one 
of their own. In a brief 1942 essay that bade farewell to Surrealism, Paalen 
concluded that the greatest lesson that he took from the movement was the 
knowledge that “imagination” was the most precious of human faculties.763  
 In 1945, Newman argued that the dream state of the Surrealists was 
inadequate in this new era of normalized Terror—in the wake of the Holocaust 
and the Bomb.764 The next year, Newman again aired his feelings about the 
paucity of the movement:  
This realistic insistence, this attempt to make the unreal more real by an 
overemphasis on illusion, ultimately fails to penetrate beyond illusion; for 
having reached the point where we see the illusion, we must come to the 
conclusion that it must have been an illusion for the artists themselves, 
that they practiced the illusion because they did not themselves feel the 
magic.765 
  
Newman was not alone in his feelings. Von Wiegand complained that, while the 
Surrealists had “restored the object in painting” and had freed it from “the logic of the old 
system,” the Surrealists had “added little or nothing to the plastic structure of 
painting.”766  
 In March of 1944, Hofmann had his first one-person show in New York at 
Guggenheim’s Art of This Century.767 It was the first substantial public viewing of the 
work of a painter who had been more visible as a teacher and mentor to the generation of 
                                                 
763 See Paalen, “Farewell au Surrealisme,” Dyn 1:1 (April 1942): 26. 
764 See Newman’s 1945 essay, “Surrealism and the War,” in BNSWI: 94–6; John Hersey, “Reporter at 
Large: Hiroshima,” The New Yorker (31 August, 1946): 14–68.  
765 Newman, “Art of the South Seas,” in BNSWI, 101. This essay was published in Spanish as “Las formas 
artisticas del Pacifico” in Ambos Mundos in June 1946. Its first publication in English was in Studio 
International 179: 919 (February 1970): 70–1.  
766 Von Wiegand, “The Meaning of Mondrian,” 69. 
767 The show ran from 7 to 31 March, 1944.  
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painters (and critics) who had come of age by mid-century.768 At the behest of Lee 
Krasner, Greenberg attended Hofmann’s lectures from 1938 to 1939. The critic had much 
to learn about painting, she felt.769 While Pollock may have rejected Hofmann in 1942, 
Greenberg proved to be a keen student. Greenberg’s class notes, carefully typed, 
illustrated, organized, and kept for the duration of his life, catalogue Hofmann’s ideas on 
the workings of modern paintings—the painter’s famous “Push-Pull.”770 As the above 
epigram demonstrates, Hofmann had long espoused the belief that abstract art was the 
“return to a professional consciousness” on the part of the artist. The automatism of the 
Surrealists would not have satisfied him; however, this is not to be confused with a recall 
to the known order.  
 Hofmann’s first solo exhibition came at a time of growing visibility for American 
painters (or, painters working in New York). In 1942, John Graham curated “French and 
American Painters” at the McMillen Gallery that included the work of de Kooning and 
others along with European Cubists and Fauves (fig. 79). The following year, Pollock had 
his first one-person show at Art of This Century, at which The She Wolf was exhibited 
(fig. 80). As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, this was the first Pollock 
acquired by MoMA. In his review, Greenberg felt that the painter was “zigzagging 
between the intensity of the easel picture and the blandness of the mural.”771 In 1945, the 
                                                 
768 It was at the instigation of a former student, Lee Krasner, and her partner, Jackson Pollock. (Pollock and 
Krasner did not marry until 25 October, 1944 at Marble collegiate Church in New York City. Compare 
Hofmann’s expressed role as teacher to that of the “not-teacher” of Barnett Newman. See, Shiff, “To Create 
Oneself,” 33.  
769 See Florence Rubenfeld, Clement Greenberg: A Life (New York: Scribner, 1997): 50.  
770 See the collected papers of Clement Greenberg at the Getty Research Institute, Box 26.  
771 Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 157:22 (27 November, 1943): 621.  
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work of Krasner and Pollock would be shown together for the first time in Howard 
Putzel’s curatorial effort at Gallery 67, “A Problem for the Critics.”772  
  Hoffman famously warned Pollock in 1942 that he would repeat himself if he didn’t 
have the stimulus of nature, or of his medium. When Hofmann’s Painting (fig. 81) was 
included in the 1944 Janis catalogue, it was accompanied by the following statement 
from the artist (here excerpted): “I paint from Nature. Nature stimulates in me the 
imaginative faculty to feel the potentialities of expression which serve to create pictorial 
life—a quality detached from nature to make possible, “a pictorial reality’.”773 Resistance 
and stimulation, the artist insisted, were necessary to engender the pictorial thing. By way 
of contrast, a number of now-well-known statements by or on the artist were coming into 
circulation that described the artist as Nature itself. In the catalogue essay for Pollock’s 
1943 show with Guggenheim, Sweeney quoted Georges Sand and termed Pollock’s talent 
as “volcanic.”774 In both a 1944 interview and his 1947 statement in Possibilities, Pollock 
made reference to his admiration for the artistic techniques of Native American cultures. 
In both statements, he acknowledged the necessity of technique, but privileged being 
with, or in, the painting.775  
                                                 
772 For a contemporary exhibition of the two artists’ work, see the exhibition catalogue by Barbara Rose, 
Betsy Wittenborn Miller, Dialogue (New York: Robert Miller Gallery, 2005). The exhibition was held 
from 8 December, 2005–28 January, 2006.  
773 Hans Hofmann, as quoted in Janis, Abstract and Surrealist Art, 79.  
774 Quoting Sands, Sweeney wrote that “Talent, will, genius are natural phenomenon, like the lake, the 
volcano, the mountain, the wind, the star, the cloud.” James Johnson Sweeny, “Jackson Pollock,” 
exhibition catalogue from Art of This Century, 1943, n.f. Sweeney used these metaphors in an earlier essay 
of the same year. See, Sweeney, “Five American Painters,” Harper’s Bazaar (April 1944): 77, 122–4.   
775 See respectively, “Jackson Pollock,” Arts & Architecture (Los Angeles) 61:2 (February 1944): 14, and 
Pollock, “My Painting,” Possibilities 1 (Winter 1947–48): 78–83.  See also, See John D. Graham, 
“Primitive Art and Picasso,” Magazine of Art (April 1937): 236–9, 260. For a discussion of the deep 
impression that Graham’s essay purportedly had upon Jackson Pollock, see Leja, Reframing Abstract 
Expressionism, 94–95, 175–6, 346, n. 147. 
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 Despite having radically different approaches to their painterly practice, both painters 
struck upon a find in the mid-1940s: the drip, which Pollock later pushed to the limits in 
his all-over paintings (figs. 82 and 36). Janet Sobel, the self-taught artist, made a similar 
discovery as early as 1944 (fig. 83). Her work, so free from artifice, garnered admiration 
from John Dewey, Sidney Janis and Greenberg, who in turn, showed it to Pollock.776 The 
point here is not to argue who made the find first; rather, the argument is that by 1944, 
and certainly no later than 1946, the drip came to signify a radical new means of picture 
making, one that was authentic—true to the individual, expressive of something that had 
percolated up from the depths. This new ‘primitivist’ abstraction displaced Surrealist 
automatism, the kind that was practiced by Max Ernst contemporaneously. The drip was 
a kind of equal-opportunity mark, one that could be achieved, sincerely, by an artist with 
Hofmann’s extensive training or by Sobel, who lacked formal training altogether. Or, 
even by Pollock, who was perhaps somewhere in between. Over time, though, drip, this 
mark, became proper to Jackson Pollock. The following passages attend to the making of 
a new Laocoön, a new model, for modern times.  
V. A Laocoön for Modern Times  
Be it truth or fable that Love made the first attempt in the imitative arts, 
thus much is certain: that she never tired of guiding the hand of the great 
masters of antiquity. For although painting, as the art which reproduces 
objects upon flat surfaces, in now practised in the broadest sense of that 
definition, yet the wise Greek set much narrower bounds to it.  
 
                                                 
776 Sobel’s work came to be more widely known through the efforts of Sobel’s son, Sol, who sent letters on 
her behalf to Dewey, Janis, and Ernst. In her excellent essay on the artist, Gail Levin argues that, “For 
Dewey, the philosopher of self-realization, Sobel, the self-taught artist, may have represented someone who 
had become the master of her own destiny.” See Levin, “Janet Sobel: Primitivist, Surrealist, and Abstract 
Expressionist,” Woman’s Art Journal 26:1 (Spring-Summer, 2005): 12. In addition to Dewey’s 1944 
introduction, Sidney Janis wrote the introduction to her 1946 show at Art of This Century, which ran from 
2–19 January. For the impression that Sobel’s work made on Pollock, see Greenberg, “American-Type 
Painting,” Art & Culture (Boston: Beacon, 1961): 218.  
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 ~ Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon, 1766777 
 
It is the goal of art that interests [Lessing] rather than any pleasant 
vagabondage of fancy or sensibility on the way thither. He will have no 
expression for the mere sake of expression, no color for the pure delight 
of color. If the path is beautiful, says Anantole France, let us not ask 
where it is leading us. Lessing would not have even understood such a 
use of the word beautiful. 
 
 ~ Irving Babbitt, The New Laokoon, 1910778  
 
It suffices to say that there is nothing in the nature of abstract art which 
compels it to be so. The imperative comes from history, from the age in 
conjunction with a particular moment reached in a particular tradition of 
art. This conjunction holds the artist in a vise from which at the present 
moment he can escape only by surrendering his ambition and returning to 
a stale past….We can only dispose of abstract art by assimilating it, by 
fighting our way through it. Where to? I do not know. Yet it seems to me 
that the wish to return to the imitation of nature in art has been given no 
more justification than the desire of certain partisans of abstract art to 
legislate it into permanency.  
  
 ~ Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” 1940779 
  
I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, of 
this self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant. Because 
he was the first to criticize the means itself of criticism, I conceive of 
Kant as the first real modernist…. But the making of pictures means, 
among other things, the deliberate creating or choosing of a flat surface, 
and the deliberate circumscribing and limiting of it. This deliberateness is 
precisely what Modernist painting harps on: the fact, that is, that the 
limiting conditions of art are altogether human conditions.  
 
   ~ Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Arts Yearbook,  
   1961780  
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
                                                 
777 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry, trans. Ellen 
Frothingham (New York: Noonday Press, 1969): 8. 
778 Irving Babbitt, The New Laocoon: An Essay on the Confusion of the Arts, (Boston and New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1910), p. 46. Anatole France was the pseudonym of Jacques Anatole Thibault (1844–
1924), the novelist and literary critic, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1921.  
779 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” Partisan Review 7:4 (July-August, 1940): 310.  
780 Clement Greenberg, “Modernist Painting,” Arts Yearbook 4 (1961): 102–8. This was the second printed 
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 That the body of the artist is subjected to conditions and restrictions has been a long-
standing theorization in the history of art. These restrictions take the form of artistic 
tradition, history, or at the conjunction of those forces, which is the particularly painful 
position in which Greenberg located the modern artist. Lessing (1729-1781) was the only 
one of these three authors who could, in good conscience, write with certainty on the 
nature and style of the art that was the subject of his study. He famously declared that it 
was the Greek drive towards Beauty that impelled the sculptors of the Laocoön to give a 
restrained shape to his lips, unlike their fellow poets, in whose words he wailed in pain 
(fig. 84). When Kierkegaard wrote of the suppression of suffering that allowed the lips of 
the poet to be formed so as to make beautiful utterances, that was but one of many 
complicated understandings of Beauty that would be made by 19th-century writers.781 
Babbitt (1865–1933) and Greenberg, as modern Moderns, were in the painfully aware 
position of being unable to predict the future with certitude. Or, even, to say how a 
painting might turn out in the end. In his own Laocoön, Greenberg recorded what he saw 
as a new, historically-derived specialization in the arts that was necessarily accompanied 
with a surrender:  
The history of avant-garde painting is that of a progressive surrender to the 
resistance of the medium; which resistance consists chiefly in the flat 
picture plane’s denial of efforts to “hole through” it for realistic 
perspectival space. In making this surrender, painting not only got rid of 
imitation—and with it, ‘literature’—but also of realistic imitation’s 
corollary confusion between painting and sculpture.782 
 
This medium-specific specialization was not a universally-accepted notion in the art 
world. Compare Greenberg’s statement to an aphorism written by Wallace Stevens:  
                                                 
781 See n. 691.  
782 Clement Greenberg, “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” 307.  
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To a large extent, the problems of poets are the problems of painters, and 
poets must often turn to the literature of painting for a discussion of their 
own problems.  
 
The aphorism was published in View, the avant-garde and Surrealist journal, in 
1940 with 21 others under the title, Materia Poetica.783 In a later essay, Babbitt 
would associate the “revery” of the stream of consciousness of the Surrealists 
with his notions of confusion.784  
 The rhetorical construction, on Greenberg’s part, of moving towards a newer 
Laocoön suggests a dialectical understanding of the paradigm: one that was valid and 
would be superceded by another, the nature of scope of which was undetermined.785 
However, this did not allow Greenberg to fall into comfortable relativities. In a 1945 
review of Gorky’s first one-person show at Julien Levy, Greenberg argued that Gorky 
had renounced some of his “ambition” and had “taken the easy way out” and, at 
moments, resorted to “charm” and “biomorphs.”786 They Will Take My Island (fig. 85) is 
a work of its time, though:  the “black looping lines and transparent washes on a white 
ground” indicated “a partial return to serious painting.”787  
 Greenberg was not alone in the early 1940s in making references to German 
Enlightenment philosophy in his criticism. Greenberg’s first direct reference to Kant was 
                                                 
783 Stevens submitted 39 aphorisms in toto arranged in a specific order and with Roman numerals: 22 were 
published in View (September 1940), n.f. following the typescript prepared by Stevens; the remaining 17 
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Prose (New York: Library of America, 1997): 916–9. 
784 See Babbitt, “Julien Benda,” in Being Creative (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1932): 190.  
785 By way of contrast, see George L.K. Morris, “Relations in Painting and Sculpture,” Partisan Review 
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786 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 160:12 (24 March, 1945): 342–3.  
787 Ibid.  
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in 1941: “As Kant says, you only find what you look for.”788 (The context for this citation 
is discussed below.) In 1943, in conjunction with their exhibition of that year (the same 
one that contained The Syrian Bull and The Rape of Persephone), the FMPS issued a 
collective statement that made reference to the German philosopher as well: “As Kant 
once wrote, ‘The purpose of existence is the development of consciousness.’”789 These 
are direct, quick condensations of Kant’s ideas (the strike of the typebars against the 
paper is practically audible.) They were cited in efforts to get some kind of other work 
done or point made: art shown, criticism published, etc. In the case of the FMPS, the 
membership was affirming its internationalist outlook (and membership) and the 
Humanist of its art in the face of menacing war-time nationalism, which had caused so 
many European artists to flee to New York.790 In a hubristic, prescient statement, they 
wrote that: “[T]he responsibility either to salvage and develop, or frustrate Western 
creative capacity…may be largely ours for a good part of the century to come.”791 
 A scholarly treatment of Kant’s work had appeared the previous year. A slim volume 
of lectures delivered by John Dewey on German philosophy was re-published in 1942.792     
Dewey sought “to account for Germany’s political behavior in terms of German 
academic philosophy,” in the early years of the First World War, and again in the Second 
                                                 
788 Greenberg, “The Renaissance of the Little Magazine,” Partisan Review 8:1 (January-February, 1941): 
75–6.  
789 Statement written on the occasion of the Third Annual Exhibition of the Modern Painters and Sculptors, 
Wildenstein & Co., 2 June–26 June, 1943. Held in the Papers of the Federation of Modern Painters and 
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World War.793 The timing was significant. As Dewey argued, the modifications 
(perversions) of classical philosophy were connected:  
[W]ith the fact that actual conditions in Germany had altered so much that 
Hitler had to reach a stratum of the population, if he was to come to 
power, which would have remained cold to the ideological approach of 
Germany’s classic philosophy.794 
 
Dewey discussed a number of German philosophers in his text, including Nietszche and 
the then-current fashion of resorting to his work “for explanation of what seems to them 
otherwise inexplicable.”795  
 It was, however, with Kant with whom he began and ended. In terms of 
understanding the character of modern German civilization, the chief marker was the 
“combination of self-conscious idealism with unsurpassed technical efficiency.”796 Were 
this not “a realization in fact of what is found in Kant,” Dewey declared that he would be 
“at a loss for a name by which to characterize it.”797 The acceptance of the Kantian 
dualism (discussed below) freed humanity “at a single stroke from superstition, 
sentimentalism, and moral and theological romanticism” at the same time that it provided 
the authorization and stimulation to “the detailed efforts of man to wrest from nature her 
secrets of causal law.”798 Deep in the deep in the 18th century lied the 20th-century origins 
for the unprecedented mobilization of resources and the drive towards an ever larger, 
more efficient military in Germany—not that Kant could have predicted the current 
situation, nor approved of it. This was certainly not what the great philosopher had 
                                                 
793 A.J. Ayer, “The Legacy of Kant,” The Nation 155: 26 (26 December, 1942): 722. This review appeared 
in the same number as Greenberg’s review of a joint exhibition of Joseph Cornell and Laurence Vail. See, 
Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 155:26 (26 December, 1942): 727.  
794 John Dewey, “Foreword to Revised Edition,” in German Philosophy and Politics, 5.  
795 Dewey, “The Two Worlds,” in German Philosophy and Politics, 69.  
796 Ibid., 69.  
797 Ibid. 
798 Ibid., 65.  
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intended. The current situation in Germany was a perversion of Enlightenment thought: 
“One can hardly use the word ‘philosophy’ in connection with Hitler’s outgivings 
without putting quotation marks around it.”799 Elsewhere in his narrative, he argued that: 
“Time heals physical ravages, but it may only accentuate the evils of an intellectual 
catastrophe—for by no less name can we call a systematic intellectual error.”800 The traits 
that benefit “thinking effectiveness for the good give it also potency for harm.”801 Ideas, 
being abstract, lingual, can operate “in remote climes and alien situations.”802  
 However, as Dewey argued, Kant, the Enlightenment figure, also break with the 
Enlightenment in his suggestion that humanity was not essentially good, rather that 
morality was “a ceaseless battle to transform all the natural desires of man into willing 
servants of law and the purpose of reason.”803 It can be extrapolated from Dewey’s 
argument that the perversion of Enlightenment thought in Germany in the 1930s and after 
was to reverse—brutally—the primacy of the Kantian realms: from the inner (free) to the 
outer (‘natural’), so that humanity was, once again, facing terror. This “totally new 
situation,” Dewey argued, gave:  
[T]he democratic way of life a significance it never had before. Peoples 
committed to this way of life now have to demonstrate that this method of 
attaining social unity…is as superior to the Hitlerian method of violent 
suppression as the better elements of human nature are superior to the 
baser elements which Hitler first appealed to and then organized with true 
German thoroughness.804 
 
                                                 
799 Ibid., 20.  
800 Ibid., 57.  
801 Ibid.  
802 Ibid. 
803 Ibid., 92. See Dewey’s discussion of the subtle, all-important differences between the German concept 
of ‘Zivilisation’ (the “by-product of the needs engendered when people live close together”) and ‘Kultur’ 
(“the fruit of man’s natural motives which have been transformed by the inner spirit” that “involves the 
slow toil of education of Inner Life” and a “conquest of the community won through devotion to ‘duty’.”).  
804 Dewey, “Foreword to Revised Edition,” in German Philosophy and Politics, 6.  
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At this juncture in his analysis, Dewey marked the subtle, all-important difference 
between the German concept of Zivilisation, the “by-product of the needs engendered 
when people live close together,” and Kultur, “the fruit of man’s natural motives which 
have been transformed by the inner spirit” that “involves the slow toil of education of 
Inner Life” and a “conquest of the community won through devotion to ‘duty’.”805 The 
perversion of philosophy that Dewey saw in 1942 was the liquidation of Kultur into 
Zivilisation. (This distinction between Zivilisation and Kultur will appear again in T.S. 
Eliot’s exchange with the editors in the pages of Partisan Review in 1944.)  
 As culture (in Germany and elsewhere) became increasingly “indifferent and 
insusceptible to the impact of critical thought,” Herbert Marcuse argued in 1941, the role 
of the critic became all the more vital.806 This presumes that the critic has not lost sight of 
his or her “world-historical task.” This other kind of confusion also drew Babbitt’s 
concern in the 1930s, and that of Walter Benjamin. Both Babbitt and Benjamin turned to 
the work of Julien Benda (1867–1956), whose La Trahison des Clercs had been 
published in 1927, and which was available in English as of 1928.807 In 1932, Babbitt 
wrote admiringly of Benda’s sharp critique of the duplicity of the intellectuals in shirking 
their responsibilities; when Benjamin wrote his critique in 1934, the situation was all the 
more dire:  
According to Benda, ever since intellectuals came into being, their world-
historical task has been to teach the universal, abstract values of mankind: 
                                                 
805 Dewey, German Philosophy and Politics, 94–6. 
806 Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 
9 (1941): 429. (Hereafter, SPSS.)  
807 See Julien Benda, The Treason of the Intellectuals, trans. Richard Aldington (New York: W. Morrow & 
Company, 1928). Benda would go on to edit The Living Thoughts of Kant in 1940, which served as a 
general introduction to the English-language readers. His introduction emphasized the Humanism of Kant’s 
philosophy. See, Benda, “Presenting Kant,” in The Living Thoughts of Kant, ed. Alfred O. Mendel (New 
York, Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1940): 1–38 
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freedom, justice, and humanity. But now, with [Charles] Maurras and 
[Maurice] Barrès…and [Oswald] Spengler, they have begin to betray 
those values, whose guardians they have been for centuries….The bitter 
necessities of reality, the maxims of Realpolitik, were defended by the 
clercs in earlier times, but not even Machiavelli tried to embellish them 
with the pathos of ethical precepts.808 
 
Still later, in 1953, Rosenberg would call to account the “confusions inherent in the 
concept of revolutionary art.” So long as the conditions that created the confusion 
persisted, it would be an impossible task to undo the confusion. What was more 
important was to “expose that there is a confusion, especially now that the adulteration of 
art with politics (and of politics with art) has ceased to be innocent.”809 To Benda, 
Benjamin, and Dewey, too, the adulteration had never been innocent in modern times.  
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 In resorting to the aesthetic category, Greenberg understood ambitious painting as a 
form of dissent from the prevailing order of things. In a 1944 review, he wrote in support 
of the FMPS membership, which included “a good many of the most advanced and 
important artists in this country.”810 The membership had recently criticized MoMA for 
its recent conservative exhibition choices.811 Greenberg concurred, and he was concerned 
that the ruling class had yanked hard on its proverbial umbilical cord of gold:  
                                                 
808 Walter Benjamin, “The Present Social Situation of the French Writer,” in WBSW, Vol. I, 748. See also, 
Clement Greenberg, “Books,” Politics (February 1944): 27. In this review of Albert Guéard’s book, 
Napoleon III: An Interpretation (Harvard University Press), Greenberg takes the author to task for the 
“rehabilitation job” that was part of the “ransacking of the past now going on among sedentary people who 
look for some scheme to insure the future against class warfare.” 
809 Rosenberg, “Revolution and the Idea of Beauty” Encounter 1:3 (December 1953): 65–8. Revised and re-
published in “Revolution and the Concept of Beauty,” The Tradition of the New (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 1960, 1994). 
810 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 158:7 (12 February, 1944): 195.  
811 Romantic Painting in America (exhibition number 246) was held from 17 November, 6 February, 1944; 
see the MoMA Archives, Public Information Records, C/E 1944–45. Americans 1943: Realists and Magic 
Realists, (exhibition number 217), was held from 10 February 10–21 March 21, 1943. See the MoMA 
Archives, Public Information Records, microfilm no. 2/427.  
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“Give us the romantic, the realistic, the descriptive, and the immediately 
erotic, and the chic. It fits us better, mirrors us better, and moves us 
quicker. Since we pay for art, we have a right to the kind we want.”812  
 
When asked, late in life, if his insistence on the autonomy of art was “a political stance” 
or “a form of resistance to bourgeois cultural dominance,” Greenberg’s response was 
succinct: “That’s shit…” “The truth in it,” he continued, “is that modernism and the 
avant-garde were traditionally a form of dissent. That’s the way it looks to me.”813  
 
VI. (Immanent) Judgment  
If, now, if in this comparison, imagination (as the faculty of intuitions a 
priori) is undesignedly brought into accord with understanding, (as the 
faculty of concepts) by means of a given representation, and a feeling of 
pleasure is thereby aroused, then the object must be regarded as final for 
the reflective judgment. A judgement of this kind is an aesthetic 
judgement upon the finality of the Object, which does not depend upon 
any present concept of the object, and does not provide one. When the 
form of an object (as opposed to the matter or its representation, as 
sensation) is, in the mere act of reflecting upon it, without regard to any 
concept to be obtained from it, estimated as the ground of a pleasure in the 
representation of such an Object, then this pleasure is also judged to be 
combined necessarily with the representation of it, and so not merely for 
the Subject apprehending this form, but for all in general who pass 
judgment. The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by 
means of such a pleasure (and so also with universal validity) is called 
taste.  
~ Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, 1790814 
 
It is as this point, where the beautiful and the honorific meet and blend 
that a discrimination between serviceability and wastefulness is most 
difficult in any concrete case. It frequently happens that an article which 
serves the honorific purpose of conspicuous waste is at the same time a 
beautiful object; at the same application of labour to which it owes its 
                                                 
812 Clement Greenberg, “Art,” The Nation 158:7 (12 February, 1944): 196. See also, Greenberg’s review of 
Georgia O’Keeffe in 1946: “Art,” The Nation 162:24 (15 June, 1946): 727–8. 
813 See Saul Ostrow, “Clement Greenberg: The Last Interview,” in Clement Greenberg: Late Writings, 237.  
814 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, ed., trans., and intro. by James Creed Meredith,  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1952): 30–1.  
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utility for the former purpose may, and often does, go to give beauty of 
form and colour to the article. 
 
  ~ Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, 1899815  
 
[Veblen] explains culture through trash, not vice versa. 
 




 A.G. Baumgarten conceived the term ‘aesthetics’(from the Gk. aisthesis) in 1735 “to 
designate a projected discipline which was to do for sensate, or ‘confused’ knowledge 
what logic did for rational, or demonstrative, knowledge.”817 Writing after Baumgarten in 
1790, Immanuel Kant negotiated the human encounter of, or with, the sensate necessarily 
differently. In Kant’s rhetoric, an apparent lacuna exists between the constitutive realms 
of Freedom and of Nature (or, of brute force). He understood the conditions for the 
possibility of Nature to be those of space (external) and of Time (internal). On the side of 
Freedom is the supersensible thing-in-itself (das ding-in-sich), which is not spacio-
temporal. If Baumgarten’s work did for the sensate what logos did for reason, then Kant’s 
rendering of the sensate, in turn, did no violence to Newtonian science. Instead, it gave a 
proper realm to the perceptible that did not impose itself upon the mechanics of the 
universe.818 Kant gave a place (a value) to the perceiving Subject. He did not make that 
experience determining, or equate it with an empirical judgment. Rather, he made it one 
of æsthetics.  
                                                 
815 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1899, 1998): 
128–9.  
816 Theodor W. Adorno, “Veblen’s Attack on Culture,” SPSS 9 (1941): 394. 
817 Jeffrey Barnouw, “The Beginnings of ‘Æsthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation,” in 
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetics and the Reconstruction of Art (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993): 52.   
818 Discussion with Professor Jeffrey Barnouw at the University of Texas at Austin on 18 November, 1999 
greatly clarified my thinking about this.  
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 The move towards the beautiful, within Kant, is towards a concord between the 
faculties and the world—an experience of the adequacy of those faculties—where we are 
correlative to nature (if not part of it).819 The structure of the judgment of the beautiful, 
for Kant, affirms the universality of mankind. The judgment of the universal is not by 
means of an accretion (or, the momentum) of particulars, rather, it is the universal within 
the Subject responding to a particular sensation. Judgment, then, mediates between the 
faculties of Cognition, or Understanding, and of the Will, or Reason: it is not in itself 
constitutive.  
Kant made the following distinction within the category of the beautiful:  “The beauty 
of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing.”820 The 
response to the content of a work of art is not cognitive, and, therefore, remains 
unexpressed. Alternately, he posited the sublime as such: “It is an object (of nature) the 
representation of which determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our 
reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas.821 An experience of the sublime, is 
necessarily the experience of the inadequacy of one’s faculties, between the Self and 
Nature. If the beautiful, for Kant, is transcendental, then the sublime is transcendent. For 
Kant, the sublime rounded out the æsthetic judgment, along with taste and beauty.   
 The categories of autonomous art and uniquely-actuated individuals as conceived by 
Kant, Horkheimer argued much later in 1941, were under attack by the societal violence 
of modern times. In “Art and Mass Culture,” he ventured into mass culture via the 
philosophical works of Kant and the American pragmatists. Autonomous art, as the last 
                                                 
819 Jeffrey Barnouw, “The Beginnings of ‘Æsthetics’ and the Leibnizian Conception of Sensation,” 30.  
820 Ibid., 172. Emphasis in the original. 
821 Ibid., 119. Emphasis in the original. 
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preserve of the promise of utopia previously found in religion, today “survives only in 
those works which uncompromisingly express the gulf between the monadic individual 
and his barbarous surrounding—prose like James Joyce’s and paintings like Picasso’s 
Guernica.”822 Horkheimer would have seen Guernica in New York City, safely installed 
at the Museum of Modern Art as of 1939—far from the brutality that had incited its 
creation (see fig. 48):  
On giving downtrodden humans a shocking awareness of their own 
despair, the work of art professes a freedom which makes them foam at 
the mouth. The generation that allowed Hitler to become great takes its 
adequate pleasure in the convulsions which the animated cartoon imposes 
upon its helpless characters, not in Picasso, who offers no recreation and 
cannot be ‘enjoyed’ anyhow.823 
 
 In his art, Picasso had rendered the violence (or, shock) of modern life visible (or, 
conscious) through artistic disfiguration (not through propaganda). He produced works 
that were challenging in that they demanded that the viewer give him or herself over to 
them. It presupposes a ‘self’ to give.824 In Picasso’s case, it is not just a question of form 
or content, but one of technique as well. Horkheimer here saw the ambitious work of art 
as providing no solace or easy comfort in its presentation.  
 However, by the criteria of American art historian Mortimer J. Adler, whose book Art 
& Prudence occasioned Horkheimer’s essay, the greatest artist of the day was neither 
Joyce nor Picasso, but Walt Disney. Disney, who would later be a cooperative witness for 
the McCarthy hearings, was deemed so because he reached “perfection in his field that 
surpasses our best critical capacity to analyze and at the same time please[d] children and 
                                                 
822 Horkheimer, “Art and Mass Culture,” SPSS 9 (1941): 294.  
823 Ibid., 296.   
824 Discussion with Professor Peter Jelavich at the University of Texas at Austin on 17 April, 2001 clarified 
my thinking on the difference between the techniques of these two artists. 
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simple folk.”825 What Adler championed in Disney’s popularity, Horkheimer understood 
as a dangerous acculturation of the masses to their own subjugation and destruction. 
While this may be a case of Horkheimer conflating pragmatism with positivism, he 
rightly concluded that “error has no less often united men than truth…Truth can make no 
pacts with ‘prevailing customs’. In the era of witch hunts, opposition to the public spirit 
would have been moral.”826 Modifying the Kantian question, he asked how anything new 
could be done or thought if everything was mere adaptation? He concluded with the 
passage from Dewey, who argued that, “indifference to response of the immediate 
audience is a necessary trait of all artists that have something new to say.”827 
Autonomous art, in its dissonance, was then the keeper of the truth in the face of mass 
culture, even if in its own time it is not understood, or appears to be speaking in tongues:  
One day we may learn that in the depths of their hearts, the masses, even 
in fascist countries, secretly knew the truth and disbelieved the lie, like 
katatonic patients who make known only at the end of their trance that 
nothing has escaped them. Therefore it may not be entirely senseless to 
continue speaking a language that is not easily understood.828 
 
VII: Zig Zag  
When contemplating an object, a connoisseur immediately and 
simultaneously gets a sense of touch, taste, smell, etc., of the object, on 
other works the individual history of this object records itself in the 
individual reaction and sensation of all human organs. Highest taste 
oscillates somewhere between the naïve clumsiness of the child and the 
utter wisdom of the most accomplished technique.  
 
                                                 
825 Ibid., 296.  
826 Ibid., 298-299.  
827 Ibid., 304. Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York, 1934): 104. 
828 Horkheimer, “Art and Mass Culture,” 304.  
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~ John D. Graham, John D. Graham, “What is good taste?” in 
System and Dialectics of Art, 1937829 
 
In order to act as an agent and stir up good writing, there must be some 
kind of positive notion, some working hypothesis, a bias in a particular 
direction, even a prejudice, as to what this good writing of the future will 
be like. As Kant says, you only find what you look for. I don’t mean by 
this that it is necessary to be dogmatic and to have fixed ideas against 
which everything is to be measured. I mean simply that more thinking and 
inquiring should be done about the problem.  
 
  ~ Clement Greenberg, Partisan Review, 1941830  
 
There was a special sense of triumph when Greenberg trotted out the 
reference to Kant; for one thing, the reference was a little arcane, and there 
was a special cachet in citing a philosopher who did not fall anywhere 
within the Marxist canon. But sometimes the reference did sound rather 
sententious coming from Greenberg’s lips, and Delmore [Schwartz] would 
growl, “Clem is always putting on the dog—intellectually speaking.”  And 
then he turned to rebuke me at my silence: “Listen, you know Clem 
doesn’t know what he’s talking about when he mentions Kant. Why don’t 
you show him up?”  
 
   ~ William Barrett, The Truants, 1982831 
 
I felt my experience confirmed Kant.  
 
 ~ Clement Greenberg, 1994832 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 In 1938, William Phillips argued that “the value of Kant’s system, for example, is 
hardly a live issue outside of the classroom; whereas Marxism is debated in the streets, 
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gaining new supporters when the working class is flushed with victories, and losing them 
after defeats.”833 Were Phillips’ distinction ever true, it did not hold for long. In 1941, 
Greenberg ‘trotted out’ his first direct reference to Kant. In his essay, “The Renaissance 
of the Little Magazine,” Greenberg argued that the re-birth of the Little Magazine had 
much to do with the collapse of the intellectual authority of Stalinism as the presence of 
transplanted Europeans who had come with the “realization” that the U.S. was the “only 
important place left where it is still possible to pursue culture without the too immediate 
interference of events.”834 Writers in New York were “on the spot,” he concluded. 
However, the results were not always good. Greenberg referred to the contents of the 
newly-published Experimental Review as “Schwärmerei, fake surrealism, transition 
bunk, which a psychiatrist would return to his patient for revision.”835  
 Eugen Jolas, the former editor of transition, the Paris-based avant-garde Little 
Magazine that ran from 1928 through 1938, objected. By 1941, Jolas was one of the 
European transplants working on the spot as contributor and translator at Partisan 
Review, objected to Greenberg’s “cheap” dismissal of a publication “that for ten years 
presented practically all the modern movements that are now the fashion here—
expressionism, dadaism, abstractionism, Stein, Joyce, etc….” and—perhaps for acutely 
for the present situation—the work of Kafka, who rendered in his stories an “alien mood 
of paroxysm, guilt [and] weltangst, which we all feel now.”836 Jolas’ assertion of his 
hard-won modernist credentials fell upon deaf ears at Partisan Review. In an earlier 
                                                 
833 William Phillips, “The Devil Theory of the Dialectic: A Reply to Edmund Wilson,” Partisan Review 6:1 
(Fall 1938): 90.  
834 See also, William Petersen, “What Has Become of Them? A Check-List of European Artists, Writers 
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review of the last edition of transition, Dwight MacDonald argued that the “decay” of 
transition was as much a symptom of “the decay of bourgeois culture” as it was also a 
comment on the impossibility of maintaining the “above-the-battle attitude in a period of 
great social tension,” such had been practiced at transition in their “metaphysical” 
critique of capitalism.837 To Macdonald, Jolas’ outlook was not political enough, not 
engaged enough; to Greenberg, it was not critical enough. 
 An early attack on Greenberg’s art criticism came from Nicolas Calas (1907–1989), 
the Surrealist poet and art critic. In a lengthy letter published in View in 1940, Calas 
leveled a number of attacks against Partisan Review generally and Greenberg personally:  
I well understand that Partisan Review is forced to back abstract art—it is 
in fact the only consistent point in its policy but it is a pity that the editors 
cannot do it in a more straightforward way. Perhaps then it would not be 
Mr. Greenberg who would write articles on abstract art, because otherwise 
how are we to explain that this critic paints pictures that are the exact 
opposite of what abstract painting should be? … [C]an Partisan Review be 
considered anything but a bureaucratically directed paper? Does not its 
policy that zigzags from Trotsky to T.S. Eliot follow a broken cultural 
line?  
… 
May I suggest…that Partisan Review…[turn] into a monthly supplement 
of the Commonwealth, where no doubt its jesuit [sic] methods would be 
appreciated by T.S. Eliot? Mr. Greenberg’s non-abstract paintings, 
although not good enough to interest the New Laocoon, could then be 
miraculously transformed into works of art through holy blessing.838 
 
Elsewhere in the letter, Calas criticized Greenberg for not knowing about the theories of 
Élie Faure. Greenberg may not have known Faure’s theories intimately in 1940, but he 
                                                 
837 See, Dwight MacDonald, “Exit Transition,” Partisan Review 5:3 (August-September 1938): 74–75. For 
Jolas’ account of transition, see Eugen Jolas, “Ten Years Transition,” Plastique 3 (Spring 1938), n.f.  
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did by 1945. The “exalted prattle” that was showing up in English-language art criticism 
since the arrival of the Surrealists in New York had been seen previously in French art 
writing “since Faure.”839   
 While Greenberg may never have sent one of his pictures to Eliot for benediction, he 
had several encounters with the poet in print.840 In his 1939 essay, “Avant-Garde and 
Kitsch,” Greenberg made reference to his debt to Eliot in his own understanding of 
kitsch. “Where Picasso paints cause, Repin paints effect,” he argued.841 The result, in 
Repin’s case, was that the “‘reflected’ effect [was] already included in the picture, ready 
for the spectator’s unreflective enjoyment.”842 Greenberg continued:  
T.S. Eliot said something to the same effect for the shortcomings of 
English Romantic poetry. Indeed, the Romantics can be considered the 
original sinners whose guilt kitsch inherited. They showed kitsch how. 
What does Keats write about mainly, if not the effect of poetry upon 
himself?843  
 
By 1944, Greenberg, for one, found Eliot’s ideas less useful. Eliot contributed “Notes 
Towards a Definition of Culture,” to which a number of critics associated with Partisan 
Review later that year.844  
 Eliot used a similar construction in the title of his essay to the one Greenberg had 
employed in 1940. Despite the presence of the word Towards, Eliot advocated for a very 
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different idea of culture. In Eliot’s rhetoric, “culture” is impossible without “a culture,” 
(or, what Dewey had distinguished as Zivilisation).845 That Eliot saw “the schematic 
structure of the Culture…as fixed,” put the poet in basic agreement, Greenberg argued, 
“more or less,” with Spengler.846 In a time of declining culture, such as the one in which 
Eliot found himself, the artist “at best” makes “the best he can of a disintegrated state,” or 
he is “a victim of it.” If, under these circumstances, the artist exaggerated “the 
importance of his art,” it is in reaction to a world that is “indifferent, scornful, amused or 
frightened.”847 As the problems afflicting culture were not solely political, a proper 
solution would have to be more than political. At this juncture in his argument, Eliot, who 
had converted to Anglicanism in 1927, made his most controversial claim: “The cultural 
problem…is inseparable from the religious problem.”848  
 This claim met with different degrees of skepticism from the respondents, who were: 
I.A. Richards, R.P. Blackmur, Greenberg, and Phillips.849 Richards, a life-long friend of 
the poet, offered the kindest critique, with which he was in “reluctant agreement,” and 
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849 Richard Palmer Blackmur (1904–1965) was a literary critic and poet. He was one of the editors and 
contributors to Hound & Horn (1928–34), which was started by Lincoln Kirstein and Varian Fry, both of 
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Oppenheimer, he and Eliot were awarded honorary degrees at Harvard in 1947.  
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limited his comments to the implications for education.850 Blackmur reoriented Eliot’s 
comments with a “secular conversion” and reassembled them: “A common faith and 
order make up the body of beliefs which gives cultures significance.”851 Due to the 
homogenizing effects of pop culture, there would soon be “little diversity of cultures for 
Mr. Eliot’s common religious faith to unify,” Greenberg warned.852 “Tin Pan Alley, the 
Luce publications (with editions in all languages), Coca-Cola…class interests, and a 
common boss…are all quite compatibly, incidentally, with religion, but not at all with 
socialism,” he concluded.853 Phillips, perhaps, leveled the most serious charges: “One can 
no more imagine Finnegans Wake, say, or abstract art, in a socialist world than in the 
medieval one.”854 Eliot’s mistake was to assume that Modernism would “carry on, only 
under more favorable conditions” in “a compact and orderly ecclesiastical culture.” Or, 
what Phillips referred to elsewhere in his essay as a kind of “clerical fascism.”855 
Modernity without the Modernist critique is a bleak thought, at the very least; but 
Phillips’ comments are a reminder that that critique comes with the conditions of 
Modernity. 
 At times, the discursive exchange achieved relatively high levels of criticism; clearly, 
at others, the level of discourse sunk to the level of personality.856 Schwartz, Calas and 
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others, who suggested that Greenberg was in over his head intellectually—or, that he flat 
out got Kant wrong—were looking for Greenberg to be a theorist and to deploy Kantian 
thought appropriately. However, Greenberg found his experiences before certain works 
of art confirmed in Kant (not by Kant—like Newman, Greenberg was not looking for an 
authoritative personality to follow).  
 
VIII. Taste (Disinterest and the Disinherited) 
 
[The man of Taste] will be enthusiastic over one Work of Art at one 
moment and unfaithful to it the next, because it can only raise his 
enthusiasm so long as it remains the newest form of Art and because he is 
always haunted by the fear that in the meantime an ever newer form of Art 
will crowd out his newest….It has never before been so difficult, so 
strenuous, to be a Philistine of culture.  
 
   ~ Hermann Baer, Expressionismus, 1916857 
 
Investigate why the concept of Taste is obsolete. It emerged in the early 
stages of capitalism. Now we are in the late stages.  
    
   ~ Walter Benjamin, “The Task of the Critic,” ca. 1931858 
 
No longer detached from the work of art, since it deals with the taste of 
art, the history of culture is made one with the history of art. It has 
departed from intuition of the work of art by a journey through all the 
domains of the mind; and it returns to the intuition of the work of art and 
of the personality of the artist, enriched with a complete humanity. 
 
 ~ Lionello Venturi, History of Art Criticism, 1936859  
 
An action is not a matter of taste. 
 
   ~ Harold Rosenberg, “The American Action Painters,” 1952860 
 
                                                 
857 Hermann Bahr, Expressionism, trans. R.T. Gribble (London: Frank Henderson, 1925): 16–7. Emphasis 
in the original.  
858 Walter Benjamin, fragment written ca. 1931, unpublished in Benjamin’s lifetime. Printed in WBSW, 
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 The problem of Taste has posed real and long-standing methodological paradoxes.861 
In 1934, Schapiro contributed an essay on Taste to The Encyclopedia of Social 
Sciences.862  The essay in demonstrative of the wound that Taste, as an objective concept, 
had been delivered by dialectical thought; in this respect, Schapiro’s essay is very much 
one of its time. Taste, in the classical sense, is the “‘choosing’” sense, as Schapiro 
argued: “It is the typical context of immediate and unreflecting judgments of the 
acceptable and the unacceptable.”863 Taste should allow for the discernment between a 
work of art that is work marveling in front of from one this is not. The problems begin 
when Taste is extended into the social (political, commercial) realm:  
In so far as the dominant class believes that its conduct and interests do 
not issue from exterior compulsions, like the conduct of the lower classes, 
but from considerations of the aesthetic pleasure of free individuals, the 
concept of good taste is extended to the larger activity of the class.864 
 
What had hitherto been understood as natural, Schapiro saw as ideological: 
changes in period styles were “clearly related to the ideologies and situations of 
the dominant class.”865 In this respect, Taste is, therefore, conservative and refers 
to the “discreet and restrained and conventional in art.”866 Which is why, as 
Phillips would argue in his 1944 response to Eliot, that the avant-garde—who 
                                                 
861 See also, Frank P. Chambers, Cycles of Taste: An Unacknowledged Problem in Ancient Art and 
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were also part of the elite—tended to be radical, dissident, innovative and 
uncompromising.867 
 Two comments from Clement Greenberg made in 1947 are useful at this 
juncture:  
Since, according to Kant (and this reviewer agrees with him), art gives one 
the sensation of a thing without necessarily including its meaning.  
 
Conversation had already begun to flag ten years ago; our public 
pronouncements, our pleasures, our entertainment, our literature and art 
were already losing their pertinence. Today they seem…radically 
irrelevant.868  
 
These comments appear in an essay by Greenberg that was prompted by Philip Wylie’s 
An Essay on Morals. That “a writer of popular fiction undistinguished even in its own 
sphere” has noticed similar things suggested to Greenberg that, “the situation must be 
even more serious than we realize.”869 That market forces could reify experiences and 
people into entertainment and things was a weighty commonplace for this generation of 
critics. To trust the sensations of the (unconditioned) unreflective judgments of the eye 
may have been the most radical of all stances.  
 In a 1950 essay, Leo Löwenthal would arrive at a similar distinction: “the counter-
concept to popular culture is art.”870 It is the difference between “an insight through a 
medium possessing self-sustaining means and mere repetition of given facts with the use 
                                                 
867 Phillips, “Mr. Eliot and Notions of Culture: A Discussion,” 309. 
868 Clement Greenberg, “Pessimism for Mass Consumption,” Commentary 4:4 (October 1947): 393–4. This 
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870 Leo Löwenthal, “Historical Perspectives on Popular Culture,” The American Journal of Sociology, 55 
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Manning White (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press and the Falcon’s Wing Press, 1957): 49, 46-58 
 264 
of borrowed tools.”871 However, in modern culture, diversion has replaced real 
experience. The meaningful experience promised by art—the greater individual 
fulfillment that is Aristotle’s catharsis—was being discarded by popular culture. Popular 
culture (like ‘Primitivism’) belongs to Modernity, as does the autonomous work of art 
and the self-critical attitude of Modernism—provided that there is a self left to critique 
and an actuated body.   
 
IX. Doubts and Promises Broken (ca. 1947) 
 
The realm of the concept of nature under the one legislation, and that of 
the concept of freedom under the other, are completely cut off from all 
reciprocal influence, that they might severally (each according to its own 
principles) exert upon the other, by the broad gulf [Kluft] that divides the 
supersensible from phenomena. The concept of freedom determines 
nothing in respect to the theoretical cognition of nature; and the concept of 
nature likewise nothing in respect of the practical laws of freedom. To that 
extent, then, it is not possible to throw a bridge from the one realm to the 
other. — Yet although the determining grounds of causality according to 
the concept of freedom (and the practical rule that this contains) have no 
place in nature, and the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the 
Subject; still the converse is possible (not, it is true, in respect of the 
knowledge of nature, but of the consequences arising from the 
supersensible and bearing on the sensible). 
 
 ~ Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, 1790872 
 
The defiant reserve or elegant appearance of the individual on show is 
mass-produced like Yale locks, whose only difference can be measured in 
fractions of millimeters. 
 
 ~ Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1947873 
 
To experience beauty is to be liberated from the overpowering domination 
of nature over men. In popular culture, men free themselves from mythical 
powers by discarding everything, even reverence for the Beautiful. 
                                                 
871 Ibid., 50.  
872 Kant, The Critique of Judgement, 36–37.  
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 In his 1946 Preface to The Dark Side of the Moon, T.S. Eliot stated earnestly that “the 
world in which we live now…is a less moral one than the world of six years ago.”875 
What concerned him greatly was the contemporary desire “to avert our eyes” or “to 
forget these thing.”876 As he had in his 1944 discussion with the editors of Partisan 
Review, he reverted to the religion question. Löwenthal took a different approach to the 
problem in his 1946 essay, “Terror’s Atomization of Man.” Löwenthal confronted the 
post-War myth that the threat of fascism was a thing of the past. Rather, he argued that 
trends in modern culture and economy make a future eruption of fascism a real 
possibility. Essentially, the modern system of terror amounts to “the atomization of 
man.”877 If mankind shudders at torture inflicted upon bodies, “we should not be less 
appalled by its menace to the spirit of man.”878 Left unfettered, the drive towards 
commodification would lead to circumstances ripe for fascism. In a section entitled 
“Reduction to Natural Materials,” Löwenthal analyzed the means by which terror divides 
its victims from any sense of belonging to a whole human history (memory). Rather, 
victims of terror come to see themselves as surplus (raw) natural goods. He drew the 
chilling parallel between the treatment of concentration camp inmates and the movement 
and distribution of merchandise. This all goes to Löwenthal’s larger point that “Mankind 
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has today so tremendously improved its technology as to render itself largely 
superfluous.”879 
 In 1947, Horkheimer and Adorno published Dialektik der Aufklärung. As a collection 
of essays, it was largely the product of the authors’ wartime stay in America. Perhaps the 
representative essay from this collection is “The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception.” In this essay, the authors offered a deeply pessimistic, blistering, analysis of 
mass culture—one that holds out slim (if any) possibilities for change. Capital, in Liberal 
Democratic countries, has created something new: the culture industry, whereby high art 
and ‘light’ distraction have been subsumed under ‘entertainment’. The false culture of 
entertainment (of kitsch) adequately matches the false consciousness of the masses. 
While this culture industry represents a totalizing system of domination of the masses by 
capital, Horkheimer and Adorno also argued that the reified masses are complicit with 
this system. The urgency for the authors is to expose the sham of freedom and 
individuality in commodity culture of the Culture Industry. Otherwise, the totalizing-
system of the Culture Industry makes conditions ripe (again) for another such totalizing-
system: fascism.   
 Early in 1947, the editors at Partisan Review ran a translation of Friedrich von 
Kleist’s celebrated “Essay on the Puppet Theater.”880 As the brief note that accompanied 
the essay stated, the essay “is generally considered by German critics and historians of 
literature to be on of the finest essays in their language.” It was a timely re-statement: not 
                                                 
879 Ibid., 7.  
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all things German were fascistic. (The distinction that Dewey insisted upon, as discussed 
above, between Kultur and Zivilisation is exactly to the point here.) As Richard Shiff has 
argued, the thesis of Kleist’s essay is that:  
Each person’s encounter with the momentary play of a discursive 
medium—its possibilities and its limitations—determines what is thought, 
visualized, enunciated, represented. We come to know what we try so hard 
to say only as the medium that contains our expression assumes a shape 
proper to itself.881 
 
Kleist’s is an understanding of freedom, the freedom from terror long sought in the 
modern era. It’s a freedom sought not by mastering one’s circumstances, but by being at 
play with (in) them. Löwenthal, who very well may have read Kleist’s essay, would have 
agreed with his thesis. As Löwenthal concluded in his 1946, the Enlightenment dreams of 
the West may still become a reality, “if mankind can free itself from its use of human 
beings as surplus of commodities of means. Otherwise we too may face the terror.”882  
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I. All Over Now  
The situation is no longer what it was, but I hardly know whether the gains 
have or have not cancelled out most of the losses American culture has 
sustained since 1918.  
 
~ Clement Greenberg, “The Present Prospects of American 
Painting and Sculpture,” Horizon, 1947883 
 
As early as 1947, I had moved painting beyond picture-making. 
   ~ Barnett Newman, Letter to William Rubin, 1968884 
Order, to me, is to be ordered about and that is a limitation.  
 
~ Willem de Kooning, “A Desperate View,” 1949885  
 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
 It is generally understood that, ca. 1947–8, the New York School triumphed. In his 
now-famous essay, “The Situation at the Moment,” Greenberg offered the impression—
“but only the impression”—that the future of advanced art was to be made in America. 886  
That the future was now and in the US was happenstance, Greenberg concluded: “The 
historic impulses [of Western art], with all they carried in the way of enlightenment and 
of compensation for the hygienically destructive effects of enlightenment, have ebbed 
away in Europe under the suction of events and a declining bourgeois order.”887 
Greenberg made no mention of them in his text, but reproductions of two Pollocks from 
1946 accompanied this essay (figs. 86 and 87). Not all of the artists who had contributed 
                                                 
883 Clement Greenberg, “The Present Prospects of American Painting and Sculpture” Horizon 16:93/94 
(October 1947): 21.  
884 Barnett Newman, “Letter to William Rubin,” in BNSWI, 237. Cited in Shiff, “To Create Oneself,” in 
BNCR: 15, 95, n. 91.  
885 Willem de Kooning, “A Desperate View,” (1949), reprinted in Thomas B. Hess, Willem de Kooning 
(New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1968): 15.  
886 Clement Greenberg, “The Situation at the Moment,” Partisan Review 15:1 (January 1948): 82. 
887 Ibid. 
 270 
to the American scene were there to witness its success. On 21 July, 1948, Gorky hanged 
himself in the barn at his family’s home in Sherman, Connecticut. It was the first of 
several deaths associated with this circle of painters. Whatever success Serge Guilbaut, 
for example, thought these painters had achieved by 1948, it was fragile.888  
 That there was greater visibility for American painters and their strange paintings by 
1948 seems reasonable to argue (fig. 88). Dorothy Miller curated “Fourteen Americans” 
in 1946 and then “Fifteen Americans” in 1952 at MoMA.889 De Kooning had his first 
solo show in 1948, and that year, Hans Hofmann’s The Search for the Real was 
published, which put the painter’s ideas into limited public circulation.890 These painters, 
especially Pollock, were given more exposure in the popular press. In 1947, Time 
published a brief art review entitled “The Best?” in which the critical judgments of 
Greenberg were parodied, and paired with Pollock’s The Key from 1946 (fig. 89).891 The 
painting was reproduced up-side down (one can only wonder if this was an intentional 
error, or not as the signature is visible in the lower left-hand corner in the painting itself). 
Life was generally more amenable to modernist painting. It published a “Round Table on 
Modern Art” in October 1948, and in August 1949, the magazine asked if Pollock was, as 
Greenberg had maintained, the “Greatest Living Painter in the United States?”892 In 1950, 
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28 painters of the New York School protested the exclusion of modern art at a juried 
show at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Fifteen of those protesters gathered for the 
now-famous photo (fig. 90) of The Irascibles, taken by Nina Leen (1909–1995).  
 Front and center in the photo is Newman, who, as is discussed in the previous 
chapters, continually sought out ways of making ethical choices (acts) in his art and 
criticism. The artist, as Newman wrote in his tribute to Gorky in 1948, is “the only man 
who performs an act for no useful purpose.” “The only moral act,” Newman wrote, “is 
the useless one, and the only useless act in the aesthetic one.”893 One of the tragedies of 
the post-War years was that even this position could become reified, clichéd, comical, 
even, by those so inclined to have their actions made painfully clear. Here, for example, 
is Clyfford Still in 1959:  
I held it imperative to evolve an instrument of thought which would aid in 
cutting through all cultural opiates, past and present, so that a direct, 
immediate, and truly free vision could be achieved, and an idea be 
revealed with clarity.894  
 
Still attempted to legislate abstraction into a kind of permanency, at least in his own 
isolated work. (It was an un-dialectical attitude towards his medium.) What then might 
distinguish a Still from Newman’s strange, newly-discovered zips (see fig. 88)? Both 
were the products of artistic choice. And, after all, a critic wondered in 1949 if it 
Newman who was “trying to write finis to the art of abstraction.”895 As Richard Shiff, has 
argued: “At no time did [Newman] care to reaffirm existing knowledge, nor did he seek a 
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degree of perfection in his art that, when attained, would have eliminated the emotional 
need to press further with his self-questioning.”896 Some acts lead to further acts; some 
lead towards a final goal. A Newman was not a Still.  
 Metaphors of topography—realms in which to act—have been used by earlier critics 
of American abstraction (e.g., Cahill’s new horizons of 1936 or Kootz’s new frontiers of 
1943). Most famously, in 1952, Harold Rosenberg conceived of the canvas as the 
painter’s arena, a space in which to act rather than one in which “to reproduce, re-design, 
analyze or ‘express’ an object, actual or imagined.”897 What was “to go on the canvas was 
not a picture but an event.”898 Performative acts (at least as theorized in 1952) were “not a 
matter of Taste.”899 Despite his antipathy for this essay in particular, Greenberg also once 
made note of the “useless” acts of an artist in the studio: “His one great diversion…was 
dancing, and I am told that he liked it so much that [Mondrian] often danced by himself 
in his studio.”900 In the wake of this new painting, the theorization of the art object 
changed. As Newman stated in a 1963 interview: “I’m against the object as a thing; I’m 
also against the non-object as a thing.”901  
 I have argued throughout this dissertation that the dialectic was the main diagnostic 
tool employed by art critics during these years.  In the post-War recall to order, explicit 
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references to a Marxian dialectic declined (outside of the organized Left). Famously, in 
1949, Arthur M. Schlesinger made use of the dialectic in The Vital Center, a Liberal call 
for collaboration between the non-Communist Left and the non-fascist Right to produce a 
vigorous center that allowed for the potentialities of the individual to be unleashed. 
Borrowing from De Witt C. Poole, Schlesinger mapped out this vital center in a diagram 
that shows the left and right not as antipodes, but as contiguous (fig. 91). As a closed 
sytem, it’s quite different from the open-ended diagram of Alfred Barr in 1936 (see fig. 
7). In Schlesinger’s analysis, the center was a scrappy place—the quest for freedom was 
always going to be a fight.902 As dynamical as this sounds, Schlesinger’s is the analysis 
of stasis. In post-War America (as opposed to 1930s New York), there would be no 
revolution to televise; there would always be anxiety—a pre-condition of freedom903   
 In his own post-War treatise, The Lost Center: Art in Crisis, Hans Sedlmayr mourned 
the loss of the center. The center, in Sedlmayr’s book, is not a place of conflict, but of 
retreat: It’s the God-fearing, mittel-Europa of an imagined past. (There’s no suggestion in 
his rhetoric that, if this center ever existed, he may have been complicit in liquidating it.) 
Contemporary culture was ill; modernist art, with all of its anxiousness, was symptomatic 
of this. Sedlmayr neatly divided human history into four stages. Now in its fourth phase, 
Sedlmayr argued, civilization was either at the brink or a turning point. Civilization could 
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either return to God, or it could continue headlong towards the precipice. (Like 
Schlesinger, he made use of Yeats’ poem, “The Second Coming,” as an epigraph: 
“Things fall apart, the center cannot hold…”904) There is little, if any, difference in 
attitude between what Sedlmayr terms the art of the fourth phase, and that which the 
National Socialists has earlier designated entartete Kunst. However, the book contains no 
reference to the Holocaust or Sedlmayr’s association with the National Socialists. As 
mentioned in the prologue, above, a letter published in1938, in which Sedlmayr praised 
the Anschluss, was edited out of the 1960 publication of his collected works.905 In The 
Lost Center, Sedlmayr perverted Riegl’s idea of the Kunstwollen into a kind of 
Naturdialectic. For this myth to work, any kind of dissent (or, even, Sedlmayr’s past 
associations with the Nazis) had to be suppressed. It makes Benjamin’s extreme 
statement—that the “‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the 
rule”—an appropriate response.906 As he argued elsewhere in “Theses on the Philosophy 
of History,” the ongoing task of the critic was to “brush history against the grain.”907 
 
II. Myths to Live By   
 
Some twenty-two years ago in a gathering, I was asked what my painting 
really means in terms of society, in terms of the world, in terms of the 
situation. And my answer then was that if my work were properly 
                                                 
904 Sedlmayr, Art in Crisis: The Lost Center, (Chicago: Henry Regency Company, 1958): frontispiece. This 
work was initially published as Verlust der Mitte (Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1948). Yeats’ “The 
Second Coming” was initially published in The Dial in 1920.  
905 Introduction to Wood, The Vienna School Reader, 12–13, 38, 54 n. 5. See Sedlmayr, “Vermutungen und 
Fragen zur Bestimmung der altfranzösischen Kunst,” Fetschrift Willem Pinder (Leipzig: Seemann, 1938), 
pp. 9–27. Cf. Sedlmayr, Epochen und Werke (Vienna und Munich: Herold, 1960), vol. 2, pp. 322–341. A 
standard reference work like The Dictionary of Art, makes no mention of Sedlmayr’s engagement with the 
National Socialists. See Petra Schniewind-Michel: ‘Sedlmayr, Hans’, The Dictionary of Art, Vol. 28, ed. J. 
Turner (London: Macmillan, 1996): 350. 
906 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, 257.  
907 Ibid.  
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understood, it would be the end of state capitalism and totalitarianism. 
Because to the extent that my painting was not an arrangement of objects, 
not an arrangement of spaces, not an arrangement of graphic elements, 
was an open painting, in the sense that is represented an open world—to 
that extent I though, and I still believe, that my work in terms of its social 
impact does denote the possibility of an open society, of an open world, 
not of a closed institutional world. 
 




 In 1951, six artists gathered for a symposium on abstract art at the Museum of 
Modern Art: George L. K. Morris, Willem de Kooning, Alexander Calder, Fritz Glarner, 
Robert Motherwell, and Stuart Davis all spoke at “What Abstract Art Means to Me” on 
the evening of 5 February. The artists’ statements collected and published later that year 
have become a significant benchmark. The topic that evening was abstract art, per se. By 
1951, the discourse was tending towards Abstract Expressionism, as gestured to briefly 
above. In their respective statements, Morris, Davis, and de Kooning all reflected back on 
the 1930s in New York, formative years for each of the three painters. Many of the 
participants spoke of issues central to this dissertation. Could entire worldviews (or world 
desires) be engendered in a painting, an abstract painting (such as a Newman would later 
claim in 1970)? Could the making and understanding of these works make for more 
understanding in culture at large? This is what Otto Pächt and Sedlmayr had hoped for in 
Vienna in the early 1930s with their new art history, even if Sedlmayr later renounced 
himself of that method and advocated, obscenely, for a closed society—markedly 
different from the one for which Newman hoped.  
                                                 
908 “Interview with Emile de Antonio,” in BNSWI, 307–308. Newman died of a heart attack on 4 July, 
1970.  
 276 
 Morris continued with the theme of liberating painting through the practice of 
abstraction: His is a statement remarkable for its consistency in that it could have been 
made at any point in the 1930s. In his statement, the lengthiest of the group, de Kooning, 
discussed previous attempts to liberate painting at the beginning of the 20th century:  
The esthetics of painting were always in a state of development parallel to 
the development of painting itself. They influenced each other and vice 
versa. But all of a sudden, in that famous turn of the century, a few people 
thought they could take the bull by the horns and invent an esthetic 
beforehand…The question, as they saw it, was not so much of what you 
could paint but rather what you could not paint. You could not paint a 
house or a tree or a mountain. It was then that a subject matter came into 
existence as something you ought not to have.909  
 
The talking about art—that which put the “Art” into painting—concerned de Kooning 
that evening.910 “The first man who began to speak, whoever he was, must have intended 
it,” he began that night.911 (Like Kleist’s puppeteer, or Newman’s first man who was an 
artist, this first speaker was with his medium.) “If I do paint abstract art, that’s what 
abstract art means to me,” de Kooning concluded, “I frankly do not understand the 
question.”912 Davis gave a more complicated definition of abstract painting (“an Idiom of 
Color-Space Logic…understood as the Universal Free Subject”), but his conclusion was, 
like that of de Kooning, resistant: “[T]here is No Abstract term. My intention is to keep it 
that way.”913  
 Side by side, these are statements of equal weight on the practice of painterly 
freedom. In a previous chapter of this dissertation, I compared latter-day reviews by 
                                                 
909 Willem de Kooning in What Abstract Art Means to Me: Statements by Six American Artists, in Museum 
of Modern Art Bulletin (Spring 1951): 6.  
910 Ibid.  
911 Ibid. 
912 Ibid., 8. Compare this to Denis’ search in 1890 for “a painter’s definition of that simple word ‘nature’” 
See Denis, “Définition du Néo-traditionnisme,” 1. Emphasis in the original in both citations.  
913 Stuart Davis in What Abstract Art Means to Me: Statements by Six American Artists, in Museum of 
Modern Art Bulletin (Spring 1951): 15. 
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Greenberg and Rosenberg on the abstract art of the 1930s. In these reviews, each critic 
pulled out the word “sparkling.” Greenberg used it to describe Davis’ Summer Landscape 
of 1930, even if he thought it a minor canvas of the highest order that worked with “taste 
and personal sensibility inside an area long staked out by Paris” (see fig. 38).914 
Rosenberg used the same word to describe de Kooning’s Untitled of 1931 (see fig. 46). 
De Kooning’s work from the 1930s were, “in their sparkling tightness, Renaissance 
color, and polished surfaces, products of the ascetic discipline that in the thirties served as 
a personal code and a social ideal.”915  The 1951 symposium offered another chance to 
compare their works: their statements were accompanied by Davis’ Hot Still Scape for 
Six Colors of 1940 and de Kooning’s The Mail Box of 1948 (figs. 92 and 93). If the art-
historical question seeks to answer why the 1948 painting succeed more than did the 
1940 in the post-War years, one possible answer is that the de Kooning of 1948 was 
possessed of an appropriate strangeness.  
                                                 
914 Ibid. 
915 Rosenberg, “The Art World: The Thirties,” 208. 
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